The American Review of Public Administration

Ways of Knowing : Passionate Humility and Reflective Practice in Research and Management

Dvora Yanow

The online version of this article can be found at:

Published by:

⑤SAGE

http://www.sagepublications.com

On behalf of:

ASPA

American Society for Public Administration

Additional services and information for *The American Review of Public Administration* can be found at:

Email Alerts: http://arp.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts

Subscriptions: http://arp.sagepub.com/subscriptions

Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav

Permissions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav

Citations: http://arp.sagepub.com/content/39/6/579.refs.html

Ways of Knowing

Passionate Humility and Reflective Practice in Research and Management

Dvora Yanow
Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

For all the attention that the concept of reflective practice has attracted, very little has been said concerning what might incline someone to be open to engage in it. My concern in this essay is with two characteristics of professional, including administrative, practice—a *language of certainty* and a *language of inquiry*—and, when the conditions under which the language of certainty has come to dominate professional practice, with the question of what might be required to introduce a posture of reflective inquiry into that practice. I advance the idea that "passionate humility" may be one of the criteria requisite for the cultivation of reflective practice, as it contains the promise of turning administrative and policy action from a language of certainty to a language of reflective inquiry. I suggest that we might learn something about the production and place of humility from the treatment of scientific practice in the philosophy of natural and social science, in two areas: in general, which sees "science" as grounded at least in part in an attitude of doubt; and in particular, from interpretive research methods and interpretive policy analysis, in which the language of inquiry is increasingly operative. Both of these might have something important to tell us concerning contemporary practices in administration and management.

Keywords: *reflection; work practices; culture of inquiry; professional education; interpretive policy analysis; interpretive research methods*

That person is a professional who,
while believing strongly in his mission,
recognizes the subjectivity of his assumptions,
the limitations of his methods
and the irrationality of his behaviors,
and who responds to being challenged
by questioning his own ways of thinking and doing.

—Raphael Fischler (2008, p. 5)

Niebuhr warns us of a lot of useful things about humility . . .
As Americans, we have a counter-tradition, which counsels optimism,
daringness, risk-taking. And reconciling the two,
staying American in the most optimistic ebullient sense of that word
while being conscious of Niebuhr['s concern with humility,]
is the central challenge.

—David Brooks (Obama's theologian, 2009)

579

"The exercise of power is necessary," Niebuhr insisted,
"and so is humility, because human nature is imperfect, sinful.
That is to say, we are always prone to excess and mistakes,
to doing real damage, even with our best intentions and actions."

—Krista Tippett (Obama's theologian, 2009)

Kevin and I have a history.
Mine is right.
His is wrong.

—Hazle (1992; 2nd level headline, San Jose, California, *San Jose Mercury News*)

The *San Jose Mercury News* headline, above, quotes the then-head of redevelopment for San Jose, California, who closed down a nightclub in the city center over its owner's, Kevin's, protests. In the quote, the agency head appears long on passionate conviction in the rightness of his position. He seems to assume that his understanding and assessment of the situation are self-evident common sense, shared by all reasonable people, and along with this to lack the ability to see the situation from another's point of view.

Other stories of this sort abound. An employee of Ben and Jerry's ice-cream company related that Ben's own "management style was at odds with how he wanted the company to treat its employees": he "was usually so single-mindedly convinced that he was right about something that he often didn't even acknowledge the legitimacy of alternative points of view" (Mr. Lager, as quoted in Henriques, 1994). What is missing from such a posture of impassioned certitude is a smidgen of thinking on the part of the Bens that they might not have all the answers, that the Kevins might have considered reasons for taking the positions they have articulated, that there might be other ways of looking at the problem at hand than the one of whose rightness one is passionately convinced. It is, however, not just that such managers (and others) do not acknowledge the possible validity of another view; they seem without the inquiry mechanisms or traits that might incline or lead them even to consider reflecting on their evidence, their findings, their "truth claims."

In contrast, consider for a moment this story, told for teaching purposes, with great humor, by an esteemed public administration theorist, about a city manager. This "enlightened" executive gets wind of a fight going on in one of the departments, several floors down from her office. Rushing through the doors as quickly as she can get down there, she asks not "How could you . . .?" or "Who's in charge?" but "What's going on here?" (Hummel, 1991, p. 36).[1] As I will elaborate below, the story illustrates a shift from the *language of certainty* (Stein, 2004, p. 140) that characterizes the first two tales to a *language of inquiry*—precisely what Kevin or some Ben and Jerry's employees might have liked to experience with their bosses.

Moreover, this language of inquiry has a particular cast: it draws on an interrogation of oneself, one's own assumptions, one's own attributions of motives to others, one's own ways of thinking and doing, as Fischler (2008, p. 5), in the opening epigraph, puts it so well. My concern in this essay is not only with the conditions under which the language of certainty has come to dominate professional practice, but even more, with what might be required to introduce a posture of reflective inquiry into that practice. Scholars of professional practices have remarked on the role of professional education since the 1960s in developing practitioners—of public administration and general management, policy making, and planning, among others—who rely strongly, if not exclusively, on modes of technical–rational expertise at the expense of other ways of knowing and the degree to which this form of expertise leads its practitioners increasingly to turn a deaf ear and a blind eye even to the possibility of other ways of knowing, in particular, the local knowledge developed by the "targets"[2] of such practices concerning their own lived experiences (e.g., Hummel, 2001; Ingersoll & Adams, 1992; Schön, 1983; Yanow, 2004). Donald Schön, in particular, was concerned throughout his writings with the conditions of reflection, whether in the form of double-loop, "Model II" management practice (Argyris & Schön, 1974, 1978) or reflective practice across the professions more broadly (Schön, 1983, 1985, 1987, 1991). He saw such reflectivity as an intervention into what he and Chris Argyris characterized as the self-sealing character of managerial practices, an outcome, in his view, of mid-20th century modes of postgraduate, professionally oriented education (see Fischler, 2008).

Yet for all the attention to the role of reflection-in-action that Schön and others have argued for, very little has been said concerning what might make one practitioner (or anyone, for that matter) more inclined than another not to stop at certainty but to be open to engaging in reflective practice—the kind of practice that is as likely to direct inquiry toward oneself as onto others. A common response—sounded at least as much, I think, by academics talking about practitioners as by practitioners themselves—is that the pressures of the working day leave little room to take "time out" to reflect. But this is a misreading of what reflection can, and does, entail. A part, at least, of what Schön was after was not this kind of ex post facto reflection, in which one leans back, loosens one's proverbial tie, puts one's feet up, and thinks about the day or the situation at hand. Instead, reflective practice also includes in-the-moment reflection—reflection within the immediacy of practice when one senses, from the backtalk (note: not feedback!) one receives from the human and physical "materials" with whom or with which one is working, that things aren't going the way one thought they should (for an elaboration, see Yanow & Tsoukas, in press). This does not require additional hours in the day: it is carried out in the moment, in the midst of practice.

Answering a different question, Argyris and Schön (1978), in the context of their theory-in-practice work with managers, suggested that it is defensiveness that *blocks* the development of Model II–type reflection, that "people who held Model I theories of action tended to be unable to reflect and question either their own governing values or the theories of action and governing values of others" (p. 4; see also Lanzara, 1991). But this appears to assume a prior condition—that without defensiveness, managers and others would naturally be inclined to be reflective. Other parts of their and others' work on shifting from self-sealing Model I to more open Model II behaviors suggests otherwise—that other factors might also be in play. Giovan Francesco Lanzara (personal communication, June 2007) related that he had conversed with Schön at length on this point in light of his personal experience that managers were incapable of reproducing Model II (i.e., reflective) behaviors on their own, without his presence in the consultant's role. Schön, he said, confirmed similar personal experiences.

For both Lanzara's and Schön's clients, already versed in Model II reflectivity (albeit under their guidance), turning the question around seems to be in order. Instead of asking what might prevent reflectivity, it might be useful instead to ask what, if anything, might enable it. What might incline someone to be reflective, to be willing to listen to others, and to attend more to the conversation with materials, including their backtalk, that Schön (1983, 1987) identified as being central to reflective practice? In engaging this question, I want to suggest that it is humility that might be key in rendering openness to a reflective conversation with one's materials, including being attentive to backtalk from them. I want to advance the idea that "passionate humility" may be one of the criteria requisite for the cultivation of reflective practice, as it contains the promise of turning administrative and policy action from a language of certainty to a language of reflective inquiry. I suggest that we might learn something about the production and place of humility from the treatment of scientific practice in the philosophy of natural and social science, in two areas: in general, where "science" is seen as grounded at least in part in an attitude of doubt; and in particular, in interpretive research methods and interpretive policy analysis, in which the language of inquiry is increasingly operative. Both of these might have something important to tell us concerning contemporary practices in administration and management.

I turn first to an exploration of certitude and wonder in scientific ways of knowing, looking at various sources of legitimation that are intended to promote certainty in scientific judgment. Next, I take up the concept of humility and then move to a consideration of its manifestations in interpretive research methods and policy analysis. Finally, I turn to the matter of administrative and management practices, where a current of nervousness about expertise and ways of knowing has found expression in the late-20th century development of professionalization, leading, perhaps, to an eclipse of humility that might be usefully restored.

Authorizing Ways of Knowing:
From Scientific Wonderment to Certainty

What authorizes a way of knowing? What validates the knowledge it generates? Consider, briefly, the legitimating structures out of and against which Western "science"

emerged.[3] Observational systematicity applied by thinkers from Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1543) through Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) to Sir Isaac Newton (1643-1727) led to discoveries that shook loose many certitudes developed over centuries of intertwined feudal and church hierarchies, whose authority structures held sway over the sources of knowledge claims, including the interpretations of biblical and other texts. Copernicus's revolution, in reconceptualizing the structure of the solar system, displaced humans from the center of the universe (a challenge not without cost to himself and his students with respect to church and societal standing, and in one case even to life itself). Natural philosophy—later called natural "science"—grew out of the recognition that understandings of the surrounding world could be had through the systematic application of observation and reason by humans capable, in principle, of such study. This procedural systematicity has become one of two central hallmarks of all science.

In generating universal principles, applicable to all persons,[4] at all places, at all times, natural philosophy/science moved along a path somewhat parallel to that traveled by changing views of the solar system. Dislodging "man," in the person of priests and land-owners up to popes, kings, and queens, as the human center of interpretations and explanations of events, much as the earth had been dislodged from the center of planetary movement, science replaced him with the increasingly depersonalized generalizability of scientific laws: "objective" procedures and methods through which certain, universal knowledge is produced from a position external to and cleansed of the human characteristics of both researcher and researched.

By the time social philosophy—later, social "science"—came in the 19th century to extend the idea of systematic observation to studying the social world (in social positivism, then evolutionary positivism, and then empiriocriticism, followed, finally, by early 20th century logical positivism), the authority-base for certain knowledge had further shifted along this dehumanizing axis. The social science that ensued—particularly in its mid-20th century forms of behaviorism and applications of an increasingly complicated statistical science—similarly sought to displace human characteristics, of both "subjects" and researchers, in order not to "contaminate" scientific findings. The human-centeredness that characterized prepositivist modes of knowing was lost in the turn to positivism-inflected ones encapsulated in the "scientific method," adherence to which authorizes behavioralist, statistical, and related claims to knowledge. And so we find survey research designs that (seek to) treat both respondents and, especially, researchers as anonymous, contextless, interchangeable units, recapitulating the experimental laboratory in which experimenters are cloaked in white lab coats which render them, visually, interchangeable (see also Livingstone, 2003, p. 3 on the lab as an intentionally "placeless" place).

It took another revolution in thinking to begin the (re)turn from machine-like, objective certainty back toward a more subjective posture of self-reflective inquiry. Sir Karl Popper (1902-1994), in engaging what we might call "the 1491 problem"—the certain "knowledge" of the world's flatness upset shortly after by unpredicted new "knowledge," argued that science cannot "prove" anything "true." Instead, science can only be in the business of "falsification"—the concerted effort to *dis*prove.[5] This is what lends scientific practice its second charge, after systematicity: that it be conducted within an attitude of doubt (known in the philosophy of science as testability, the requirement that scientific findings be subjected to further testing[6]).

As two ways of knowing, systematicity and the attitude of doubt are firmly embedded within all forms of science.[7] On the centrality of the latter, Nobel prize winner Richard Feynman (1998) observed,

> The freedom to doubt is an important matter in the sciences . . . It was born of a struggle. It was a struggle to be permitted to doubt, to be unsure. And I do not want us to forget the importance of the struggle and, by default, to let the thing fall away. (p. 28)

The attitude of doubt has taken hold in increasingly central ways within those modes of inquiry influenced by the philosophies that challenged positivism in its various forms, and especially 20th century logical positivism, concerning issues central to social science: how humans, including both researchers and those they study, make sense of their "sense data" (observations produced through the five senses) and thereby, of their lives, especially those aspects that social scientific researchers study. The philosophies are hermeneutics, phenomenology, pragmatism, symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology (itself part theory, part method), and some critical theory; the methods that enact these philosophies and their attendant methodologies include participant observation, ethnography, semiotics, analyses of language (metaphors, categories, discourses), frames/framing, and so forth (for a suggestive list of some two dozen, see Yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 2006, p. xx). In contrast with those methods that seek to depersonalize research, these reposition human qualities, including researchers' and respondents' humanity, at their center: participant–observer ethnography and other interpretive modes of data generation and analysis focus on situated words, acts, and physical artifacts, in which the researcher's person is the initial and central means of understanding (see, e.g., Van Maanen, 1996, p. 380; Yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 2006; see also Pachirat, 2006).

Whether under the influence of "the interpretive turn" (see Geertz, 1973; Hiley, Bohman, & Shusterman, 1991; Polkinghorne, 1983; Rabinow & Sullivan, 1979/1985) or science studies (discussed below), interpretive sciences have become increasingly reflective on their own processes of knowledge production. They enact the attitude of doubt through researcher reflexivity, a practice that increasingly renders these areas of inquiry distinctive within the social sciences, comprising what might be called the "reflective sciences." What are being subjected to inquiry are questions of evidence and the research practices that produce knowledge claims. The language of certainty with which the latter are advanced is hedged by the language of reflective inquiry.

Reflective Knowing: The Interpretive Sciences and Evidence

"What is this?"
"How do you know?"
"How would you know if you were wrong?"

Two key ideas lie at the heart of the interpretive sciences and distinguish them from other modes of knowing. The first comes from the phenomenological critique of (logical) positivist

philosophy, in which the individual is perceived as her own authority on her own lived experience; appeals to church, monarchic or other forms and sources of tradition or authority no longer compel, as Max Weber argued in advancing bureaucracy as the legal–rational form of legitimate authority in organizational contexts. The challenge for interpretive sciences from this perspective is to explain interpretive processes. The second key idea, from the hermeneutic critique, is based on the notion that individual knowledge draws on a collective repertoire: in its search for authorizing knowledge claims, a hermeneutic phenomenology turns not necessarily to a bureaucracy, but to a broader sense of the collective, in the form of a hermeneutic circle of practitioners and their practices. Intersubjective knowing within collectivities leads to the development of epistemic–interpretive communities of local knowledge, discourse, and practice. These could be tied to work or other sorts of practices, interpreting texts or conducting disciplinary or other activities to sustain (or change) the collective.

Reflexivity on the part of researchers plays an increasingly central role in interpretive science: attention to the ways in which the researcher's positionality, whether literally locational (within the research setting) or personal (with respect, e.g., to demographic or experiential factors), can affect access to a research site and/or to people or other sources of information within it, and thereby the kinds of data generated. In some forms, positional reflexivity also calls for attending to the impossibility of knowing how one's presence might affect either the research or participants' lives.[8] It derives its philosophical–methodological mandate from, among others, feminist studies, cultural studies, intersectionality, and subaltern studies—those "standpoint" approaches to knowing that argue not only against the possibility of an Archimedean point from which to generate knowledge, but also against a single, unified subjective point (see, e.g., Haraway, 1988; Harding, 1986; Hartsock, 1987; Hawkesworth, 2006). This is a hermeneutic–phenomenological stance toward the multiplicities of experience and, hence, interpretation. It is increasingly being applied not only to individual researchers, but also to the practices of disciplinary ways of knowing and the truth claims they generate.

This is also the analytic domain of science studies: the social (or sociological) study of the production of knowledge and its legitimation within a specific scientific practice (also known as the social studies of science, or science and technology studies). It has largely taken as its focus to date practices in physical and natural sciences (e.g., Latour 1987, 1990, 1999; Latour & Woolgar, 1988; M. Lynch, 1990; M. Lynch & Woolgar, 1990; Traweek, 1988), but scholars are beginning to extend the approach to the study of political science, including public law and international relations, and organizational studies (see, e.g., Brandwein, 2006; Büger & Gadinger, 2007; Friese, 2001; Lapid, 2002; Oren, 2003; Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2002; Wæver, 1998; Woolgar, Coopmans, & Neyland, 2009; Yanow, 2005) and perhaps other social sciences as well. It asks of members of a community of scientific practice to be more transparent and articulate not only about *what* they (claim to) know, but also about *how* they know what they claim to know—in other words, to make explicit not just the evidentiary bases for their knowledge, but also the knowledge-generating practices that produce that "evidence" and recognize it as such. "What is this?"—scientific claims—joins "How do you know?"—basic statements about systematic procedures (methods) for generating trustworthy evidence. The attitude of doubt requires a further question: "How would you know if you were wrong?"[9]—if, somehow,

your procedures and/or your assumptions had led you to generate evidence that was less trustworthy than it, at first (or second or third) blush, appeared. Underlying these questions is a concern with what authorizes an interpretation of evidence—a truth claim—and what elevates one interpretation over another. Do we all see—observe, experience, interpret—the same "evidence" in the same way?

With respect to experiences in general (i.e., not in a research context), stage theories of human development (Kohlberg, 1971; Perry, 1970; Piaget, 1955) had already begun to problematize notions of unitary cognitive and moral interpretations of experiences, explaining differences in terms of age and/or life phases. Gilligan (1982; see also Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, & Tarule, 1986) challenged this presumed uniformity of life experience on gender grounds; but these "difference" theories, too, along with initial formulations of standpoint theory (Hartsock, 1987), presumed an experiential and hence interpretive uniformity *within* male/female gender categories. An expansion of phenomenological viewpoints, compassing race–ethnicity, class, physical ability, sexuality, and other varieties of human experience, has made ample argument for not considering that "everyone" sees the world the same way I do. Gardner's (1993) work on "multiple intelligences" moves our understanding further along in this direction of "difference" that is not necessarily "lesser" in quality.[10]

With respect to scientific practices, symbolic/cultural anthropology has been particularly sensitive to issues in anthropologists' production of knowledge concerning those they study (see, e.g., Geertz 1973, 1983). This inquiry has focused, in particular, on two areas of anthropological work: the texts produced about cultures studied (e.g., Clifford & Marcus, 1986; Geertz, 1988; Van Maanen, 1986; see also Golden-Biddle & Locke; 1993, 1997); and the "writing" of cultures in another form, through curating and exhibiting practices in museums (e.g., Baxandall, 1991; Clifford, 1997; Karp & Lavine, 1991). Once these are perceived as scientific "ways of worldmaking" (Goodman, 1978), it follows that one should inquire into how such worldmaking takes place. In a discipline that is conscious of the ethnographer as the primary vehicle for knowing, looking back at its scientists' own collective, disciplinary practices concerning the production of knowledge logically follows (where the willingness to do so is also present). It is out of these orientations that researcher reflexivity has developed, entailing a phenomenological–hermeneutic intertwining of *positional reflexivity*—both personal ("Who am I?"—the kind of questioning advanced by experience-oriented stage and standpoint theories) and locational ("Where am I?")—and *epistemic reflexivity* ("How do these two aspects intertwine to shape my ways of knowing?"). This is what provides the rationale for a personal voice in writing, from accounting for the sources of one's inquiry in one's own life and/or research experiences to the use of the first person narrator.[11]

Reflexivity enacts that attitude of inquiry, of "testability," as distinct from taking things on "faith" or because a pronouncement is issued from a position of authority (let alone power); and it is extended not only to methods procedures themselves but to the person of the researcher as an integral part of those procedures. The impulse to turn a reflective "science studies-type" eye on what we are doing and to inquire into our assumptions is one of the things that demarcates interpretive methods from qualitative ones. As a mode of inquiry, reflexivity is an orientation not just toward questioning *tout cour* (about the world, about evidence), but toward

asking about oneself, one's own knowledge, one's own role in producing evidence that then serves as the basis for one's knowledge claims. And these claims, and the reflexive process, could just as well be situated in managing–administering settings as in research ones. Such reflexivity presupposes a mental attitude that one may not have all the answers, a willingness to ask not only "How do I know?"—what is the basis for my truth claims?—but also, "How would I know if I were wrong?" This is the enactment of humility.

On Passionate Humility I: Learning From the Reflective Sciences

We have many ways of understanding,
of which science is only one.

—Freeman J. Dyson (2006)

The exchange between the San Jose agency director and "Kevin" encapsulates the certainty of a monopoly on knowledge that treats other, different views as lesser and as not worthy of investigation. Surely, in both science and management practices, passionate conviction in one's analyses is often called for. Yet in both general and in scientific practices, as noted above, research has demonstrated the disutilities of assuming that one has all the answers, thereby closing the door, superciliously, to other ways of knowing and the knowledge claims they produce. Reflective scientific inquiry keeps a door open to the consideration of other possibilities. Its enactment by individual scientists may require humility, which, coupled with that passionate conviction, generates passionate humility.

Elsewhere, I have defined this as one's passionate conviction that one is right, wedded to the acknowledgement of the possibility that one might be wrong (Yanow, 1997; see also Yanow & Willmott, 1999, 2000). Here, I expand on this definition by adding the *willingness to consider* the possibility of error as a requisite condition for developing passionate humility.

Accounts of humility are more commonly found in the context of religious studies (e.g., Diamond, 2006a) or even political philosophy (e.g., Button, 2005; Diamond, 2006b) than they are in public administration, organizational studies, or other social sciences (but see Jasanoff, 2003).[12] The Jewish and Christian traditions on which these draw—I am unaware of Buddhist,[13] Hindu, Muslim, or other sources—appear to treat humility as a necessary correction to excess pride and other manifestations of ego, although Diamond (2006a) points to sources (Maimonides, for example) that are careful to distinguish between extreme forms of self-effacement and more moderate expressions. I am, however, seeking less to explore the contours of humility per se, as a virtue in the abstract, than to articulate its manifestations as it might arise in administrative and other areas of practice, conjoined with passionate conviction.

Considering humility in the context of such practices adds a dimension seemingly not of concern to theologians: how someone in a decision-making capacity might be able to enact humility while at the same time having to be "decisive" and to take action (of whatever sort).

What we learn from examining the way in which an attitude of doubt is enacted in the reflective sciences might shed some light on what it looks like in other arenas. Latour (2004), comparing the practices of the *Conseil d'Etat* with those of a scientific laboratory, offers one example. In the latter, although "every effort is made to reach certainty," he notes that the lab scientists leave it to others—colleagues, reviewers of manuscripts for journal publication, and so on—to "decide on the truth value of what is said" (p. 94). Although science, in his view, seeks to produce "knowledge" rather than doubt, he notes that "[s]cientists, having exercised all the passions of knowledge and every pretension to certainty, suddenly become modest and humbly defer to others" (p. 95). The point stands out when contrasted with judges' practices in the Conseil d'Etat, where they exert efforts to "sustain doubt for as long as possible" (p. 94) and then, "abruptly, and with the greatest arrogance . . . decide the issue" (p. 95). In each practice, in other words, certainty (in the form of closure on inquiry) and doubt (in the form of prolonged inquiry) both play roles: as Latour notes, both scientific and judging practices are concerned with legitimating the knowledge they produce and managing uncertainty (doubt) about that authorizing process by bringing it to closure. One might assume that, in the throes of doubt, one continues with inquiry. But in Latourian science, an analyst taking a meta-view and looking at the whole of the process would see that any lingering uncertainty about truth claims and the processes through which they have been generated—commonly expressed in discussing research limitations and alternative explanations—is passed along to other parts of the research process once scientists are willing to make their "knowledge" public—passed, specifically, to those who judge that research as it is made available for review. In this, the scientist reserves the humility that goes with the possibility that she might be wrong, even as she is prepared to argue her case with passionate conviction should her findings be challenged.

Within the reflective sciences, the exercise of passionate humility enacts the existentialist principle of engaging with others as persons, not as objects (see, e.g., Buber, 1923/1958; Rogers, 1980), a characteristic of the relational turn in qualitative–interpretive methodologies (Nencel & Yanow, 2008). Interpretive field methods also call for retaining a certain analytic indeterminacy as long as possible—an avoidance of the "rush to closure" (or "rush to diagnosis") that psychotherapists seek to follow—in face of the impossibility of knowing that all the factors of the situation in question have been recognized and appreciated.[14] Cultivating humility and its partner, openness to inquiry, about existing procedures and programs is one way of dealing with the "1491 problem" mentioned earlier—the premature closure that forecloses inquiry. In management settings, administrators and others are often faced with pressures to act in the face of missing data, missing information, missing or silenced stories. Passionate humility would suggest proceeding through dialogical inquiry—"What is going on here?"—and continuing to keep that dialogue open as much and as long as possible, rather than the monological attribution to others of acts and motives—the unilateral projection of an answer to "Who is in charge?" and its implied "What are you doing/ have you done?" It pushes back against the certainty built in to the rational authoritarianism of Weberian bureaucracy and the professional training that it calls for and which, in turn, reinforces it, to minimize its needlessly irrational and destructive effects through a more humanistic, phenomenological–hermeneutic, reflective practice.

On Passionate Humility II: Learning
From Reflective Practice

If you know that you are not sure,
you have a chance to improve the situation.[15]

—Richard P. Feynman (1998, p. 28)

The idea of reflective practice, and specifically of reflection-in-action, was developed by Donald Schön (1983, 1985, 1987, 1991; see also Fischler, 2008; Schmidt, 2000) specifically as an antidote for the excessive reliance on technical–rational expertise in professional education and training as it developed in the latter part of the 20th century. Schön's work focused attention on the details of professional practice—the kind of thinking professionals, including planners, teachers, and managers engage in that underlies the ways they go about doing their work. He postulated that reflective practice entails entering into conversation with one's materials and especially with their "backtalk"(Schön, 1983).[16] One of the central questions posed by his work is how professionals (and others) can train themselves as well as others to be open to backtalk from inanimate—and I would add human—"materials."[17] Schön treated such backtalk as an unexpected "surprise" that interrupts the flow of work, but he seems not to have problematized the fact that surprise does not come prelabeled as such and not everyone sees such interruptions as opportunities for inquiry.

Drawing on his work, we can describe the ways in which "in-the-midst-of" reflective practice requires the willingness and the ability to be open to interruptions in routine practice—for example, the backtalk one receives from one's "materials"—and to recognize them as "surprising": as something out of the ordinary, nonroutine; and it requires the willingness and the ability to be open to responding to those surprising interruptions (Yanow & Tsoukas, in press). Recognizing the surprising character of the surprise requires moving from the posture of all-knowing certainty inculcated by university-based professional education, which trains professionals to see themselves as "experts" of a particular cast—an expertise that is licensed to have all the answers, in which surprises should not occur and inquiry is seen as unprofessional and perhaps even weak. Had the San Jose redevelopment director, for instance, been more of a reflective practitioner, he might have asked himself what lay behind what he perceived to be Kevin's bizarre request concerning the nightclub permit. Even better, he might have asked Kevin himself, directly, to explain his thinking, and then he might have explained his own, and perhaps—not necessarily, but perhaps—they would have together worked out a mutually acceptable resolution of the problem.[18]

The first step in reflective practice, then, seems to be to acquire the *ability (or willingness) to recognize an interruption, to see a surprise as "surprising"—as something out of the ordinary, nonroutine*. This means giving up on the idea that professional expertise means having all the answers, already. That such recognition does not come automatically is evident in Klemola and Norros's (2001) observation from empirical research with anesthesiologists: "*Without recognition* of the inherent uncertainty of the process, the situation was experienced as predictable . . ." (p. 462, italics added). Surprises do not appear as surprises unless the practitioner has a framework for anticipating other than routine action.

Jerome Groopman (2007) describes a similar process among physicians (including himself), which he calls "diagnosis momentum."

> Once a diagnosis is made, it is passed on to other doctors *with ever-increasing conviction. Contradictory evidence is brushed aside . . .* [italics added] "When all the pieces of the clinical puzzle did not fit tightly together," he writes, "I moved some of those that didn't to the side. I made faulty assumptions, *seeking to make an undefined condition conform to a well-defined prototype* [italics added], in order to offer a familiar treatment" (Crichton, 2007).[19]

What Groopman delineates here is, on the one hand, the process through which professionals exhibit mastery of their subjects—the conscious inquiry of new practitioners becomes the routine diagnosis of more seasoned ones (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 2005; Schatzki, 2005; Yanow & Tsoukas, in press), accompanied by conviction in its rightness—and, on the other hand, the premature closure that forestalls a reflective inquiry prompted by recognizing and engaging the contradictions, the surprises. "Diagnosis momentum," a cousin to the "self-sealing" character of Model I managerial behaviors, leads, in other words, to what Mary Hawkesworth (2006) has, in another context, called "evidence blindness," the inability "to accept evidence that impugns [one's] beliefs," despite its compelling character (p. 10).

"It takes time to be reflective," as Dr. T, a psychotherapist and psychology professor, put it.[20] Certainly, that is one requirement, along with the willingness to be surprised. But it also takes something else: a willingness to appear, in one's role as professional or "expert," *visibly and publicly not-knowing*—which is the implication of being "taken by surprise." This is the antithesis of a professional education that sees expertise as all-knowing. Reflection in the midst of action rests on a reciprocal relationship with other parties to that action: in-process course adjustments draw on a conscious awareness in the moment, which entails both a self-observing and an observing of other(s) (Yanow & Tsoukas, in press). It requires making the self "more permeable," as Dr. T also observed—making one's inquiry accessible to oneself and to other parties (analogous, in a sense, to science's requirement to make findings public). As Dr. T remarked in the midst of his own reflective practice, "I don't usually do this, but . . ."—thereby rendering his actions more explicitly observable and his rationale more transparent to any who would wish to inquire about them. The willingness to be publicly open (and non-"expert," in the accepted sense of that term) requires being willing to relinquish the sense of control over the situation and/or over others (although one need not lose control over oneself). It means living with one's own possible anxieties induced by not-knowing, as well as with whatever anxieties might be aroused by being perceived, publicly, as not-knowing (Yanow & Tsoukas, in press).[21] The willingness to do this seems to require an other-regardingness—a Buberian "I–Thou"—that also entails a setting aside of one's ego, allowing someone else to share center stage. Here, once again, is humility.

Having recognized the surprise, reflective practice then requires the willingness to engage that surprise. Being open to surprise and willing to engage it may run against the grain of what most would consider to be "expertise." Many experts, including "leaders," are not willing to "allow the unpredictable to happen," to use Dr. T's words again. Conviction gets in the way of humility: They may well see backtalk from their materials not as an opportunity to enter into reflective inquiring conversation, but as a challenge to their authority or position—misunderstanding hierarchical authority or even leadership to

mean omniscience as well as omnipotence. This is what would lead practitioners to respond with all manner of defensive behaviors intended to protect their self-perceptions, as Argyris and Schön (1974, 1978) noted so well.

Allowing the unpredictable its own space moves us out of the realm of business as usual: we might need to break old habits in order to become more reflective. Among the anaesthesiologists they studied, Klemola and Norros (2001, p. 461) found two distinct professional practices, each associated with a different epistemic orientation: one, a *reactive* habit of action, linked to belief in a predictable world, with an "underlying quest for certainty and detachment" characteristic of the technical rational view dominant in medical thinking, in which "observation is identified with passive reception of sensory images yielding a secure basis for knowledge"; the other, an interpretive habit of action linked to a belief in an unpredictable world, leading to "the development of reflective and critical capacities." How might one acquire that second orientation? To develop the interpretive habit of reflexivity, one has first to be willing and open to considering the possibility that there might be something on which one has to, or ought to, reflect. This means according other parties agency and standing of their own—Buber, again—as well as admitting of the possibility that one's passionately held convictions might be wrong—that one may not have all the answers, that there may be other sources of knowledge that one has not considered or other views or ways of seeing.

Humility may well be a prerequisite for asking such questions *of oneself*, which is what reflection entails (although is not limited to). This, too, can be, or become, a habit—and it is one of the challenges that a hermeneutic–phenomenology puts to us through both interpretive methodology and reflective practice: cultivating the habit of examining our decisions, our judgments, our diagnoses, at times in the midst of action. What is at play here, then, is as much a reconceptualization of the character of expertise as it is a change in other aspects of practice. Just as interpretive methodologies position the researcher as expert in methods of observational and conversational inquiry and reflective practice requires expertise in practice-focused inquiry, passionate humility repositions managerial expertise as mastery of mutual inquiry, as much as (if not more than) of subject–matter knowledge. Passionate humility is willing to accord legitimacy to others' local knowledge, whether of situations or of themselves. Similar features mark interpretive policy analysis.

On Passionate Humility III: Learning From Interpretive Policy Analysis

We need . . . to see policy analysis
as a process of inquiry that seeks to ask questions,
rather than as a collection of tools and techniques
designed to provide the right answers.
The "right answers" approach begins from the assumption
that the perception of the problem is accurate,
whereas the "inquiry" approach
problematizes the very definition of the problem.

—Yanow (1996, p. 15)

Interpretive policy analysis, first and foremost, accords legitimacy to local knowledge (Fischer, 2003; Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003; Schmidt, 1993; Yanow, 1996, 2000, 2007): policy analytic "expertise" is recognized not only as the property of those acquiring technical–rational, university-based knowledge through postgraduate professional training, but also as being the knowledge held by the so-designated "targets" for whom policies are being designed, based on their lived experiences of their own circumstances.[22] This, plus its orientation toward dialogue rather than authoritarian decision making, has led some scholars (Dryzek, 1990; Schneider & Ingram, 1997) to deem interpretive policy analysis as more democratic than other more traditional forms.

Equally as important, interpretive policy analysis calls on practitioners to focus as much, if not more, on the framing of policy problems as it does on the efficiency or effectiveness of the proposed solutions, seeing the latter as emerging from the metaphors and other language forms used in the former (Fischer, 2003; Schön, 1979; Schön & Rein, 1994; Yanow, 2008). Interestingly, Jasanoff (2003) calls for a similar rethinking of the relationship among policy makers, experts, and citizens in the context of science and technology policy, which leads her to call for "technologies of humility" "that try to come to grips with the ragged fringes of human understanding—the unknown, the uncertain, the ambiguous, and the uncontrollable" (p. 227). Acknowledging "the limits of prediction and control," she writes, technologies of humility that confront "the normative implications of our lack of perfect foresight" (idem.) counteract the "technologies of hubris" that privilege assumptions of objectivity, rigor, and complete knowledge.

The most recent manifestation of the latter in public policy is the "evidence-based" policy movement; philosophers and social scientists are not the only ones asking about knowledge practices and truth claims. Over the last decade or so, calls for various practices to be grounded in evidence, and for that evidentiary grounding to be explicit and transparent, have been growing across the full spectrum of applied diagnostic sciences, from evidence-based medicine, the movement's source, to evidence-based psychotherapy, social work, and so on, and most recently, to evidence-based management (see, e.g., the *Academy of Management Learning and Education*, Vol. 6, Issue 1, March 2007, special issue).[23] Unreflectively equating "evidence" with objectively determined facts, the movement has restricted its ways of knowing to experimental science, effectively eliminating observational data from systematic clinical science which cannot establish control groups and randomized trials. It is as if "the underlying motive were simplification until professional thinking could be replaced with a few rules" which create "measurable properties," both of which lead to "a systematic blindness to pertinent features of professional behaviour" (Klemola & Norros, 2001, p. 455). The best defense against such bureaucratic imperatives, these authors note, is "an insistence on qualities such as judgement and experience" (idem.)—and judgment is the exercise of reflection and assessment. Yet as Jasanoff (2003, p. 239) notes, the claims of objectivity entailed in the concept of evidence "hide the exercise of judgment, so that normative presuppositions are not subjected to general debate." Had space been made for passionate humility in these several policy contexts, the language of "evidence" might have been subjected to inquiry, leading to an understanding of the ways in which it closes down discussion by privileging one form of evidence and silencing others without even considering their existence— with important implications for policy implementation and professional practice.

Toward the Practice of Passionate Humility

Trusting his images, he assumes their relevance;
Mistrusting my images, I question their relevance.
Assuming their relevance, he assumes the fact;
Questioning their relevance, I question the fact.

> —Robert Graves, "In Broken Images" (1923/2003)

Those who are confident of their faith are not threatened but enlarged by the different faiths of others . . . There are, surely, many ways of arriving at this generosity of spirit and each faith may need to find its own.

> —Sir Jonathan Sacks, Chief Rabbi of the British Commonwealth (quoted in Cahill, 2006)

The language of certainty draws on passion—the passionate belief in our convictions; the language of inquiry, on reflection. A practice informed by passionate humility begins by assuming the social reality of multiple ways of seeing and their potential incommensurability and proceeds with a respect for such differences. It starts by asking: What, and whose, meanings—other than mine—are at play in this situation, in actuality or in potential? How are they being conveyed? How are they being "read"? And it turns reflective: How shall I treat my interpretation of events, especially when it is contradicted or denied by others? It is a practice that relies, at heart, on deliberation (Forester, 1999) and persuasion, not positional compulsion (whether on the basis of bureaucratic position or degreed education) and fiat.

Acting with passionate humility in administrative practices as well as in other professional practices today has been made difficult at least in part because of the increasing scientization of society, as embodied in the growth of task specialization, university education, and "licensed" expertise. This has led many practitioners, in organizational, policy, and other practice worlds, to adopt a paternalistic attitude that denies subordinates and constituents both agency and intelligence. "His view is wrong, mine is right" characterizes much of this exchange, all impulses toward a Habermasian "deliberative discourse" notwithstanding. "Passionate humility" puts a name to a problem experienced in various areas of practice: how both to be committed to a course of action and to remain open to alternatives. To many it seems an utter oxymoron: as several individuals, both classroom-based academics and practice-based professionals, have asked me, "How can these two possibly be combined?" Yet I think the more important question is, How can humility be learned?

The acquisition and development of passion and conviction appear to me less problematic (although people suffering from depressive states can be constrained from its exercise) than the acquisition of humility. If the sources of this deafness to non–technical-rational forms of knowing and expertise are located in curricula for professional education and training, then the "antidote" is clear. Public management and administration educators need to recognize the "hidden curriculum" (Snyder, 1973) communicated through their programs and build in explicit discussions of the problem and explorations of alternative modes of administrative action (e.g., through the use of case-based role playing in a Practice of Public Management course). Passionate humility requires a sort of "diagnostic ability" to recognize those situations in which one's expertise is limited (i.e., leaving other

options still in play) or not applicable or at all (i.e., none of the options implied by the expertise make sense, because a different framing of the problem is called for).[24] Students in professional degree programs can learn such habits through course-based exercises in multiple paradigms or ways of seeing (e.g., in which they are called on to apply at least two theoretical or methodological paradigms to their work settings). These require a shift from thinking about the world of practice as a value-free, technical–rational world to one marked by various modes of meaning-engaged, expressive action (of which instrumental rationality may be one). And this challenges the conceptualization of *expertise* that is too often developed, unthinkingly, in curricula that train for the practices of management and administration, planning, policy making, social work, community organizing, education, design—all those areas of specialization developed over the last century under the influence of the concept of "professionalization." Engaging the tendency toward closed, self-reliant action and the language of certainty—perhaps even in the so-called "capstone" course in public administration education—might well go a long way toward helping practitioners cultivate new habits of thought, including the habit of considering other ways of thinking.

The upshot of a professional education oriented toward technical–rational proficiency is an unquestioned and un-self-questioning expertocracy. Under the pressure of impersonal, numerical evaluative measures, such as the questionnaires used to enable students to evaluate their professors, professionals such as teachers become fearful of admitting they do not know an answer to a student's question, because this may result in a lower score with all its attendant promotion and salary issues. But what precisely is wrong with saying, "I'll find out and get back to you?" Isn't that better than making something up or otherwise fudging one's response? Wouldn't further deliberation, in a management setting, be less costly (literally and/or figuratively) than settling a decision point by administrative fiat that in the longer term is unimplementable or that damages employee trust? A sole individual's responsibility for a department's or an organization's actions need not mean relying solely on that individual's knowledge. We need to find ways to replace reactive habits with interpretive habits, as Klemola and Norros put it, to counter "the allergic reaction to admitting doubt."

It seems fitting, given my present geographical location, to turn in concluding to Spinoza. Goldstein describes him as understanding that each of us has a "powerful tendency . . . toward developing a view of the truth that favors the circumstances into which we happened to have been born" (Goldstein, 2006a; see also 2006b); and she notes, "Self-aggrandizement can be the invisible scaffolding of religion, politics or ideology" (Goldstein, 2006a). Yet much as passion need not become self-aggrandizement, it would be wrong to understand that humility is equivalent to self-doubt. If religions—certainly, bastions of passionate conviction—can learn to make room for others, as Sir Jonathan Sacks suggests (in this section's epigraph), why not administrators, managers, and executives?

Perhaps, in the end, an openness to the kind of humility I am calling for requires a less paternalistic or perhaps even narcissistic image of interpersonal relations, family structures, organizational hierarchies, and professional authority. Its development certainly seems, paradoxically, to require self-confidence—the presence of mind, and of self, that enables one not just to take time, but to make time—time to listen, to reflect; a self-confidence that would not be shaken by involving others—subordinates, in particular—in collaborative deliberation. But this self-confidence is, surely, a mark of the kind of leadership we desire, rather than the more punishing, narcissistic "leadership" enacted by insecure persons.

Perhaps the practice of passionate humility does, in the end, come down to moral attitudes—to a valuing of otherness that sees difference not so much as a threat to one's customary way of being, but as potentially enlarging it. One needs "only" to grow that generosity of spirit that Sir Jonathan refers to.

Nobel laureate Richard Feynman (in the context of an appreciation of democracy over Soviet Communism) called for "a satisfactory philosophy of ignorance, and the progress made possible by such a philosophy, progress which is the fruit of freedom of thought." He added, "I feel a responsibility to proclaim the value of this freedom and to teach that doubt is not to be feared, but that it is to be welcomed as the possibility of a new potential for human beings" (quoted in Ferris, 1998). Passionate humility, as a way of knowing in administrative and other professional practices, does no less.

Notes

1. In the original tale (told in the 1987, 3rd edition of his *The Bureaucratic Experience*, p. 83), credited to an untitled draft manuscript by Jay White, Ralph Hummel notes that the managers he knows were likely not only to ask "What's going on?" but also to say, "Stop!" He adds (personal communication, December 26, 2008) that Charles Levine contributed, "Those at the more advanced levels of administrative sophistication" would probably ask, "Who's in charge?" My thanks to Cam Stivers for help tracking down the source of this illustration, which I use here to illuminate a point other than the one Ralph intended.

2. I use "targets" advisedly, to highlight the effects of such conceptualizing on one of these areas, academic policy analysis (see, e.g., Sapolsky, 1972, Schneider & Ingram, 1993), a usage that has also been critiqued (e.g., DeHaven-Smith, 1988; Yanow, 2007).

3. I treat the Western history of science because this is commonly acknowledged as the source of contemporary notions of natural, physical, and social science. I do not mean, however, to claim that this is the only form of science. Historical evidence demonstrates the existence of what would be recognizable today as agronomy, astronomy, and other sciences in ancient Babylon, Egypt, Greece, China, Mexico, Africa, and India and in medieval Moslem Spain, all preceding Copernicus (see, e.g., Teresi, 2002).

4. Regardless of class, religion, or other trait; today's list would include race, ethnicity, gender, physical ability, and so forth. For this reason, positivist philosophies, discussed below, should not be treated as 20th–21st century bogeymen: This principle of generalizable universality spawned two revolutions in the name of "all men are created equal" and *liberté, egalité, fraternité* and the *Declaration des droits de l'homme.* Without these, as both woman and Jew, I would likely be in no position to be writing this essay.

5. Hence, the testing of null hypotheses within statistical science. Popper's "emendation" has been widely debated; many also argue that actual scientific conduct in some fields does not strive to test and falsify accepted theories. As an idea and leitmotif, it does, however, signal a significant turn in scientific attitudes and, potentially, energies from seeking proofs to attempting falsifications. On the generative utility of doubt in the research process, see Locke, Golden-Biddle, and Feldman (2008).

6. This requires that findings be made publicly available and undergirds double-blind peer review publishing processes. "Testing" suggests the existence of an objective reality against which the tenets of a theory might be compared. It follows, in other words, from a realist–objectivist observational science. Interpretive research, which does not hold with such presuppositions, although not formally in the business of testing findings, is still conducted within that attitude of doubt.

7. Although different sciences engage certainty and inquiry differently. For example, in positivism-inflected methods, both quantitative and qualitative, systematicity is discussed as "rigor." For discussions of this term's limitations for interpretive methods, see C. Lynch (2005) and Yanow (2006).

8. The methodological literature on reflexivity is extensive; for an overview, see Schwartz-Shea (2006). Two recent articles are brilliant exemplars of the role of reflexivity in research: Shehata (2006) emphasizes identity and knowledge production, whereas Pachirat (2009) explores a more locational notion of positionality and the (limited) sight it enables.

9. This wording should not be read as implying that there is an external reality against which theories or findings might be tested, a position denied by interpretive researchers. It points, instead, to the question of the trustworthiness of findings as presented in research texts and the latter's persuasive character (on this see Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, in press; Yanow, in press).

10. What elevates one interpretation over another is either a consensus built across interpretive communities or the exercise of power on the part of one of them to subjugate the others, found, for example, in the "othering" of persons and views that treats "difference" as being "lesser" (see Minow, 1990).

And yet, arguments within science—claims to knowledge—are fought fiercely and largely on methodological grounds. Some might be willing to concede other than scientific ways of knowing; but within science, it has been rare to encounter those who would accept multiple ways of understanding (a point that lies at the heart of Kuhn's, 1970, theory). This has been particularly the case among those who are persuaded of the superiority of quantitative methods and the universal and generalizable laws they are argued to produce, vis-à-vis those arguing on behalf of situated, grounded, local knowledge of a phenomenological–hermeneutic sort. In U.S. political science, the hegemonic position of the former (in departmental positions and curricula, among journal editors and their boards, and in other key decision-making positions) led to the increasing departure of the latter from the ranks of the national professional association (the American Political Science Association), until the so-called Perestroika movement brought some back (see Monroe, 2005). Sociology, organizational studies, and public administration have been similarly marked by such tensions.

11. Such narratives could also include autoethnographic studies (e.g., Greenhalgh, 2001; Humphreys, 2005); but the two concepts are not identical: While autoethnographies are reflexive, not all reflexive writing need be autoethnographic.

12. My thanks to Victor Toom for bringing Jasanoff's essay to my attention. Altruism in a political context as discussed by Monroe (1996) comes close; perhaps humility, or even passionate humility as I am using it here, is a constituent of altruism, maybe even requisite for it, or at least for the kind of altruism she explores.

13. Peri Schwartz-Shea calls my attention to the potential link between Zen Buddhist writings and practices that treat the "setting aside of one's ego" discussed below.

14. And "negative case analysis" enacts this at the analytic stage (see Schwartz-Shea, 2006).

15. The whole passage, the first part of which was quoted earlier, is,

The freedom to doubt is an important matter in the sciences and, I believe, in other fields. It was born of a struggle. It was a struggle to be permitted to doubt, to be unsure. And I do not want us to forget the importance of the struggle and, by default, to let the thing fall away. I feel a responsibility as a scientist who knows the great value of a satisfactory philosophy of ignorance, and the progress made possible by such a philosophy, progress which is the fruit of freedom of thought . . . If you know you are not sure, you have a chance to improve the situation. I want to demand this freedom for future generations.

16. Parts of this section draw on Yanow and Tsoukas (in press). The quotes from Dr. T draw on research for a course paper by Jamal Granick, and some of my analysis of Dr. T's words and actions benefited from discussions with Jamal, for which I remain grateful.

17. Schön derived much of his theorizing from case studies of architecture professors and their students. In such settings, the "materials" of the professional practice, as Schön (1983, 1987) makes clear, are the slope of the hill, for instance, or the materials one wants to put there. However, administrators, educators, and other professionals work with "human" materials—employees, students, and so forth—in addition to whatever inanimate objects they might engage. Hence, my expansion of Schön's concept.

18. One limit on direct dialogue can be the denials that arise, not out of defensiveness, but of alcoholism, drug addiction, and similar substance abuses.

19 Peri Schwartz-Shea (personal communication, March 2009) notes that a priori concept definition and variables operationalization can similarly "encourage the rush to diagnosis or, at least, build in a rigidity to the research process."

20. Part of what takes time is listening: "'How a doctor thinks can first be discerned by how he speaks and how he listens,' Dr. Groopman writes, noting that studies have shown that physicians, on average, interrupt patients less than 18 seconds after they have begun telling their story" (Grimes, 2007).

21. Although I do not find these themes sounded in Schön's treatments of reflective practice—as noted above, he attends to "surprise" and "backtalk" but not to what would bring someone to become cognizant of

the surprise, and so on—it seems to me that they are taken up to some extent in the discussions of Model II (Argyris & Schön, 1974). The focus there seems to be on fear, however, and its role in prompting defensive behaviors. Although I do not rule fear out as a major motivator preventing inquiry and reflection, I suspect that there is more going on in the enactment of expertise than can be explained by fear alone.

22. For further discussion of the differences between these two types of knowledge, see Yanow (2004); see also Hummel (2001). In traditional policy analysis, this often is manifested as a paternalism toward clients—the "targets" of public policies (see Note 2)—who are conceptualized as the "females" of the social policy world. This view emerges in exploring one of the predominant metaphors used in talking about social policies: the military metaphor of policies as missiles and the "delivery systems" that enable them to reach their "targets." It is a gendered metaphor: targets don't move; they are not capable of thought or action or independent analysis. The metaphor evokes the passivity stereotypically associated with women and projects it onto policy clients, who are seen and portrayed as having no role in policy design (except to conform to expectations). These are, in the realm of social policy, commonly the poor (welfare policy), children (e.g., Head Start and other educational policies), the elderly (Medicare), the ill and/or disabled (e.g., the Americans with Disabilities Act), immigrants and/or non-Whites (Affirmative Action, English Only), women (EEOC), single mothers (welfare and abortion). The patriarchal and patronizing assumptions that inhere in this metaphor comprise a way of thinking that is "deadly" for accomplishing social change. Treating clients and potential clients as active creators of and interpreters of meaning in their own right restores agency to them.

23. A goodly number of recent U.S. and U.K. evening television programs have also been concerned with questions of evidence. No longer "mystery" shows in the tradition of Agatha Christie's Mrs. Marple or Hercule Poirot putting together the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, the several *Law & Order* series in the United States, Inspector Lynley (in a morgue in Scotland) and other series in the United Kingdom, and other programs feature forensic scientists in crime labs and morgues (e.g., *Crossing Jordan*, with a forensic scientist in the coroner's office), and even the "ordinary" physician lead on the eponymous *House* is portrayed, with his team, in forensic fashion. What to make of this public preoccupation with evidence, truth claims, and ways of knowing, alongside our academic ones? I'm not yet sure.

24. My thanks to Peregrine Schwartz-Shea (personal communication, February 2009) for this formulation and example. I have been aided in thinking about the curricular implications of this analysis by these conversations, and I thank her also for bringing Robert Graves's *In Broken Images* poem to my attention.

References

Argyris, C., & Schön, D. A. (1974). *Theory in practice: Increasing professional effectiveness*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Argyris, C., & Schön, D. A. (1978). *Organizational learning: A theory of action perspective.* Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Baxandall, M. (1991). Exhibiting intention. In I. Karp & S. D. Lavine (Eds.), *Exhibiting cultures: The poetics and politics of museum display* (pp. 33-41). Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press.

Belenky, M., Clinchy, B., Goldberger, N., & Tarule, J. (1986). *Women's ways of knowing*. New York: Basic Books.

Brandwein, P. (2006). Studying the careers of knowledge claims: Bringing science studies to legal studies. In D. Yanow & P. Schwartz-Shea (Eds.), *Interpretation and method: Empirical research methods and the interpretive turn* (pp. 228-243). Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.

Buber, M. (1958). *I and thou*. New York: Scribner. (Original work published 1923)

Büger, C., & Gadinger, F. (2007). Reassembling and dissecting: International relations practice from a science studies perspective. *International Studies Perspectives*, *8*, 90-110.

Button, M. (2005). "A monkish kind of virtue?" For and against humility. *Political Theory*, *33*, 840-868.

Cahill, T. (2006, December 25). The peaceful crusader. *The New York Times*, p. A25.

Clifford, J. (1997). Four Northwest Coast museums. In *Routes: Travel and translation in the late twentieth century* (pp. 107-146). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Clifford, J., & Marcus, G. E. (Eds.). (1986). *Writing culture: The poetics and politics of ethnography*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Crichton, M. (2007, April 1). Where does it hurt? [Review of the book *How doctors think*] *The New York Times Book Review*. Retrieved April 6, 2007, from http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/01/books/review/Crichton.t.html

DeHaven-Smith, L. (1988). *Philosophical critiques of policy analysis*. Gainesville: University of Florida Press.

Diamond, J. A. (2006a). Maimonides on kingship: The ethics of imperial humility. *Journal of Religious Ethics*, *34*, 89-114.

Diamond, J. A. (2006b, December). *Humility as political doctrine*. Paper presented at the Political Hebraism: Jewish Sources in the History of Political Thought conference The Shalem Center, Jerusalem.

Dreyfus, H., & Dreyfus, S. (2005). Expertise in real world contexts. *Organization Studies*, *26*, 779-792.

Dryzek, J. S. (1990). *Discursive democracy*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Dyson, F. J. (2006, June 22). Religion from the outside. [Review of the book *Breaking the spell: Religion as a natural phenomenon*]. *The New York Review of Books*, *53,*(11).

Ferris, T. (1998, May 17). Mr. Feynman wasn't joking. [Review of the book *The meaning of it all: Thoughts of a citizen scientist*]. *The New York Times Book Review*, p. 50.

Feynman, R. P. (1998). *The meaning of it all*: *Thoughts of a citizen-scientist.* Reading, MA: Perseus Books.

Friese, H. (2001). Thresholds in the ambit of discourse: On the establishment of authority at academic conferences. In P. Becker & W. Clark (Eds.), *Little tools of knowledge: Historical essays on academic and bureaucratic practices* (pp. 285-312). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Fischer, F. (2003). *Reframing public policy: Discursive politics and deliberative practices*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Fischler, R. (2008). *Reflective practice.* Unpublished manusript.

Forester, J. F. (1999). *The deliberative practitioner*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Gardner, H. (1993). *Frames of mind: The theory of multiple intelligences*. New York: Basic Books.

Geertz, C. (1973). *The interpretation of cultures*. New York: Basic Books.

Geertz, C. (1983). "From the native's point of view": On the nature of anthropological understanding. In C. Geertz (Ed.), *Local knowledge* (pp. 55-70). New York: Basic Books.

Geertz, C. (1988). *Works and lives*: *The anthropologist as author*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Gilligan, C. (1982). *In a different voice*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Golden-Biddle, K., & Locke, K. (1993). Appealing work: An investigation in how ethnographic texts convince. *Organization Science*, *4*, 595-616.

Golden-Biddle, K., & Locke, K. (1997). *Composing qualitative research*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Goldstein, R. (2006a). Reasonable doubt. *The New York Times*, Retrieved July 29, 2006, from www.nytimes.com/2006/07/29/opinion/29goldstein.html?th&eme=th<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/29/opinion/29goldstein.html?th&eme=th>

Goldstein, R. (2006b). *Betraying Spinoza: The renegade Jew who gave us modernity*. NY: Schocken.

Goodman, N. (1978). *Ways of world-making*. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.

Graves, R. (2003). In broken images. In *The complete poems* (p. 296). London: Penguin. (Original work published 1929)

Greenhalgh, S. (2001). *Under the medical gaze: Facts and fictions of chronic pain*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Grimes, W. (2007, March 23). Diagnosis as art, not rocket science. [Review of the book *How doctors think. The New York Times Books*. Retrieved March 25, 2007, from http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/23/books/23book.html?em&ex=1174968000&en=bea6d7e6f91878d6&ei=5087%0A

Groopman, J. (2007). *How doctors think.* New York: Houghton Mifflin.

Hajer, M. A., & Wagenaar, H. (Eds.). (2003). *Deliberative policy analysis*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Haraway, D. (1988). Situated knowledges: The science question in feminism and the privilege of the partial perspective. *Feminist Studies*, *14*, 575-599.

Harding, S. (1986). *The science question in feminism*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Hartsock, N. C. M. (1987). The feminist standpoint. In S. Harding (Ed.), *Feminism & methodology* (pp. 157-180). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Hawkesworth, M. E. (2006). *Feminist inquiry*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Hazle, M. (1992, May 14). S.J. nightclub closes its doors, blames city. *San Jose Mercury News*, p. 1B.

Henriques, Diana B. (1994, June 19). The emperors of ice cream. *New York Times Book Review*, p. 12.

Hiley, D. R., Bohman, J. F., & Shusterman, R. (Eds.). (1991). *The interpretive turn*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Hummel, R. P. (1991). Stories managers tell: Why they are as valid as science. *Public Administration Review*, *51*, 31-41.

Hummel, R. (2001, June). *Kant's contributions to organizational knowledge: Do workers know something managers don't?* Paper presented at the annual conference of the Public Administration Theory Network, Leiden, the Netherlands.

Humphreys, M. (2005). Getting personal: Reflexivity and autoethnographic vignettes. *Qualitative Inquiry*, *11*, 840-860.

Ingersoll, V. H., & Adams, G. B. (1992). *The tacit organization*. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

Jasanoff, Sheila. (2003). Technologies of humility: Citizen participation in governing science. *Minerva*, *41*, 223-244.

Karp, I., & Lavine, S. D. (Eds.). (1991). *Exhibiting cultures: The poetics and politics of museum display*. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press.

Klemola, U., & Norros, L. (2001). Practice-based criteria for assessing anaesthetists' habits of action: Outline for a reflexive turn in practice. *Medical Education*, *35*, 455-464.

Kohlberg, L. (1971). *From is to ought*. New York: Academic Press.

Kuhn, T. S. (1970). *The structure of scientific revolutions*, 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Lanzara, G. F. (1991). Shifting stories: Learning from a reflective experiment in a design process. In D. A. Schön (Ed.), *The reflective turn: Case studies in and on educational practice* (pp. 285-320). New York: Teachers College Press.

Lapid, Y. (2002). International relations: Sculpting a new academic identity. In D. Puchala (Ed.), *Visions of international relations* (pp. 1-15). Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.

Latour, B. (1987). *Science in action: How to follow scientists and engineers through society*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Latour, B. (1990). Drawing things together. In M. Lynch and S. Woolgar (Eds.), *Representation in scientific practice* (pp. 19-68). Cambridge: MIT Press.

Latour, B. (1999). *Pandora's hope*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Latour, B. (2004). Scientific objects and legal objectivity. In A. Pottage & M. Mundy (Eds.), *Law, anthropology and the constitution of the social: Making persons and things* (pp. 73-113). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Latour, B., & Woolgar, S. (1988). *Laboratory life: The construction of scientific facts* (2nd ed.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Livingstone, D. N. (2003). *Putting science in its place*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Locke, K., Golden-Biddle, K., & Feldman, M. (2008). Making doubt generative: Rethinking the role of doubt in the research process. *Organization Science*, *19*, 907-918.

Lynch, C. (2005). The 'R' word, narrative, and Perestroika: A critique of language and method. In K. R. Monroe (Ed.), *Perestroika! The raucous rebellion in political science* (pp. 154-166). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Lynch, M. (1990). The externalized retina: Selection and mathematization in the visual documentation of objects in the life sciences. In M. Lynch & S. Woolgar (Eds.), *Representation in scientific practice* (pp. 152-186). Cambridge: MIT Press.

Lynch, M., & Woolgar, S. (Eds.). (1990). *Representation in scientific practice*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Minow, M. L. (1990). *Making all the difference.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Monroe, K. R. (1996). *The heart of altruism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Monroe, K. R. (Ed.). (2005). *Perestroika! The raucous rebellion in political science*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Nencel, L., & Yanow, D. (2008, August). *On methodological relics: Reconsidering etic outsiders, emic insiders, and fieldwork relationships*. Paper presented in the panel, "New vocabularies of method: Experts, ethics and the mutuality of ethnographic fieldwork" at the annual meeting of the European Association of Social Anthropologists, Ljubljana, Slovenia.

Obama's theologian. (2009, February 19). David Brooks and E. J. Dionne speaking on Reinhold Niebuhr, interviewed by Krista Teppitt. Transcript of radio program in the series *Speaking of faith* (National Public

Radio). Retrieved April 10, 2009, from http://speakingoffaith.publicradio.org/programs/2009/obamas-theo-logian/transcript.shtml

Oren, I. (2003). *Our enemies and US: America's rivalries and the making of political science*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Pachirat, T. (2006). We call it a grain of sand: The interpretive orientation and a human social science. In D. Yanow & P. Schwartz-Shea (Eds.), *Interpretation and method: Empirical research methods and the interpretive turn* (pp. 373-379). Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.

Pachirat, T. (in press). The *political* in political ethnography: Reflections from an industrialized slaughterhouse on perspective, power, and the ethnographic voice. In E. Schatz (Ed.), *Political ethnography: What immersion contributes to the study of power*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Perry, W. G., Jr. (1970). *Forms of intellectual and ethical development in the college years*. New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston.

Piaget, J. (1955). *The child's construction of reality*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Polkinghorne, D. E. (1983). *Methodology for the human sciences: Systems of inquiry*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Rabinow, P., & Sullivan, W. M. (Eds.). (1979/1985). *Interpretive social science* (2nd ed.). Berkeley: University of California Press. (First edition published 1979)

Rogers, C. R. (1980). *A way of being*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Sapolsky, H. (1972). *The Polaris system development*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Schatzki, T. R. (2005). The sites of organizations. *Organization Studies*, *26*, 465-484.

Schmidt, M. R. (1993). Grout: Alternative kinds of knowledge and why they are ignored. *Public Administration Review*, *53*, 525-530.

Schmidt, M. R. (2000). You know more than you can say: In memory of Donald A. Schön (1930-1997). *Public Administration Review*, *60*, 266-275.

Schneider, A. L., & Ingram, H. (1993). Social construction of target populations. *American Political Science Review*, *87*, 334-347.

Schneider, A. L., & Ingram, H. (1997). *Policy design for democracy*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.

Schön, D. A. (1979). Generative metaphor. In A. Ortony (Ed.), *Metaphor and thought* (pp. 254-283). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Schön, D. A. (1983). *The reflective practitioner: How professionals think in action*. New York: Basic Books.

Schön, D. A. (1985). *The design studio: An exploration of its traditions and potentials*. London: RIBA.

Schön, D. A. (1987). *Educating the reflective practitioner*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Schön, D. A. (Ed.). (1991). *The reflective turn: Case studies in and on educational practice*. New York: Teachers College Press.

Schön, D. A. & Rein, M. (1994). *Frame reflection: Toward the Resolution of Intractable Policy Controversies*. NY: Basic Books.

Schwartz-Shea, P. (2006). Judging quality: Evaluative criteria and epistemic communities. In D. Yanow & P. Schwartz-Shea (eds.), *Interpretation and method: Empirical research methods and the interpretive turn* (pp. 89-113). Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.

Schwartz-Shea, P., & Yanow, D. (2002). "Reading" "methods" "texts": How research methods texts construct political science. *Political Research Quarterly*, *55*, 457-486.

Schwartz-Shea, P., & Yanow, D. (in press). Reading and writing as method: In search of trustworthy texts. In S. Ybema, D. Yanow, H. Wels, & F. Kamsteeg (Eds.), *Organizational ethnography: Studying the complexity of everyday life*. London: Sage.

Shehata, S. (2006). Ethnography, identity, and the production of knowledge. In D. Yanow & P. Schwartz-Shea (Eds.), *Interpretation and method: Empirical research methods and the interpretive turn* (pp. 244-263). Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.

Snyder, B. R. (1973). *The hidden curriculum*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Stein, S. J. (2004). *The culture of education policy*. New York: Teachers College Press.

Teresi, D. (2002). *Lost discoveries: The ancient roots of modern science—from the Babylonians to the Maya*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Traweek, S. (1988). *Beamtimes and lifetimes: The world of high energy physicists*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Van Maanen, J. (1986). *Tales of the field*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Van Maanen, J. (1996). Commentary: On the matter of voice. *Journal of Management Inquiry*, *5*, 375-381.

Wæver, O. (1998). The sociology of a not so international discipline: American and European developments in international relations. *International Organization*, *52*, 687-727.

Woolgar, S., Coopmans, C., & Neyland, D. (2009). Does STS mean business? *Organization*, *16*, 5-30.

Yanow, D. (1996). *How does a policy mean? Interpreting policy and organizational actions*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.

Yanow, D. (1997). Passionate humility in interpretive policy and administrative analysis. *Administrative Theory and Praxis*, *19*, 171-177.

Yanow, D. (2000). *Conducting interpretive policy analysis*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Yanow, D. (2004). Translating local knowledge at organizational peripheries. *British Journal of Management*, *15*, S15-S25.

Yanow, D. (2005). In the house of "science," there are many rooms: Perestroika and the "'science studies" turn. In K. R. Monroe (Ed.), *Perestroika! The raucous rebellion in political science* (pp. 200-217). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Yanow, D. (2006). Neither rigorous nor objective? Interrogating criteria for knowledge claims in interpretive science. In D. Yanow & P. Schwartz-Shea (Eds.), *Interpretation and method: Empirical research methods and the interpretive turn* (pp. 67-88). Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.

Yanow, D. (2007). Interpretation in policy analysis: On methods and practice. *Critical Policy Analysis*, *1*, 109-121.

Yanow, D. (2008). Cognition meets action: Metaphors as models *of* and models *for*. In T. Carver & J. Pikalo (Eds.), *Political language and metaphor: Interpreting and changing the world* (pp. 225-238). London: Routledge.

Yanow, D. (in press). Dear author, dear reader: The third hermeneutic in writing and reviewing ethnography. In E. Schatz (Ed.), *Political ethnography: What immersion brings to the study of power*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Yanow, D., & Schwartz-Shea, P. (Eds.). (2006). *Interpretation and method: Empirical research methods and the interpretive turn*. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.

Yanow, D., & Tsoukas, H. (in press). What is reflection-in-action? A phenomenological account. *Journal of Management Studies*.

Yanow, D., & Willmott, H. (1999). Considering passionate humility. *Administrative Theory & Praxis*, *21*, 440-454.

Yanow, D., & Willmott, H. (2002). Passionate humility: Toward a philosophy of ethical will. In J. S. Jun (Ed.), *Rethinking administrative theory* (pp. 131-140). Westport, CT: Praeger.

Dvora Yanow holds the strategic chair in Meaning and Method in the Faculty of Social Sciences, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Her research has been shaped by an overall interest in the communication of meaning in policy and organizational settings. She is the author of *How Does a Policy Mean? Interpreting Policy and Organizational Actions*, *Conducting Interpretive Policy Analysis*, and *Constructing American "Race" and "Ethnicity": Category-making in Public Policy and Administration* (awarded the 2004 ASPA and 2007 Herbert A. Simon-APSA book awards) and coeditor of *Knowing in Organizations: A Practice-Based Approach*, *Interpretation and Method: Empirical Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn*, and the forthcoming *Organizational Ethnography: Studying the Complexities of Everyday Organizational Life*. Her current projects engage Dutch race–ethnic category-making, reflective practice, policy frames and framing, science museums, emics/etics, and U.S. Institutional Review Board policies and practices.