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BUYING TIME: MONEYED INTERESTS AND THE MOBILIZATION OF BIAS IN CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES

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Over the last two decades institutional critics have increasingly charged that moneyed interests dominate the legislative process in Congress. Systematic research on campaign contributions and members' floor voting, however, provides little supporting evidence. We develop a view of the member-donor relationship that questions the theoretical underpinnings of the vote-buying hypothesis itself and suggests two alternative claims: (1) the effects of group expenditures are more likely to appear in committee than on the floor; and (2) the behavior most likely to be affected is members' legislative involvement, not their votes. In order to test this account, we specify a model of committee participation and estimate it using data from three House committees. In contrast to the substantial literature on contributions and roll calls, our analysis provides solid support for the importance of moneyed interests in the legislative process. We also find evidence that members are more responsive to organized business interests within their districts than to unorganized voters even when voters have strong preferences and the issue at stake is salient. Such findings suggest several important implications for our understanding of political money, interest groups, and the representativeness of legislative deliberations.

At least since Madison railed about the mischiefs of faction, critics of U.S. political institutions have worried about the influence of organized interests in national policy making. In this century, one of the most eloquent critics of the interest group system was E. E. Schattschneider, who warned of the inequalities between private, organized, and upper-class groups on the one hand and public, unorganized, and lower-class groups on the other. The pressure system, he argued in *The Semisovereign People* (1960), "mobilized bias" in national policy making in favor of the former, against the interests of the latter, and hence against

the interests of U.S. democracy. Such concerns have hardly abated thirty years since the publication of Schattschneider's essay. In particular, the precipitous growth in the number and financial strength of political action committees has refueled the charge that moneyed interests dominate the policy making process. The current Congress is *The Best Congress Money Can Buy* according to one critic (Stern 1988), one where *Honest Graft* is an institutional imperative (Jackson 1988; see also Drew 1982; Etzioni 1984). "The rising tide of special-interest money," one close observer concludes, "is changing the balance of power between voters and

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donors, between lawmakers' constitutional constituents and their cash constituents" (Jackson 1988, 107).

Despite the claims of the institutional critics and the growing public concern over PACs during the last decade, the scientific evidence that political money matters in legislative decision making is surprisingly weak. Considerable research on members' voting decisions offers little support for the popular view that PAC money permits interests to buy or rent votes on matters that affect them. Based on an examination of 120 PACs in 10 issue areas over four congresses, one recent study concludes flatly that PAC contributions do not affect members' voting patterns (Grenzke 1989a). Another study, designed to explore the "upper bounds" of PAC influence on House roll calls, emphasizes "the relative inability of PACs to determine congressional voting" (Wright 1985, 412). Other studies have come to similar conclusions (see e.g., Chappell 1982; Wayman 1985; Welch 1982), though there are also dissenting voices (e.g., Kau and Rubin 1982; Silberman and Durden 1976). On the whole, then, this literature certainly leads one to a more sanguine view of moneyed interests and congressional politics than one gets from the popular commentaries. Does money matter?

Our approach to this question is two-pronged. In the first two sections, we revisit the question by developing a theoretical account of the constrained exchange between legislator and donor quite different from the one evident in the substantial literature cited above. In particular, we adopt the premise that PACs are rational actors, seeking to maximize their influence on the legislative outcomes that affect their affiliates; but we take issue with the standard account of PAC rationality. Our approach does not lead us to predict a strong causal relationship between PAC money and floor votes. House members and interest group representa-

tives are viewed as parties to an implicit cooperative agreement, but the constraints on member behavior and the rational calculations of group representatives limit the extent to which votes become the currency of exchange. Instead, we advance two hypotheses about the effect of money on congressional decision making.

First, we suggest that in looking for the effects of money in Congress, one must look more to the politics of committee decision making than those of the floor. This view, of course, is neither original nor remarkable. Students of Congress have long contended that interest group influence flourishes at the committee level, and recent students of PAC influence invariably advocate that work move in this direction (e.g., Grenzke 1989a, 18; Schlozman and Tierney 1986, 256). To date, however, systematic studies of PACs and committee decision making have been altogether rare (for an important exception, see Wright 1989). We focus here at the committee level and emphasize the theoretical reasons for doing so.

Second, and more importantly, our account of the member-donor exchange leads us to focus on the *participation* of particular members, not on their votes. This variable, we believe, is a crucial but largely neglected element of congressional decision making. It is especially important in any analysis of interest group influence in a decentralized Congress. In their famous study of lobbying on foreign trade policy, for instance, Bauer, Pool, and Dexter concluded that a member's principal problem is "not how to vote but what to do with his time, how to allocate his resources, and where to put his energy" (1963, 405). More recently, Denzau and Munger (1986) have modeled the interest group-member relationship as an exchange of contributions and electoral support for legislative services or effort. If money does not necessarily buy votes

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or change minds, in other words, it can buy members' time. The intended effect is to mobilize bias in congressional committee decision making.

We then develop and estimate a model of committee participation that permits a direct test of whether moneyed interests do mobilize bias in committee decision making. Analyzing data from three House committees on three distinct issues, we find that they do. In the final section we briefly discuss the implications of the findings for our understanding of money, interest groups, and representation in Congress.

The Rational PAC Revisited

The interdependencies of legislators and moneyed interests have been widely discussed by political scientists and widely lamented by critics of pluralism (see esp. Hayes 1981). The basis for political exchange is clear. Each depends at least partially on the other to promote its goals. Interest groups seek, among other things, favorable action on legislation that will affect them; members of Congress seek financial and political support from particular groups. Like the relationship between legislators and bureaucrats, however, the relationship between legislators and interest groups is one of *implicit* exchange: the actors "trade speculatively and on credit" (Arnold 1979, 36; see also Denzau and Munger 1986; Hayes 1981). Contributions are marked somewhere in the invisible ledger, and a group's political strategists presumably can use them to their momentary legislative ends.

This account of the legislator-interest group relationship underpins the now-considerable literature on contributions and roll call voting. The working hypothesis is that contributions influence legislative outcomes by "purchasing" the votes of particular members or, less directly, by

serving as "investments" that will pay dividends in legislative support at some later date (e.g., Chappell 1982; Jacobson 1980, 77, 82). The scientific evidence that such effects appear only infrequently may be cause for relief among critics of the system, but it is puzzling to theorists of institutional behavior. Why should PACs flourish, both in number and financial strength, when their legislative efficacy is so low? The payoffs would appear inadequate to sustain the cooperative relationship.

One possible explanation is that PACs raise and disburse money with local congressional elections, not specific legislative ends, in mind. Wright (1985) argues, in fact, that the decentralized nature of most PAC organizations inclines them to do just that. But this account simply moves the issue of PAC rationality to a second, institutional level. Why would PACs organize in this way? Wright suggests that the typical national PAC office permits local officials substantial discretion because it wants to encourage them to continue raising funds. But the organization's fund-raising and disbursement, presumably, are intended for some more ultimate purpose, namely, to increase the net political benefits associated with governmental action (or inaction) on issues that affect it. On the whole, using money solely to affect election outcomes is not likely to be a rational means to this end. The probability that any single group's contribution will affect the outcome of a congressional election—in which a wide range of more powerful forces are at work—is almost certainly slight. In the aggregate it might affect the organization's political support within Congress by only a member or two (Wayman 1985). While organizational arrangements may create some inefficiency in the way PACs employ funds to promote their political ends, one should still expect to find systematic patterns of allocation that are driven by legislative considerations,

even among PACs that are highly decentralized (and especially among those that are not). Indeed, there is growing evidence that this is the case (Grenzke 1989b).

If the principal value of contributions lies in their potential to affect floor roll calls, however, a second puzzle appears. One would expect to find contribution strategies that favor the swing legislators in anticipated floor battles, since these are the cases where the marginal utility in votes purchased per dollar spent is likely to be greatest (Denzau and Munger 1986). Money allocated to almost certain supporters (or almost certain opponents) should be counted as irrational behavior, evidence of scarce resources wasted. In fact, however, the evidence suggests that such "misallocations" systematically occur. The Business-Industry Political Action Committee (BIPAC) and the National Chamber of Commerce give overwhelmingly to conservative Republicans (Kau and Rubin 1982, 88; Maitland 1985). Labor PACs such as the AFL-CIO's Committee on Political Education give overwhelmingly to incumbent Democrats loyal to labor's agenda (Chappell 1982; Grier and Munger 1986; Jacobson 1980). Oil PACs give to conservative incumbents regardless of party and to friends regardless of ideology (Evans 1988). In general, PACs are prone to reward their friends—even when their friends are not in danger of defeat. In a specific test of the swing hypothesis, in fact, Welch found that if anything, dairy PACs were *less* likely to contribute to swing legislators on dairy issues, all other things being equal (1982).¹ On the whole, it would seem that if, as Schattschneider (1960) said, moneyed interests sing with an upper-class accent, they also spend a good deal of effort singing to the choir.

One oft-mentioned solution to these puzzles is that contributions buy not votes but "access" to members and their staffs (e.g., Berry 1984; Gopioian 1984; Schloz-

man and Tierney, 1986). But this solution only provokes a second query: If money buys access, what does access buy? (see esp. Herndon, 1982, 1017). Presumably, it gives the representatives of contributing groups important opportunities to directly lobby and potentially persuade legislators to the group's point of view. In this scenario the language of *access* may serve symbolically to launder the money going from group to roll call vote, but the effect of the group on the vote should still appear in systematic analysis (Grenzke 1989a). As we note above, it does not.

The Rational PAC Revised

The literature on PAC contribution strategies and members' roll call voting behavior thus suggests two puzzles. First, if group strategists are reasonably rational, why would they continue to allocate scarce resources to efforts where the expected political benefits are so low? Second, if PAC allocation strategies are designed to influence members' votes, why do they contribute so heavily to their strongest supporters and occasionally to their strongest opponents? Is it the case that PACs are systematically irrational (e.g., Welch 1982, 492) and, by extension, that claims about the influence of money on legislative process almost certainly exaggerated? We believe that the premise of rationality need not be rejected but that theoretical work in this area requires a more complete account of rational PAC behavior. We extend here an account developed formally in Denzau and Munger's model of a supply price for public policy (1986). Simply put, interest group resources are intended to accomplish something different from, and more than, influencing elections or buying votes. Specifically, we argue that PAC money should be allocated in order to *mobilize* legislative support and *demobilize* opposition, particularly at the most

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important points in the legislative process.

This argument turns directly on what we already know about the nature of legislators' voting decisions from a very rich literature. The simple but important point is that a number of powerful factors exist that predispose a member to vote a certain way, among them party leaders, ideology, constituency, and the position of the administration (Fiorina 1974; Jackson 1974; Kingdon 1981).² Kingdon notes, moreover, that members' votes on particular issues are also constrained by their past voting histories (1981, 274-78). Members attach some value to consistency, independent of the other factors that influence their voting behavior. A third and related point is that the public, recorded nature of the vote may itself limit the member's discretion: a risk-averse member may fear the appearance of impropriety in supporting major campaign contributors in the absence of some other, legitimate force pushing her in the same direction. Finally, the dichotomous nature of the vote acts as a constraint. Money must not only affect members' attitudes at the margin but do so enough to push them over the threshold between *nay* and *yea*. In short, the limits on member responsiveness to messages wrapped in money are substantial, perhaps overwhelming, at least insofar as floor voting is concerned.

Of course, almost all studies of PAC contributions and roll calls acknowledge the importance of such factors and build them into their statistical models of the voting decision. But it is also important to consider the implications of these findings for the vote-buying hypothesis itself. Interest group strategists tend to be astute-enough observers of the legislative process to appreciate the powerful constraints that shape members' voting behavior. To the extent that this is true the rational PAC should expect little in the way of marginal benefits in votes bought for

dollars spent, especially when individual PAC contributions are limited by the Federal Election Campaign Act to ten thousand dollars—a slight fraction of the cost of the average House race. Individual votes, that is, simply aren't easy to change; and even if some are changed, the utility of the votes purchased depends on their net cumulative effect in turning a potentially losing coalition into a winning one. For the rational PAC manager, the expected marginal utility approximates zero in most every case. All other things being equal, scarce resources should be allocated heavily elsewhere and to other purposes.

How, then, should the strategic PAC distribute its resources? The first principle derives from the larger literature on interest group influence in Congress. Well aware of the decentralized nature of congressional decision making, interest groups recognize that resources allocated at the committee stage are more efficiently spent (e.g., Berry 1984; Grier and Munger 1986; Kingdon 1981, 170-71). Interest group preferences incorporated there have a strong chance of surviving as the bill moves through subsequent stages in the sequence, while provisions not in the committee vehicle are difficult to attach later. Second, the nature of the committee assignment process increases the probability that organized interests will find a sympathetic audience at the committee or subcommittee stage. Members seek and often receive positions that will permit them to promote the interests that, in turn, help them to get reelected (Shepsle 1978). Finally, the less public, often informal nature of committee decision making suggests that members' responsiveness to campaign donors will receive less scrutiny. Indeed, a long tradition of research on subgovernments emphasizes that such clientelism flourishes at the committee stage (e.g., Ripley and Franklin 1980; Shepsle 1978, chap. 10; but see Gais, Peterson, and Walker 1984). In short,

groups will strategically allocate their resources with the knowledge that investments in the politics of the appropriate committee or subcommittee are likely to pay higher dividends than investments made elsewhere. Indeed, this principle is especially important in the House, where the sheer size of the chamber's membership, the greater importance of the committee stage, and the frequent restrictions on floor participation recommend a more targeted strategy (see, esp., Grenzeke 1989b and Grier and Munger 1989).

If PACs concentrate at the committee level, what, specifically, do they hope to gain there? Purchasing votes is one possibility; and, in fact, the rationale for allocating campaign money to buy votes in committee is somewhat stronger than for vote-buying on the floor. But even within committee, PACs still tend to give to their strongest supporters. In addition, committee votes, like floor votes, are dichotomous decisions. And despite the lower visibility of committee decision making, the factors of constituency, ideology, party, and administration are almost certainly at work. In fact, while research on PACs and committee voting is just now beginning to emerge, there is little evidence that contributions influence voting in committee any more than they do voting on the floor (Wright 1989).

The alternative hypothesis that we test here is that political money alters members' patterns of legislative involvement, a point that emerges from an older literature on interest group influence in Congress (e.g., Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1963; Matthews [1960] 1973, esp. 192-93) but is given its fullest theoretical expression in the recent work of Denzau and Munger (1986). Denzau and Munger suggest that interest groups provide political resources in an implicit effort to purchase policy-relevant "services" from members or their staffs. Stated somewhat differently, the object of a rational PAC allocation strategy is not

simply the *direction* of legislators' preferences but the *vigor* with which those preferences are promoted in the decision making process. Such strategies should take the form of inducing sympathetic members to get actively involved in a variety of activities that directly affect the shape of committee legislation: authoring or blocking a legislative vehicle; negotiating compromises behind the scenes, especially at the staff level; offering friendly amendments or actively opposing unfriendly ones; lobbying colleagues; planning strategy; and last and sometimes least, showing up to vote in favor of the interest group's position. The purposes of PACs in allocating selective benefits, then, are analogous to the purposes that Arnold attributes to legislatively strategic bureaucrats: the goal is not simply to purchase support but to provide incentives for supporters to act as agents—at the extreme, to serve as "coalition leaders" on the principal's behalf (see Arnold 1979, 40-42 and esp. 98-100).

Several arguments support this view. First, participation is crucial to determining legislative outcomes; and voting is perhaps the least important of the various ways in which committee members participate (Hall 1989; Mayhew 1974, 95). Second, while members' voting choices are highly constrained, how they allocate their time, staff, and political capital is much more discretionary (Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1963, 406-7). At any given moment, each member confronts a wide range of opportunities and demands, the response to any subset of which will serve one or more professional goals. To be sure, the member must choose among them. Legislative resources are scarce, and their allocation to one activity results in other beneficial opportunities foregone (Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1963; Hall 1987; Matthews [1960] 1973, 182-93). But for the most part, the purposive legislator is free to choose among the abundant alternatives with only modest constraints im-

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posed by constituents, colleagues, or other actors. Hence, the member's level of involvement is something that a strategic PAC can reasonably expect to affect. The contribution need not weigh so heavily in a member's mind that it changes his or her position in any material way; it need only weigh heavily enough to command some increment of legislative resources. The minimum threshold that must be passed is thus a fairly modest one, and the potential effect of contributions on behavior is one of degree. Specifically, the member will allocate scarce legislative resources on the group's behalf so long as the marginal utility of the contribution to the member exceeds the expected marginal utility of the most valuable remaining use of the member's resources (see also Denzau and Munger 1986).

A third advantage of this view is that it explains the ostensibly anomalous tendency of PACs to contribute so heavily to members who are almost certain to win reelection and almost certain to support the group's point of view. Such behavior now appears quite rational. It is precisely one's supporters that one wants to mobilize: the more likely certain members are to support the group, the more active it should want them to be. Furthermore, this view of purposive PACs makes sense of the evidence that PACs sometimes contribute to members who will almost certainly oppose them and whose involvement in an issue stands to do the group harm. The PAC may have no hope of changing the opponent's mind, but it may, at the margin at least, diminish the intensity with which the member pursues policies that the organization does not like. The intent of the money, then, is not persuasion but demobilization: "We know you can't support us, but please don't actively oppose us." However, we should not expect the demobilizing effect of money to be nearly so strong as the mobilizing effect. The message provided through contributions to one's supporters

is widely perceived as a legitimate one: in asking for help, the group is encouraging members to do precisely what they would do were resources plentiful. In contrast, contributions to opponents are meant to encourage them to go against their predispositions: the implicit message is to "take a walk" on an issue that they may care about. In short, the expected effects are not symmetric; the mobilization hypothesis is on stronger theoretical ground.

A final advantage of the view of rational action employed here is that it renders the matter of access more comprehensible. We have already noted that according to the standard account of PAC behavior, the importance that both legislators and lobbyists attach to the money-access connection makes little sense, given the evidence that money has little ultimate effect on votes. In light of the theory sketched here, however, access becomes an important, proximate goal of the interest group pursuing a legislative agenda. Access is central to stimulating agency. It gives the group the opportunity to let otherwise sympathetic members (and their staffs) know that some issue or upcoming activity is important to them. The ideal response they seek is not simply "I'll support you on this" but "What can I do to help?" Perhaps more importantly, access refers to the reciprocal efforts of the group. It is the pipeline through which the group effectively subsidizes the considerable time and information costs associated with their supporters' participation in the matters the group cares about. As various accounts reveal, group representatives often serve as "service bureaus" or adjuncts to congressional staff (e.g., Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1963, chap. 24; Kingdon 1981, 154-55). They provide technical information and policy analysis; they provide political intelligence; they draft legislation and craft amendments; they even write speeches or talking points that their supporters can employ in efforts on their behalf. Such subsidies to the

"congressman-as-enterprise" (Salisbury and Shepsle 1981) do not necessarily persuade, but they should affect the patterns of activity and abdication that have a direct bearing on legislative deliberations and outcomes (Hall 1987, 1989).

The Data: Money and Mobilization on Three Committees

The data for this investigation are drawn from staff interviews and markup records of three House committees on three issues: (1) the Dairy Stabilization Act, considered by the Agriculture Committee in 1982; (2) the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA), considered by Education and Labor in 1982; and (3) the Natural Gas Market Policy Act, considered by Energy and Commerce during 1983–84.

Several features of these cases make them particularly appropriate for exploring the effects of money on the participation of committee members. First, all were highly significant pieces of legislation, the stakes of each measuring in the billions of dollars. At issue in the Natural Gas Market Policy Act was the deregulation of natural gas prices, a proposal that would transfer billions of dollars from one region to another, from consumer to industry, and within the industry from interstate pipelines and distributors to the major natural gas producers (Uslaner 1989, chap. 5; Maraniss 1983). Annual spending on the Job Training Partnership Act was expected at the time of its passage to be in the four-to-five-billion-dollar range (Donnelly 1982, 1035), and it replaced one of the most important domestic programs of the 1970s (Franklin and Ripley 1984). While more narrow than these in scope, the Dairy Stabilization Act also entailed significant economic effects. The principal purpose of the act was to adjust the scheduled support price for milk

downward by as much as a dollar per hundredweight over two years, creating budget savings of 4.2 billion dollars for fiscal years 1983–85 and decreasing the profitability of milk production by as much as 30% for the typical dairy farmer. In each case, then, evidence of the influence of PAC money on congressional decision making can hardly be counted narrow or trivial. The deliberations in each case bore in significant ways on major interests, both public and private.

A second feature relevant to this investigation follows from the economic importance attached to these issues. All three were salient among actors other than the private groups immediately affected, a feature that the considerable research on roll call voting suggests should depress the effect of PAC contributions on congressional decision making (see, esp., Evans 1986). This was especially true for the natural gas and job training bills. While the Natural Gas Market Policy Act never received action on the House floor in the 98th Congress, it was a highly visible issue while still in committee. Consumer interest in the issue of natural gas pricing was unusually high. Gas heating costs had been climbing quickly in much of the country despite a substantial surplus of domestic natural gas (Davis 1984; Murray 1983; Uslaner 1989, chap. 5); and this fact was widely publicized through the efforts of the Citizen/Labor Energy Coalition (Pressman 1983). The *Washington Post*, in turn, gave Commerce Committee deliberations front-page coverage, and the issue was a high priority for the Reagan administration. The job training bill, likewise, was one of the most important domestic initiatives of Reagan's first term and received considerable media attention. The principal purpose of the bill was to replace the much maligned but widely used public jobs program, the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA), at a time when the national un-

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employment rate threatened to exceed 10% for the first time in four decades. To a lesser degree, finally, the 1982 dairy bill was also salient among actors off the committee and outside the industry. While the interest of the general public in dairy policy was slight, the burgeoning budget deficit loomed large on Capitol Hill, and it clearly motivated the decision to change dairy policy only one year after passage of an omnibus farm bill (Wehr 1982a, 1982b). Indeed, relative to other domestic nonentitlements, dairy subsidies were widely perceived as a major budget offender. The administration thus counted the price adjustments a high priority, one that commanded considerable attention from Budget Director David Stockman, and the House Budget Committee was involved at every stage of the process.

Finally, each of the policy areas we examine here has received the attention of previous scholars studying PAC contributions and floor roll calls; and in each case the effects of PAC money were found to be slight. In a study of dairy legislation considered in the House in 1975, for instance, Welch (1982) concluded that dairy PAC contributions were the least important determinant of voting on milk price supports and that their effect on the legislation was negligible (see also Chappell 1982). Grenzke (1989a) estimated a dynamic model of members' voting behavior over four congresses and found that labor union contributions had either a negligible or a *negative* effect on members' propensity to take prolabor positions on the House floor (but see Wilhite and Theilmann 1987). And Wayman and Kutler (1985) found no effect of natural gas industry campaign contributions on members' votes during House consideration of natural gas deregulation in 1975.

At two levels, then, past research indicates that our selection of cases is biased against our argument. It suggests that high salience issues should exhibit little PAC influence on legislative behavior, yet

each of the cases here commanded the attention of a wide range of political actors. Second, past research suggests that we will find little PAC influence in precisely these three policy areas. Should we find support for the hypothesis that money mobilizes support (or demobilizes opposition) at the committee level, we should be on reasonably solid ground to conclude that (1) the results of this exploration are apt to generalize to other committees and other issues and (2) the null results of past research are more likely to be artifacts of the legislative behavior and the legislative stage studied than evidence that moneyed interests do not matter in congressional decision making.

The Model

The model of participation we use to test for the hypothesized effects is adapted from Hall 1987.³ The model begins from the same motivational premise that we employed in our discussion of PAC contribution behavior. Members of Congress are purposive actors who allocate their time, staff, and other legislative resources in such a way as to advance certain personal goals or interests. There are several goals that commonly figure in these calculations. The one most prominently cited in the literature on legislative behavior is reelection or, more generally, service to the district (see, esp., Mayhew 1974); but we report elsewhere that the relevance of any particular goal to a member's participation depends directly on the nature of the issue and the legislative context (Hall 1987). To use language borrowed from Kingdon (1981), goals are "evoked." Any particular issue may evoke several goals simultaneously or may evoke none at all. In the latter case, a member is simply uninterested, the expected benefits of participation slight; in the former, the level of interest is intense, the expected benefits of participation high.

In the three cases under study here, in fact, several goals were probably at work in the resource allocation decisions of most committee members. For instance, the natural gas bill raised issues of government intervention in the economy and the country's long-term dependence on foreign energy sources. The budgetary implications of the dairy bill undoubtedly evoked some committee members' concerns about good fiscal policy and its macroeconomic consequences. The Job Training Partnership Act concerned the government's obligation to redress inequalities of economic opportunity resulting from inadequate or outdated job skills. But the goal most consistently evident in staff interviews, markup debates, and secondary accounts of the three bills was promoting or protecting district interests. For the purposes of this analysis, then, we adopt the simpler and more tractable motivational assumption common to most models of legislative behavior.⁴ In deciding whether and to what extent to participate on a particular issue, the member estimates both the expected benefits and expected costs, where benefits are a direct function of the issue's economic relevance to the district.⁵

If the interests of one's constituents motivate a member to become involved, the costs of participation are also important and highly variable: resources are scarce, and the allocation to one activity results in other profitable opportunities foregone. Several factors affect the resources available to particular members on particular issues. First, assignment to the subcommittee of jurisdiction provides members both with greater formal opportunities to participate and access to an earlier stage of the sequential process. It also gives the member greater access to staff and to lines of communication with other interested actors both on and off the committee. For similar reasons, a committee or subcommittee leadership position subsidizes participation even more. The

greater staff allocations that these positions bestow, the procedural control over the agenda, and the central place in the committee communication network diminish the time and information costs associated with meaningful involvement in the issue at hand. Finally, freshman status tends to increase the information costs and diminish the opportunities or resources a member enjoys for any particular bill.

The variable of greatest interest in this investigation, however, is the level of contributions each member receives from PACs interested in the issue at hand. To what degree, that is, does money affect members' decisions regarding whether and to what extent they will participate in the committee deliberations? Two points require emphasis here. First, the foregoing discussion suggests that the effects of money on participation should not be simply linear. The positive effect of contributions on participation should be contingent on probable support; this is the mobilization hypothesis. To the extent that contributions are given to probable opponents, on the other hand, they should diminish participation; this is the demobilization hypothesis.

Second, contributions may well be related to other activities that moneyed interests employ to further their legislative aims, making it difficult to isolate the effects of any particular part of their effort (Rothenberg 1989; Wright 1989). For instance, it may be the case that those groups that organize PACs for the purpose of channeling money to candidates are also the most active in developing grass roots campaigns or direct lobbying efforts. While there is evidence to suggest that the correlation among these activities is modest for the cases under study here,⁶ our data on interest group activity are limited to political action committee campaign contributions. Hence, while our model tests for the effect that money has on committee behavior, one might more

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accurately characterize our results as capturing the effect of the several resources that moneyed interests employ.⁷

The dependent variable is the participation of member *i* on bill *j*, where participation refers to a member's activity both during formal committee markups and committee action behind the scenes. Our data on activity are drawn from two sources: semistructured interviews with both the majority and minority staffers assigned to cover each bill and the largely unpublished but meticulously kept committee and subcommittee markup records. The summary measure of participation that we use for the purposes of this exploration is a simple scale score derived from a factor analysis of six activities: attendance; voting participation; speaking; offering amendments during committee markups; role in authoring the legislative vehicle or an amendment in the nature of a substitute; and negotiating behind the scenes at either the member or the staff level.⁸ The measurement of the independent variables, in turn, follows directly from the preceding discussion. Members' institutional positions and status are measured with dichotomous variables that are set at zero except as the following conditions hold: subcommittee membership takes a value of one if a member sat on the subcommittee with jurisdiction over the bill; leadership position takes a value of one if a member was chair or ranking minority member of either the full or subcommittee; and freshman status takes a value of one for members in their first term in the House.

In measuring the relevance of each issue to committee members' districts, we assume that relevance is primarily economic in nature. In the natural gas case, this takes two quite different forms: total district-level natural gas production⁹ and the economic effect of gas price increases on residential consumers in the member's district, which we measure using industry data on natural gas price in-

creases and census data regarding congressional district natural gas use.¹⁰ If high production and high inflation capture dimensions of intradistrict salience, however, the presence of both at once should produce intradistrict conflict. The member is torn between two significant economic interests, and activity on behalf of one may alienate the other. Indeed, Fiorina (1974) suggests that unrequited constituents are likely to punish more than the required are to reward. As intradistrict conflict increases, in any case, the expected benefits of activity on the issue should diminish, *ceteris paribus*. In the natural gas case, then, intradistrict conflict occurs as the production and inflation variables both approach their upper limits. We measure this condition as the product of two terms: "high production" is the extent to which natural gas production in the district exceeds the mean district production for all members of the committee; similarly, "high inflation" is the extent to which the district inflationary effect exceeds the mean for all committee members. When either district gas production or inflationary effect is below the committee mean, then, intradistrict conflict is zero.

In the other two cases the measurement of district interest is uncomplicated by potential conflicts within members' geographic constituencies. In the dairy stabilization case district relevance is directly related to the importance of dairy farming, measured simply by the total number of dairy cows in the member's district as reported by the United States Department of Agriculture biennial census. Given that milk prices were not a salient consumer issue *per se* and that the Dairy Stabilization Act was not likely to affect retail prices in any significant way, we do not assume a more general public concern with this issue. For the Job Training Partnership Act, likewise, district relevance is directly related to the importance of federal jobs programs in addressing struc-

tural unemployment, which we measure as the current level of CETA expenditures in the member's district.¹¹ This variable not only taps the district-specific economic benefits of clients of the expiring job training program but (given that CETA allocations were directly tied to local unemployment rates) also captures the severity of structural unemployment in the district.

Consistent with the preceding theoretical discussion, we estimate the effect of group expenditures on participation by including pairs of interactions between group contributions (measured as the amount contributed during the two-year election cycle prior to committee action) and indicators of probable support or opposition. For each case, the exact specification of the interactions is straightforward. In the dairy stabilization case, we measure probable support or opposition using the ratings of the National Farmers' Union (NFU),¹² an organization that strongly supports federal intervention in the agricultural economy to control supply and support the commodity prices paid to farmers. Given that we expect very different effects for contributions on the behavior of likely supporters and opponents, however, the model requires two separate interactions: *Money to supporters* is the product of contributions¹³ and the member's distance from the mean NFU score where the members' rating is greater than the mean; the money-support term is zero otherwise. *Money to opponents* is the product of contributions and the member's distance from the mean NFU score, where the member's rating is less than the mean; the money-opposition term is zero otherwise. Following the theoretical reasoning of the last section, then, the expected effect on participation is positive for money to supporters. The expected effect is negative for money to opponents in each case.

Any attempt to model the effect of contribution activity on legislative behavior

cannot assume that a particular industry is necessarily unified, however: one segment of an industry may have different interests and work in ways that offset some other segment. In the case of the federal dairy legislation, no such split within the industry was apparent among the principal actors, thus permitting the fairly simple specification described above. But in general—and in the natural gas case in particular—an industry may not be so easily simplified. While the gas producers were by far the most visible and most vigorous among the corporate actors and gave by far the most money in campaign contributions among energy PACs, the natural gas industry was seriously divided (Pressman 1983; Uslaner 1989, chap. 5), a feature that we attempt to capture. The alignments were by no means perfect, but the principal issues at stake in the legislation before House Energy and Commerce pitted the major gas producers and intrastate pipelines against the interstate pipelines and distributors. As a result, different segments of the industry were likely to target different members to serve as legislative agents and identify different members as their likely opponents. Our first task therefore was to distinguish the various energy PACs according to the principal business activities of their affiliates. Using the detailed descriptions of individual companies provided by Moody's Investor Service (1983a and 1983b), we classified each affiliate according to its principal interests in the natural gas area.¹⁴ We then divided the contributions a member received according to whether they came from producers or intrastate pipelines on the one hand and interstates or distributors on the other. The measure of contributions that we employ, then, is the producer-intrastate contributions minus the interstate-distributor contributions, the value of which was positive in almost every case.

The operationalization of the interactions tapping the net producer-intrastate

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effects, in turn, was handled in a fashion analogous to the dairy stabilization case. In the natural gas case, however, members' Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) scores were more appropriate as an indicator of likely support or opposition. For the producer-intrastate segment of the gas industry at least, the issue of greatest concern was the extent to which the government continued its intervention in the natural gas market by controlling the price of old gas. The ADA score should tap members' historical tendency to support such federal interventions quite well. *Money to supporters*, then, is the product of net producer-intrastate contributions and the member's distance from the mean ADA score where the member's rating is less than the mean; the money-support term is zero otherwise; and *money to opponents* is the product of contributions and the member's distance from the mean ADA score where the member's rating is greater than the mean; the money-opposition term is zero otherwise.

Unlike the dairy and natural gas cases, finally, the job training bill did not involve issues specific to a particular industry. The organized interests most concerned with CETA and its prospective replacement were the national labor unions: public service employment and training programs were at the top of labor's agenda, especially in 1982, when unemployment was approaching postwar records. Moreover, labor unions were one of the single largest categories of contributors to congressional campaigns and gave to five-sixths of the members of House Education and Labor. It is the effect of these contributions on committee behavior with which we are primarily concerned. This is not to say, however, that labor unions were the only groups interested in mobilizing support on this bill.¹⁵ On the business side, national business associations generally opposed any public service employment provisions and

favored an expanded role for private industry councils so that federally subsidized training would be tailored to meet the changing needs of the private sector (Baumer and Van Horn 1985, 173). As in the natural gas case, we thus employ a net contributions variable, which takes the value of the member's total labor contributions less the total contributions received from national business organizations.¹⁶ As in the other two cases, likewise, the indicator of probable support or opposition was constructed using the appropriate group rating, in this case, the AFL-CIO's Committee on Political Education (COPE) score. *Money to supporters*, then, is the product of net labor contributions and the member's distance from the mean COPE score, where the member's rating is greater than the mean; and *money to opponents* is the product of contributions and the member's distance from the mean COPE score where the member's rating is less than the mean.

Results and Interpretations

In estimating the model of participation, we explicitly account for the possibility that contributions are effectively endogenous, that is, that in allocating contributions to committee members during the previous election cycle, a group may attempt to anticipate who the principal players will be on issues it cares about.¹⁷ To the extent this is true, at least, the error term will be correlated with contributions and the ordinary least squares coefficient on the latter will be upwardly biased. We thus estimate the participation model using two-stage least squares, with the second stage results reported in the tables.¹⁸ In each of the three cases, the model performs quite well, explaining over 55% of the variance in participation. More importantly, the analysis provides solid support for the principal hypothesis of this study, that moneyed interests

mobilize bias in committee decision making.

This finding is clear for all three cases.¹⁹ The campaign contributions that dairy industry PACs gave to their likely supporters significantly increased their participation, even when we controlled for the importance of the issue to individual members' districts, whether they sat on the subcommittee of jurisdiction, and whether they held a leadership position (Table 1). Such factors are reported elsewhere to be strong determinants of committee participation (Hall 1987), and each is also likely to affect contributions since interest groups tend to concentrate their resources on members who hold positions of institutional power (e.g., Grenzke 1989b; Grier and Munger 1986, 1989), as well as on members who have a district stake in their industry. That the mobilization coefficient remains positive and significant in the face of the multivariate controls reinforces the interpretation that the connection between group resources and mobilization is causal. When dairy PACs did give to their probable opponents, moreover, there is some evidence that the contributions diminished participation. While the coefficient on the money-opposition variable is statistically

insignificant, its size is substantively non-trivial, and the negative sign is consistent with the demobilization hypothesis. In short, the more money a supporter received from the dairy PACs and the stronger the member's support, the more likely he or she was to allocate time and effort on the industry's behalf (e.g., work behind the scenes, speak on the group's behalf, attach amendments to the committee vehicle, as well as show up and vote at committee markups). Alternatively, money may have diminished the intensity of the opposition. The effect of money on decision making in the House Agriculture Committee, then, was to encourage industry supporters to be active and, if anything, to encourage industry opponents to abdicate.

The results of the job training case are also clear, and the specific estimates are striking in their similarity to the dairy stabilization case. As Table 2 shows, the contributions that labor groups made to their supporters had a substantial, statistically significant effect on participation during Education and Labor deliberations. Remarkably, the unstandardized coefficient for the money support variable is almost identical in size to the analogous coefficient in the dairy stabilization model

**Table 1. PAC Money and Committee Participation:
1982 Dairy Stabilization Act**

Independent Variables	Unstandardized 2SLS Coefficient	t-statistic
Intercept	.01	.05
Number of dairy cows in district	.27**	2.21
Dairy PAC contributions to supporters	.26**	2.42
Dairy PAC contributions to opponents	-.11	-.61
Membership on reporting subcommittee	.17**	3.54
Committee or subcommittee leadership position	.35**	4.50
Freshman status	-.02	-.31

Note: Adjusted R-squared = .60; number of observations = 41. All variables are measured on a 0-1 scale. The contributions term is the predicted value from the first-stage equation.

**Statistically significant at .05 level, one-tailed test.

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**Table 2. PAC Money and Committee Participation:
1982 Job Training Partnership Act**

Independent Variables	Unstandardized 2SLS Coefficient	t-statistic
Intercept	.13	.77
CETA expenditures in district	.03	.23
Labor union net contributions to supporters	.25*	1.62
Labor union net contributions to opponents	-.18	-.80
Membership on reporting subcommittee	.19**	2.61
Committee or subcommittee leadership position	.47**	4.55
Freshman status	-.05	-.51

Note: Adjusted R-squared = .56; number of observations = 32. All variables are measured on a 0-1 scale. The net contributions term is the predicted value from the first-stage equation.

*Statistically significant at .10 level, one-tailed test.

**Statistically significant at .05 level, one-tailed test.

despite the fact that the two cases are drawn from different committees with qualitatively different jurisdictions and policy environments (Smith and Deering 1984). In each case, a change in the money support variable from its minimum to its maximum value moves a member approximately one-fourth of the way along the participation scale, almost exactly one standard deviation. In both cases, likewise, this coefficient is greater than that for subcommittee membership, a variable generally considered central to understanding participation in the postreform House. As in the dairy stabilization case, finally, the Education and Labor bill provides some support for the demobilization hypothesis. While it fails to meet conventional levels of statistical significance, the size of the money-opposition term proves negative and substantively significant, nearly matching the size of subcommittee membership.

The results regarding moneyed interests and mobilization are only slightly less compelling in the natural gas case, a case complicated both by divisions within the industry and the apparent importance of both organized and unorganized interests. As we note above, such conditions are

likely to mitigate the efficacy of interest group efforts, and they complicate the measurement of anticipated support and opposition. Still, the mobilization hypothesis finds strong support in the behavior of Energy and Commerce members. While the size of the unstandardized coefficient for the money support variable is somewhat smaller than for the other two cases, it is still substantial and statistically significant at the .05 level. A change in the money support variable from its minimum to its maximum moves a Commerce Committee member approximately one-sixth of the way along the participation scale. By way of illustration, this amounts to the difference between Minnesota Representative Gerry Sikorski, who did little more than faithfully attend and vote during formal markups, and Alabama Representative Richard Shelby, whose staff participated in behind-the-scenes negotiations and who offered two substantive amendments during subcommittee markup, both of which passed.

As Table 3 shows, finally, the demobilization hypothesis is not supported in the natural gas case. While the coefficient on the money opponents interaction is slight, its positive sign is inconsistent with our

**Table 3. PAC Money and Committee Participation:
1984 Natural Gas Market Policy Act**

Independent Variables	Unstandardized 2SLS Coefficient	t-statistic
Intercept	.08	.40
Natural gas production in district	.32*	1.65
Natural gas price increase effect on district	.17*	1.35
High production/high inflation interaction	-.18	-1.28
Producer-intrastate net contributions to supporters	.17**	1.69
Producer-intrastate net contributions to opponents	.01	.06
Membership on reporting subcommittee	.23**	3.17
Committee or subcommittee leadership position	.54**	4.77
Freshman status	.13*	1.31

Note: Adjusted R-squared = .57; number of observations = 42. All variables are measured on a 0-1 scale. The net contributions term is the predicted value from the first stage equation.

*Statistically significant at .10 level, one-tailed test.

**Statistically significant at .05 level, one-tailed test.

prediction. The foundation for the demobilization hypothesis being theoretically weaker, however, the null result here, as well as the weak results in the dairy and job training cases, are not altogether surprising. The theoretically stronger hypothesis, that money mobilizes a pro-PAC bias at the committee level, is confirmed in all three.

For the most part, the other variables in the model also perform as predicted and suggest interesting implications for the politics of representation in a decentralized Congress. The relevance of an issue to the member's district enhances member participation in two cases, providing evidence that Agriculture and Commerce members purposively allocate their legislative time and resources to promote the interests of their constituencies. On House Agriculture, the more important dairy farming was to the member's district, the more likely he or she was to participate in committee deliberations. Likewise, the greater the presence of natural gas production in the district, the more likely the Energy and Commerce member was to participate in deliberations on the Natural

Gas Market Policy Act. Indeed, a change in gas production from its minimum to its maximum corresponds to a 32% change along the participation scale, the difference between simply showing up and being a major player on the bill. By comparison, however, the effect of natural gas price increases on district consumers appears smaller by half. And the importance of structural unemployment and program spending in the districts of Education and Labor members had at best a slight effect on their involvement in the Job Training Partnership Act.

Pending better measurement of unorganized constituents' interest at the district level, of course, we cannot draw unqualified conclusions regarding their importance in shaping committee behavior. Should such patterns hold up under subsequent analysis, however, the implications for member responsiveness to industry interests and industry money relative to more general constituency concerns would be several and important. If members allocate their scarce legislative time and resources with district interests in mind, they perceive their districts in terms

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of different constituencies; and these perceptions affect their behavior as representatives (Fenno 1978). In part, the results presented here suggest that organized economic interests within districts figure more prominently in the psychology of representation than the diffuse and unorganized interests of rank-and-file voters. Such was the charge that Schattschneider made thirty years ago, one which critics of pluralism have echoed repeatedly since.

At the same time, however, the findings in the natural gas case also suggest that the preferences of unorganized interests sometimes constrain the responsiveness of members to organized groups, thus confirming the thesis of Denzau and Munger (1986) regarding how unorganized interests get represented. Beyond the positive coefficient for the inflationary effect variable, this is evident in the size and significance of the coefficient on the high production-high inflation interaction. Even if members are inclined to respond to producer interests, in short, this tendency is mitigated when consumer interests are also high. However, we should point out two things. First, the simultaneous occurrence of both strong producer interests and high consumer-voter salience is rare. Indeed, this distinguishes the natural gas issue from most of the issues with which members of Congress typically deal, and even in this case only 4 of the 42 members of Energy and Commerce were seriously cross-pressured. Second, we found no such constraint on the behavioral effect of producer contributions. One might expect, for instance, that the mobilizing effect of producer contributions would be diminished for a member who also represents a high inflation district. In one variant of the model tested here we included an interaction between the money support and high inflation variables, with the result that the coefficient was correct in sign (negative) but very near zero and the money-support

coefficient was unchanged.

Finally, most of the variables that tap members' institutional positions prove to be strong determinants of committee participation. While the coefficients on freshman status differ in sign, both subcommittee membership and leadership position are positive, statistically significant, and substantively large in all three cases. Even on issues that are widely perceived among the committee membership to be important, issues where the organized interests in the policy environment are themselves active, the opportunities and resources provided by formal institutional position are major factors in determining who makes the laws at the committee stage. Such findings are generally consistent with findings from other committees and larger samples of issues (Evans n.d.; Hall 1987, 1989; Hall and Evans 1990) and reinforce the assumption that the model of participation employed here is specified correctly.

Conclusion

We have elaborated a theory of the member-group exchange relationship that comprehends the general patterns of PAC contributions reported in the literature. House members and interest group representatives are parties to an implicit cooperative agreement, but the constraints on member behavior and the rational calculations of group strategists limit the extent to which votes become the basis for exchange. This view suggests expectations about the effects of money on congressional decision making quite different from the ones that motivate the substantial research on the subject. We should find little causal connection between contributions and votes, especially on the floor—an expectation generally supported, although not adequately explained, in the literature. We should expect to find an important connection be-

tween contributions and the legislative involvement of sympathetic members, especially in committee—a relationship that empirical research to date has altogether ignored.

In order to test this view of moneyed interests and congressional decision making, we investigated the participation of House members on three issues in three committees. In each case, we found solid support for our principal hypothesis: moneyed interests are able to mobilize legislators already predisposed to support the group's position. Conversely, money that a group contributes to its likely opponents has either a negligible or negative effect on their participation. While previous research on these same issues provided little evidence that PAC money purchased members' votes, it apparently did buy the marginal time, energy, and legislative resources that committee participation requires. Moreover, we found evidence that (organized) producer interests figured more prominently than (unorganized) consumer interests in the participation decisions of House committee members—both for a case in which the issue at stake evoked high district salience and one where it did not. And we found little evidence that committee members respond to the interests of unemployed workers except insofar as those interests might be represented in the activities of well-financed and well-organized labor unions. Such findings suggest several implications for our understanding of political money, interest groups, and the legislative process.

The first and most important implication is that moneyed interests *do* affect the decision-making processes of Congress, an implication that one does not easily derive from the existing political science literature on contributions. In fact, it matters most at that stage of the legislative process that matters most and for a form of legislative behavior likely to have a direct bearing on outcomes. As David

Mayhew has suggested (1974, 95), parliamentary suffrage gives a member relatively little leverage over the shape of legislation, especially at the committee stage. Only a small fraction of the decisions that shape a bill ever go to a vote, either in committee or on the floor. The vast majority are made in authoring a legislative vehicle, formulating amendments, negotiating specific provisions or report language behind the scenes, developing legislative strategy, and in other activities that require substantial time, information, and energy on the part of member and staff. While such efforts by no means guarantee that a particular member will influence the final outcome, they are usually a precondition for such influence (Hall 1989).

A second and related implication of this investigation, then, is that empirical research should expand its view of the legislative purposes of political money and the other group resources that may accompany it (see also Salisbury 1984, esp. 70–72). We focus here on committee participation; but the more general implication is that group expenditures may do much more than buy votes, or they may buy votes under certain conditions and affect other forms of legislative behavior under others. Such a suggestion, of course, usually appears in the various studies that examine the relationship between contributions and floor roll calls, but it needs to be elevated from the status of footnote or parenthetical remark to a central element of future research designs. Even for a small set of issues and a single group, the legislative strategies available are several, sometimes mixed. To speculate beyond the research reported here, for instance, we believe groups allocate their various resources (1) to mobilize strong supporters not only in House committees but also on the Senate floor, in dealings with executive agencies, and in various other decision-making forums relevant to the group's interests; (2) to

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demobilize strong opponents; and (3) to effect the support of swing legislators. We require greater knowledge of the frequency and efficacy of such strategies, in any case, before we denigrate the role of moneyed interests in Congress, especially when the overwhelming weight of the evidence provided by Washington journalists and political insiders suggests that they matter a great deal.

Finally, the argument presented here provides a very different slant on the role of interest groups as purveyors of information in the deliberations of representative assemblies. A common defense of group lobbying activity, in fact, is that it provides ideas and information although its effect on member preferences is slight. Members (and their staffs) tend to consume information selectively, relying on sources with whom they already agree and discounting sources with whom they usually disagree (e.g., Milbrath 1963). The view that we have advanced here suggests that while this may in fact describe how such information is used, it does not render it inconsequential. In light of the extraordinary demands on each congressional office, information—gathering it; analyzing it; turning it into speeches, amendments, and bills; using it to develop legislative strategy—can be very costly. Such costs, more than anything, limit the extent to which a nominal member will be a meaningful player in the decision-making process on a particular bill. At the very least, then, money-induced activity will distort the “representativeness of deliberations,” a standard that democratic theorists since John Stuart Mill have used to evaluate the legitimacy of legislative assemblies (Chamberlin and Courant 1983). But it may also affect the “representativeness of decisions.” By selectively subsidizing the information costs associated with participation, groups affect the *intensity* with which their positions are promoted by their legislative agents. In short, not all preferences weigh equally in

legislative deliberations; and the resources of moneyed interests at least partly determine the weights.

The extent to which such efforts are damaging to representative government, as Schattschneider claimed, depends in part on the balance of interests and resources apparent in the relevant set of groups that are organized for political action. On any given issue, the efforts of one interest to mobilize supporters in Congress may be at least partially offset by the efforts of some competing group to mobilize its own supporters; indeed, there is some evidence that such countervailing efforts occurred in the natural gas case. But for those who believe that money is an illegitimate resource in such efforts—that pluralism requires something more than a competition among moneyed interests—the results of this study can only be disturbing.

Notes

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1. Rothenberg (1989) finds that in the allocation of lobbying resources on the MX missile issue Common Cause did concentrate more on likely “fence straddlers.” By extension, his analysis provides an excellent guide for modeling the effect of expected voting behavior on contributions. See Smith 1984 for an important formulation of this argument.

2. Kingdon found that there was no conflict in the member’s “field of forces” in almost half of the important votes that members cast on the House floor. In an additional 33% of the votes all of the personal goals that were relevant to a vote pointed the member in the same direction (1981, 255). While his study was conducted before the precipitous rise of

PAC contributions, Kingdon found little evidence of group influence on members' voting decisions (chap. 5).

3. In adapting our model from Hall 1987, we retained only the variables that were found to be consistently significant and collapsed the several specific leadership positions into a single dichotomous variable.

4. This assumption is especially valid for the dairy and natural gas cases, though somewhat problematic for the JPTA. Like so many of the issues that come before the House Agriculture Committee, the dairy program is a classic constituency issue. If anything, the administration's assault on the price levels intensified such interests in the minds of the legislators. Likewise, the Natural Gas Market Policy Act evoked strong sentiment among consumers, distributors, and pipelines in some states and producers in others, sentiments that were loudly communicated to their representatives in Washington (Murray 1983). The resulting regional split within the committee was noted at length in virtually every account of its deliberations (see e.g., Maraniss 1983; Murray 1983).

5. In attempting to capture the representation of constituency interests, however, we necessarily neglect constituents' preferences regarding the public goods dimensions of each of these bills. On the importance of public goods preferences to political representation, see J. Jackson and King (1989).

6. The principal grass roots campaigns in the natural gas case were conducted by the Citizen/Labor Energy Coalition (CLEC) (which conducted door-to-door efforts in a number of states) and the public utility companies (who used inserts in monthly utility bills to encourage their customers to write letters to their representatives). Both were also actively engaged in lobbying members of the Energy and Commerce Committee. (Indeed, the CLEC was one of the most vigorous in this respect; see Pressman 1983.) Neither of the two were major campaign contributors, however. The CLEC did not have an organized PAC, and of the various segments of the gas industry the utility companies contributed relatively little money. (The major gas producers, for instance, contributed more than the distributors by a factor greater than seven to one.) Similarly, there were dozens of groups active in lobbying on the Job Training Partnership Act that contributed little or nothing in the way of campaign money, including various public interest groups, state and local officials, education organizations, and the National Governors' Association (Baumer and Van Horn 1985). The correlation between contributions and other interest group activities is probably higher for the dairy stabilization case, but even here it should be fairly modest. The various dairy organizations were in fact active in getting local dairy producers to write letters and meet with their representatives during visits to the district. But such a grass roots strat-

egy was only feasible in districts that had a significant number of dairy producers, and the correlation between district dairy production and dairy industry PAC contributions was only .09 for the period 1979-80. Likewise, while the dairy industry gave a great deal of money to some House Agriculture members and none to others, the National Milk Producers by themselves contacted every committee member regarding the dairy stabilization bill, either through letters to the member's Washington office or meetings with the member or the member's staff.

7. On this point, we are especially indebted to conversations with Jack Wright.

8. Data on the first four activities were taken directly from the committee and subcommittee markup minutes and transcripts. Indexes of authorship role and behind-the-scenes participation were coded on four-point scales from semistructured interviews with both minority and majority staffers who had primary responsibility for staffing the bill under study. On the collection and coding of these data, see Hall 1987, though the data-reduction technique used here loses less information than the Guttman scale scores and the informal participation indexes that were used in that analysis. The factor analysis that generated the scores retained only one factor using conventional methods, the weights assigned were similar across the three cases, and (most importantly) the ordinal ranking of the weights for each activity were precisely those hypothesized in Hall 1987. In addition to the results reported here, however, we also estimated the model using both the Guttman scales and the informal participation index as well as a simple summary of the two. These several measures of participation are all highly correlated, and various estimates of the model using them generally confirmed the findings that we report here. Problems of measurement undoubtedly remain, however; and addressing them is an important matter for future work.

9. The measure of district natural gas production was constructed from county-level data acquired directly from state departments of natural resources. Where counties were not wholly contained within a single district, the proportion of natural gas production credited to particular districts was estimated by comparing congressional district maps with the geologic surveys showing the geographic location of natural gas production within counties. The production data are for the year 1983, the year in which the Energy and Commerce Committee began consideration of the Natural Gas Market Policy Act.

10. District-level data on natural gas price changes were not immediately available, but the intrastate variations should be sufficiently small as to make the state-level data reasonable approximations of the inflation in district natural gas prices. However, there are dramatic variations in the use of natural gas from one district to the next, so that the economic effect of a given price increase on residential energy

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consumers may vary dramatically across districts within a state (e.g., many rural districts that depended primarily on fuel oil for home heating were virtually unaffected by major increases in the price of natural gas). Fortunately, however, district-level information about household fuel use is available. In order to create a district-level indicator of consumer interest, then, we simply multiplied the state-level price increase for 1981–82 times the percentage of households in the district that used natural gas for their home heating. State data on the average price of natural gas delivered to consumers were taken from the *Natural Gas Annual 1982* (vol. 1, Table 17) and the *Natural Gas Annual 1983* (vol. 1, Table 18). District-level data on household energy sources were taken from the U.S. Bureau of the Census 1981.

11. District-level data on CETA expenditures were calculated from *The Employment and Training Reporter* (1980), which lists the 1981 allocations to counties, cities, or other “prime sponsors” located within members’ districts. In cases where a prime sponsor was located in more than one congressional district, the expenditure for that sponsor was allocated equally among the several districts in which the sponsor administered its program.

12. It is important to note, however, that we are not assuming that NFU, ADA, or any other voting index measures members’ personal ideology (much less their true preferences); a number of factors combine to determine these voting patterns, ideology being only one. (See Jackson and Kingdon 1990; Carson and Oppenheimer 1984.) Rather, we simply assume that the rating summarizes members’ past voting behavior, which in turn form the basis for particular groups’ expectations about what positions members will take in the future. Indeed, one of the principal reasons that groups construct their own indexes is to help them distinguish between friend and foe, and raters themselves report that the ratings “have their greatest impact on the distribution of campaign funds, because they provide a simple test of support or opposition” (Fowler 1982). The NFU scores were taken from the National Farmers Union Newsletter (1982a, 1982b).

13. We measured dairy industry contributions for each member as the summary of contributions from the three main dairy PACs during the previous election cycle: Committee for Thorough Agricultural Political Education of Associated Milk Producers; Mid-America Dairymen; and Dairymen Special Political Agricultural Community Education.

14. The Moody’s entry included a brief description of each business’s activities that usually indicated whether it belonged primarily in one category or another. Where that description mentioned interests in more than one category, we went to the financial statements or audit summaries provided in the Moody’s entry and classified businesses as producer, interstate pipeline, intrastate pipeline, or distributor according to the principal sources of

their natural gas revenues. Such information permitted an unambiguous classification in almost every case. Natural gas peak associations were categorized according to the nature of the businesses they represented. In addition, some of the classifications were checked against similar classifications made by Eric Uslaner using both interview and archival data. In every case where our data overlapped, our classifications matched his (see Uslaner 1989).

15. Other groups interested in the legislation included the National Governors’ Association, national education groups, city and county officials, and the various organizations that represented them, such as the National League of Cities (Baumer and Van Horn, 1985). Of these, however, only the education groups contributed money; and they tended to align with, and contribute to, the same members as organized labor. The education contributions were very small in any case, and the alternative strategy of adding them to the labor PAC total had no effect on the coefficients.

16. Included in this category were the American Business Association, the Business Industry Council, the Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the National Federation of Independent Businesses.

17. We believe that there is far less reason a priori to believe that PAC contributions should be considered endogenous in modeling members’ participation than in modeling their roll-call voting behavior. While it is likely that PACs will give disproportionately to members with important committee positions, there is little evidence to suggest that the anticipated participation of member i on some particular bill j (independent of what one would anticipate given the member’s institutional position or positions, seniority, and interests—factors that are built into our model) figures prominently in PAC allocation decisions. Such calculations, at least, have been nowhere evident in the considerable political science or journalistic literature on this subject. Hence, we also estimated the equations for both cases using ordinary least squares. The parameter estimates from the ordinary least squares and two-stage least squares (2SLS) were very similar, with the exception that the magnitude of the 2SLS mobilization coefficients were somewhat smaller in the natural gas and job training cases. By presenting the 2SLS results, then, we address the potential endogeneity problem and, as it turns out, slightly bias our results against our main conclusions.

18. While the first-stage results are not relevant to our substantive interests here, they do bear on the confidence of the second-stage results and thus warrant some attention. In estimating the first stage, we adapted the contributions model from the substantial literature on the allocation strategies of national PACs (e.g., Evans 1986; Grenzke 1989b; Gopojan 1984; Grier and Munger 1989), including three variables that qualified as instruments: party, the rele-

vant voting index, and the marginality of the district. In all three cases the first-stage results were satisfactory. The adjusted R-squared was .34 for the model of dairy industry contributions to Agriculture Committee members, .58 for the model of net producer contributions to Commerce members, and .48 for the model of net labor contributions to Education and Labor members. More importantly, in every case the coefficient on at least one of the three instruments was large, correct in sign, and statistically significant at the .05 level. Checks for multicollinearity among the independent variables in the second stage equations likewise provided little cause for concern. Regarding the appropriateness and implementation of the two-stage least squares estimation procedure, see Hanushek and Jackson 1977, chap. 9; Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1981, 328-31.

19. As a check on the results reported here, we also estimated for the effects of contributions on participation without interacting them with anticipated support or opposition, and, as our theory would predict, the effects were consistently weaker. Note, secondly, that we do not include the relevant group support score separately in the model, a variable that has proven important in estimating the effects of contributions on roll calls. Even if ideology is what the voting scores capture (see Jackson and Kingdon 1990), there is no theoretical reason to expect that liberals will be more active than conservatives (or vice versa) or for that matter that ideological moderates will be less active than either conservatives or liberals. In any case, we tested for the effect of past voting behavior on the participation of members in each case. For all three, the t-statistics for the voting score coefficients were less than .5.

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