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Epistemology of the Closet

The lie, the perfect lie, about people we know, about the relations we have had with them, about our motive for some action, formulated in totally different terms, the lie as to what we are, whom we love, what we feel with regard to people who love us . . . — that lie is one of the few things in the world that can open windows for us on to what is new and unknown, that can awaken in us sleeping senses for the contemplation of universes that otherwise we should never have known.

Proust, The Captive

The epistemology of the closet is not a dated subject or a superseded regime of knowing. While the events of June, 1969, and later vitally reinvigorated many people's sense of the potency, magnetism, and promise of gay self-disclosure, nevertheless the reign of the telling secret was scarcely overturned with Stonewall. Quite the opposite, in some ways. To the fine antennae of public attention the freshness of every drama of (especially involuntary) gay uncovering seems if anything heightened in surprise and delectability, rather than staled, by the increasingly intense atmosphere of public articulations of and about the love that is famous for daring not speak its name. So resilient and productive a structure of narrative will not readily surrender its hold on important forms of social meaning. As D. A. Miller points out in an aegis-creating essay, secrecy can function as

the subjective practice in which the oppositions of private/public, inside/outside, subject/object are established, and the sanctity of their first term kept inviolate. And the phenomenon of the "open secret" does not, as one might think, bring about the collapse of those binarisms and their ideological effects, but rather attests to their fantasmatic recovery.¹

Even at an individual level, there are remarkably few of even the most openly gay people who are not deliberately in the closet with someone

personally or economically or institutionally important to them. Furthermore, the deadly elasticity of heterosexist presumption means that, like Wendy in Peter Pan, people find new walls springing up around them even as they drowse: every encounter with a new classful of students, to say nothing of a new boss, social worker, loan officer, landlord, doctor, erects new closets whose fraught and characteristic laws of optics and physics exact from at least gay people new surveys, new calculations, new draughts and requisitions of secrecy or disclosure. Even an out gay person deals daily with interlocutors about whom she doesn’t know whether they know or not; it is equally difficult to guess for any given interlocutor whether, if they did know, the knowledge would seem very important. Nor—at the most basic level—is it unaccountable that someone who wanted a job, custody or visiting rights, insurance, protection from violence, from “therapy,” from distorting stereotype, from insulting scrutiny, from simple insult, from forcible interpretation of their bodily product, could deliberately choose to remain in or to reenter the closet in some or all segments of their life. The gay closet is not a feature only of the lives of gay people. But for many gay people it is still the fundamental feature of social life; and there can be few gay people, however courageous and forthright by habit, however fortunate in the support of their immediate communities, in whose lives the closet is not still a shaping presence.

To say, as I will be saying here, that the epistemology of the closet has given an overarching consistency to gay culture and identity throughout this century is not to deny that crucial possibilities around and outside the closet have been subject to most consequential change, for gay people. There are risks in making salient the continuity and centrality of the closet, in a historical narrative that does not have as a fulcrum a saving vision—whether located in past or future—of its apocalyptic rupture. A meditation that lacks that particular utopian organization will risk glamorizing the closet itself, if only by default; will risk presenting as inevitable or somehow valuable its exactions, its deformations, its disempowerment and sheer pain. If these risks are worth running, it is partly because the nonutopian traditions of gay writing, thought, and culture have remained so inexhaustibly and gorgeously productive for later gay thinkers, in the absence of a rationalizing or often even of a forgiving reading of their politics. The epistemology of the closet has also been, however, on a far vaster scale and with a less honorific inflection, inexhaustibly productive of modern Western culture and history at large. While that may be reason enough for taking it as a subject of interrogation, it should not be reason enough for focusing scrutiny on those who inhabit the closet (however equivocally) to the exclusion of those in the ambient heterosexist culture who enjoin it and whose intimate representational needs it serves in a way less extortionate to themselves.

I scarcely know at this stage a consistent alternative proceeding, however; and it may well be that, for reasons to be discussed, no such consistency is possible. At least to enlarge the circumference of scrutiny and to vary by some new assays of salutation the angle of its address will be among the methodological projects of this discussion.

In Montgomery County, Maryland, in 1973, an eighth-grade earth science teacher named Acanfora was transferred to a nonteaching position by the Board of Education when they learned he was gay. When Acanfora spoke to news media, such as “60 Minutes” and the Public Broadcasting System, about his situation, he was refused a new contract entirely. Acanfora sued. The federal district court that first heard his case supported the action and rationale of the Board of Education, holding that Acanfora’s recourse to the media had brought undue attention to himself and his sexuality, to a degree that would be deleterious to the educational process. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed. They considered Acanfora’s public disclosures to be protected speech under the First Amendment. Although they overruled the lower court’s rationale, however, the appellate court affirmed its decision not to allow Acanfora to return to teaching. Indeed, they denied his standing to bring the suit in the first place, on the grounds that he had failed to note on his original employment application that he had been, in college, an officer of a student homophile organization—a notation that would, as school officials admitted in court, have prevented his ever being hired. The rationale for keeping Acanfora out of his classroom was thus no longer that he had disclosed too much about his homosexuality, but quite the opposite, that he had not disclosed enough.² The Supreme Court declined to entertain an appeal.

It is striking that each of the two rulings in Acanfora emphasized that
the teacher’s homosexuality “itself” would not have provided an
acceptable ground for denying him employment. Each of the courts relied in its
decision on an implicit distinction between the supposedly protected and
bracketable fact of Acanfora’s homosexuality proper, on the one hand,
and on the other hand his highly vulnerable management of information
about it. So very vulnerable does this latter exercise prove to be, however,
and vulnerable to such a contradictory array of interdictions, that the
space for simply existing as a gay person who is a teacher is in fact
bayoneted through and through, from both sides, by the vectors of a
disclosure at once compulsory and forbidden.

A related incoherence couched in the resonant terms of the distinction
of public from private riddles the contemporary legal space of gay being.
When it refused in 1985 to consider an appeal in Rowland v. Mad River
Local School District, the U.S. Supreme Court let stand the firing of a
bisexual guidance counselor for coming out to some of her colleagues; the
act of coming out was judged not to be highly protected under the First
Amendment because it does not constitute speech on a matter “of public
concern.” It was, of course, only eighteen months later that the same U.S.
Supreme Court ruled, in response to Michael Hardwick’s contention that
it’s nobody’s business if he do, that it ain’t: if homosexuality is not,
however densely adjudicated, to be considered a matter of public
concern, neither in the Supreme Court’s binding opinion does it subsist under the
mantle of the private.3

The most obvious fact about this history of judicial formulations is
that it codifies an excruciating system of double binds, systematically
oppressing gay people, identities, and acts by undermining through
contradictory constraints on discourse the grounds of their very being.
That immediately political recognition may be supplemented, however,
by a historical hypothesis that goes in the other direction. I want to argue
that a lot of the energy of attention and demarcation that has swirled
around issues of homosexuality since the end of the nineteenth century, in
Europe and the United States, has been impelled by the distinctively
indicative relation of homosexuality to wider mappings of secrecy and
disclosure, and of the private and the public, that were and are critically
problematical for the gender, sexual, and economic structures of the
heterosexist culture at large, mappings whose enabling but dangerous
incoherence has become oppressively, durably condensed in certain
figures of homosexuality: “The closet” and “coming out,” now verging on all-
purpose phrases for the potent crossing and recrossing of almost any
politically charged lines of representation, have been the gravest and most
magnetic of those figures.

The closet is the defining structure for gay oppression in this century.
The legal couching, by civil liberties lawyers, of Bowers v. Hardwick as an
issue in the first place of a Constitutional right to privacy, and the liberal
focus in the aftermath of that decision on the image of the bedroom
invaded by policemen—“Letting the Cops Back into Michael Hardwick’s
Bedroom,” the Native headlined—as though political empowerment
were a matter of getting the cops back on the street where they belong and
sexuality back into the impermeable space where it belongs, are among
other things extensions of, and testimony to the power of, the image of the
closet. The durability of the image is perpetuated even as its intelligibility
is challenged in antihomophobic responses like the following, to Hardwick,
addressed to gay readers:

What can you do—alone? The answer is obvious. You’re not alone, and
you can’t afford to try to be. That closet door—never very secure as
protection—is even more dangerous now. You must come out, for your
own sake and for the sake of all of us.5

The image of coming out regularly interfaces the image of the closet, and
its seemingly unambivalent public sitting can be counterposed as a salva-
tional epistemologic certainty against the very equivocal privacy afforded
by the closet: “If every gay person came out to his or her family,” the same
article goes on, “a hundred million Americans could be brought to our
side. Employers and straight friends could mean a hundred million
more.” And yet the Mad River School District’s refusal to hear a woman’s

3. Nan Hunter, director of the ACLU’s Lesbian and Gay Rights Project, analyzed
Rowland in “Homophobia and Academic Freedom,” a talk at the 1986 Modern Language
Association National Convention. There is an interesting analysis of the limitations, for
gay-rights purposes, of both the right of privacy and the First Amendment guarantee of
free speech, whether considered separately or in tandem, in “Notes: The Constitutional
Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification,” Harvard Law
issues that is strikingly apropos of, and useful for, the argument made in Epistemology of
the Closet, see Janet E. Halley, “The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection

coming out as an authentically public speech act is echoed in the frigid response given many acts of coming out: “That’s fine, but why did you think I'd want to know about it?”

Gay thinkers of this century have, as we’ll see, never been blind to the damaging contradictions of this compromised metaphor of in and out of the closet of privacy. But its origins in European culture are, as the writings of Foucault have shown, so ramified—and its relation to the “larger,” i.e., ostensibly nongay-related, topologies of privacy in the culture is, as the figure of Foucault dramatized, so critical, so enfolding, so representational—that the simple vesting of some alternative metaphor has never, either, been a true possibility.

I recently heard someone on National Public Radio refer to the sixties as the decade when Black people came out of the closet. For that matter, I recently gave an MLA talk purporting to explain how it’s possible to come out of the closet of privacy. But its origins in European culture are, as I have indicated, the pairings secrecy/disclosure and private/public. Along with and sometimes through these epistemologically charged pairings, condensed in the figures of “the closet” and “coming out,” this very specific crisis of definition has then inevitably marked other pairings as basic to modern cultural organization as masculine/feminine, majority/minority, innocence/initiation, natural/artificial, new/old, growth/decadence, urbanc/provincial, health/illness, same/different, cognition/paranoia, art/kitsch, sincerity/sentimentality, and voluntarv/addiction. So pervasive has the suffusing stain of homo/heterosexual crisis been that to discuss any of these indices in any context, in the absence of an antihomophobic analysis, must perhaps be to perpetuate unknowingly compulsions implicit in each.

For any modern question of sexuality, knowledge/ignorance is more than merely one in a metonymic chain of such binarisms. The process, narrowly bordered at first in European culture but sharply broadened and accelerated after the late eighteenth century, by which “knowledge” and “sex” become conceptually inseparable from one another—so that knowledge means in the first place sexual knowledge; ignorance, sexual ignorance; and epistemological pressure of any sort seems a force increasingly saturated with sexual impulsion—was sketched in Volume I of Foucault’s History of Sexuality. In a sense, this was a process, protracted almost to retardation, of exfoliating the biblical genesis by which what we now know as sexuality is fruit—apparently the only fruit—to be plucked from the tree of knowledge. Cognition itself, sexuality itself, and transgression itself have always been ready in Western culture to be magnetized into an unyielding though not an unfissured alignment with one another, and the period initiated by Romanticism accomplished this disposition through a remarkably broad confluence of different languages and institutions.

In some texts, such as Diderot’s La Religieuse, that were influential early in this process, the desire that represents sexuality per se, and hence sexual knowledge and knowledge per se, is a same-sex desire. This possibility, however, was repressed with increasing energy, and hence increasing visibility, as the nineteenth-century culture of the individual proceeded to elaborate a version of knowledge/sexuality increasingly structured by its pointed cognitive refusal of sexuality between women, between men. The gradually reifying effect of this refusal meant that by the end of the nineteenth century, when it had become fully current—as obvious to Queen Victoria as to Freud—that knowledge meant sexual knowledge, and secrets sexual secrets, there had in fact developed one particular sexuality that was distinctively constituted as secrecy: the perfect object for the by now insatiably exacerbated epistemological/sexual anxiety of the turn-of-the-century subject. Again, it was a long chain of originally scriptural identifications of a sexuality with a particular cog-

6. A reminder that “the closet” retains (at least the chronic potential of) its gay semantic specification: a media flap in June, 1989, when a Republican National Committee memo calling for House Majority Leader Thomas Foley to “come out of the liberal closet” and comparing his voting record with that of an openly gay Congressman, Barney Frank, was widely perceived (and condemned) as insinuating that Foley himself is gay. The committee’s misjudgment about whether it could maintain deniability for the insinuation is an interesting index to how unpredictably fully or empty of gay specificity this location may be perceived to be.

7. On this, see my “Privilege of Unknowing.”

8. On this, see Between Men.
nitive positioning (in this case, St. Paul's routinely reproduced and reworked denomination of sodomy as the crime whose name is not to be uttered, hence whose accessibility to knowledge is uniquely preterited) that culminated in Lord Alfred Douglas's epochal public utterance, in 1894, "I am the Love that dare not speak its name."9 In such texts as Billy Budd and Dorian Gray and through their influence, the subject—the thematics—of knowledge and ignorance themselves, of innocence and initiation, of secrecy and disclosure, became not contingently but integrally infused with one particular object of cognition: no longer sexuality as a whole but even more specifically, now, the homosexual topic. And the condensation of the world of possibilities surrounding same-sex sexuality—including, shall we say, both gay desires and the most rabid phobias against them—the condensation of this plurality to the homosexual topic that now formed the accusative case of modern processes of personal knowing, was not the least infliction of the turn-of-the-century crisis of sexual definition.

To explore the differences it makes when secrecy itself becomes manifest as this secret, let me begin by twining together in a short anachronistic braid a variety of exemplary narratives—literary, biographical, imaginary—that begin with the moment on July 1, 1986, when the decision in Bowers v. Hardwick was announced, a moment which, sandwiched between a weekend of Gay Pride parades nationwide, the announcement of a vengeful new AIDS policy by the Justice Department, and an upcoming media-riveting long weekend of hilarity or hysteria focused on the national fetishization in a huge hollow blind spike-headed female body of the abstraction Liberty, and occurring in an ambient medium for gay men and their families and friends of wave on wave of renewed loss, mourning, and refreshed personal fear, left many people feeling as if at any rate one's own particular car had finally let go forever of the tracks of the roller coaster.

In many discussions I heard or participated in immediately after the Supreme Court ruling in Bowers v. Hardwick, antihomophobic or gay women and men speculated—more or less empathetically or venomously—about the sexuality of the people most involved with the decision. The question kept coming up, in different tones, of what it could have felt like to be a closeted gay court assistant, or clerk, or justice, who might have had some degree, even a very high one, of instrumentality in conceiving or formulating or "refining" or logistically facilitating this ruling, these ignominious majority opinions, the assaultive sentences in which they were framed.

That train of painful imaginings was fraught with the epistemological distinctiveness of gay identity and gay situation in our culture. Vibrantly resonant as the image of the closet is for many modern oppressions, it is indicative for homophobia in a way it cannot be for other oppressions. Racism, for instance, is based on a stigma that is visible in all but exceptional cases (cases that are neither rare nor irrelevant, but that delineate the outlines rather than coloring the center of racial experience); so are the oppressions based on gender, age, size, physical handicap. Ethnic/cultural/religious oppressions such as anti-Semitism are more analogous in that the stigmatized individual has at least notionally some discretion—although, importantly, it is never to be taken for granted how much—over other people's knowledge of her or his membership in the group: one could "come out as" a Jew or Gypsy, in a heterogeneous urbanized society, much more intelligibly than one could typically "come out as," say, female, Black, old, a wheelchair user, or fat. A (for instance) Jewish or Gypsy identity, and hence a Jewish or Gypsy secrecy or closet, would nonetheless differ again from the distinctive gay versions of these things in its clear ancestral linearity and answerability, in the roots (however tortuous and ambivalent) of cultural identification through each individual's originary culture of (at a minimum) the family.

Proust, in fact, insistently suggests as a sort of limit-case of one kind of coming out precisely the drama of Jewish self-identification, embodied in the Book of Esther and in Racine's recasting of it that is quoted throughout the "Sodom and Gomorrah" books of A la recherche. The story of Esther seems a model for a certain simplified but highly potent imagining of coming out and its transformative potential. In concealing her Judaism from her husband, King Assuérus (Ahasuerus), Esther the Queen feels she is concealing, simply, her identity: "The King is to this day unaware who I am,"10 Esther's deception is made necessary by the powerful ideology that makes Assuérus categorize her people as unclean ("cette source impure [1039]) and an abomination against nature ("Il nous croit en horreur à toute la nature" [174]). The sincere, relatively abstract Jew-hatred of this


10. Jean Racine, Esther, ed. H. R. Roach (London: George G. Harrap, 1949), line 89, my translation. Further citations of this play will be noted by line number in the text.
fuddled but omnipotent king undergoes constant stimulation from the
grandiose cynicism of his advisor Aman (Haman), who dreams of an
entire planet exemplarily cleansed of the perverse element.

I want it said one day in awestruck centuries:
"There once used to be Jews, there was an insolent race;
widespread, they used to cover the whole face of the earth;
a single one dared draw on himself the wrath of Aman,
at once they disappeared, every one, from the earth."

The king acquiesces in Aman's genocidal plot, and Esther is told by her
cousin, guardian, and Jewish conscience Mardochee (Mordecai) that the
time for her revelation has come; at this moment the particular operation
of suspense around her would be recognizable to any gay person who has
inched toward coming out to homophobic parents. "And if I perish, I
perish," she says in the Bible (Esther 4:16). That the avowal of her secret
identity will have an immense potency is clear, is the premise of the story.
All that remains to be seen is whether under its explosive pressure the
king's "political" animus against her kind will demolish his "personal" love
for her, or vice versa: will he declare her as good as, or better, dead? Or
will he soon be found at a neighborhood bookstore, hoping not to be
recognized by the salesperson who is ringing up his copy of
Loving Someone Jewish?

The biblical story and Racimian play, bearable to read in their balance
of the holocaustal with the intimate only because one knows how the story
will end, are enactments of a particular dream or fantasy of coming out.
Esther's eloquence, in the event, is resisted by only five lines of her
utterance of these blank syllables, making the weight of Assuerus's power­
ning suddenly audible — not least to him — in the same register as
the dull Assuerus in all his imperial ineloquent bathos of unknowing:
[1032]). "What people?" indeed — why, as it oddly happens, the very people whose
eradication he personally is just on the point of effecting. But only with the
utterance of these blank syllables, making the weight of Assuerus's powerful
ignorance suddenly audible — not least to him — in the same register as
the weight of Esther's and Mardochee's private knowledge, can any open
flow of power become possible. It is here that Aman begins to tremble.

Just so with coming out: it can bring about the revelation of a powerful
unknowing as unknowing, not as a vacuum or as the blank it can pretend
to be but as a weighty and occupied and consequential epistemological
space. Esther's avowal allows Assuerus to make visible two such spaces at
once: "You?" "What people?" He has been blindly presuming about herself, and simply blind to the race to whose extinction he has pledged

11. It is worth remembering, of course, that the biblical story still ends with mass
slaughter: while Racine's king revokes his orders (1197), the biblical king reverses his
(Esther 8:5), licensing the Jews' killing of "seventy and five thousand" (9:16) of their
enemies, including children and women (8:11).

12. In Voltaire's words, "un roi insensé qui a passé six mois avec sa femme sans savoir,
sans s'informer même qui elle est" (in Racine, Esther, pp. 83–84).
I moments of phobic oppression; these go back to the important differences between closet. The clerk’s authority to describe her or his own-sexuality might well be impeached; the avowal might well only further perturb an already "personal" and "political" realms, nor does it require us to deny how potential is to be looked for.

Even in the "Sodom and Gomorrah" books of Proust, after all, and Jewish (here I mean Racinian-Jewish) and gay identity and oppression. There is another whole family of reasons why too long a lingering on moments of Esther-style avowal must misrepresent the truths of homophobic oppression; these go back to the important differences between Jewish (here I mean Racinian-Jewish) and gay identity and oppression. Even in the "Sodom and Gomorrah" books of Proust, after all, and especially in La Prisonnière, where Esther is so insistently invoked, the play does not offer an efficacious model of transformative revelation. To the contrary: La Prisonnière is, notably, the book whose Racine-quoting hero has the most disastrous incapacity either to come out or to be come out to.

The suggested closeted Supreme Court clerk who struggled with the possibility of a self-revelation that might perceptibly strengthen gay sisters and brothers, but would radically endanger at least the foreseen course of her or his own life, would have an imagination filled with possibilities beyond those foreseen by Esther in her moment of risk. It is these possibilities that mark the distinctive structures of the epistemology of the closet. The clerk’s authority to describe her or his own sexuality might well be impeached; the avowal might well only further perturb an already stirred-up current of the open secret; the avowal might well represent an aggression against someone with whom the clerk felt, after all, a real bond; the nongay-identified Justice might well feel too shaken in her or his own self-perception, or in the perception of the bond with the clerk, to respond with anything but an increased rigor; the clerk might well, through the avowal, be getting dangerously into the vicinity of the explosive-mined closet of a covertly gay Justice; the clerk might well fear being too isolated or self-doubting to be able to sustain the consequences of the avowal; the intersection of gay revelation with underlying gender expectations might well be too confusing or disorienting, for one or the other, to provide an intelligible basis for change.

To spell these risks and circumscriptions out more fully in the comparison with Esther:

1. Although neither the Bible nor Racine indicates in what, if any, religious behaviors or beliefs Esther's Jewish identity may be manifested, there is no suggestion that that identity might be a debatable, a porous, a mutable fact about her. "Esther, my lord, had a Jew for her father" (1033)—ergo, Esther is a Jew. Taken aback though he is by this announcement, Assuerus does not suggest that Esther is going through a phase, or is just angry at Gentiles, or could change if she only loved him enough to get counseling. Nor do such undermining possibilities occur to Esther. The Jewish identity in this play—whatever it may consist of in real life in a given historical context—has a solidity whose very unequivocalness grounds the story of Esther's equivocation and her subsequent self-disclosure. In the processes of gay self-disclosure, by contrast, in a twentieth-century context, questions of authority and evidence can be the first to arise. "How do you know you're really gay? Why be in such a hurry to jump to conclusions? After all, what you're saying is only based on a few feelings, not real actions [or alternatively: on a few actions, not necessarily your real feelings]; hadn't you better talk to a therapist and find out?" Such responses—and their occurrence in the people coming out to can seem a belated echo of their occurrence in the person coming out—reveal how problematical at present is the very concept of gay identity, as well as how intensely it is resisted and how far authority over its definition has been distanced from the gay subject her- or himself.

2. Esther expects Assuerus to be altogether surprised by her self-disclosure; and he is. Her confident sense of control over other people’s knowledge about her is in contrast to the radical uncertainty closeted gay people are likely to feel about who is in control of information about their sexual identity. This has something to do with a realism about secrets that is greater in most people’s lives than it is in Bible stories; but it has much more to do with complications in the notion of gay identity, so that no one person can take control over all the multiple, often contradictory codes by which information about sexual identity and activity can seem to be conveyed. In many, if not most, relationships, coming out is a matter of
crystallizing intuitions or convictions that had been in the air for a while already and had already established their own power-circuits of silent contempt, silent blackmail, silent glamorization, silent complicity. After all, the position of those who think they know something about one that one may not know oneself is an excited and empowered one—whether what they think one doesn’t know is that one somehow is homosexual, or merely that one’s supposed secret is known to them. The glass closet can license insult (“I’d never have said those things if I’d known you were gay!”—yeah, sure); it can also license far warmer relations, but (and) relations whose potential for exploitiveness is built into the optics of the asymmetrical, the specularized, and the inexplicit. 13 There are sunny and apparently simplifying versions of coming out under these circumstances: a woman painfully decides to tell her mother that she’s a lesbian, and her mother responds, “Yeah, I sort of thought you might be when you and Joan started sleeping together ten years ago.” More often this fact makes the closet and its exits not more but less straightforward, however; not, often, more equable, but more volatile or even violent. Living in and hence coming out of the closet are never matters of the purely hermetic; the personal and political geographies to be surveyed here are instead the more imponderable and convulsive ones of the open secret.

3. Esther worries that her revelation might destroy her or fail to help her people, but it does not seem to her likely to damage Assuérus, and it does not indeed damage him. When gay people in a homophobic society come out, on the other hand, perhaps especially to parents or spouses, it is with the consciousness of a potential for serious injury that is likely to go in both directions. The pathogenic secret itself, even, can circulate contagiously as a secret: a mother says that her adult child’s coming out of the closet with her has plunged her, in turn, into the closet in her conservative community. In fantasy, though not in fantasy only, against the fear of being killed or wished dead by (say) one’s parents in such a revelation there is apt to recoil the often more intensely imagined possibility of its killing them. There is no guarantee that being under threat from a double-edged weapon is a more powerful position than getting the ordinary axe, but it is certain to be more destabilizing.

4. The inert substance of Assuérus seems to have no definitional involvement with the religious/ethnic identity of Esther. He sees neither himself nor their relationship differently when he sees that she is different from what he had thought her. The double-edged potential for injury in the scene of gay coming out, by contrast, results partly from the fact that the erotic identity of the person who receives the disclosure is apt also to be implicated in, hence perturbed by it. This is true first and generally because erotic identity, of all things, is never to be circumscribed simply as itself, can never not be relational, is never to be perceived or known by anyone outside of a structure of transference and countertransference. Second and specifically it is true because the incoherences and contradictions of homosexual identity in twentieth-century culture are responsive to and hence evocative of the incoherences and contradictions of compulsory heterosexuality.

5. There is no suggestion that Assuérus might himself be a Jew in disguise. But it is entirely within the experience of gay people to find that a homophobic figure in power has, if anything, a disproportionate likelihood of being gay and closeted. Some examples and implications of this are discussed toward the end of Chapter 5; there is more to this story. Let it stand here merely to demonstrate again that gay identity is a convoluted and off-centering possession if it is a possession at all; even to come out does not end anyone’s relation to the closet, including turbulently the closet of the other.

6. Esther knows who her people are and has an immediate answerability to them. Unlike gay people, who seldom grow up in gay families; who are exposed to their culture’s, if not their parents’, high ambient homophobia long before either they or those who care for them know that they are among those who most urgently need to define themselves against it; who have with difficulty and always belatedly to patch together from fragments a community, a usable heritage, a politics of survival or resistance; unlike these, Esther has intact and to hand the identity and history and commitments she was brought up in, personified and legitimated in a visible figure of authority, her guardian Mardochee.

7. Correspondingly, Esther’s avowal occurs within and perpetuates a coherent system of gender subordination. Nothing is more explicit, in the Bible, about Esther’s marriage than its origin in a crisis of patriarchy and its value as a preservative of female discipline. When the Gentile Vashti, her predecessor as Ahasuerus’s queen, had refused to be put on exhibition to his drunk men friends, “the wise men, which knew the times,” saw that

Vashti the queen hath not done wrong to the king only, but also to all the princes, and to all the people that are in all the provinces of the king

13. On this, see “Privilege of Unknowing,” esp. p. 120.
Ahaseurus. For this deed of the queen shall come abroad unto all women, so that they shall despise their husbands in their eyes, when it shall be reported.

(Esther 1:13–17)

Esther the Jew is introduced onto this scene as a salvific ideal of female submissiveness, her single moment of risk with the king given point by her customary pliancy. (Even today, Jewish little girls are educated in gender roles—fondness for being looked at, fearlessness in defense of “their people,” nonsolidarity with their sex—through masquerading as Queen Esther at Purim; I have a snapshot of myself at about five, barefoot in the pretty “Queen Esther” dress my grandmother made [white satin, gold spangles], making a careful eyes-down toe-pointed curtsey at [presumably] my father, who is manifest in the picture only as the flashgun that hurls my shadow, pillaring up tall and black, over the dwarfed sofa onto the wall behind me.) Moreover, the literal patriarchism that makes coming out to parents the best emotional analogy to Esther’s self-disclosure to her husband is shown with unusual clarity to function through the male traffic in women: Esther’s real mission, as a wife, is to get her guardian Mardochee installed in place of Aman as the king’s favorite and advisor. And the instability and danger that by contrast lurk in the Gentile Aman’s relation to the king seem, Iago-like, to attach to the inadequate heterosexual buffering of the inexplicit intensities between them. If the story of Esther reflects a firm Jewish choice of a minority politics based on a conservative reinscription of gender roles, however, such a choice has never been able to be made intelligibly by gay people in a modern culture (although there have been repeated attempts at making it, especially by men). Instead, both within and outside of homosexual-rights movements, the contradictory understandings of same-sex bonding and desire and of male and female gay identity have crossed and recrossed the definitional lines of gender identity with such disruptive frequency that the concepts “minority” and “gender” themselves have lost a good deal of their categorizing (though certainly not of their performative) force.

Each of these complicating possibilities stems at least partly from the plurality and the cumulative incoherence of modern ways of conceptualizing same-sex desire and, hence, gay identity; an incoherence that answers, too, to the incoherence with which heterosexual desire and identity are conceptualized. A long, populous theoretical project of interrogating and historicizing the self-evidence of the pseudo-symmetrical opposition homosexual/heterosexual (or gay/straight) as categories of persons will be assumed rather than summarized here. Foucault among other historians locates in about the nineteenth century a shift in European thought from viewing same-sex sexuality as a matter of prohibited and isolated genital acts (acts to which, in that view, anyone might be liable who did not have their appetites in general under close control) to viewing it as a function of stable definitions of identity (so that one’s personality structure might mark one as a homosexual, even, perhaps, in the absence of any genital activity at all). Thus, according to Alan Bray, “To talk of an individual [in the Renaissance] as being or not being ‘a homosexual’ is an anachronism and ruinously misleading,” whereas the period stretching roughly between Wilde and Proust was prodigally productive of attempts to name, explain, and define this new kind of creature, the homosexual person—a project so urgent that it spawned in its rage of distinction an even newer category, that of the heterosexual person.

To question the natural self-evidence of this opposition between gay and straight as distinct kinds of persons is not, however, as we saw in the Introduction, to dismantle it. Perhaps no one should wish it to do so; substantial groups of women and men under this representational regime have found that the nominative category “homosexual,” or its more recent near-synonyms, does have a real power to organize and describe their experience of their own sexuality and identity, enough at any rate to make their self-application of it (even when only tacit) worth the enormous accompanying costs. If only for this reason, the categorization commands respect. And even more at the level of groups than of individuals, the durability of any politics or ideology that would be so much as permissive of same-sex sexuality has seemed, in this century, to depend on a definition of homosexual persons as a distinct, minority population, however produced or labeled. Far beyond any cognitively or politically enabling effects on the people whom it claims to describe, moreover, the nominative category of “the homosexual” has robustly failed to disintegrate under the pressure of decade after decade, battery after battery of deconstructive exposure—evidently not in the first place because of its meaningfulness to those whom it defines but because of its indispensability to those who define themselves as against it.

For surely, if paradoxically, it is the paranoid insistence with which the
definitional barriers between "the homosexual" (minority) and "the heterosexual" (majority) are fortified, in this century, by nonhomosexuals, and especially by men against men, that most saps one's ability to believe in "the homosexual" as an unproblematically discrete category of persons. Even the homophobic fifties folk wisdom of Tea and Sympathy detects that the man who most electrifies those barriers is the one whose own current is at most intermittently direct. It was in the period of the so-called "invention of the 'homosexual'" that Freud gave psychological texture and credibility to a countervalent, universalizing mapping of this territory, based on the supposed protean mobility of sexual desire and on the potential bisexuality of every human creature; a mapping that implies no presumption that one's sexual penchant will always incline toward persons of a single gender, and that offers, additionally, a richly de-naturalizing description of the psychological motives and mechanisms of male paranoid, projective homophobic definition and enforcement.

Freud's antiminoritizing account only gained, moreover, in influence by being articulated through a developmental narrative in which heterosexist and masculinist ethical sanctions found ready camouflage. If the new common wisdom that hotly overt homophobes are men who are "insecure about their masculinity" supplements the implausible, necessary illusion that there could be a secure version of masculinity (known, presumably, by the coolness of its homophobic enforcement) and a stable, intelligible way for men to feel about other men in modern heterosexual capitalist patriarchy, what tighter turn could there be to the screw of an already off-center, always at fault, endlessly blackmailable male identity ready to be manipulated into any labor of channeled violence? 17

It remained for work emerging from the later feminist and gay movements to begin to clarify why the male paranoid project had become so urgent in the maintenance of gender subordination; and it remained for a stunningly efficacious coup of feminist redefinition to transform lesbianism, in a predominant view, from a matter of female virilization to one of woman-identification. 18 Although the post-Stonewall, predominantly male gay liberation movement has had a more distinct political presence than radical lesbianism and has presented potent new images of gay people and gay communities, along with a stirring new family of narrative structures attached to coming out, it has offered few new analytic facilities for the question of homo/heterosexual definition prior to the moment of individual coming out. That has not, indeed, been its project. In fact, except for a newly productive interest in historicizing gay definition itself, the array of analytic tools available today to anyone thinking about issues of homo/heterosexual definition is remarkably little enriched from that available to, say, Proust. Of the strange plethora of "explanatory" schemas newly available to Proust and his contemporaries, especially in support of minoritizing views, some have been superseded, forgotten, or rendered by history too unpalatable to be appealed to explicitly. (Many of the supposedly lost ones do survive, if not in sexological terminology, then in folk wisdom and "commonsense." One is never surprised, either, when they reemerge under new names on the Science page of the Times; the men-women of Sodom matriculate as the "sissy boys" of Yale University Press.) 19 But there are few new entries. Most moderately to well-educated Western people in this century seem to share a similar understanding of homosexual definition, independent of whether they themselves are gay or straight, homophobic or antihomophobic. That understanding is close to what Proust's probably was, what for that matter mine is and probably yours. That is to say, it is organized around a radical and irreducible incoherence. It holds the minoritizing view that there is a distinct population of persons who "really are" gay; at the same time, it holds the universalizing views that sexual desire is an unpredictably powerful solvent of stable identities; that apparently heterosexual persons and object choices are strongly marked by same-sex influences and desires, and vice versa for apparently homosexual ones; and that at least male heterosexual identity and modern masculinist culture may require for their maintenance the scapegoating crystallization of a same-sex male desire that is widespread and in the first place internal. 20

17. For a fuller discussion of this, see Chapter 4.
19. I'm referring here to the publicity given to Richard Green's The "Sissy Boy Syndrome" and the Development of Homosexuality on its 1987 publication. The intensely stereotypical, homophobic journalism that appeared on the occasion seemed to be legitimated by the book itself, which seemed, in turn, to be legitimated by the status of Yale University Press itself.
20. Anyone who imagines that this perception is confined to antihomophobes should listen, for instance, to the college football coach's ritualistic scapegoating and abjection of his team's "sissy" (or worse) personality traits. D. A. Miller's "Cage aux folies: Sensation and Gender in Wilkie Collins's The Woman in White" (in his The Novel and the Police, pp. 146-91, esp. pp. 186-90) makes especially forcefully the point (oughtn't it always to have been obvious?) that this whole family of perceptions is if anything less distinctively the property of cultural criticism than of cultural enforcement.
It has been the project of many, many writers and thinkers of many different kinds to adjudicate between the minoritizing and universalizing views of sexual definition and to resolve this conceptual incoherence. With whatever success, on their own terms, they have accomplished the project, none of them has budged in one direction or other the absolute hold of this yoking of contradictory views on modern discourse. A higher valuation on the transformative and labile play of desire, a higher valuation on gay identity and gay community: neither of these, nor their opposite, often far more potent depreciations, seems to get any purchase on the stranglehold of the available and ruling paradigm-clash. And this incoherence has prevailed for at least three-quarters of a century. Sometimes, but not always, it has taken the form of a confrontation or nonconfrontation between politics and theory. A perfect example of this potent incoherence was the anomalous legal situation of gay people and acts in this country after one recent legal ruling. The Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick notoriously left the individual states free to prohibit any acts they wish to define as “sodomy,” by whomsoever performed, with no fear at all of impinging on any rights, and particularly privacy rights, safeguarded by the Constitution; yet only shortly thereafter a panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled (in Sergeant Perry J. Watkins v. United States Army) that homosexual persons, as a particular kind of person, are entitled to Constitutional protections under the Equal Protection clause. To be gay in this system is to come under the radically overlapping aegises of a universalizing discourse of acts and a minoritizing discourse of persons. Just at the moment, at least within the discourse of law, the former of these prohibits what the latter of them protects; but in the concurrent public-health constructions related to AIDS, for instance, it is far from clear that a minoritizing discourse of persons (“risk groups”) is not even more oppressive than the competing, universalizing discourse of acts (“safer sex”). In the double binds implicit in the space overlapped by the two, at any rate, every matter of definitional control is fraught with consequence.

The energy-expensive but apparently static clinch between minoritizing and universalizing views of homo/heterosexual definition is not, either, the only major conceptual siege under which modern homosexual and heterosexist fates are enacted. The second one, as important as the first and intimately entangled with it, has to do with defining the relation to gender of homosexual persons and same-sex desires. (It was in this conceptual register that the radical-feminist reframing of lesbianism as woman-identification was such a powerful move.) Enduringly since at least the turn of the century, there have presided two contradictory tropes of gender through which same-sex desire could be understood. On the one hand there was, and there persists, differently coded (in the homophobic folklore and science surrounding those “sissy boys” and their manish sisters, but also in the heart and guts of much living gay and lesbian culture), the trope of inversion, anima muliebris in corpore virili inclusa—“a woman’s soul trapped in a man’s body”—and vice versa. As such writers as Christopher Craft have made clear, one vital impulse of this trope is the preservation of an essential heterosexuality within desire itself, through a particular reading of the homosexuality of persons: desire, in this view, by definition subsists in the current that runs between one male self and one female self, in whatever sex of bodies these selves may be manifested. Proust was not the first to demonstrate—not, for that matter, was the Shakespeare of the comedies—that while these attributions of “true” “inner” heterogender may be made to stick, in a haphazard way, so long as dyads of people are all that are in question, the broadening of view to include any larger circuit of desire must necessarily reduce the inversion or liminality trope to a choreography of breathless farce. Not a jot the less for that has the trope of inversion remained a fixture of modern discourse of same-sex desire; indeed, under the banners of androgyny or, more graphically, “genderfuck,” the dizzying instability of this model has itself become a token of value.

Charged as it may be with value, the persistence of the inversion trope has been yoked, however, to that of its contradictory counterpart, the trope of gender separatism. Under this latter view, far from its being of the essence of desire to cross boundaries of gender, it is instead the most natural thing in the world that people of the same gender, people grouped together under the single most determinative diacritical mark of social organization, people whose economic, institutional, emotional, physical needs and knowledges may have so much in common, should bond together also on the axis of sexual desire. As the substitution of the phrase “woman-identified woman” for “lesbian” suggests, as indeed does the

21. When Watkins's reinstatement in the army was supported by the full Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in a 1989 ruling, however, it was on narrower grounds.

concept of the continuum of male or female homosocial desire, this trope tends to reabsorb or assimilate to one another identification and desire, where inversion models, by contrast, depend on their distinctness. Gender-separatist models would place the man-loving woman and the man-loving man each at the "natural" defining center of their own gender, again in contrast to inversion models that locate gay people—whether biologically or culturally—at the threshold between genders (see Figure 2).

The immanence of each of these models throughout the history of modern gay definition is clear from the early split in the German homosexual rights movement between Magnus Hirschfeld, founder (in 1897) of the Scientific-Humanitarian Committee, a believer in the "third sex" who posited, in Don Mager's paraphrase, "an exact equation . . . between cross-gender behaviors and homosexual desire"; and Benedict Friedländer, co-founder (in 1902) of the Community of the Special, who concluded to the contrary "that homosexuality was the highest, most perfect evolutionary stage of gender differentiation."23 As James Steakley explains, "the true typus inversus," according to this latter argument, "as distinct from the effeminate homosexual, was seen as the founder of patriarchal society and ranked above the heterosexual in terms of his capacity for leadership and heroism."24

Like the dynamic impasse between minoritizing and universalizing views of homosexual definition, that between transitive and separatist tropes of homosexual gender has its own complicated history, an especially crucial one for any understanding of modern gender asymmetry, oppression, and resistance. One thing that does emerge with clarity from this complex and contradictory map of sexual and gender definition is that the possible grounds to be found there for alliance and cross-identification among various groups will also be plural. To take the issue of gender definition alone: under a gender-separatist topos, lesbians have looked for identifications and alliances among women in general, including straight women (as in Adrienne Rich’s "lesbian continuum" model); and gay men, as in Friedländer's model—or more recent "male liberation" models—of masculinity, might look for them among men in general, including straight men. "The erotic and social presumption of women is our enemy," Friedländer wrote in his "Seven Theses on Homosexuality" (1908).25 Under a topos of gender inversion or liminality, in contrast, gay men have looked to identify with straight women (on the grounds that they are also "feminine" or also desire men), or with lesbians (on the grounds that they occupy a similarly liminal position); while lesbians have analogously looked to identify with gay men or, though this latter identification has not been strong since second-wave feminism, with straight men. (Of course, the political outcomes of all these trajectories of potential identification have been radically, often violently, shaped by differential historical forces, notably homophobia and sexism.) Note, however, that this schematization over "the issue of gender definition alone" also does impinge on the issue of homo/heterosexual definition, as well, and in an unexpectedly chiasmic way. Gender-separatist models like Rich's or Friedländer's seem to tend toward universalizing understandings of homo/heterosexual potential. To the degree that gender-integrative inversion or liminality models, such as Hirschfeld's "third-sex" model, suggest an alliance or identity between lesbians and gay men, on the other hand, they tend toward gay-separatist, minoritizing models of specifically gay identity and politics. Steakley makes a useful series of comparisons between Hirschfeld's Scientific-Humanitarian Committee and Friedländer's Com-

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25. Steakley, The Homosexual Emancipation Movement in Germany, p. 68.
munity of the Special: "Within the homosexual emancipation movement there was a deep factionalization between the Committee and the Community. . . . [T]he Committee was an organization of men and women, whereas the Community was exclusively male. . . . The Committee called homosexuals a third sex in an effort to win the basic rights accorded the other two; the Community scorned this as a beggarly plea for mercy and touted the notion of supervirile bisexuality."  

26 These crossings are quite contingent, however; Freud's universalizing understanding of sexual definition seems to go with an integrative, inversion model of gender definition, for instance. And, more broadly, the routes to be taken across this misleadingly symmetrical map are fractured in a particular historical situation by the profound asymmetries of gender oppression and heterosexist oppression.

Like the effect of the minoritizing/universalizing impasse, in short, that of the impasse of gender definition must be seen first of all in the creation of a field of intractable, highly structured discursive incoherence at a crucial node of social organization, in this case the node at which any gender is discriminated. I have no optimism at all about the availability of a standpoint of thought from which either question could be intelligibly, never mind efficaciously, adjudicated, given that the same yoking of contradictions has presided over all the thought on the subject, and all its violent and pregnant modern history, that has gone to form our own thought. Instead, the more promising project would seem to be a study of the incoherent dispensation itself, the indissoluble girdle of incongruities under whose discomfiting span, for most of a century, have unfolded both the most generative and the most murderous plots of our culture.