Chapter 31

Influence and Leadership

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Leaders are agents of influence. When people are influenced it is often because of effective leadership. Influence and leadership are thus tightly intertwined, phenomenologically and conceptually. Influence and leadership are also two of the most fundamental and thoroughly researched topics in social psychology. In one of the most widely cited definitions of social psychology, social psychology *is* the study of influence: "The scientific investigation of how the thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of individuals are influenced by the actual, imagined or implied presence of others" (Allport, 1954, p. 5). And the topic of leadership is so enormous and popular that Goethals, Sorenson, and Burns's (2004) *Encyclopedia of Leadership* ran to four volumes, 1,927 pages, 1.2 million words, and 373 substantive (1,000- to 6,000-word) entries written by 311 scholars.

Clearly, writing a handbook chapter that does justice to these two topics in isolation, let alone in conjunction, is a significant challenge. In taking on this challenge, it was immediately obvious that a comprehensive and in-depth coverage of over a century of research would be impossible. Instead, this chapter is organized around a particular perspective on influence and leadership. The most widespread and enduring forms of social influence rest on conformity to self-relevant group norms, in which norms are configured by normative conflict within and between groups and among majorities, minorities and factions. Furthermore, norms are often embodied by individuals who thus functionally occupy leadership positions in groups.

This perspective privileges the role of group and intergroup processes and representations in the explanation of influence (cf. Turner, 1991) and leadership (cf. Chemers, 1997). Other aspects of influence and leadership are dealt with elsewhere in this handbook. Albarracín and Vargas (volume 1) cover dynamics of interpersonal persuasion as attitude change; Gruenfeld and Tiedens discuss organizations and hierarchy; Yzerbyt and Demoulin cover intergroup relations; De Dreu discusses conflict, cooperation, and negotiation; Wood and Eagly (volume 1) discuss gender and leadership; and Fiske discusses status, power, and oppression.

This chapter opens with a brief discussion of processes of compliance, persuasion, and obedience, mainly to contrast the more group- and conformity-oriented focus of the body of the chapter. Next, the nature of group norms is discussed—what they look like, how they develop and change, and how people can determine the appropriate self-relevant norm of a group they feel they belong to. This is followed by a discussion of majority influence and conformity. Because the behavior of a majority of people in a particular context is often a powerful indication of what is normative, there are strong pressures to conform to the majority. However, some people remain independent and some contexts encourage independence. How can that happen? The fact of resistance to majority influence invites the more far-reaching question of how an individual or minority can sway the majority and produce a genuine normative change: the issue of minority influence and social change. This leads smoothly into the topic of leadership. A group that is mobilized to pursue social change or, less extremely, to forge new normative goals and practices usually coalesces around a leader who acts as the focus of influence for the group, defining its goals and motivating group members to internalize them and work together for their achievement.

INFLUENCE, LEADERSHIP, AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

A notable feature of influence and leadership research is that although leadership is clearly an influence phenomenon, social psychologists have tended to study the two phenomena relatively separately, with influence researchers and leadership researchers inhabiting relatively separate scientific universes. This has not always been the case. For example, the study of social influence processes and leadership were more closely interwoven during the heyday of small groups research in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s

(e.g., Cartwright & Zander, 1953; Festinger, Schachter, & Back, 1950; Lewin, 1947; Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star, & Williams, 1949; see Shaw, 1976). Another example is Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford's (1950) classic study of the authoritarian personality that linked influence, albeit through psychodynamic processes, to reverence for and subservience to powerful leadership.

As social psychology matured and research activity exploded in the 1960s, the inevitable specialization focused researchers on influence *or* leadership rather than both. Then in the early 1970s, there was a well-publicized crisis of confidence in social psychology among some social psychologists (e.g., Elms, 1975; Strickland, Aboud & Gergen, 1976); among many concerns, one was that social psychological theories and methods were unsophisticated and fell far short of those developed in cognitive psychology. Although social psychology had always had a cognitive focus, one response to this critique was the rise of modern social cognition, which has had an enormous and some would say transformational impact on the discipline (e.g., Devine, Hamilton, & Ostrom, 1994; Fiske & Taylor, 2008). Another concern was that social psychology was no longer social enough, in the sense that it focused too much on individuals and interpersonal interaction and paid too little attention to large-scale social phenomena (e.g., Taylor & Brown, 1979). This concern underpinned the development of a European agenda for social psychology (Tajfel, 1984) that focused on intergroup relations, social representations, minority influence, and social identity processes.

Leadership

A correlate and consequence of all this was a dramatic shift of research interest and activity away from interactive small group processes including leadership (see Abrams & Hogg, 1998; Moreland, Hogg, & Hains, 1994; Wittenbaum & Moreland, 2008). Some scholars were led to the pessimistic conclusion that social psychology no longer studied small interactive groups (e.g., Steiner, 1974, 1986), and others to note that the study of group processes including leadership was alive and well but outside social psychology, in the organizational sciences (e.g., Sanna & Parks, 1997; Tindale & Anderson, 1998).

Regarding leadership, this is indeed true. Fiedler's (1964, 1967) contingency theory of leadership promoted substantial research in social psychology, but can in many ways be considered the high tide mark of significant social psychological interest in leadership. For example, although the first three editions of *The Handbook of Social Psychology* (in 1954, 1969, and 1985) had chapters on leadership, culminating in Hollander's (1985) chapter on leadership and power; the fourth edition (Gilbert, Fiske, & Lindzey, 1998)

did not. There are three other more recent social psychology handbooks, of which Hogg and Cooper's *The SAGE handbook of Social Psychology* (2003) also had no chapter on leadership. However, Kruglanski and Higgins's (2007) second edition of *Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles* did have a chapter on leadership (Hogg, 2007a), and Hogg and Tindale's (2001) *Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology: Group Processes* had two chapters on leadership (Chemers, 2001; Lord, Brown, & Harvey, 2001).

The study of leadership has a natural home in the organizational and management sciences. In the world of work, people's careers and prosperity hinge on securing leadership positions, becoming a member of the senior management team and perhaps ultimately the chief executive officer (CEO), and organizational success and societal prosperity rest heavily on effective organizational leadership. Although social psychology largely turned its back on leadership, leadership research has thrived and expanded exponentially in the organizational and management sciences. In recent years, however, social psychology has become notably more interested in leadership; as part of a revival in interest in small interactive group processes (Wittenbaum & Moreland, 2008) and a group perspective on leadership (e.g., Chemers, 1997, 2001), and as a development of research on power (e.g., Fiske & Dépret, 1996), gender (e.g., Eagly & Carli, 2007; Eagly & Karau, 2002; Eagly, Karau, & Makhijani, 1995), social cognition and social perception (e.g., Lord, Brown, & Harvey, 2001; Lord & Hall, 2003), and social identity and intergroup relations (e.g., Hogg, 2001; Hogg & Van Knippenberg, 2003).

Influence

What about social influence? Social psychology has continued to research social influence processes. Given the centrality of the phenomenon of influence to the definition of social psychology, this is not surprising. However, this research on influence takes many different forms and perspectives that are often somewhat isolated from one another. For example, one strand of research focuses on the social cognition of attitude change as a consequence of influence, rather than on influence itself (e.g., Chaiken, 1987; Eagly & Chaiken, 1984, 1993). The Yale attitude change program has provided another, classic line of research with a more practical and applied orientation—studying attitude change to understand theory and techniques of propaganda and mass transformation of attitudes (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953; Hovland, Lumsdaine, & Sheffield, 1949).

Another significant focus is on interpersonal persuasion—the psychology of getting someone to comply with requests (e.g., Burger, 1986; see Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004) or

obey commands (e.g., Milgram, 1963, 1974; see Martin & Hewstone, 2003). Persuasion and attitude change have also been a focus of minority influence researchers who describe social cognitive processes and behavioral strategies and techniques that enable minorities to change the attitudes and practices of the majority (e.g., Moscovici, 1980; Mugny & Pérez, 1991; see Martin & Hewstone, 2008).

One of the best known approaches to influence focuses on how behavioral norms develop and change (e.g., Sherif, 1935, 1936) and on the processes whereby an individual is influenced by or remains independent of the normative behavior of a numerical majority (e.g., Asch, 1956; also see Allen, 1965, 1975). Other takes on the influence of behavioral regularities on people's behavior focus on how readily people conform to role prescriptions (e.g., Berger, Wagner, & Zelditch, 1985; Correll & Ridgeway, 2003; Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973; Hogg, Terry, & White, 1995) or are socialized by the group (e.g., Levine & Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982), and on how social-cognitive processes associated with identifying with a group generate group normative behavior and transform self-conception (e.g., Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Hogg & Turner, 1987; Turner, 1982; Turner & Oakes, 1989; see Turner, 1991).

Finally, what has sometimes been referred to as the Illinois school of small group research has focused on how the nature and distribution of opinions or positions in a small group influences the group's overall normative position that is accepted and endorsed by the group's members. The focus is mainly on group decision making, and rests on an analysis of social combination rules, unshared information, socially shared cognition, relative persuasive power, and the nature of the group task (e.g., Davis, 1973; Tindale, Davis, Vollrath, Nagao, & Hinsz, 1990; Tindale, Kameda, & Hinsz, 2003; Tindale, Meisenhelder, Dykema-Engblade, & Hogg, 2001).

MILESTONES IN THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INFLUENCE AND LEADERSHIP

Some of social psychology's most memorable and impactful research programs and studies have, explicitly or implicitly, been studies of influence and leadership. For example, in 1898, Triplett published what is often cited as the first social psychology experiment. Triplett, a keen cyclist, wanted to understand why cyclists sometime cycled faster when being paced by or in competition with other cyclists. In one experiment, he had children reeling in fishing lines alone or in competition with another child. Although Triplett did

not answer his question satisfactorily, his research was a platform for subsequent research on social facilitation that systematically investigated the influence of the mere presence of other people on people's performance of easy/well learned or difficult/poorly learned tasks (e.g., Allport, 1920; Bond & Titus, 1983; Guerin, 1993; Zajonc, 1965).

Still focusing on the influence of other people on task performance, Ringelmann (1913) reported a study in which he had groups of different sizes pulling on a rope and found that the amount of effort each person exerted became smaller as the group got larger. This influential study spawned an array of clever studies of social loafing to investigate the way that people's motivation to exert effort on a task is reduced if they know that others are also working on the task (e.g., Karau & Williams, 1993). An extreme case of loafing is free-riding (e.g., Kerr, 1983)—people exert no effort on a task when they believe that others will put in all the effort. Loafing and free-riding can be reduced if a person places a great deal of subjective importance on the task and the group and if they believe that their behavior is identifiable by the group.

Although social facilitation, social loafing, and free-riding all address situations where people's behavior is quite clearly *influenced* by the behavior of others, they are usually treated as social performance rather than social influence phenomena. In the same "performance" genre but more easily classified as influence is ostracism—a situation in which people believe an individual or group is intentionally ignoring them. The effects are quite dramatic and even disturbing, as has been demonstrated by studies in which someone is included for a while in a three-person ball-tossing game and then excluded by the other two people (see Williams, 2001, 2007).

More typically and centrally associated with the theme of social influence are studies of the development and persistence of group norms, and the enduring influence of norms and role prescriptions over individuals. These studies include Sherif's (1935, 1936) classic autokinetic experiments, showing how norms arise and persist in groups and influence members; Zimbardo's Stanford prison experiment (Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973), demonstrating the power of roles to influence behavior; Garfinkel's (1967) analysis of norms as the taken-for-granted background to everyday life that only become visible when they are violated; Newcomb's (1965) Bennington study, showing how students' conservative voting pattern became more liberal after two or three years' exposure to the college's liberal norms; and Kelley's (1952) research on reference groups and membership groups as sources of different forms of influence.

Other classic research has focused more on how individuals yield to majority influence. The classic studies here are Asch's (1956) studies of conformity to a face-to-face

erroneous majority (also see Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). Turning this approach to influence on its head and focusing instead on how minorities can influence the majority are studies of minority influence. One ingenious paradigm discovered that when a minority called out blue slides as green, participants still called the slides blue but experienced a change in their afterimage that indicated that due to minority influence they had actually *seen* the slides as green (Moscovici, Lage, & Naffrechoux, 1969; also see Maass & Clark, 1984; Martin, 1998).

The role of social influence in changing people's attitudes and behavior has been the focus of a number of classic research programs and studies—for example, the Yale attitude change program that focused on persuasion and attitude change to understand propaganda and mass attitude transformation (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953; Hovland, Lumsdaine, & Sheffield, 1949). Drawing on cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957; see Cooper, 2007), Zimbardo, Weisenberg, Firestone, and Levy (1965) found that military cadets had more favorable attitudes toward eating, and actually ate, more fried grasshoppers after being "pressured" to do so by an unpleasant rather than pleasant senior officer. In another food-oriented study, Lewin (1943) discovered that group discussion was more effective than persuasion in changing American housewives' attitudes so that they were less negative toward eating beef hearts and other such foods.

The idea that group discussion is a powerful mechanism of influence is associated with a long tradition of research on group decision making. One classic piece of research is that on risky shift and group polarization—under some circumstances, group discussion can make a group adopt a more extreme position than the average of the members' prediscussion private opinions (Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969; Wallach, Kogan, & Bem, 1962). Another classic is groupthink (Janis, 1972)—a situation in which a decision-making group comes to a group decision that is suboptimal and flawed because the group is too cohesive, the leader is too influential, and the members are consumed by pressure to seek concurrence and to avoid dissent.

The notion of concurrence with a powerful leader is most memorably explored by Milgram (1963) in his classic studies of obedience to authority, in which "ordinary" people administered deadly electric shocks to another participant simply because they were told to do so by an authority figure, and by Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1950) in their analysis of the authoritarian personality as a person who desperately needs to defer to powerful leadership.

Social psychological leadership research has largely separated power from leadership. For example, Lippitt and White (1943) conducted a classic early experiment in which groups of children exposed to different leadership styles operated most effectively when the leader was democratic rather than autocratic or *laissez-faire*. The huge Ohio State program of leadership studies (see Stogdill, 1974) identified two general leadership styles, one that focused on task activity and the other on social relationships, and argued that the most influential leaders are those who are both task and relationship oriented. Finally, Fiedler's (1964, 1967) heavily researched contingency theory of leadership was based on the idea that the effectiveness of particular leadership styles is contingent on the nature and context of the leadership task.

COMPLIANCE VERSUS CONFORMITY

Social influence is ultimately a process of change in which one's behaviors (what one does or says) or cognitions (attitudes, opinions and feelings), or both, are changed by the perceived cognitions and behaviors of others. A typical example of the result of influence would be a Conservative joining the Democratic Party and then voting for liberal politicians in elections. Influence can also be a process that *maintains* patterns of behavior or cognition. An example would be the way that cultural propaganda maintains cultural practices. However, this can probably also be considered a process of change, albeit less dramatic change that more resembles the light touch on the tiller that keeps a boat on course.

Given that influence involves change, a critical distinction pivots on the nature of the change. Is it a transitory change simply in what one publicly does and says (for example, saying one enjoys a particular piece of cacophonous music simply because one's friends say they like it), or is it an enduring and deep-seated cognitive change in one's private beliefs, attitudes, perceptions, and feelings (actually coming to like the cacophony and see it as genuinely melodious)? This is an important distinction—practically, because the consequences are different, and theoretically, because entirely different influence processes may be involved. But it is also a problematic distinction because it engages with the relationship between attitudes and behavior (e.g., Sheeran, 2002) and with the conceptualization and measurement of implicit attitudes and cognitions (e.g., Greenwald et al., 2002).

The distinction is captured in the attitude change literature by Kelman's (1958) differentiation among compliance, identification, and internalization; in the influence literature by a contrast between compliance or coercive compliance on the one hand and persuasive influence or genuine conformity on the other (e.g., Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Turner, 1991); and more generally in social psychology as a whole by a distinction between superficial, unelaborated and heuristic information processing, and deeper, more elaborated, and deliberative information processes (e.g., Bohner, Moskowitz, & Chaiken, 1995).

Moscovici (1976) puts the compliance–conformity distinction rather nicely. Public compliance is an outward change in behavior and expressed attitudes, often as a consequence of coercion. As compliance does not reflect internal change, it usually persists only while behavior is under surveillance and is based on the perception that the source of influence has coercive power over the target of influence. In contrast, persuasive influence or conformity is a "conversion" process that produces private acceptance and internalization—true internal change that persists in the absence of surveillance and is not based on coercive power. Rather, it is based on the subjective validity of social norms conveyed by the source's behavior (Festinger, 1950), that is, a feeling of confidence and certainty that the beliefs and actions described by the norm are correct, appropriate, valid, and socially desirable. Under these circumstances, the norm becomes an internalized standard for behavior.

The notion of perceived "power over" the target is a feature of this distinction between compliance and conformity (but note that power is a complicated construct with many different interpretations; for discussion see Fiske & Berdahl, 2007). Another feature is that compliance and conformity are associated with different relationships between the individual and the group. Kelley (1952) distinguishes between reference groups (groups that are psychologically significant for our attitudes and behavior—positively significant so that we behave in accordance with their norms or negatively significant so that we behave in opposition to their norms) and membership groups (groups to which we belong—are *in*—by some objective criterion, external designation, or social consensus). A positive reference group is a source of conformity (which is socially validated if that group also happens to be our membership group), whereas a negative reference group that is also our membership group has significant coercive power to produce compliance. From the perspective of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; also see Hogg, 2006; Hogg & Abrams, 1988), conformity is the influence process associated with groups that one identifies with as an important aspect of one's self-concept. However, compliance is a surface behavioral change in response to coercion and fear or aimed at pleasing (or irritating) others; it is not associated with group identification.

COMPLIANCE AND OBEDIENCE

Compliance and Persuasion

Research on compliance, which generally refers to a *behavioral* response to a *request by another individual*, has primarily focused on the conditions under which people acquiesce to a request, and on the strategies that are most effective in gaining compliance. Situations of compliance are extraordinarily common—for example, a salesperson trying to sell a car, a friend asking a favor, an employee asking for a raise, a charity asking for donations. Although compliance with small requests can rest on careful consideration of pros and cons, it can also be relatively "mindless" insofar as we comply without much thought. However, even if the request is small, we are more inclined to comply if some reason, any reason, even a spurious reason, is given for the request (Langer, Blank, & Chanowitz, 1978).

Strategic Self-Presentation

The tactics people use to gain compliance from others typically involve strategic self-presentation designed to elicit different emotions that will compel others to comply. Jones and Pittman (1982) describe five such strategies and emotions: *intimidation* is an attempt to elicit fear by getting others to think you are dangerous; *exemplification* is an attempt to elicit guilt by getting others to regard you as a morally respectable individual; *supplication* is an attempt to elicit pity by getting others to believe you are helpless and needy; *self-promotion* is an attempt to elicit respect and confidence by persuading others that you are competent; and *ingratiation* is simply an attempt to get others to like you to secure compliance with a subsequent request.

These last two, self-promotion and ingratiation, service two of the most common goals of social interaction: to get people to think you are competent and to get people to like you (Leary, 1995). Ingratiation, in particular, has been the focus of substantial research (Gordon, 1996; Jones, 1964). People can ingratiate themselves in a variety of ways; for example, by agreeing with someone to appear similar to them or make them feel good, making oneself look attractive, paying compliments, or name-dropping. Appropriately touching someone can also work. Smith, Pruitt, and Carnevale (1982) reported that shoppers who were approached to sample a new food product were more likely to sample and buy the item when they were touched in a socially acceptable way.

The psychology behind the effectiveness of ingratiation is the human tendency to be agreeable to those we like. It is much more difficult to decline a request from someone we feel we like than someone we feel we do not like. However, ingratiation can backfire. If it is too transparent that you are strategically trying to get someone to like you (you are pandering or engaging in deceptive flattery) to profit from their liking in some way, then the strategy is ineffective or worse: It can generate dislike that significantly reduces the probability of compliance.

Multiple Requests: Foot-in-the-Door, Door-in-the-Face, and Low-Balling

One of the most researched compliance tactics involves the use of multiple requests, in which softener or set-up requests prepare the ground for the focal request (see Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004, for a review). One strategy is to get one's foot-in-the-door by making a small request that no one could reasonably decline, and then following up with a more substantial request. This seems to work; we have all used it. For example, Freedman and Fraser (1966) contacted people in their homes to answer a few simple questions about the kind of soap they used, and then once they had agreed, they made the larger request to allow six people to make a thorough inventory of all household items. Only 22% complied when they received the larger request "cold," but 53% complied when they had been softened up by the initial questions about soap. Other studies have found that multiple small prior requests can make the foot-in-the-door even more effective—specifically, people who had agreed to two preliminary requests that were increasingly demanding, prior to the ultimate request, were more likely to agree to the ultimate request (e.g., Dolinski, 2000; Goldman, Creason, & McCall, 1981).

If properly used, gaining a foot-in-the-door can be effective; it may even, according to Saks (1978), induce people to act as organ and tissue donors. The tactic is, however, relatively ineffective if the link between the requests breaks down because the initial request is too small or the focal request too large (Foss & Dempsey, 1979; Zuckerman, Lazzaro, & Waldgeir, 1979). One reason why the foot-in-the-door may work is that complying with a small request changes a person's self-conception; people develop a picture of themselves in that situation as "giving" (DeJong, 1979.) Similarly, people seek self-consistency and find it inconsistent to comply on one occasion and refuse to comply on a second occasion in the same context; if we are charitable on one occasion then we should be charitable again on the second occasion (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Others, however, are skeptical that something as dramatic as self-conceptual change is involved, instead proposing that the foot-in-the-door tactic simply changes people's attitudes toward compliance in the situation so that they favor compliance (e.g., Gorassini & Olson, 1995).

Another compliance-gaining tactic that can be quite effective is to first make a large request that no one will comply with, and then scale it down to make the smaller focal request—the door-in-the-face tactic. In the classic door-in-the-face study, Cialdini and his colleagues (Cialdini et al., 1975) approached students with a huge request: "Would you serve as a voluntary counselor at a youth offenders" center two hours a week for the next two years?" Virtually no one agreed. However, when they then made a considerably smaller request, "Would you chaperone a group of these offenders on a two-hour trip to the zoo?," 50% complied. When the second request was presented alone, less than 17% complied.

One reason why the door-in-the-face works may be that there is a contrast effect. The second request seems small and reasonable in contrast with the ludicrously large first request, much like lukewarm water feels cool when you have just had your hand in hot water. Another, more robust explanation is, according to Cialdini and his associates, that the second scaled-down request may be viewed as a concession that invites reciprocation. This is consistent with the fact that the tactic is most effective if both requests come from the same source, typically the same individual. Reciprocity is, in its own right, a powerful compliance tactic. It invokes the reciprocity principle: the general social expectation or norm that "we should treat others the way they treat us." If someone treats us well or does us a favor, we feel a strong urge to reciprocate, and we feel guilty if we are unable to reciprocate. From the point of view of compliance, people are more likely to comply with a request if the requester first does them a small favor (Regan, 1971). Guilt arousal has a similar effect. Guilt has been shown to increase compliance with requests to make a phone call to save native trees, to agree to donate blood, or to participate in an experiment (Carlsmith & Gross, 1969; Darlington & Macker, 1966; Freedman, Wallington, & Bless, 1967).

The final multiple requests tactic is called low-balling. Here the initial request is framed to conceal various drawbacks and hidden costs. Once people have agreed, the request is changed and they discover the drawbacks and costs. For example, Cialdini, Cacioppo, Bassett, and Miller (1978) asked half their participants to be in an experiment starting at 7:00 A.M. The other half were first asked simply to commit to participating in an experiment, and then they were informed that it would start at 7:00 A.M. The latter group had been low-balled. They complied more often (56%) than the control group (31%) and also tended to keep their appointments. Low-balling works because once people are committed to a decision or course of action, they are more likely to accept a slight increase in the cost of that action. Taken to an extreme, this reflects the notion of sunk costs (Fox & Hoffman, 2002), in which once a course of action is decided on, people will continue to invest in it even if the costs increase dramatically.

Obedience to Authority

One factor that can increase the probability of compliance is power. Under these circumstances, the request is no longer a request that we are free to accept or decline, but an order that we disobey at our peril. Rather than comply, we

obey because the order comes from an authority we perceive to have coercive or legitimate power over us (e.g., Raven, 1993) or to have control over our outcomes (Fiske & Berdahl, 2007).

Stanley Milgram

The name most closely associated with the study of obedience to authority is Stanley Milgram. His obedience studies (Milgram, 1963, 1974) are some of the most influential pieces of research in social psychology (see Blass, 1992, 2004), not least due to the storm over research ethics that they stirred up (Baumrind, 1964, 1985; Miller, 1986). Milgram, like much of the rest of the world, was shocked at the "I was only following orders" justification given by many of the Nazis on trial for their involvement in the Holocaust—in particular the early 1960s trial of Adolf Eichmann, the Nazi official most directly responsible for the logistics of Hitler's "Final Solution," reported in Arendt's 1963 book *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A report on the banality of evil*. These "monsters" were often mild-mannered, softly spoken, courteous people who repeatedly and politely explained that they did what they did not because they hated Jews but because they were ordered to do it; they were simply obeying orders.

Milgram was also influenced by Solomon Asch's (1951; see later) conformity studies in which an individual conformed to the bizarrely erroneous judgments of a numerical majority. Like a number of others, Milgram was unimpressed with the Asch studies on the grounds that the task, judging line length, was trivial, and there were no significant consequences for conforming or resisting. So, he tried to replicate Asch's studies, but with a task that had important consequences attached to the decision to conform or remain independent, more like the Eichmann scenario.

Milgram had experimental confederates apparently administer electric shocks to another person to see whether true participants would conform to the confederates' behavior by doing the same. Before being able to start the study, Milgram needed to run a control group to obtain a base rate for people's willingness to shock someone *without* social pressure from confederates. For Milgram, this almost immediately became the crucial question in its own right. He never went ahead with his original conformity study, and the control group became the basis of one of social psychology's most dramatic research programs.

Milgram's obedience paradigm has been described in detail in many places (Milgram, 1963, 1974; also see Blass, 1992, 1999, 2004). Briefly, participants tested another participant (called the "learner," but actually a confederate) on a paired-associate learning task, and were told to give the learner an electric shock, moving systematically up

through a scale with labels indicating the severity of the shock, each time the learner got the associate wrong. The learner was incompetent, in some variants failing to respond at all, and so the participant was confronted by the prospect of moving up the scale past 375V, labeled "danger severe shock," into the 435–450V range, ominously labeled "XXX." Although the participant believed he was giving shocks, no shocks were actually given; the learner faked responses, which included crying out in pain, pleading with the participant to stop, and in some cases pounding on the wall. Throughout the experiment, the participant was agitated and tense, and often asked to break off. To such requests, the experimenter responded with an ordered sequence of replies proceeding from a mild "please continue" through "the experiment requires that you continue" and "it is absolutely essential that you continue," to the ultimate "you have no other choice, you must go on."

The remarkable finding was that obedience was extraordinarily high. In one of the 18 variants Milgram conducted, fully 65% of participants administered the maximum shock to a learner in another room who had ceased responding and who had previously reported having a heart complaint. Replications, some using slightly different paradigms, have been conducted all over the world (Blass, 1999; also see Smith, Bond, & Kağitçibaşi, 2006), with obedience rates ranging from a high of 90% in Spain and the Netherlands (Meeus & Raaijmakers, 1986) to a low of 16% among Australian women (Kilham & Mann, 1974).

Factors Influencing Obedience

Research has identified a number of factors that increase or diminish destructive obedience—that is, following orders that prescribe actions that harm others (victims). One of the most important is immediacy: the social proximity of the victim to the participant. For example, Milgram found 100% of participants administered the maximum shock when the victim was neither seen nor heard at all, but "only" 30% did so when they had to physically hold the victim's hand down on to the electrode to receive the shock. This is consistent with moral dilemmas research on what is called the "trolley problem" (e.g., Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001). Individuals who have to save the lives of five people lying on the tracks are less willing to do so by pushing someone onto the tracks to stop the train than by switching a switch that diverts the trolley onto another track on which only one person is lying. Immediacy is clearly involved here.

Immediacy may make it easier to view a victim as a living and breathing person like oneself and thus to empathize with their thoughts and feelings as a consequence of one's actions. Hence, pregnant women express greater commitment to their pregnancy after having seen an ultrasound

that clearly reveals body parts (Lydon & Dunkel-Schetter, 1994), and it is easier to press a button to wipe out an entire village from 30,000 feet than it is to shoot an individual enemy from close range. There is substantial research on dehumanization that shows an association between believing a person not to be a human being at all and endorsement or commitment of atrocities against them (Haslam, 2006; Haslam, Loughnan, & Kashima, 2008; see Epley and Waytz, volume 1). Interestingly, if we return to Adolf Eichmann, it may not actually be the case that he, or his fellow Nazis, was blindly following orders, but rather that he was able to consider atrocities against Jews because he viewed Jews as less than human. Peter Malkin, the Israeli agent who captured Eichmann in 1960, interviewed him and reports that when confronted with irrefutable evidence of having murdered a Jewish child, Eichmann replied, "Yes, . . . but he was Jewish, wasn't he?" (Malkin & Stein, 1990, p. 110).

Another important factor that influences destructive obedience is the proximity or immediacy of the authority figure giving the orders. Milgram found that obedience was reduced to 20.5% when the experimenter was absent from the room and relayed directions by telephone. When the experimenter gave no orders at all and the participant was entirely free to choose when to stop, 2.5% still persisted to the end.

The most dramatic influence on obedience is group pressure. Milgram found that the presence of two disobedient peers (i.e., others who appeared to revolt and refused to continue after giving shocks in the 150–210V range) reduced complete obedience to 10%, while two obedient peers raised complete obedience to 92.5%. Group pressure, more accurately others' behavior, probably has its effects because the actions of relevant others establishes a prescriptive norm that confirms that it is either legitimate or illegitimate to continue administering the shocks.

Another critical factor is the legitimacy of the authority figure, which allows people to abdicate personal responsibility for their actions—to enter what Milgram called an agentic state in which people see themselves (followers) as agents for the authority figure (leader), carrying out orders but not being responsible for their consequences. Milgram's original experiments were conducted by laboratory-coated scientists at prestigious Yale University, and the purpose of the research was quite clearly the pursuit of scientific knowledge. What would happen if these trappings of legitimate authority were removed? Milgram ran one experiment in a run-down inner-city office building. The research was ostensibly sponsored by a private commercial research firm. Obedience dropped, but to a still remarkably high 48%.

A final factor that may be at play, particularly in the Milgram studies, is the psychology of sunk costs (Fox & Hoffman, 2002) that we discussed previously in the context of low-balling induced compliance; once committed, particularly publically, to a course of action, people will continue their commitment even if the costs increase dramatically. Milgram's experiments start innocuously with trivial shocks, but once people have committed themselves to giving these small shocks it may be difficult to know when or how to stop.

Taken together, research on obedience points to a recipe for destructive obedience: the victim should be remote and dehumanized, the authority figure issuing the orders should be close by and perceived as having legitimate authority, and relevant other "followers" should be seem to be uniformly obedient. To combat destructive obedience, the victim should be close by and be empathized with as a fellow human being, the authority figure should be remote and perceived as having little legitimate authority, and relevant other followers should be seen to be disobeying en masse.

Obedience is not entirely bad. It can sometimes be beneficial; for example, many organizations would grind to a halt or would be catastrophically dysfunctional if their members continually painstakingly negotiated orders (think about an emergency surgery team, a flight crew, a commando unit). However, the pitfalls of blind obedience are many and dramatic. For example, research has shown that medication errors in hospitals can be attributed to nurses overwhelmingly deferring to doctors' orders, even when metaphorical alarm bells are ringing (Krackow & Blass, 1995; Lesar, Briceland, & Stein, 1997), and that interviewers have obeyed bosses' orders to use interview tactics that they know will ruin interviewees' prospects of getting the job (Meeus & Raaijmakers, 1986, 1995). Blind obedience also plays a role in groupthink, in which members of cohesive decision-making groups that are under pressure and have a strong leader defer uncritically to the leader's will (Janis, 1972; also see Aldag & Fuller, 1993). For example, in an organizational study 77% of participants who were playing the role of board members of a pharmaceutical company advocated continued marketing of a hazardous drug merely because they felt that the chair of the board favored this decision (Brief, Dukerich, & Doran, 1991).

GROUP NORMS

If someone asks a favor and the target complies, then that is compliance. If the requester has authority and power over the target, the request is effectively an order and compliance is obedience. Conformity is a quite different form of influence. Above all, it is fundamentally a group, rather than interpersonal, process that rests on the power of group norms to influence people. The compliance and obedience literatures have little to say about norms, although there are

exceptions; for example, we have just seen how obedience can be dramatically strengthened or weakened by normative support for obedience or for disobedience respectively. Norms are the focus of this section, largely as a transition to the discussion of conformity in the next section—a more extensive and broader discussion of norms is provided by Cialdini and Trost (1998).

Nature and Structure of Norms

Early on, Sumner (1906) talked about norms as "folkways": Habitual customs displayed by a group because they had originally been adaptive in meeting basic needs. Sherif (1936) described norms as "customs, traditions, standards, rules, values, fashions, and all other criteria of conduct which are standardized as a consequence of the contact of individuals" (p. 3). Garfinkel (1967) described norms as the taken-for-granted background to everyday life. People typically assume a practice is "natural" or "human nature" until the practice is disrupted by norm violation and people suddenly realize the practice is "merely" normative. Indeed, Piaget's theory of cognitive development describes how children only slowly begin to realize that norms are not objective facts and suggests that even adults find it difficult to come to this realization (Piaget, 1928, 1955). Finally, Cialdini and Trost (1998) define norms as "rules and standards that are understood by members of a group and that guide and/or constrain social behavior without the force of laws. These norms emerge out of interaction with others; they may or may not be stated explicitly, and any sanctions for deviating from them come from social networks, not the legal system" (p. 152).

Turner and other social identity theorists place a particular emphasis on the group-defining dimension of norms (e.g., Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg, & Turner, 1990; Turner, 1991; Hogg & Smith, 2007). Norms are attitudinal and behavioral regularities that map the contours of social groups (small groups or large social categories) such that normative discontinuities mark group boundaries. Norms capture attributes that describe one group and distinguish it from other groups, and because groups define who we are—our identity—group norms are also prescriptive, telling us how we should behave as group members. This perspective, to some extent, transcends (see Hogg & Reid, 2006) the traditional distinction drawn between descriptive norms ("is" norms) that describe behavioral regularities and injunctive norms ("ought" norms) that convey approval or disapproval of the behavior (e.g., Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991).

Stereotypes and Roles

Norms and stereotypes are related constructs, but they are not identical and it can be difficult to disentangle them.

One key difference is that norms are studied from the perspective of social influence (how norms emerge and change and influence people), whereas stereotypes are studied from the perspective of social cognition (how the individual perceiver forms a generalized image of a group and how this generalized image influences individual perception and conduct; e.g., Hamilton & Sherman, 1996) and prejudice (derogatory stereotypes of outgroups lie at the psychological core of prejudice and discrimination; e.g., Fiske, 1998).

One immediate conceptual difference between norms and stereotypes is that the former tend to refer to behavioral regularities within a group, whereas the latter refer to people's shared perceptions of such regularities (e.g., Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994). However, some consideration shows this distinction to be less clear-cut. If one were to believe that the French cycle around wearing berets and carrying baguettes, that would be one's perception or individual stereotype of a normative practice; this perception may be inaccurate, which reminds us that stereotypes and the normative practices they purport to capture are not objective facts but social constructs that people can disagree and negotiate over (see later). If one were to share this perception with fellow Americans, then to hold that attitude or have that perception would be a norm of one's own group; and it is often just such social agreement and consensual validation that makes a normative practice seem like an objective fact (cf. Festinger, 1954; Suls & Wheeler, 2000).

Also related to norms—but not identical—are roles. As with stereotypes, it can sometimes be difficult to distinguish the two. Like norms, roles describe and prescribe behaviors that distinguish one "group" of people from another, but here the relevant group is a subgroup of people within a larger group and there is an emphasis on how the subgroups relate to one another for the greater benefit of the larger group as a whole (e.g., cooks and waiters in a restaurant, or faculty and students in a university). Roles tend, within groups, to represent a division of labor, provide clear-cut social expectations, provide information about how members relate to one another, and furnish members with a self-definition and a place within the group. However, there can also be role conflict, and since roles within a group can often be based on wider social categories (e.g., race, socio-economic status, gender), intragroup role conflict can often be a manifestation of wider intergroup conflict in society.

Like norms, roles have a real influence on people's behavior and sense of who they are: their role identity (McCall & Simmons, 1978; Stryker & Statham, 1986; see Hogg, Terry, & White, 1995). The classic demonstration of the influence of roles is Zimbardo's simulated prison study (Zimbardo, 1971; also see Banuazizi & Movahedi, 1975) in which participants randomly assigned to prisoner

or guard roles took on and enacted their role prescriptions with great gusto (cf. Haslam & Reicher, 2005).

Variation of Norms

Norms serve a function for the individual. They provide a frame of reference (Sherif, 1936) that regulates one's behavior and allows one to predict, with more or less accuracy, how others might behave. Because in this way norms reduce uncertainty (cf. Hogg, 2007b, in press), they are likely to persist and, like stereotypes, are resistant to change in response to disconfirmation.

However, norms are not monolithic; they are often situation specific, and they are subject to moderation in the face of changed circumstances. Norms often initially arise to deal with specific circumstances; they endure as long as those circumstances prevail but ultimately change with changing circumstances. Some norms can be quite generic, though typically these are normative practices attached to fundamental roles within a group. For example, leadership can be viewed as a role that has general normative properties or more specific normative properties catered closely to the leadership task (e.g., Lord & Brown, 2004). Another example comes from the group development and group socialization literatures that identify generic roles and associated normative expectations in groups. Tuckman (1965) famously described five stages, with associated normative practices, that all groups go through: forming, storming, norming, performing, and adjourning. Taking a slightly different approach, Moreland and Levine (e.g., Moreland & Levine, 1982; Levine & Moreland, 1994) describe a group socialization process in which normative expectations of members change quite dramatically as they move from prospective member, to newcomer, to full member, to marginal member, to ex-member.

Norms also vary in their latitude of acceptable behavior. Some norms are narrow and restrictive (e.g., military dress codes) and others wider and less restrictive (e.g., faculty dress codes). Generally, norms that relate to group loyalty and to central aspects of group life have a narrow latitude of acceptable behavior, whereas norms relating to more peripheral features of the group are less restrictive. But it is also the case that some group members are allowed greater latitude than others: higher-status members (e.g., leaders) can get away with more than lower-status members and followers (e.g., Hogg & Van Knippenberg, 2003; Hollander, 1958).

There is evidence for the patterning and structure of different types of norms from Sherif and Sherif's (1964) study of adolescent gangs in American cities. Participant observers infiltrated these gangs and studied them over several months. The gangs had given themselves names, had adopted various insignia, and had strict codes about how members should dress. Dress codes were important, as it was largely through dress that the gangs differentiated themselves from one another. The gangs also had strict norms concerning sexual mores and how to deal with outsiders (e.g., parents, police); however, leaders were allowed greater latitude in their adherence to these and other norms.

Emergence and Persistence of Norms

The classic studies of how norms develop are Sherif's (1935, 1936) autokinetic experiments. Sherif took advantage of the autokinetic effect: an optical illusion in which a fixed pinpoint of light in a completely dark room appears to move. People asked to estimate how much the light moves find the task difficult and generally feel uncertain about their estimates. Sherif presented the point of light a large number of times and had participants, who were on their own and were unaware that the movement was an illusion, estimate the amount of movement on each trial. People used their own estimates as a frame of reference. Over a series of 100 trials, they gradually focused on a narrow range of estimates, with different people adopting their own personal range, or norm. On subsequent days, Sherif had participants repeat the task but in groups of two or three in which they called out their estimates in random order. The well-known finding is that estimates converged quickly on a narrow range defined by the mean of the group's judgment, experimentally confirming Floyd Allport's (1924) earlier observation that people in groups gave less extreme and more conservative judgments of odors and weights than when they were alone. Allport speculated that it seemed as if, in the absence of direct pressure, the group could cause members to converge and thus become more similar to one another.

Sherif also discovered that once the group norm had been established, participants tested alone continued to make autokinetic estimates in line with the norm. Rohrer and colleagues (Rohrer, Baron, Hoffman, & Swander, 1954) found, quite remarkably, that people who were retested individually as much as a year later were still influenced by the group norm. Perhaps an even more powerful demonstration of the emergence and persistence of group norms comes from studies by Jacobs and Campbell (1961) and MacNeil and Sherif (1976) of arbitrarily extreme norms. In a group comprising three confederates (who gave extreme estimates of autokinetic movement) and one true participant, a relatively extreme norm emerged. The group went through a number of "generations," in which a confederate would leave and another true participant would join, until the membership of the group contained none of the original members. The original extreme norm still powerfully influenced participants' estimates. This is an elegant

demonstration that a norm is a true group phenomenon: It can emerge only from a group, yet it can influence the behavior of the individual in the physical absence of the group (Turner, 1991). It is as if the group is carried in the head of the individual in the form of a norm.

A more naturalistic classic demonstration of normative persistence comes from Coch and French (1948), who studied factory production norms and described a group that set for itself a standard of 50 units per hour as the minimum level to secure job tenure. New members quickly adopted this norm; those who did not were strongly sanctioned by ostracism and in some cases had their work sabotaged. The norm persisted.

Although norms that emerge through face-to-face interaction can reflect an averaging process, as in Sherif's original studies and even the case in which an extreme norm is induced, this is not always the case. In most situations, some individuals have more influence than others over what the group perceives to be the relevant norm. Leadership is a case in point (see later). Leaders, almost by definition, disproportionately influence group norms. Indeed, the essence of transformational leadership (e.g., Avolio & Yammarino, 2003) is precisely that specific individuals—leaders—reconfigure or transform the group's norms for the group. In contrast, fringe members of the group tend to have less influence over what the group considers to be normative.

Also, group norms typically do not emerge or exist in isolation of the perceived normative practices of other groups that one does not belong to; there is a critical intergroup dimension of norms that is often underemphasized in discussions of norms (see Yzerbyt and Demoulin's discussion of intergroup behavior, this volume). This argument is most comprehensively made by social identity theory's perspective on norms and influence (e.g., Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Hogg & Smith, 2007; Hogg & Turner, 1987; Turner, 1991; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; Turner & Oakes, 1989). Norms are cognitively represented as group prototypes—fuzzy sets of attributes (e.g., attitudes and behaviors) that define ingroup membership. Prototypes are formed and configured according to the principle of meta-contrast; that is, they optimize the ratio of intergroup differences to intragroup differences, essentially striving to accentuate or maximize both intergroup differences and intragroup similarities (cf. Tajfel, 1959; 1969), and the perceived entitativity of groups (Campbell, 1958; Hamilton & Sherman, 1996). A clear consequence of this analysis is that prototypes/norms rarely embody the average of ingroup members' behavior; more often they are ideals that are displaced from the group mean in a direction away from the relevant comparison outgroup. Following from this, it can be seen that if the relevant outgroup changes

then the ingroup prototype/norm changes also. In this way, prototypes/norms are sensitive to context.

This analysis has been used to explain group polarization: the tendency for group discussion to produce a consensual group position that is more extreme than the mean of the prediscussion individual positions of the group's members in the direction favored by the mean (e.g., Isenberg, 1986; Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969). The argument rests on the assumption that holding an "extreme" position means that most other people are moderate. So, if a collection of individuals with relatively extreme positions comes together as a psychologically real group (a group that they identify with), the prototype of the group will form not only to capture their similarities but to contrast the group with people who are not in the group, most of whom are "moderates." Hence the perceived prototype/norm is polarized to be even more extreme, and self-categorization as a group member produces prototype-consistent/normative behavior. A number of studies have supported this analysis (e.g., Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg, & Turner, 1990; Hogg, Turner, & Davidson, 1990; Mackie, 1986; Mackie & Cooper, 1984; Turner, Wetherell, & Hogg, 1989).

Detecting and Changing Norms

Given that group norms can have such a powerful influence over the way we behave and the way we perceive ourselves and the world we live in, people are continually in the business of determining what the appropriate norms are. This is no easy task. Although some groups have explicit guidelines, even regulations or laws, about normative conduct (e.g., the military, many organizations), many groups do not, and even groups with explicit guidelines almost always have a host of sometimes more important implicit norms that one needs to learn more informally.

How People Determine Norms

People generally learn normative information from the behavior of other people: what they do and what they say. In fact, a great deal of what groups do is talk directly or obliquely about normative practices and what it means to be a member of the group, about how things are done, and how one ought to behave. There is a great deal of "norm talk" in groups (Hogg & Reid, 2006). Although communication scholars focus on the role of communication in the development and learning of norms (e.g., Bendor & Swistak, 2001; Lapinski & Rimal, 2005), social psychologists focus more on information processing.

Because norms of subjectively important ingroups are, according to the social identity theory of norms and influence (e.g., Turner, 1991), cognitively internalized as self-defining prototypes, people are vigilant for reliable

information about ingroup norms. They pay close attention to the relative prototypicality of group members including themselves (Haslam, Oakes, McGarty, Turner, & Onorato, 1995; Hogg, 2005), and are more likely to take a normative lead from highly prototypical ingroup members whose behavior is consistent with the group's identity than from prototypically marginal members or from noningroup members. For example, Reicher's (1984a; also see Reicher, 2001) analysis of an urban community riot showed how members of the crowd who were unsure of what behaviors they should engage in were guided by identity-consistent behavior of prototypical community members, rather than the behavior of nonprototypical members or identity-inconsistent behavior of prototypical members.

Because prototypical group members tend to occupy influential leadership positions in groups (Hogg, 2001; Hogg & Van Knippenberg, 2003), people tend to look to their leaders as a source of reliable information about norms. The effect is stronger to the extent that the group is subjectively important, and the leader is highly prototypical. Research shows that people can certainly pay close attention to their leaders and try to learn as much as they can about them (e.g., Fiske & Dépret, 1996). Less prototypical or marginal group members can also be informative about group norms but in a more indirect manner; they may provide information about what the group is not (Hogg, 2005). According to subjective group dynamics theory, one reason why marginal members are often derogated or rejected from the group is that such members threaten the integrity of group norms (e.g., Abrams, Marques, Bown, & Henson, 2000; Marques, Abrams, & Serôdio, 2001). However, marginal members can have a substantial impact on group norms if they unite and work together as an active minority (see discussion of minority influence later in the chapter).

One way to determine a group norm is to assess the degree of consensus existing within the group—if everyone else behaves in the same way then that is pretty reliable evidence for a norm (e.g., Asch, 1951). However, there is rarely consensus, so the question arises of how to combine information to arrive with relative confidence at a decision about what is normative. In some situations, groups—particularly decision-making groups—have explicit or implicit rules about how to combine information to determine the group norm. These social decision schemes (e.g., Davis, 1973; Miller, 1989) include rules such as "unanimity," "majority wins," "two thirds majority," and "truth wins." Other research focuses on how groups deal with shared or unshared information (e.g., Stasser & Titus, 1985). Overall, shared information is considered more valid and comes to the fore (Larson, Foster-Fishman, & Keys, 1994), people who communicate shared information are viewed more favorably (Wittenbaum, Hubbell, & Zuckerman, 1999),

and unshared information is strained out over time (e.g., Kashima, 2000). Overall, majority views are privileged over minority views or unshared information.

A notable aspect of how people detect norms is that people can get them wrong. One reason for this is that people often determine norms on the basis of the overt behavior of fellow group members. Yet, behavior can be a notoriously unreliable cue to what people really believe; in his classic 1969 paper, Wicker reported a correlation of only 0.30 between what people do or say and what they believe. Subsequent research by Ajzen and colleagues (e.g., Ajzen, 1991; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1974) built in parameters to improve the correspondence, but the improvement was not as great as one would expect. Most recently, social identity theory has been applied to attitude–behavior correspondence to show that people's attitudes are most in line with their behavior when people identify strongly with an important self-defining group for which the attitudes and behavior are normative (Hogg & Smith, 2007; Terry & Hogg, 1996, 2001). The implication of this is that it is unreliable to infer norms from behavior unless one is careful to only attend to the behavior of members who are themselves highly prototypical and highly identified with the group, which is the same point made previously.

Two well-documented distortions of how people understand group norms are pluralistic ignorance and ingroup projection. Pluralistic ignorance (Prentice & Miller, 1993, 1996) is a tendency for people to believe that everyone else in their group behaves in a certain way or shares a certain belief, whereas they themselves do not. The classic demonstration of this was a series of studies by Prentice and Miller (1993), in which they found that Princeton University students all reported that other Princeton students were significantly more comfortable with the alcohol drinking habits at Princeton than they were. Essentially they were reporting an erroneous norm: that all students were comfortable with the drinking habits when in fact very few were.

Ingroup projection (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Wenzel, Mummendey, & Waldzus, 2007; Wenzel, Mummendey, Weber, & Waldzus, 2003) is a tendency for subgroups within a superordinate group to overestimate the extent to which their own characteristics are represented in (normative of) the superordinate group. The effect is, however, asymmetrical. Subgroups who consider themselves to be subordinate or have minority status within the larger group underestimate how normative their attributes are of the superordinate category and overestimate the normativeness of the higher status subgroup's attributes (see Sindic & Reicher, 2008).

Normative Disagreement and Normative Criticism

As noted previously, norms are not objective facts. They are social constructs that people can disagree over and that gain

their sense of objectivity largely from consensual support within a group. In groups, people spend a substantial amount of time talking, directly or obliquely, about the group's norms. It is through this "norm talk" that groups fine-tune who they are and how they should behave (see Hogg & Reid, 2006; Hogg & Tindale, 2005).

Normative disagreement can be a constructive and adaptive process in which a group examines its identity and practices to adjust to a changing environment. In decision-making contexts normative disagreement and associated diversity of views can lead to better decisions (Stasser, Stewart, & Wittenbaum, 1995) and protect against groupthink (e.g., Postmes, Spears, & Cihangir, 2001). However, more often than not and in nondecision-making groups, normative disagreement is charged and conflictual. Because norms define the parameters of groups and therefore who we are, normative disagreement can be threatening; it raises self-conceptual uncertainty and may sponsor extreme reactions (Hogg, 2007b, in press), including marginalization and even rejection of those who express disagreement (cf. Marques, Abrams, & Serôdio, 2001).

Normative disagreement implies criticism of the group's practices and identity. According to the research on deviance and subjective group dynamics discussed previously (e.g., Abrams, Marques, Bown, & Henson, 2000; Marques, Abrams, & Serôdio, 2001), nonnormative (deviant) information and behavior is better tolerated within groups if it comes from an outgroup member. However, research by Hornsey (e.g., 2005) on the intergroup sensitivity effect reveals that people are more tolerant of criticism of group norms and practices if such criticism comes from an ingroup member. Internal criticism may even be encouraged as a basis for normative change. In contrast, outgroup criticism spawns defensiveness, and may enhance intergroup polarization and conflict.

The contradictory findings here probably rest on the difference between, on the one hand, being nonnormative and on the other engaging in criticism (Hogg & Reid, 2006; Hogg & Tindale, 2005). Violation of norms and criticism of normative practices may be quite different phenomena. The former conveys that one is not a group member or that one is marginal or does not wish to belong. The latter, if it comes from outside the group, conveys a deliberate attempt to discredit the group and all that it stands for. If it comes from inside the group, particularly from prototypical members (cf. discussion of leadership later), it may be viewed more positively as a constructive attempt to improve the group and promote its best interest.

Normative disagreement can take more of a collective form when, rather than an individual, it is a subgroup or faction that dissents. Later, we will see how a normative minority can sometimes dramatically change the normative practices of a majority (minority influence—Moscovici, 1980; Mugny & Pérez, 1991; see Martin & Hewstone, 2008); here we discuss how schisms can unravel the normative fabric of groups. Schisms are usually associated with profound attitudinal and value differences within ideological groups such as religions, political parties, or artistic movements (e.g., Liebman, Sutton, & Wuthnow, 1988). According to Sani and Reicher (1998, 1999), identity threat, self-conceptual uncertainty, and a sense of self-conceptual impermanence and instability can arise in groups whose normative properties are suddenly changed by the actions of a subgroup or a leadership clique. Members feel that the group is no longer what it used to be; its normative attitudes, values, perceptions, and behaviors have uncompromisingly shifted, and thus the group's identity has changed. Taken off guard by this change, members feel acutely uncertain about how, and whether, they fit into the new group.

In response, members can try to reestablish the group's original identity through discussion, persuasion, and negotiation, or they can split into a separate subgroup that is in conflict with the rest of the group. A split, or schism, is most likely to occur if members feel the group is intolerant of dissent, unable to embrace diverse views, and inclined toward marginalization of dissenting individuals. A schism transforms one group, a single category, into two separate groups engaged in often highly charged intergroup conflict. The split rests on a profound social identity threat that engages a drive to reduce the acute self-conceptual uncertainty that has been aroused. Not surprisingly, schisms can sometimes be destructive of groups—for example, factional conflicts within political ideologies (e.g., Stalinists vs. Trotskyites within the Communist Party) and interpretational differences within religions (e.g., Sunnis vs. Shi'ites within Islam).

When a schism exists, the subgroup that holds the minority position may paradoxically stand a chance of winning over the rest of the group and reinstating a degree of normative consensus. This might happen if the minority's position was novel, the minority could lay some claim to being a bone fide part of the larger ingroup, and the minority adopted a consistent yet flexible style of social influence and persuasion (e.g., Mugny, 1982; Nemeth, 1986). Indeed, although schisms are often highly destructive, the fact that they may sponsor critical thinking, creativity and innovation may, if properly managed, enhance the larger group (e.g., Nemeth & Owens, 1996; Nemeth & Staw, 1989).

MAJORITY INFLUENCE AND CONFORMITY

Norms have an enormous influence on people. For example, Milgram, Bickman, and Berkowitz (1969) were able to make 84% of pedestrian passers-by gaze up into space

at nothing at all by simply having a group of confederates set a norm by doing so. A classic early demonstration of the power of norms is Newcomb's (1965) study of 1930s norms at a small liberal arts college, Bennington College. The college had progressive and liberal norms but drew its students from conservative upper-middle-class families. The 1936 American presidential election allowed Newcomb to conduct a confidential ballot. First-year students strongly favored the conservative candidate, whereas third- and fourth-year students had shifted their voting preference toward the liberal and communist–socialist candidates. Presumably, prolonged exposure to liberal norms had produced the change in political preference. Siegel and Siegel (1957) conducted a better controlled study to rule out individual differences. New students at a private college were randomly assigned to different types of student accommodation: sororities and dormitories. At this college, sororities had a conservative ethos and dormitories had more progressive liberal norms. Siegel and Siegel measured the students' degree of conservatism at the beginning and end of the year. Exposure to liberal norms significantly reduced conservatism.

Why and how do people conform to norms? To answer these questions, social psychology has tended to downplay the norm concept, and instead reframe the question in terms of how and why people yield to group pressure or social pressure from a numerical majority.

Yielding to the Majority

The classic studies of conformity, as yielding to majority opinion, were conducted by Asch in the 1950s (Asch, 1956). Male students, participating in what they thought was a visual discrimination task, sat around a table in groups of seven to nine, and took turns in a fixed order to call out publicly which of three comparison lines was the same length as a standard line. There were 18 trials. In reality, only one person was a true naïve participant, and he answered second to last. The others were experimental confederates instructed to give erroneous responses on 12 focal trials; on six trials, they picked a line that was too long and on six trials, a line that was too short. There was a control condition in which participants performed the task privately with no group influence; as less than 1% of control participants' responses were errors, it can be assumed that the task was unambiguous.

The results were striking. There were large individual differences: 25% of participants remained steadfastly independent throughout; 50% conformed to the erroneous majority on six or more focal trials; and 5% conformed on all 12 focal trials. The average conformity rate was 33%, computed as the total number of instances of conformity across the experiment divided by the product of the number of participants in the experiment and the number of focal trials in the sequence.

When participants were asked about their experience in the experiment, they reported initially experiencing uncertainty and self-doubt, which gradually evolved into self-consciousness, fear of disapproval, and feelings of anxiety, even loneliness. They gave a variety of reasons for conforming: some said they felt their perceptions may have been inaccurate and that the group was actually correct; others that they knew the group was wrong but went along with the majority in order not to stand out; and a small minority claimed that they actually saw the lines as the group did. Independents (those who did not yield) were either entirely confident in the accuracy of their judgments or were emotionally affected by the group but guided by a belief in individualism or in doing the task as directed (i.e., being accurate and correct).

To pursue the idea that one reason why people conform, even when the stimulus is completely unambiguous, is to avoid censure, ridicule, and social disapproval, Asch (1951) conducted a variant of his experiment in which 16 naïve participants faced one confederate who gave incorrect answers. The participants found the confederate's behavior ludicrous and openly ridiculed him and laughed at him. Even the experimenter found the situation so bizarre that he could not contain his mirth and also ended up laughing at the poor confederate.

Perhaps if participants were not concerned about social disapproval, there would be no subjective pressure to conform? To investigate this, Asch conducted another variation of the experiment, in which the incorrect majority called out their judgments publicly but the single naïve participant wrote his down privately. Conformity dropped to 12.5%.

Deutsch and Gerard (1955) took this one step further. They believed that they could entirely eradicate pressure to conform if the task was unambiguous and the participant was anonymous, responded privately, and was not under any sort of surveillance by the group. Why should one conform to an erroneous majority when there is an obvious, unambiguous, and objectively correct answer, and the group has no way of knowing what one is doing?

To test this idea, Deutsch and Gerard confronted a naïve participant face-to-face with three confederates, who made unanimously incorrect judgments of lines, exactly as in Asch's original experiment. In another condition, the naïve participant was anonymous, isolated in a cubicle, and allowed to respond privately; no group pressure existed. There was a third condition in which participants responded face-to-face, but with an explicit group goal to be as accurate as possible; group pressure was maximized.

Deutsch and Gerard also manipulated subjective uncertainty by having half the participants respond while the stimuli were present (the procedure used by Asch) and half respond after the stimuli had been removed (there would be scope for feeling uncertain). As predicted, decreasing uncertainty and decreasing group pressure (i.e., the motivation and ability of the group to censure lack of conformity) reduced conformity. But, intriguingly, people still conformed at a rate of about 23% even when uncertainty was low (stimulus present) and responses were entirely private and anonymous.

Based on Deutsch and Gerard's (1955) discovery that participants still conformed when isolated in cubicles, Crutchfield (1955) devised an apparatus in which participants in cubicles believed they were communicating with one another by pressing buttons on a console that illuminated responses, when in reality the cubicles were not interconnected and the experimenter was the source of all communication. In this way, many participants could be run simultaneously and yet all would believe they were being exposed to a unanimous group. The time-consuming and costly practice of using confederates was no longer necessary, and data could now be collected much more quickly under more controlled and varied experimental conditions; there was an explosion of research into conformity (Allen, 1965, 1975).

Individual and Group Differences in Conformity

One obvious question to ask about conformity is whether some people conform more than others: Are there individual or group differences in conformity and are there personality attributes that predispose some people to conform more than others? Research has suggested that those who conform tend to have lower self-esteem, greater need for social support or social approval, a need for self-control, lower IQ, high anxiety, feelings of self-blame and insecurity in the group, feelings of inferiority, feelings of relatively low status in the group, and a generally authoritarian personality (e.g., Costanzo, 1970; Elms & Milgram, 1966; McGhee & Teevan, 1967; Stang, 1972; Strickland & Crowne, 1962).

However, other research suggests that people who conform in one situation may not conform in another situation: whether one conforms or not may be less influenced by predisposition than by situational and contextual factors (e.g., Barocas & Gorlow, 1967; Barron, 1953; McGuire, 1968; Vaughan, 1964). For example, research on gender and conformity initially confirmed the prevailing stereotype that women are more compliant and conformist than men. This has now been shown to overwhelmingly reflect the conformity tasks used in these early studies—tasks

with which women had less familiarity and expertise, and experienced greater subjective uncertainty, and thus were influenced more than men (Eagly & Carli, 1981; Eagly & Chrvala, 1986).

Sistrunk and McDavid (1971) illustrated this by having male and female participants identify various objects in group pressure situations. For some participants, the stimuli were traditional male items (e.g., a special type of wrench); for some, traditional female items (e.g., types of needlework); and for others, the stimuli were neutral (e.g., popular rock stars). As expected, women conformed more on male items, men more on female items, and both groups equally on neutral (nonsex-stereotypical) items. Women do, however, tend to conform a little more than men in public interactive settings like that involved in the Asch paradigm. One explanation is that it reflects women's greater concern with maintaining group harmony (Eagly, 1978). However, a later study put the emphasis on men's behavior; women conformed equally in public and private contexts whereas it was men who were particularly resistant to influence in public settings (Eagly, Wood, & Fishbaugh, 1981).

Cultural Norms

Conformity is universal, but the extent to which people conform is affected by cultural norms. Smith, Bond, and Kağitçibaşi (2006) surveyed conformity studies conducted in different nations using Asch's paradigm or a modified version of the Asch paradigm. They found that the level of conformity ranged from a low of 14% among Belgian students (Doms, 1983) to a high of 58% among Indian teachers in Fiji (Chandra, 1973), with an overall average of 31.2%. Conformity was lower among participants from individualist cultures in North America and northwestern Europe (25.3%) than among participants from collectivist or interdependent cultures in Africa, Asia, Oceania, and South America (37.1%).

A meta-analysis of 133 replications of the Asch paradigm in 17 countries (Bond & Smith, 1996) confirmed that people who score high on Hofstede's (1980) collectivism scale conform more than people who score low. For example, Norwegians, who have a reputation for social unity and responsibility, were more conformist than the French, who value critical judgment, diverse opinions, and dissent (Milgram, 1961), and the Bantu of Zimbabwe, who have strong sanctions against nonconformity, were highly conformist (Whittaker & Meade, 1967).

Cultural differences in level of conformity map onto not only Hofstede's (1980) societal-level distinction between collectivist and individualist societies, but also Markus and Kitayama's (1991) individual-level distinction between interdependent and independent self-construal. The interdependent self is relatively connected, fluid, and flexible and

is tied to and guided by social relations that govern behavior, whereas the independent self is relatively bounded, stable, and autonomous, and in itself governs behavior (for further elaboration see Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002; Vignoles, Chryssochoou, & Breakwell, 2000; see Heine's discussion of culture, this volume).

From an individualistic perspective, interdependent self-construal and associated conformity can be pejoratively caricatured as slavish conformity that suppresses individual creativity and freedom and prevents social innovation; from a collectivist perspective, independent self-construal can also be pejoratively caricatured as brash disregard for and intolerance of others coupled with lack of sensitivity and immature lack of self-control. Both extremes are maladaptive in a social evolutionary sense (cf. Campbell, 1975) and because such caricatures have undesirable epistemological consequences (cf. Markus & Kitayama, 1994). In reality conformity—as yielding to the majority—is as essential to social cohesion and independence as resistance to majority views is vital for innovation and social change.

Situational Influences on Conformity

Privacy, Interdependence, and Attraction

A number of situational factors influence conformity. One important factor is privacy; people tend to conform less if their behavior is not under surveillance by the group. As we saw earlier, Deutsch and Gerard (1955) found that privacy reduced conformity in the Asch paradigm, but did not abolish it. Insko and colleagues found a similar effect using a different paradigm in which the judgment dimension was ambiguous (judging whether a blue–green slide was blue or green): Participants were less influenced in private than public by the majority judgment (Insko, Smith, Alicke, Wade, & Taylor, 1985).

Another factor that affects conformity is perceived interdependence. When individuals believe their fates are interdependent and that they must work together to achieve a common goal, conformity increases (Allen, 1965; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). This is part of a wider psychological effect in which interdependence can enhance group serving motivation and cooperation (e.g., Sherif & Sherif, 1953) and increase effort exerted on behalf of the group (e.g., Karau & Williams, 1993).

Perhaps unsurprisingly, due to the similarity–attraction link (Byrne, 1971), people tend to conform more in settings in which they like fellow group members or the group as a whole. Conformity has been found to be greater when the group contains friends (e.g., Lott & Lott, 1961; Thibaut & Strickland, 1956), when the person values or feels valued by the group (Dittes & Kelley, 1956), when

people feel they are in the group because of shared characteristics (e.g., Gerard, 1954) or that others in the group are similar to them (e.g., Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg, & Turner, 1990), and when the group is more established (e.g., Williams & Sogon, 1984). However, attraction does not influence conformity when the group is faced with a perceptual task such as judgment of autokinetic movement (Downing, 1958) or judgment of line lengths (Harper, 1961); perhaps because the similarity–attraction link is less important here where perceptual validation is better grounded in triangulation from diverse perspectives (Gorenflo & Crano, 1989).

Group Size and Group Unanimity

Two situational factors in conformity that have been well researched are group size and group unanimity (Allen, 1965, 1975). Asch (1952) found that as the unanimous group increased from one person to two, to three, to four, to eight, to 10, and to 15, the conformity rate increased and then decreased slightly: 3, 13, 33, 35, 32, and 31%. Although some research reports a linear relationship between group size and conformity, the most robust finding is that conformity reaches its full strength with a three- to five-person majority, and additional members have little effect (e.g., Stang, 1976).

Campbell and Fairey (1989) suggest that group size affects conformity differently depending on the type of judgment being made and on the person's motivational goals. With matters of taste, in which there is no objectively correct answer (e.g., fashions), and in which people are concerned about "fitting in," group size has a relatively linear effect: The larger the majority, the more one is swayed. When there is a correct response and one is concerned about being correct, then the views of one or two others will usually be sufficient: The majority-consistent views of additional others will not increase confidence and will largely be redundant.

In addition, group size may not refer to the actual number of physically separate people in the group but to the number of seemingly *independent* sources of influence in the group (Wilder, 1977). For instance, a majority of three individuals who are perceived to be independent will be more influential than a majority of, say, five who are perceived to be in collusion and thus represent a single information source. People may actually find it difficult to represent more than four or five discriminable or independent pieces of information, and thus they assimilate additional group members into one or other of these initial sources of information—hence the relative lack of effect of group size above three to five members.

Unanimity plays a key role in conformity. Asch's original experiment in which there was a conformity rate of

33% used a unanimous erroneous majority. Subsequent experiments have shown that conformity is significantly reduced if the majority is not unanimous (Allen, 1975). Asch found that a correct supporter (i.e., a member of the majority who always gave the correct answer, and thus agreed with and supported the true participant) reduced conformity from 33 to 5.5%. The effectiveness of a supporter in reducing conformity is marginally greater if the supporter responds before rather than after the majority (Morris & Miller, 1975).

Support itself may not be the crucial factor in reducing conformity. Any lack of unanimity among the majority is effective. For example, Asch found that a dissenter who was even more wildly incorrect than the majority was equally effective, and Shaw, Rothschild, and Strickland (1957) found that a dithering and undecided deviate was also effective. Allen and Levine (1971) conducted a memorable experiment in which participants, who were making visual judgments, were provided with a "competent" supporter who had normal vision or an "incompetent" supporter who wore such thick glasses as to raise serious doubts about his ability to see anything at all, let alone judge lines accurately. In the absence of any support, participants conformed 97% of the time. The competent supporter reduced conformity to 36%, but most surprising was the fact that the incompetent supporter also reduced conformity to 64%.

Supporters, dissenters, and deviates are effective in reducing conformity because they shatter the unanimity of the majority, and this raises or legitimizes the possibility of alternative ways of responding or behaving. For example, Nemeth and Chiles (1988) confronted participants with four confederates who either all correctly identified blue slides as blue, or among whom one consistently called the blue slide "green." Participants were then exposed to another group that unanimously called red slides "orange." The participants who had previously been exposed to the consistent dissenter were more likely to correctly call the red slides "red."

Processes of Conformity

Research on conformity has led to the proposal of at least three main processes of influence (see Nail, 1986): informational influence, normative influence, and referent informational influence.

Informational and Normative Influence

The most enduring distinction concerning processes of conformity is between informational influence and normative influence (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Kelley, 1952). Informational influence is an influence to accept information from another as evidence about reality. Because people

need to feel confident that their perceptions, beliefs, and feelings are correct, informational influence comes into play when people are uncertain, either because stimuli are intrinsically ambiguous or because there is social disagreement. Under these circumstances, people first make objective tests against reality, but if this is not possible they make social comparisons (Festinger, 1950, 1954; Suls & Wheeler, 2000). Effective informational influence causes true cognitive change: changes in people's underlying attitudes, beliefs and perceptions.

Informational influence was at least partially responsible for Sherif's (1935, 1936) autokinetic findings. Because reality was ambiguous, participants used other people's estimates as information to remove the ambiguity and resolve subjective uncertainty. When participants were told that the perceived movement was merely an illusion, they did not conform (Alexander, Zucker, & Brody, 1970). Presumably, since reality itself was uncertain, their own subjective uncertainty was interpreted as a correct and valid representation of reality, and thus informational influence did not operate. Although Asch's judgment task was designed to be unambiguous to exclude informational influence, Asch (1952) found that conformity increased when the comparison lines were made similar to one another and thus the task more ambiguous.

Normative influence is an influence to conform to the positive expectations of others. People have a need for social approval and acceptance, which causes them to go along with the group for instrumental reasons: to cultivate approval and acceptance, avoid censure or disapproval, or achieve specific goals. Thus, normative influence comes into play when the group is perceived to have the power and ability to mediate rewards and punishment contingent on our behavior. An important precondition is that one believes one is under surveillance by the group, and, therefore, that one's behavior is publicly observable. Effective normative influence creates situation-specific surface compliance in public settings rather than true enduring cognitive change. There is considerable evidence that people often conform to a majority in public but do not necessarily internalize this as it does not carry over to private settings or endure over time (Nail, 1986).

Normative influence was clearly the principal cause of conformity in the Asch paradigm. The stimuli were unambiguous (informational influence would not be operating), and participants' behavior was under direct surveillance by the group. We saw earlier how privacy, anonymity, and lack of surveillance reduced conformity in the Asch paradigm, presumably because normative influence was weakened. However, we also saw that Deutsch and Gerard (1955) tried to remove normative influence entirely, but were unsuccessful. Even under conditions in which neither informational

nor normative influence would be expected to operate, they found residual conformity at a remarkably high rate of about 23%. Perhaps Deutsch and Gerard simply failed to completely remove the preconditions for informational and normative influence; for example, the participants did not feel the task was totally unambiguous or that their responses were entirely private. Another possibility is that there is either a third process of influence in groups, or that normative and informational influence need to be reconceptualized to fully capture the process of group influence.

Referent Informational Influence

This last possibility has been the focus of a critique of social influence research (e.g., Turner, 1981, 1982). It has been argued that normative and informational influence represents a dual-process model: a model that has drifted away from group norms and group belongingness and focused on *interpersonal* dependency that could just as well occur between individuals as among group members.

Grounded in social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; also see Hogg, 2006; Hogg & Abrams, 1988), referent informational influence was developed to address this critique as a different way to explain social influence and conformity in groups (Abrams & Hogg 1990; Hogg & Turner, 1987; Turner, 1981, 1982; Turner & Oakes, 1989; also see Hogg & Smith, 2007; Turner, 1991). Its premise is that rather than being influenced by others because we are dependent on them for social approval and acceptance or for information that removes ambiguity and establishes subjective validity, we are influenced by others because we feel we belong, psychologically, to the group, and, therefore, the norms of the group are relevant standards for our behavior.

In situations in which we feel a sense of belonging and define ourselves in group terms (group membership is psychologically salient), we recruit information from memory and the immediate social context to determine the relevant normative attributes of our group. Although contextual information can be gleaned from the behavior of outgroup members or unrelated individuals, the most immediate and reliable source is the behavior of fellow ingroup members, particularly those who are generally group prototypical and behaving in a way that is broadly consistent with the essence of the group. As described earlier, the context-relevant ingroup norm that is constructed and cognitively represented as an ingroup prototype, obeys the metacontrast principle, capturing and accentuating intragroup similarities and intergroup differences.

The process of self-categorization associated with group identification, group belongingness, and group behavior (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) depersonalizes self-conception such that we define and see ourselves in group terms and assimilate our thoughts, feelings, and behavior to the prototype—thus we behave in group prototypical terms. To the extent that all members of the group construct a similar group prototype, self-categorization causes members to converge on the prototype; there is increased uniformity within the group—the characteristic conformity effect.

Referent informational influence differs from normative and informational influence in a number of ways. People conform because they are group members, not to validate physical reality or to avoid social disapproval. People conform not to other people but to a norm; other people act as a source of information about the appropriate ingroup norm. Because the norm is an internalized representation, people can conform to it in the absence of surveillance by group members or, for that matter, anybody else.

Support for referent informational influence comes from a wide range of studies of social identity and group influence (see Abrams & Hogg 1990; Hogg & Smith, 2007; Turner, 1991; Turner & Oakes, 1989). For example, across a series of four conformity experiments, Hogg and Turner (1987) found that under conditions of private responding (i.e., no normative influence), participants conformed to a nonunanimous majority containing a correct supporter (i.e., no informational influence) only if it was the participant's explicit or implicit ingroup. Turner, Wetherell, and Hogg (1989) found evidence for conformity to a polarized ingroup norm when there was a salient comparison outgroup and participants identified with the ingroup (cf. Mackie, 1986; Mackie & Cooper, 1984). Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg, and Turner (1990) found broad evidence for referent informational influence across an autokinetic study, an Asch paradigm study, and a group polarization study; and Reicher found similar evidence from an analysis of a riot (Reicher, 1984a) and an associated laboratory experiment analogue (Reicher, 1984b).

MINORITY INFLUENCE AND SOCIAL CHANGE

From the perspective of conformity research, social influence is a process whereby individuals yield to direct or indirect influence from a numerical majority; the majority prevails over the minority to maintain social stasis. There is, however, an entirely different type of social influence that we are all familiar with, in which lone individuals or small groups of individuals are able to change, often dramatically, the attitudes and behaviors of the larger majority; the minority prevails over the majority to promote social change. Minority influence and associated social change are the focus of this section.

Dissenters, Deviants, and Marginal Groups

For conformity research, individuals, alone or in small groups, who dissent or deviate from or are marginal within the majority, are treated as targets of influence that are resistant due to personality or situational factors. Typically, groups try to socialize and include dissenters and deviant members (e.g., Levine & Moreland, 1994; Schachter, 1959), particularly if the group is small or retaining members is important (e.g., Wicker, 1968), and only marginalize and reject members as a last resort (Darley, 2001).

Marginal members are not powerless. By the fact that they deviate from or are resistant to the group's normative practices, they can raise questions in members' minds about what the group stands for. As such, members can view them as posing a real threat to the group and its identity. Not surprisingly, normative deviates can be characterized as "black sheep" and rejected from the group, particularly if they are clearly ingroup members (Marques, Abrams, & Serôdio, 2001; Marques & Paez, 1994).

A different dynamic comes into play when a member is not merely normatively marginal, but is someone who actively criticizes the group's norms and, by implication, identity; here, it is outgroup critics who are censured and rejected more than ingroup critics (Hornsey, 2005). Ingroup critics who are constructively critical and viewed by the group to be highly prototypical members can sometimes be effective in transforming the group's norms and identity; these people may have a leadership function in groups (e.g., Hogg & Van Knippenberg, 2003; see discussion of leadership later).

Dissenters, "deviants," critics, and marginal members are not always lone individuals. In many cases, they are numerous, and more often than not, they represent a coherent and distinctive subgroup: a group that can acquiesce in its minority position, engineer a schism and split away from the majority group (e.g., Sani & Reicher, 1999; see previous), or actively promote its position in an attempt to influence and change the majority's position. These latter active minorities are a potent source of social influence oriented toward innovation and social change.

Minority Influence

Typically, minorities are at an influence disadvantage relative to majorities. Often, they are less numerous, and in the eyes of the majority, they have less legitimate power and are less worthy of serious consideration. Asch (1952) found, as we saw previously, that a lone deviate (a confederate giving erroneous line judgments) was ridiculed and laughed at by a majority comprising true participants giving correct line judgments. However, sometimes a minority can have some influence and be taken seriously by a majority. In a variant of the single deviate study, Asch (1952) found that a correct majority of 11 true participants confronted by a deviant/incorrect minority of nine confederates remained independent (i.e., continued responding correctly) but took the minority's responses far more seriously; no one laughed.

The minority had some influence over the majority, albeit not enough in this experiment to produce manifest conformity. In the real world, however, minorities can be enormously influential. Some of the key questions are whether minorities and majorities gain influence via different social practices and, more fundamentally, whether the underlying psychology is different. For recent conceptual and empirical overviews of minority influence research, see Martin and Hewstone (2003, 2008) and Martin, Hewstone, Martin, and Gardikiotis (2008), and for a meta-analysis of research findings, see Wood, Lundgren, Ouellette, Busceme, and Blackstone (1994).

Conformity Bias and the Genetic Model

The scientific study of minority influence really began with Moscovici and Faucheux's (1972; Moscovici, 1976) critique of social influence research. They argued that there had been a "conformity bias" and a functionalist assumption in the literature on social influence. Nearly all research focused on how individuals or minorities yield to majority influence and conform to the majority, and assumed that conformity is functional because people are dependent on majorities for normative and informational reasons. From this perspective social influence *is* conformity, and is a process that produces uniformity, perpetuates stability, and sustains the status quo—leaving no room for innovation and social change.

Moscovici and Faucheux (1972) also famously "turned Asch on his head," by cleverly suggesting that Asch's studies had actually been studies of minority influence, not majority influence. The Asch paradigm appears to pit a lone individual (true participant) against an erroneous majority (confederates) on an unambiguous physical perception task. However, in reality, virtually no judgment tasks are truly unambiguous; if we find we are in disagreement with others, even over the apparently most objective of perceptions, we feel uncertain and question our perceptions. This sense of uncertainty would be particularly acute when an obviously correct perception is challenged. Asch's lines were *not* "unambiguous": There was disagreement between confederates and participants over the length of the lines. In reality, Asch's lone participant was a member of a large majority (the rest of humanity who would call the lines "correctly") confronted by a small minority (the confederates who called the lines "incorrectly"). Asch's

participants were influenced by a minority, and the participants who remained "independent" can be considered the conformists.

Building on this critique, Moscovici (1976) proposed a genetic model of social influence, calling it a "genetic" model because it focused on the way in which the dynamics of social conflict can generate (are genetic of) social change. The core premise was that all attempts at influence create disagreement-based conflict between the source and the target of influence. Because people generally do not like conflict, they try to resolve it. In the case of disagreement with a minority, an easy and common resolution is, as we saw earlier, to dismiss, discredit, or pathologize the minority (Papastamou, 1986).

However, it is more difficult to dismiss a minority if it "stands up to" the majority and adopts a behavioral style that conveys uncompromising certainty about and commitment to its position, and a genuine belief that the majority ought to change to adopt its position. Under these circumstances, the majority takes the minority seriously, reconsidering its own beliefs and considering the minority's position as a viable alternative. The most effective behavioral style a minority can adopt to prevail over the majority is one in which, among other things, the minority is diachronically and synchronically consistent, shows investment in its position by making significant personal and material sacrifices, and is seen to be acting out of principle rather than from ulterior motives.

Consistency is the most important minority behavioral style, as it speaks directly to the existence of an alternative norm and identity rather than merely an alternative opinion. When a number of people repeatedly agree on an alternative viewpoint, this draws attention to them as a distinct entity (e.g., Hamilton & Sherman, 1996) with a coherent and unshakable commitment to an alternative reality. From an attribution theory perspective (e.g., Kelley, 1967), this form of consistent and distinctive behavior cries out for explanation as it cannot be discounted. Furthermore, the behavior is likely to be internally attributed to invariant and perhaps essentialist (e.g., Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 1998) properties of the minority rather than to transient situational factors, which makes the minority even more of a force to be reckoned with and a focus of cogitation by the majority.

The role of consistency has been demonstrated by Moscovici and his colleagues in a series of ingenious experiments, referred to as the "blue–green" studies (Maass & Clark, 1984). In a modified version of the Asch paradigm, Moscovici, Lage, and Naffrechoux (1969) had four participants confront two confederates for a color perception task involving blue slides that varied only in intensity. The confederates were either consistent, always calling the slides "green," or inconsistent, calling the slides "green" two-thirds of the time and "blue" one-third of the time. There was also

a control condition with no confederates, just six true participants. The consistent minority had significantly more influence (9% conformity) than the inconsistent minority (less than 2% conformity). Although the conformity rate is much lower than with a consistent majority (recall that Asch reported an average conformity rate of 33%), it is, nevertheless, remarkable that four people (a numerical majority) were influenced by two people (a minority).

Moscovici and Lage (1976) employed the same color perception task to compare consistent and inconsistent minorities with consistent and inconsistent majorities. There was also a control condition. As before, the only minority to produce conformity was the consistent minority (10% conformity). Although this does not compare well with the rate of conformity to the consistent majority (40%), it is comparable with the rate of conformity to the inconsistent majority (12%). Other studies have shown that the most important aspects of consistency are synchronic consistency (i.e., consensus) among members of the minority (Nemeth, Wachtler, & Endicott, 1977) and perceived consistency, not merely objective repetition (Nemeth, Swedlund, & Kanki, 1974).

Moscovici's (1976) focus on behavioral style was extended by Mugny (1982) who focused on the strategic use of behavioral styles by real, active minorities struggling to change societal practices. Mugny argued that because minorities are typically in powerless positions relative to majorities, they have to negotiate their influence with the majority rather than unilaterally adopt a behavioral style. Mugny distinguished between rigid and flexible negotiating styles, arguing that a rigid minority that refuses to compromise on any issues risks being rejected as dogmatic, and one that is too prepared to flexibly shift its ground and compromise risks being rejected as inconsistent (the classic case of "flip-flopping"). There is a fine line to tread, but a degree of flexibility is more effective than rigidity. A minority should be absolutely consistent with regard to its core position but should adopt a relatively open-minded and reasonable negotiating style on less core issues (e.g., Mugny & Papastamou, 1981).

Conversion Theory

Moscovici's (1980, 1985) conversion theory is still the dominant explanation of minority influence. While his genetic model focused largely on how a minority's behavioral style (in particular, attributions based on the minority's consistent behavior) could enhance its influence over a majority, conversion theory is a more cognitive account of how a member of the majority processes the minority's message.

Moscovici argued that majorities and minorities exert influence through different processes. Majority influence brings about direct public compliance for reasons of normative or informational dependence. People engage in a

comparison process in which they concentrate attention on what others say to know how to fit in with them. Majority views are accepted passively without much thought. The outcome is public compliance with majority views with little or no private attitude change.

In contrast, minority influence brings about indirect, often latent, private change in opinion due to the cognitive conflict and restructuring that deviant ideas produce. People engage in a *validation process* in which they carefully examine and cogitate over the validity of their beliefs. The outcome is little or no overt public agreement with the minority, for fear of being viewed as a member of the minority, but a degree of private internal attitude change that may only surface later on. Minorities produce a conversion effect as a consequence of active consideration of the minority point of view.

It is worth noting that Moscovici's dual-process model of influence embodies a distinction that resembles, according to Turner (1991), the one discussed earlier between normative and informational influence. It also resembles Petty and Cacioppo's (1986) distinction between peripheral and central processing, and Chaiken's (e.g., Bohner, Moskowitz, & Chaiken, 1995) distinction between heuristic and systematic processing.

Martin and Hewstone's (2003) review of empirical evidence for conversion theory is organized around three testable hypotheses. The *direction-of-attention hypothesis* that majority influence causes people to focus on their relationship to the majority (interpersonal focus) whereas minority influence causes people to focus on the minority message itself (message focus) is supported (e.g., Campbell, Tesser, & Fairey, 1986). The *content-of-thinking* hypothesis that majority influence leads to superficial examination of arguments whereas minority influence leads to detailed evaluation of arguments has support from thought-listing studies of cognitive elaboration (e.g., Maass & Clark, 1983; Martin, 1996; Mucchi-Faina, Maass, & Volpato, 1991).

The *differential-influence* hypothesis that majority influence produces more public/direct influence than private/indirect influence whereas minority influence produces the opposite has received the most research attention and solid support (see meta-analysis by Wood, Lundgren, Ouellette, Busceme, and Blackstone, 1994). For example, the studies described previously by Moscovici, Lage, and Naffrechoux (1969) and Moscovici and Lage (1976) found, as would be expected from conversion theory, that conversion through minority influence took longer to manifest itself than compliance through majority influence; there was evidence for private change in color thresholds (i.e., conversion) among participants exposed to a consistent minority, although they did not behave (or had not yet behaved) publicly in accordance with this change.

Other support for the differential-influence hypothesis comes from an intriguing series of "blue–green" experiments by Moscovici and Personnaz (1980, 1986). Individual participants, judging the color of obviously blue slides, were exposed to a single confederate who always called the blue slides "green." They were told that most people (82%) would respond as the confederate did or that only few people (18%) would. In this way, the confederate was a source of majority or minority influence. Participants publicly called out the color of the slide and then (and this is the ingenious twist) the slide was removed and participants wrote down privately the color of the after-image. Unknown to most people, including the participants, the after-image is always the complementary color; for blue slides, the after-image would be yellow and for green slides, purple. There were three phases to the experiment: an influence phase in which participants were exposed to the confederate, preceded and followed by phases in which the confederate was absent and there was thus no influence. The remarkable finding was that majority influence hardly affected the after-image (it remained yellow, indicating that participants had seen a blue slide), but that minority influence shifted the after-image toward purple (indicating that participants had actually "seen" a green slide), and the effect persisted even when the minority confederate was absent. Because some other research teams have failed to replicate Moscovici and Personnaz's findings, Martin (1998) conducted a series of five careful replications to come to the relatively cautious conclusion that the finding may at least partially be an artifact of the amount of attention participants were paying to the slides: the greater the attention the greater the after-image shift.

Convergent-Divergent Theory

A slightly different account of majority/minority differences in influence has been proposed by Nemeth (1986, 1995). Because people expect to share attitudes with the majority, the discovery of disagreement associated with majority influence is surprising and stressful and leads to a self-protective narrowing of focus of attention. This produces convergent thinking that inhibits consideration of alternative views. In contrast, because people do not expect to share attitudes with a minority, the discovery of disagreement associated with minority influence is unsurprising and not stressful and does not narrow focus of attention. It allows divergent thinking that involves consideration of a range of alternative views, even ones not proposed by the minority. In this way, Nemeth believes that exposure to minority views can stimulate innovation and creativity, generate more and better ideas, and lead to superior decision making in groups. The key difference between Nemeth's (1986) convergent–divergent theory and Moscovici's (1980) conversion theory

hinges on the relationship between "stress" and message processing: For Nemeth, majority-induced stress restricts message processing; for Moscovici, minority-induced stress elaborates message processing.

Convergent-divergent theory is supported by research using relatively straightforward cognitive tasks showing that minority influence improves performance relative to majority influence on tasks that benefit from divergent thinking (e.g., Martin & Hewstone, 1999; Nemeth & Wachtler, 1983), that majority influence improves performance relative to minority influence on tasks that benefit from convergent thinking (e.g., Peterson & Nemeth, 1996), and that minority influence leads to the generation of more creative and novel judgments than does majority influence (e.g., Mucchi-Faina, Maass, & Volpato, 1991; Nemeth & Wachtler, 1983). Research also shows that minority influence leads people to explore different strategies for problem solving whereas majority influence restricts people to the majority endorsed strategy (e.g., Butera, Mugny, Legrenzi, & Pérez, 1996; Peterson & Nemeth, 1996) and that minority influence encourages issue-relevant thinking whereas majority influence encourages message-relevant thinking (e.g., De Dreu, De Vries, Gordijn, & Schuurman, 1999).

Martin and Hewstone (2003) note in their review of minority influence that the role of stress has not been properly tested, and it is not clear whether convergent–divergent theory will hold up so well in studies using more complex cognitive tasks or in attitude domains (Kruglanski & Mackie, 1990).

Social Identity and Self-Categorization

We saw earlier that the social identity theory of influence in groups, referent informational influence theory (e.g., Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Hogg & Turner, 1987; Turner & Oakes, 1989), views prototypical ingroup members as the most reliable source of normative information and that through self-categorization and prototype-based depersonalization of self, members behave in line with the norm. From this perspective, minorities should be extremely ineffective sources of influence; they are low in prototypicality and, in many cases, are widely stigmatized by the majority group as social outgroups, or are "psychologized" as deviant individuals.

So, from a social identity perspective, how can a minority within one's group be influential? According to David and Turner (2001), the problem for ingroup minorities is that the majority makes intragroup social comparisons that highlight and accentuate the minority's otherness, essentially instantiating a majority–minority intergroup differentiation within the group. The key to effective minority influence is for the majority to shift its level of social comparison to focus on intergroup comparisons with a genuine shared outgroup; this automatically transcends perceived intragroup divisions and accentuates the minority's ingroup status. The minority is now viewed as part of the ingroup, and there is indirect attitude change that may not be manifested overtly. For example, a radical faction within Islam will have more influence within Islam if Muslims make intergroup comparisons between Islam and the West than if they dwell on intra-Islam comparisons between majority and minority factions.

Studies by David and Turner (1996, 1999) support this analysis; ingroup minorities produced more indirect attitude change (i.e., conversion) than did outgroup minorities, and majorities produced surface compliance. However, other research finds that an outgroup minority has just as much indirect influence as an ingroup minority (see review by Pérez & Mugny, 1998) and, according to Martin and Hewstone (2003), more research is needed to provide evidence that minority conversion is generated by a self-categorization process.

Vested Interest and the Leniency Contract

Overall, however, minorities are more influential if they can avoid being categorized by the majority as a despised outgroup and can be considered by the majority as part of the ingroup. The challenge for a minority is to be able to achieve this at the same time as promulgating an unwaveringly consistent alternative viewpoint that differs from the majority position.

Crano's context–comparison model of minority influence describes how this may happen (e.g., Crano & Alvaro, 1998; Crano & Chen, 1998; Crano & Seyranian, 2009). When a minority's message involves weak or unvested attitudes, an ingroup minority can be quite persuasive—the message is distinctive and attracts attention and elaboration, and, by virtue of the message being unvested and the minority a clear ingroup, there is little threat that might invite derogation or rejection of the minority. An outgroup minority is likely to be derogated and not influential.

When the message involves strong or vested attitudes, it is more difficult for the minority to prevail. The message is not only distinctive but speaks to core attributes; however, the fact that the minority is part of the ingroup makes members reluctant to derogate people who are, after all, ingroup members. One way out of this dilemma is to establish what Crano calls a leniency contract, which allows the target to elaborate on the ingroup minority's message without derogating the minority, open-mindedly with little defensiveness or hostility. This leniency toward an ingroup minority leads to indirect attitude change. An outgroup minority does not invite leniency and is therefore likely to be strongly derogated as a threat to core group attitudes.

Social Change

Minorities are a force for innovation and social change. Moscovici's (1976) original agenda in studying active minorities was to understand social change. As we saw earlier, his genetic model and subsequent research by Mugny (1982) outlined a number of behavioral styles and strategic behaviors that help an active minority prevail over a majority. However, subsequent research and theory has focused increasingly on information processing (e.g., Martin & Hewstone, 2008) and has been somewhat divorced from a separate literature that deals with social movements and collective mobilization in the service of social change.

Social Movements and Collective Mobilization

Active minorities often organize themselves into social movements that engage in collective mobilization and sustained social protest. Collective protest has often been characterized as crowd behavior and studied as if it were the primitive irrational behavior of a mob of uncoordinated and pathologically deviant individuals—people in the grip of a group mind and primitive emotions (cf. LeBon, 1896/1908; McDougall, 1920) or lacking a sense of responsibility due to deindividuation (cf. Zimbardo, 1970).

More recent social identity analyses of the crowd (e.g., Reicher, 2001) believe these approaches are metatheoretically predicated on an ideology that protects the establishment and perpetuates the status quo. Instead, social identity approaches see crowd behavior as collective protest in normatively unstructured contexts in which members of the crowd determine identity- and situation-appropriate behavioral norms through referent informational influence and then conform to these norms through self-categorization (e.g., Reicher, 1984a, 2001). From this perspective, deindividuation is not a loss of identity associated with regression to primitive instincts, but a change in identity associated with conformity to identity-defining group norms (Klein, Spears, & Reicher, 2007; Postmes & Spears, 1998; Reicher, Spears, & Postmes, 1995).

One key issue for social protest is what transforms individual discontents or grievances shared by a minority into collective action. How and why do sympathizers become mobilized as activists or participants? What triggers a minority to rise up and fight for social change? Klandermans (1997) provides a conceptual architecture showing how a number of social psychological processes may work together to mobilize collective action. According to Klandermans, mobilization involves translating individual attitudes into overt behavior. Sympathizers have sympathetic attitudes toward an issue, yet these attitudes do not automatically translate into behavior. Participation also resembles a social dilemma (e.g., Dawes & Messick, 2000). Protest is generally *for* a social good (e.g., equality) or *against* a social ill (e.g., pollution), and as success benefits everyone irrespective of participation but failure harms participants more, it is tempting to "free ride" (e.g., Kerr & Bruun, 1983): to remain a sympathizer rather than become a participant. Finally, Klandermans notes that protest can only be understood as intergroup behavior that occurs in what he calls "multiorganizational fields": That is, protest movements involve the clash of ideas and ideologies between groups and politicized and strategic articulation with other more or less sympathetic organizations.

Klandermans (1997; for overview see Stürmer & Simon, 2004) described four steps in social movement participation. The first step is to become part of the group's mobilization potential by being a sympathizer. This is determined by feeling that one's group has been collectively disadvantaged or deprived (cf. Walker & Pettigrew, 1984), by having an us-versus-them orientation that blames an outgroup for one's own group's plight, and by believing that social change through collective action is possible. The second step is to become a target of mobilization attempts. Being a sympathizer is not enough; one must also be informed, via media access and informal communication networks, about what forms of protest are occurring that one can engage in.

The third step is to become motivated to participate. Being a sympathizer and knowing what is going on is not sufficient; one must also be motivated to participate. Motivation arises from the value that people place on the outcome of protest and the extent to which they believe that the protest will deliver the goods. Motivation is strongest if the collective benefit of the outcome of protest is highly valued (collective motive), if important others value one's participation (normative motive), and if valued personal outcomes are anticipated (reward motive). The normative and reward motives are important to prevent sympathizers from free-riding on others' participation. This analysis of motivation is based on Ajzen and Fishbein's (1980) expectancy–value analysis and their theory of reasoned action account of attitude–behavior correspondence.

Finally, barriers to participation must be overcome. Even powerful motivation may not translate into action if there are insurmountable obstacles, such as no transport to the protest or ill health. However, these obstacles are more likely to be surmounted if motivation is high.

Empirical support for Klandermans's integrative model resides in empirical support for the various conceptual components that it rests on. Although they agree with most of Klandermans's analysis, Stürmer & Simon (2004) argue that the cost–benefit aspect places too much emphasis on individual decision making. Instead, they argue that when people identify strongly with a group, they have a powerfully shared perception of collective injustice, needs, and

goals. They also share behavioral intentions, trust and like one another, and are collectively influenced by group norms and legitimate group leaders. Furthermore, group motivation eclipses personal motivation. Provided that members believe that protest is an effective way forward, these processes increase the probability of participation in collective protest.

LEADERSHIP

Social movements as agents of social change almost always coalesce behind and are motivated by leaders who focus and embody a vision of the group's distinctive goals and identity. Since leaders serve this function for almost all groups, big and small (leadership may serve an evolutionary function for the survival of our species; Van Vugt, Hogan, & Kaiser, 2008), no discussion of influence can be complete without a significant discussion of leadership. Leaders are the focus of influence, the individuals who give orders, make requests, define norms and identity, and motivate normative behavior. However, as explained at the start of this chapter, the study of influence now tends not to discuss leadership, and the study of leadership is largely conducted in the organization and management sciences with a focus on business leadership and the psychology of the CEO and with little linkage to the social psychology of influence. This section summarizes some of the key theories and research on leadership from social psychology and the organization sciences (Hogg, 2007a; also see Northhouse, 2007; Yukl, 2006). Research on gender and leadership is covered in full detail elsewhere in this book (see Wood and Eagly's chapter, volume 1), so it is not covered here.

Defining Leadership

It is difficult to find a single definition of leadership that embraces all the research done on leadership. There are numerous definitions that reflect and are closely tied to the variety of different theories of, approaches to, and perspectives on leadership. Leadership is a quintessentially social psychological phenomenon. Leaders influence other people, and *influence* is a core component of classic definitions of social psychology: "The scientific investigation of how the thoughts, feelings and behaviors of individuals are influenced by the actual, imagined or implied presence of others" (Allport, 1954, p. 5).

One useful definition is provided by Chemers, who defines leadership as "a process of social influence through which an individual enlists and mobilizes the aid of others in the attainment of a collective goal" (Chemers, 2001, p. 376). Leadership requires there to be an individual, or

clique, which influences the behavior of another individual or group of individuals; wherever there are leaders, there must be followers. Definitions of leadership are generally quite broad and inclusive, which begs the question of what is *not* leadership.

If I asked you to mow my lawn and you agreed because you liked me or were afraid of me, it would be influence and compliance (Cialdini & Trost, 1998), not leadership. Relatedly, the exercise of power is influence but is generally not considered to be leadership (Chemers, 2001; Lord, Brown, & Harvey, 2001; Moscovici, 1976; Raven, 1993). If you agreed because you knew that there was a neighborhood norm to mow neighbors' lawns, it would be conformity (e.g., Turner, 1991), not leadership. If, on the other hand, I had first convinced you that we should develop such a norm, and you subsequently adhered to that norm, then that most definitely would be leadership. Leaders play a critical role in defining collective goals, and, in this respect, leadership is more typically a group process than an interpersonal process; it is an influence process that plays out more noticeably in group than interpersonal contexts.

In defining leadership, an important distinction is between effective/ineffective leaders and good/bad leaders (e.g., Kellerman, 2004). Effective leaders are successful in setting new goals, whatever they might be, and influencing others to achieve them. Here, the evaluation of leadership is largely an objective matter of fact—how much influence did the leader have in setting new goals and were the goals achieved? Most leadership research is concerned with leadership effectiveness.

In contrast, evaluating whether a leader is good or bad is a subjective judgment based on one's preferences and perspective and one's goals and group memberships. We evaluate leaders in terms of their character (e.g., nice, nasty, charismatic), the ethics and morality of the means they use to influence others and achieve goals (e.g., persuasion, coercion, oppression, democratic decision making), and the nature of the goals that they lead their followers toward (e.g., saving the environment, reducing starvation and disease, producing a commodity, combating oppression, denying human rights, engaging in genocide). Good leaders are those who have attributes we applaud, use means we approve of, and set and achieve goals we value.

Individual Differences and Leadership Personalities

Leaders tend to stand out against the background of the group and are the focus of our attention. Not surprisingly, we tend to personify leadership, underemphasizing the context and process of leadership and explaining the leader's behavior in terms of invariant personality dispositions

(cf. Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 1998; Ross, 1977). There is evidence that we do indeed do this (e.g., Fiske & Dépret, 1996; Meindl, 1995; Meindl, Ehrlich, & Dukerich, 1985).

Social psychologists are little different from people in everyday life and have, therefore, tried to explain leadership in terms of personality constellations that make some people more effective leaders than others. The "great person" perspective on leadership has a long history, going as far back as Plato and ancient Greece. The view that leadership effectiveness is innate (e.g., Galton, 1892) is generally rejected by most "great person" scholars, who prefer the view that leadership ability is acquired early in life in the form of an enduring constellation of personality attributes that imbue people with charisma and a predisposition to lead (e.g., Carlyle, 1841; House, 1977).

Research has tried to identify these attributes. Early research identified a handful of weak correlates (among which intelligence and talkativeness are the most reliable), leading Stogdill to conclude that leadership is not "mere possession of some combination of traits" (Stogdill, 1948, p. 66), and others to proclaim that the search for a leadership personality is simplistic and futile (e.g., Conger & Kanungo, 1998). In general, correlations among traits and between traits and effective leadership are low (Stogdill, 1974, reports an average correlation of .30).

The belief that some people are better leaders than others because they have enduring traits that predispose them to effective leadership has reemerged, as we see later, in a different guise in modern theories of transformational leadership that place an emphasis on charisma (e.g., Avolio & Yammarino, 2003; Bass, 1985; Conger & Kanungo, 1998). Rather than focusing on specific traits, this tradition focuses on the wider Big Five personality dimensions of extraversion/surgency, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, and intellect/openness to experience. A definitive meta-analysis by Judge, Bono, Ilies and Gerhardt (2002) reports a multiple correlation of .58 of these attributes with leadership, extraversion/surgency, intellect/openness to experience, and conscientiousness as the best predictors of effective leadership.

Situational Perspectives

In contrast to personality approaches is the view that anyone can lead effectively if the situation is right. However, this may be too extreme. For example, Simonton (1980) analyzed 300 military battles to find that situational factors did not account for all the outcomes; personal attributes of specific leaders were also significant correlates.

In reality, effective leadership is a function of a match between behavioral style or personality attributes and the particular requirements of a specific leadership situation. Different situations call for different leadership properties, and, therefore, the most effective leader in a given context is the group member who is best equipped to assist the group in achieving its objectives (Bales, 1950).

For example, Carter and Nixon (1949) had pairs of high school students perform three different tasks: an intellectual task, a clerical task, and a mechanical assembly task. Those who took the lead in the first two tasks rarely led in the mechanical assembly task. In another example, Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, and Sherif (1961; Sherif, 1966) documented in one of their boys' camp studies a change of leader in one of the groups when the situation changed from intragroup norm formation to intergroup competition.

The Behavior of Leaders

Based on dissatisfaction with the validity and predictive reliability of the construct of personality, another perspective on leadership focused on what leaders do—their actual behavior. This perspective spawned some of social psychology's classic leadership research. For example, Lippitt and White (1943) manipulated leadership style (autocratic, democratic, and laissez-faire) and measured the effect on group atmosphere, morale, and effectiveness in after-school clubs for young boys. They found that a democratic leadership style was most effective; it produced a friendly, group-centered, task-oriented atmosphere that was associated with relatively high group productivity and was unaffected by whether the leader was physically present or not.

Another program of research identified two key leadership roles: *task specialist* and *socioemotional specialist* (Bales, 1950). No single person could occupy both roles simultaneously, and the task specialist was more likely to be the dominant leader. Task specialists tend to be centrally involved, often by offering opinions and giving directions, in the task-oriented aspects of group life, whereas socioemotional specialists tend to respond and pay attention to the feelings of other group members.

The Ohio State leadership studies constitute a third leadership program (e.g., Fleishman, 1973; Stogdill, 1974). A scale for measuring leadership behavior was devised—the *leader behavior description questionnaire* (LBDQ)—and a distinction was drawn between *initiating structure* and *consideration*. Leaders high on initiating structure define the group's objectives and organize members' work toward the attainment of these goals: they are task oriented. Leaders rating high on consideration are concerned with the welfare of subordinates and seek to promote harmonious relationships in the group; they are relationship oriented. Unlike Bales (1950), who believed that task-oriented and socioemotional attributes were inversely related, the Ohio State researchers

believed their dimensions to be independent: A single person could be high on both initiating structure (task-oriented) and consideration (socioemotional), and such a person would be a particularly effective leader. Research supports this latter view (e.g., Sorrentino & Field, 1986; Stogdill, 1974).

The general distinction between a leadership style that pays attention to the group task and getting things done and one that pays attention to relationships among group members is pervasive in the literature. It appears in Fiedler's (1964) contingency theory of leadership and, in a slightly different guise, in leader–member exchange (LMX) theory's emphasis on the quality of the leader's relationship with his or her followers (e.g., Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995). It is also a distinction that may hold across cultures, though what counts as task-oriented or socioemotional leadership behavior may vary from culture to culture (e.g., Smith, Misumi, Tayeb, Peterson, & Bond, 1989).

Contingency Theories

Contingency theories of leadership recognize that the leadership effectiveness of particular leadership behaviors or styles is contingent on the properties of the leadership situation. Some styles are better suited to some situations or tasks than are others.

Fiedler's Contingency Theory

Probably the best known contingency theory is that proposed by Fiedler (1964, 1967). Fiedler, like Bales (1950), distinguished between task-oriented and relationship-oriented leaders. He measured leadership style in a rather unusual way with his least preferred co-worker (LPC) scale, in which respondents rated their least preferred co-worker on semantic differentials. Respondents with high LPC scores were relationship oriented (because they were positive about a poor-performing co-worker); respondents with low LPC score were task oriented (because they were harsh on a poor performer).

Fiedler classified situations in terms of the quality of leader–member relations, the structural clarity of the task, and the power and authority the leader had by virtue of his or her position as leader. Good leader–member relations in conjunction with a clear task and substantial position-power furnished maximal "situational control" (making leadership easy), whereas poor leader–member relations, a fuzzy task, and low position-power furnished minimal "situational control" (making leadership difficult).

Fiedler predicted that task-oriented leaders would be most effective when situational control was low (the group needs a directive leader to focus on getting things done) *and* when it was high (the group is doing just fine so there is little need to worry about morale and relationships), and

relationship-oriented leaders would be more effective when situational control was between these extremes. Against a background of some controversy and criticism (e.g., Peters, Hartke, & Pohlmann, 1985) focused on the measurement of situational control and on the characterization of leadership style as an invariant personal quality, Fiedler's predictions have generally been supported—see meta-analyses by Strube and Garcia (1981) and Schriesheim, Tepper, and Tetrault (1994).

One troublesome finding, reported by Kennedy (1982), is that the 20% or so of leaders who have neither high nor low LPC scores are actually the most effective leaders of all, and their effectiveness is not influenced by situational control. Another limitation of Fiedler's theory is that it is somewhat static; it does not focus on the dynamic interactive processes that occur within a group between leaders and followers and among followers.

Normative Decision Theory

Normative decision theory (NDT) is a contingency model of leadership in group decision-making contexts (Vroom & Jago, 1988; Vroom & Yetton, 1973). NDT identifies three decision-making strategies among which leaders choose: autocratic (subordinate input is not sought), consultative (input is sought, but the leader retains authority to make the final decision), and group decision making (leader and subordinates are equal partners in a shared decision-making process). The efficacy of these strategies is contingent on the quality of leader–subordinate relationships (which influences how committed and supportive subordinates are) and on task clarity and structure (which influences the leader's need for subordinate input).

Autocratic leadership is fast and effective if subordinate commitment and support are high and the task is clear and well structured. When the task is less clear, subordinate involvement is needed and, therefore, consultative leadership is best. When subordinates are not committed or supportive, group decision making is required to increase participation and commitment. Predictions from NDT are reasonably well supported (e.g., Field & House, 1990); leaders and managers report better decisions and better subordinate ratings when they follow the prescriptions of the theory. However, there is a tendency for subordinates to prefer fully participative group decision making, even when it is not the most effective strategy.

Path-Goal Theory

Path-goal theory (PGT; House, 1971; House & Mitchell, 1974) is another well-known contingency theory, although it can also be classified as a transactional leadership theory (see later). For PGT, a leader's main function is to motivate followers by clarifying the paths (i.e., behaviors and actions)

that will help them attain their goals. There are two types of behaviors available to leaders to do this: *structuring* behaviors whereby the leader directs task-related activities, and *consideration* behaviors whereby the leader addresses followers' personal and emotional needs (this distinction is that identified by the LBDQ described previously).

PGT predicts that structuring will be most effective when followers are unclear about their goals and how to reach them (e.g., when the task is new, difficult, or ambiguous). When tasks are well understood, structuring is less effective or can even backfire because it is viewed as meddling and micro-management. Consideration is most effective when the task is boring or uncomfortable but can backfire when followers are already engaged and motivated because it is considered distracting and unnecessary.

Empirical support for PGT is mixed, and most scholars agree that tests of the theory tend to suffer from flawed methodology and from being incomplete and simplistic (Schriesheim & Neider, 1996). For these reasons research on PGT tapered off in the early 1980s. Recently, House (1996) has reinvigorated the theory by addressing some of these concerns and by making it feel contemporary; for example, the interpersonal focus of the original formulation has been expanded to include ways in which a leader can motivate an entire work group rather than just individual followers.

Situational Leadership Theory

Situational leadership theory (Hersey & Blanchard, 1969) proposes that effective leaders need to be able to tailor their behavior to the situational demands of subordinates' level of task maturity (i.e., ability) and psychological maturity (i.e., willingness) to complete a task at hand. The distinction between task and relations behavior that surfaces repeatedly in leadership research is here relabeled *directing* and *supporting*. These dimensions are orthogonal, creating four leadership behaviors: *telling* (high directive, low supportive), *selling* (high directive, high supportive), *participating* (low directive, high supportive), and *delegating* (low directive, low supportive). So, for example, *telling* is best suited to low maturity/ability followers and *participating* to high maturity/willingness followers.

Intuitively this makes sense, but empirical support is sparse and the theory has a rather narrow conception of situational factors. However, it does underline the need for leaders to adapt their behavior to the situation, including the qualities of the followers. In leadership, followers matter (Shamir, Pillai, Bligh, & Uhl-Bien, 2006).

Transactional Leadership

One limitation of contingency theories is that they do not focus on the dynamic interaction between leaders and followers that allows leaders to lead and encourages followers to follow—an interaction in which leaders and followers provide support and gratification for one another (Messick, 2005).

Transactional theories view leadership as a process of exchange, similar to contractual relations in economic life that are based on good faith. Leaders transact with followers to get things done, setting expectations and goals, and providing recognition and rewards for task completion (Burns, 1978). Mutual benefits are exchanged (transacted) between leaders and followers against a background of contingent rewards and punishments that shape up cooperation and trust (Bass, 1985). The transactions may also have an equity dimension (Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978). Because effective leaders play a greater role in steering groups to their goals than do followers, followers may reinstate equity by rewarding the leader with social approval, praise, prestige, status and power—the trappings of effective leadership.

Although path-goal theory (PGT) discussed previously (House, 1971) is a contingency theory because of its focus on the situation-contingent effectiveness of leadership behaviors, it can also be considered a transactional theory because it focuses on transactions between leaders and followers that enhance motivation and lead to goal attainment.

Idiosyncrasy Credit

An early transactional approach to leadership is Hollander's (1958; Hollander & Julian, 1970) analysis of idiosyncrasy credit. Hollander argued that effective leaders need to be allowed by the group to be innovative, to experiment with new ideas and new directions; to be idiosyncratic. Drawing on the equity argument above, Hollander argued that leaders who had behaved in a highly conformist manner as they climbed the organizational ladder accumulated credits, called "idiosyncrasy credits," from the group. When the leader arrived at the top of the organization, followers would effectively hand over these credits (as a resource) to the leader, who could then "spend" them by behaving idiosyncratically, innovatively, and creatively.

An early study by Merei (1949) is often cited as supporting this analysis. Merei introduced older children who had shown leadership potential into small groups of younger children in a Hungarian nursery and found that the most successful leaders were those who initially complied with existing group practices and who only gradually and later introduced minor variations.

Going beyond this strictly interpersonal approach, the idea that leaders who initially conform to group norms are ultimately allowed to be innovative and, paradoxically, non-normative has recently been given a more group oriented treatment by social identity analyses of leadership (Hogg, 2001; Hogg & Van Knippenberg, 2003). As described later,

the key idea is that normative leaders are assumed to identify strongly with the group and are considered "one of us," and if they behave nonnormatively and innovatively they are trusted to be doing so in the best interest of the group (cf. Abrams, Randsley de Moura, Marques, & Hutchison, 2008).

Vertical Dyad Linkage and Leader–Member Exchange Theories

Leader–member transactions are center stage in the vertical dyad linkage (VDL) model of leadership (Danserau, Graen, & Haga, 1975), which has evolved into leader–member exchange (LMX) theory (e.g., Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995; Sparrowe & Liden, 1997). According to VDL, leaders develop dyadic exchange relationships with different specific subordinates. In these dyadic relationships, the subordinate can either be treated as a close and valued "ingroup" member with the leader or in a more remote manner as an "outgroup" member who is separate from the leader.

In LMX theory, this dichotomous, ingroup versus outgroup treatment of leader–member exchange relationships has been replaced by a continuum of quality of exchange relationships, ranging from ones that are based on mutual trust, respect, and obligation (high quality LMX relationships) to ones that are mechanically based on the terms of the formal employment contract between leader and subordinate (low quality LMX relationships). Effective leadership hinges on the development of high quality LMX relationships. High quality relationships motivate subordinates to internalize the group's and the leader's goals, whereas in low quality relationships, subordinates simply comply with the leader's goals without internalizing them as their own. However, from a leader's point of view, high quality relationships are labor intensive and so, over time, leaders tend to develop them with only a small subset of group members and develop low quality relationships with the rest of the group.

Research confirms that differentiated LMX relationships do exist in most organizations; that high quality LMX relationships are more likely to develop when the leader and the subordinate have similar attitudes, like one another, belong to the same sociodemographic groups, and both perform at a high level; and that high quality LMX relationships are associated with better performing and more satisfied workers who are more committed to the organization and less likely to leave (see Gerstner & Day, 1997; Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995; Schriesheim, Castro, & Cogliser, 1999).

One limitation of LMX theory is its exclusive focus on dyadic leader–member relations. In reality, such relations are located in a wider context of shared group membership in which followers interact with one another as group members and are influenced by their perceptions of the leader's relations with other group members (Hogg, Martin & Weeden, 2004; Scandura, 1999). From a social identity perspective, one might expect that members who identify strongly with a group would find differentiated LMX relationships that favor some members over others to be uncomfortably personalized and fragmentary of the group and would not endorse such leaders. They might prefer a more depersonalized leadership style that treated all members relatively equally as group members, endorsing such leaders more strongly. Two field surveys of leadership perceptions in organizations in Wales and India have confirmed this hypothesis (Hogg et al., 2005).

Transformational Leadership

Transactional theories of leadership represent a focus on leadership, but transactional leadership is itself a leadership style that can be contrasted to other leadership styles. Transactional leaders appeal to followers' self-interest, whereas transformational leaders inspire followers to adopt a vision that involves more than individual self-interest (Burns, 1978; Judge & Bono, 2000). A third leadership style—laissez-faire (noninterfering) leadership, which involves not making choices or taking decisions and not rewarding others or shaping their behavior—has been added to transactional and transformational leadership to complete what Avolio (1999) calls the full-range leadership theory (see Antonakis & House, 2003).

The three main components of transformational leadership are: (a) individualized consideration (careful attention to followers' needs, abilities, and aspirations to raise aspirations, improve abilities, and satisfy needs); (b) intellectual stimulation (challenging of followers' basic thinking, assumptions, and practices to help them develop newer and better mind-sets and practices); and (c) charismatic/inspiring leadership which provides the energy, reasoning, and sense of urgency that transforms followers (Avolio & Bass, 1987; Bass, 1985). The components of transactional and transformational leadership are measured by the multifactor leadership questionnaire (MLQ), which (now in its fifth version) has been extraordinarily widely used and is the leadership questionnaire of choice of the organizational and management research communities, producing numerous large-scale meta-analyses of findings (e.g., Lowe, Kroeck, & Sivasubramaniam, 1996).

There is, however, some concern that the black box of transformation remains shut. What happens in the head of a follower to transform leader behavior into follower thought and behavior—what is the social psychology of transformation? In answer to this question, Shamir, House, and Arthur (1993) suggest that followers personally identify with the leader and, in this way, make the leader's vision their own;

Dvir, Eden, Avolio, and Shamir (2002) suggest that the behavior of transformational leaders causes followers to identify more strongly with the organization's core values. For the social identity theory of leadership (Hogg, 2001, see later), members look to and trust group prototypical leaders to define identity relevant group norms; members will follow and internalize leaders' innovative and transformational lead.

Charisma and Charismatic Leadership

Charisma is a key component of transformational leadership. Charisma facilitates effective leadership because charismatic people are emotionally expressive, enthusiastic, driven, eloquent, visionary, self-confident, and responsive to others (e.g., House, Spangler, & Woycke, 1991); all are attributes allowing a person to be influential and persuasive and, therefore, able to make others buy their vision for the group and sacrifice personal goals for collective goals. Meindl and Lerner (1983; Meindl, Ehrlich, & Dukerich, 1985) talk about visionary leaders heightening followers' sense of shared identity and how this shared identity produces a collective "heroic motive" that puts group goals ahead of personal goals.

The notion of charisma is so central to transformational leadership theory that a distinction was drawn between good and bad charisma (e.g., O'Connor, Mumford, Clifton, Gessner, & Connelly, 1995). Good charismatic leaders have socialized charisma that they use in a "morally uplifting" manner to improve society; they are transformational heroes (e.g., Gandhi). Bad charismatic leaders use personalized charisma to tear down groups and society; they are nontransformational villains (e.g., Hitler). The problem here is that one person's transformational leader can sometimes be another person's war criminal or vice versa (much like one person's freedom fighter is another's terrorist). For example, whether Osama Bin Laden is a transformational hero or nontransformational villain may rest more on one's ideological leanings than on transformational leadership theory's notion of good versus bad charisma.

There is another more general issue with the role of charisma in transformational leadership. Scholars talk of charismatic leadership as a product of the leader's personal charisma and followers' reactions to the leader's charisma; personal charisma alone may not guarantee charismatic leadership (e.g., Bryman, 1992). However, it is difficult to escape the inference that charisma is an enduring personality trait. For example, charismatic leadership has been linked to the Big Five personality traits of extraversion/surgency, agreeableness, and intellect/openness to experience (e.g., Judge, Bono, Ilies, & Gerhardt, 2002) and to the related construct of visionary leadership (e.g., Conger & Kanungo, 1998). Visionary leaders are special people who can identify attractive future goals and objectives for a group and mobilize followers to internalize these as their own. The worry is that this perspective recreates some of the problems of earlier personality theories of leadership (see Haslam & Platow, 2001).

An alternative perspective on the role of charisma in leadership is that a charismatic personality is constructed for the leader by followers; charisma is more a consequence or correlate, not a cause, of effective leadership. For example, Meindl's (1995; Meindl, Ehrlich, & Dukerich, 1985) *romance of leadership* argues that people have a strong tendency to attribute effective leadership to the leader's behavior and there is a halo effect in which the leader's shortcomings are overlooked. The social identity theory of leadership (e.g., Hogg, 2001; Hogg & Van Knippenberg, 2003; see later) provides a similar analysis. Social identity processes in salient groups that members identify strongly with render group prototypical leaders influential and attractive, imbue them with trust, and allow them to be innovative. Followers attribute these qualities internally to the leader's personality, thus constructing a charismatic leadership personality. Empirical studies provide some support for the attributional construction of charisma (e.g., Fiske & Dépret, 1996; Meindl, Ehrlich, & Dukerich, 1985) and for the social identity perspective on charisma and leadership (Haslam & Platow, 2001; Platow & Van Knippenberg, 2001).

Leader Perceptions and Leadership Schemas

Leader Categorization Theory

Leader categorization theory (LCT), also called implicit leadership theory, is a social cognitive theory of leadership that focuses on the content of people's leadership schemas and on the causes and consequences of categorization of someone as a leader (e.g., Lord, Brown, Harvey, & Hall, 2001; Lord, Foti, & DeVader, 1984; Lord, Foti, & Phillips, 1982; Lord & Hall, 2003; Lord & Maher, 1991). It assumes that leadership perceptions play a key role in leader selection decisions, leader endorsement, and in a leader's power base, and, thus, in how effectively a leader can lead and influence others.

In making leadership judgments, leadership schemas based on implicit leadership theories are activated, and characteristics of the leader are matched against the relevant schema. Earlier conceptions of LCT (e.g., Lord, Foti, & DeVader, 1984) viewed leader schemas as relatively general and fixed, whereas the contemporary version (e.g., Lord, Brown, Harvey, & Hall, 2001; Lord & Hall, 2003) views them as flexible cognitive structures that are regenerated in situ to meet contextual demands. In both cases, however, the better the match between the leader's characteristics and the perceiver's leadership schema, the more favorable are leadership perceptions.

LCT focuses on categories and associated schemas of leadership and leaders (e.g., military generals, CEOs, outward bound leaders), not on social groups as categories (e.g., a psychology department, a corporation, a sports team). LCT's leader categories are tied to tasks and functions and transcend groups; for example, a CEO schema applies similarly to companies such as Apple, Dell, GM, Toyota, Starbucks, Google, and so forth, whereas each company may have different group norms and prototypes.

Expectation States, Status Characteristics, and Role Congruity

Two other theories that also focus on leader categorization but do not go into social cognitive details quite so extensively are expectation states/status characteristics theory and role congruity theory. Both theories suggest that the match between an individual's characteristics and abstracted conceptions of status and leadership affect leadership perceptions.

Expectation states theory or status characteristics theory (e.g., Berger, Fisek, Norman, & Zelditch, 1977; Berger, Wagner, & Zelditch, 1985; Ridgeway, 2001) attributes influence (by implication leadership) within groups to possession of specific status characteristics (qualities that match what the group actually does) and diffuses status characteristics (stereotypical properties of high status groups in society). Influence is a function of the extent to which people possess characteristics that suit them to effective task performance (i.e., specific status characteristics) and possess characteristics that categorize them as members of high status sociodemographic categories (i.e., diffuse status characteristics). Influence, or leadership, is an additive function of perceived group task competence and perceived societal status (Ridgeway, 2003).

Role congruity theory focuses on gender and leadership (see Wood and Eagly's chapter on gender in this volume for detail). Briefly, because there is greater overlap between general leader schemas and male stereotypes than between leader schemas and female stereotypes, people tend to have more favorable perceptions of male leaders than of female leaders; this can make it generally easier for males than females to be effective leaders (e.g., Eagly & Karau, 2002; Heilman 1983).

Social Identity and Leadership

Leadership is a group process in which followers play a key role not only in the cognitive–perceptual sense described previously, but in the wider sense that leaders cannot lead unless followers follow. One way in which this idea has been explored is by research on "followership" that explores how followers can be empowered to create great and effective leaders (e.g., Kelley, 1992; Riggio, Chalefff, & Lipman-Blumen, 2008; Shamir, Pillai, Bligh, & Uhl-Bien, 2006).

Social Identity Theory of Leadership

Another perspective on leadership as a group process in which leader and follower roles are intertwined is provided by the social identity theory of leadership (Hogg, 2001, 2008; Hogg & Van Knippenberg, 2003; for empirical overviews, also see Ellemers, de Gilder, & Haslam, 2004; Van Knippenberg, Van Knippenberg, De Cremer, & Hogg, 2004); but here the key emphasis is on the identity function of leadership. Groups provide us with a social identity and our leaders are the most significant source of information about who we are as group members; we look to our leaders to express and epitomize our identity, to clarify and focus our identity, to forge and transform our identity, and to consolidate, stabilize, and anchor our identity.

A key tenet of the social identity theory of leadership is that as group membership becomes more important to self-definition and members identify more strongly with the group, leaders who are perceived to be more group prototypical are more effective than leaders who are perceived to be less prototypical of the group; and as prototypicality assumes greater importance, other determinants of effective leadership, such as leadership schemas, become less important (e.g., Hains, Hogg, & Duck, 1997; Hogg et al., 2006; Hogg, Hains, & Mason, 1998).

Prototypical leaders are effective because they are perceived by members to best embody the group's defining attributes and are, therefore, the source rather than target of conformity processes. Because members favorably evaluate the group prototype, tend to agree on the prototype, and consider prototypical members to be protecting and promoting the group, prototypical leaders are consensually liked as group members (Hogg, 1993). This facilitates influence (people comply more with requests from people they like; Berscheid & Reis, 1998), and accentuates the evaluative (status) differential between leader and followers.

Prototypical leaders find the group more central and important to self-definition and identify more strongly with it; they have greater investment in it and are more likely to behave in group-serving ways; they embody group norms more precisely and are more likely to favor the ingroup, treat ingroup members fairly, and act in ways that promote the ingroup. These behaviors confirm their prototypicality and membership credentials and communicate to the group that the leader is "one of us": A central member who identifies strongly and embodies the norms and aspirations of the group and is, therefore, unlikely to harm the group (e.g., Platow, Hoar, Reid, Harley, & Morrison, 1997; Platow & Van Knippenberg, 2001). Prototypical members are trusted to be acting in the best interest of the group even

when it may not appear that they are (e.g., Brewer, 1981; Hogg, 2007c; Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000); they are furnished with legitimacy (Tyler, 1997; Tyler & Lind, 1992; see Platow, Reid, & Andrew, 1998). Together, this allows prototypical leaders to be innovative; they can, paradoxically, diverge from group norms and be less conformist than non- or less prototypical leaders.

This analysis of how prototypical leaders can be innovative describes the processes that may account for Hollander's (1958) idea, discussed earlier, that to be effective, a leader needs initially to conform to group norms to earn "idiosyncrasy credits," to be able later to diverge from such norms and be innovative. The social identity analysis is wider in that it is not tied to interpersonal transactions and conformity and the temporal dimension are not always necessary. The key factor is that the leader behaves in ways that build trust based on shared identity and the perception that the leader is centrally invested in the group (cf. Abrams, Randsley de Moura, Marques, & Hutchison, 2008).

Prototypical leaders are also often invested by the group with charisma, which further strengthens their authority and facilitates innovative and transformational leadership. However, as we saw earlier, this social identity perspective on charisma differs from the more personality oriented perspective of transformational leadership theories (cf. Conger & Kanungo, 1998). From a social identity perspective, similar to Meindl's (1995) *romance of leadership*, charisma is an attribution-based social construction (e.g., Haslam & Platow, 2001; Platow & Van Knippenberg, 2001). In salient groups, prototypical leaders are the focus of attention and members attribute their qualities (e.g., being influential and consensually attractive, having high status, being trusted, and being innovative and transformational) internally to stable and essentialist aspects of the leader's personality (c.f., Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 1998; Ross, 1977).

Social identity based leadership processes confer on leaders considerable power to maintain their leadership position. Specifically, through talk, they can construct, reconstruct, or change the group prototype in ways that protect or promote their prototypically central position in the group—a process that can be referred to as norm talk (Hogg & Reid, 2006; Hogg & Tindale, 2005; also see Fiol, 2002; Reid & Ng, 2000). A key attribute of effective leadership is precisely this visionary and transformational activity in which a leader is an "entrepreneur of identity" who is adept at changing what the group sees itself as being (Reicher & Hopkins, 2003). Prototypical leaders can do this in different ways: talk-up prototypical aspects of their behavior and talk-down nonprototypical aspects; characterize as marginal those members who do not share their prototype of the group; vilify and cast as deviant those

who are contending for leadership; identify as relevant comparison outgroups those that are most favorable to their own prototypicality; and engage in a discourse that raises salience to favor a prototypical leader or lowers salience to favor a nonprototypical leader (e.g., Reicher & Hopkins, 1996, 2001, 2003). Nonprototypical leaders engage in group-oriented behaviors to strengthen their membership credentials (e.g., Platow & Van Knippenberg, 2001).

Trust and the Group Value Model

A key dimension of leadership is trust (e.g., Dirks & Ferrin, 2002). Can we trust our leaders? If we are to follow their lead, surely we should trust them (Kellerman, 2004)? Because shared group membership is a powerful basis of trust (e.g., Brewer, 1981; Hogg, 2007c; Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000), it follows that we are more likely to trust prototypical than nonprototypical leaders.

We are also more likely to trust and, thus, follow our leaders if they treat members fairly and with respect. According to Tyler's group value model (Lind & Tyler, 1988) and his relational model of authority in groups (Tyler, 1997; Tyler & Lind, 1992), fairness and justice perceptions are critical to group life. Because leaders make decisions that have important consequences for us (e.g., promotions, allocation of duties), we are concerned about how fair the leader is in making these decisions. In judging fairness, we focus on both distributive justice (how fair are the outcomes of the leader's decisions) and procedural justice (how fair are the procedures that the leader has used to make a decision). Justice and fairness judgments affect reactions to decisions and to the authorities making these decisions and, thus, influence leadership effectiveness (e.g., De Cremer, 2003).

Procedural justice is particularly important in building trust in leadership. One reason for this is that procedural justice serves a social identity function (Tyler, 2003). Because fair procedures convey a favorable social evaluation of followers as group members, the respect for group members conveyed by procedural fairness builds member identification and, thus, feeds into cooperative and compliant behavior. As members identify more strongly with the group, they care more that the leader is procedurally fair (e.g., Brockner, Chen, Mannix, Leung, & Skarlicki, 2000; Lipponen, Koivisto, & Olkkonen, 2005) and care less that the leader is distributively fair. This asymmetry arises because with increasing identification, instrumental outcome-oriented considerations (distributive justice) become less important relative to intragroup relational and membership considerations (procedural justice) (e.g., Vermunt, Van Knippenberg, Van Knippenberg, & Blaauw, 2001).

Another related line of research on trust and leadership focuses on the way that leadership can be an effective structural solution to social dilemmas. Social dilemmas are

crises of trust that are notoriously difficult to resolve (Dawes & Messick, 2000; Kerr & Park, 2001). However, enhancing a sense of common social identity can build trust that resolves the dilemma (e.g., Brewer & Schneider, 1990; De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999; also see Brewer, 1981; Hogg, 2007c; Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000). Leadership plays an often critical role in this process precisely because a leader can transform selfish individual goals into shared group goals by building a sense of common identity, shared fate, interindividual trust, and custodianship of the collective good (e.g., De Cremer & Van Knippenberg, 2003; De Cremer & Van Vugt, 2002; Van Vugt & De Cremer, 1999).

Intergroup Leadership

The social identity analysis of leadership has an intragroup focus: intragroup prototypicality, shared group membership, ingroup trust, and so forth. However, the great challenge of leadership is often not merely to transcend individual differences, but to bridge profound group divisions to build an integrative vision and identity. Leadership is often better characterized as intergroup leadership (Hogg, 2009; Pittinsky, 2009; Pittinsky & Simon, 2007).

Effective intergroup leadership confronts the wider challenge of building social harmony and a common purpose and identity out of conflict among groups. One problem is that intergroup leaders are often viewed as representing one group more than the other; they are outgroup leaders to one subgroup and, thus, suffer compromised effectiveness (Duck & Fielding, 1999, 2003). This problem has been well researched in the context of mergers and acquisitions. Mergers often fail precisely because the leader of the merged organization is viewed with suspicion as a member of the former outgroup organization (e.g., Terry, Carey, & Callan, 2001). These problems can be accentuated by ingroup projection. Subgroups overestimate the extent to which their characteristics are represented in the superordinate group (Wenzel, Mummendey, & Waldzus, 2007), in which case an outgroup leader will be viewed as particularly unprototypical.

One interesting wrinkle to this is that lower/minority status subgroups often do not engage in ingroup projection; both groups agree that the superordinate group reflects the dominant subgroup's attributes (Sindic & Reicher, 2008). The minority subgroup *will* view the outgroup leader as prototypical; but such a leader will not gain a prototypicality-based advantage because the minority group feels underrepresented and, thus, is unlikely to identify sufficiently strongly with the superordinate group (Hohman, Hogg, & Bligh, in press).

Effective intergroup leaders need to build a common ingroup identity (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993). But this can threaten the subgroup identity of subgroups, so another strategy is to balance the superordinate identity and associated vision with recognition of the integrity and valued contribution of subgroup identities (e.g., Hornsey & Hogg, 2000).

SUMMARY

Influence and leadership are core concerns of social psychology. Social psychology is often defined in terms of influence, and leadership is one of the most potent ways in which an individual can influence a large number of people. Research on influence has always been conducted within social psychology, though an early focus on norms has largely—with some important exceptions—been replaced by a focus on cognitive processing of potential persuasive information. Research on leadership was a major theme within social psychology, but some decades ago, the focus of research activity moved largely to the organizational and management sciences. However, leadership research is currently experiencing a revival within social psychology.

This chapter shows that, overall, we have a great deal of scientific knowledge about influence and leadership. However, there are loose ends and promising and important new directions. For example, mainstream social psychology is largely mute on the role of language and communication in influence and leadership—how else do people influence one another than by communication, largely through talk? The study of norms as social constructs would benefit from a more communication-oriented perspective such as this.

As a legacy of the transformational role of social cognition in social psychology, research on influence has tended over the past two decades to focus more on information processing than social interaction. We now know a great deal about this, and perhaps it is time to redress the balance. A good example is the study of minority influence; initially championed as a perspective on social change and societal transformation, it has become increasingly focused on the detail of cognitive change. Armed with what we now know, it would be timely and translational to revisit the role of active minorities in social change.

Finally, it is certainly gratifying to see that social psychology is once again paying attention to the quintessentially social psychological phenomenon of leadership. However, it is in its early days and much remains to be done to untether the study of leadership from a narrow focus on corporate leadership and the role of the CEO. A broader view of leadership needs to focus more on public and ideological leadership; the identity function of leadership; intergroup leadership; and leadership and social change.

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