

# *Understanding Ethnic Violence*

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FEAR, HATRED, AND  
RESENTMENT IN  
TWENTIETH-CENTURY  
EASTERN EUROPE

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## Resentment

Resentment: Structural changes such as the collapse or weakening of the center and/or occupation rearrange ethnic status hierarchies by changing sovereignty relations, composition of political positions and police, and other features such as language policy. *The predicted ethnic target will be the group perceived as farthest up the ethnic status hierarchy that can be most surely subordinated through ethnic/national violence.* If the target group is lower on the ethnic status hierarchy, then the theory of Resentment is not supported. If the target group is higher on an ethnic hierarchy but cannot have its position reduced through ethnic violence, then Resentment does not apply. If two possible target groups are higher on an ethnic hierarchy and either one or the other can be brought to a subordinate position, and if the lower group is the target, then Resentment *alone* is not a sufficient explanation. The choice of a suboptimal target would need to be explained in conjunction with another theory (possibly Hatred or Rage) or simply by another theory.

Resentment stems from the perception that one's group is located in an unwarranted subordinate position on a status hierarchy.<sup>1</sup> The concept hinges on the linkage between group status and individual esteem. Human beings are motivated by a desire for esteem. The concept of Resentment is much more specific than this general desire for group-based esteem, though. Here, Resentment is the feeling of being *politically* dominated by

<sup>1</sup> For discussions of ethnic conflict in ranked versus unranked systems, see Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). Chapters 3 and 4 have greatly influenced the present work. Also see T. David Mason, "The Ethnic Dimension of Civil Violence in the Post Cold War Era: Structural Configurations and Rational Choices" Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, September 1-4, 1994.

## Resentment

a group that has no right to be in a superior position. It is the everyday experience of these perceived status relations that breeds the emotion. The concept assumes that social relations are usually tinged with overtones of domination/subordination, that humans tend to think in terms of group-based hierarchies, that these hierarchies are reordered through structural changes. Crucially, the Resentment narrative holds that individuals believe these hierarchies can be reordered through violence and discriminatory policies.

This chapter details the Resentment narrative twice. The first run goes over each link from Figure 2.1 citing the intellectual background supporting the connections in the causal chain. The second run covers the historical progression found in Figure 2.2 indicating which periods should have witnessed the highest prevalence of Resentment. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the linkage between Resentment and macro theories of nationalism. In effect, I will argue, Resentment provides important but unspecified microfoundations of Ernest Gellner's structural theory of nationalism.

### *Microlevel Links in the Resentment Narrative*

#### *Structure and Information*

Structure is a difficult concept to grasp.<sup>2</sup> Here, structure refers to relationships among the state and ethnic groups in terms of force and status. The strength of the state and its monopoly on force is one key structural element. The relative abilities of ethnic groups to mobilize force (their balance of power) in the absence of a state monopoly is another. Resentment is tied to structures of status relations. In the day to day operation of government, members of ethnic groups become aware of whose group is "on top" and who is "below." Status, at its core, involves an element of dominance and subordination. It is a question of who gives orders and who takes them, whose language is spoken, and whose symbols predominate. While status can be complex, status relations among ethnic groups are generally tied to the following indicators:

1. The language of day to day government
2. The composition of the bureaucracy

<sup>2</sup> For a discussion of definitional difficulties, see William Sewell, "A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation" *American Journal of Sociology* 98(1) (1992): 1-29.

3. The composition of the police
4. The composition of the officer corps
5. Symbols such as street names
6. Redistribution of land

Some ethnic groups may be wealthier than others, but when they are forced to speak the language of others in everyday business, when they are under the eye of ethnically different police, when they cannot advance in the ranks of the state bureaucracy or the military, when land is redistributed to favor another group, then they occupy a lower level on the status hierarchy.

Structural change can affect these status relations in two important ways. First, slow changes wrought by modernization create an awareness of status relations. Modernizing states must rationalize their operations through use of a common language. These expanding states must also penetrate into formerly isolated communities to educate skilled workers, levy taxes, and conscript soldiers. All of these structurally induced activities serve to show which group is "on top" and which group is "on the bottom." Everyone comes to know the ethnicity of officers, whose language must be used, who is allowed to carry guns, the background of military officers and the police, and so on. Moreover, under modernization, the process works in two directions: Information is produced not only through state penetration of the countryside, but by the process of urbanization as peasants from the overpopulated countryside flood into the cities. Increased contact with other groups automatically produces new information. Some of that information usually indicates that business and bureaucracy are controlled by other groups and conducted in other languages.

A second form of information, again especially relevant to Eastern Europe, is less direct. Modernization brings literacy to large masses of peasants and former peasants. Individuals who identified only with their clan or their region soon discover that others speak their language and are subject to the same experiences. With literacy comes a wealth of new group-oriented information. The ability to form an "imagined community," as Benedict Anderson has so aptly phrased it, creates the ability to identify with an ethnic/linguistic group and experience the "real" emotions that stem from knowledge that one's group occupies a subordinate position on an ethnic hierarchy.

The slow structural changes of modernization produce new information necessary for the perception of ethnic hierarchy. A second type of

structural change is equally or more important for the subject here. Rapid structural changes accompanying empire, war, occupation, and empire and state collapse also produce information, often blatant and dramatic information, that lets everyone know which group is "on top." For example, occupiers often staff the new police force and key positions in the bureaucracy from what they consider a "loyal" ethnic group. Language and educational policy may shift as well.

### *Information and Beliefs*

Following the next step in Figure 2.1, new information concerning the status of one's group invariably leads to a belief about the justice of that status. If a mismatch occurs between reality and the conception of a "just" hierarchy, the emotion of Resentment is activated. With Resentment, beliefs are not formulated through the distorted lens of elite manipulated information, but rather developed through a comparative, esteem-sensitive, and group-based process. During such a process, the belief in hierarchy and a focus on its elements of domination/subordination are inevitable. At least this is the finding of a considerable variety of social scientists. Perhaps most familiar to political scientists, the work of Donald Horowitz relies on observations centered on group-based comparison and group status. In his massive study of ethnic conflict in the developing world, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*,<sup>3</sup> Horowitz finds that group comparison is a nearly universal phenomenon. Furthermore, these comparisons often produce the sense of domination and subordination that defines hierarchy. After citing examples from Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Lebanon, Uganda, Kenya, Zambia, and many other states, Horowitz concludes: "Everywhere the word *domination* was heard. Everywhere it was equated with political control. Everywhere it was a question of who were 'the real owners of the country' and of who would rule over whom."<sup>4</sup> Horowitz employs a "positional psychology" fundamentally similar to Resentment in that "people or groups situated in a similar position 'respond in an appreciably similar way.'<sup>5</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, particularly Chapter 4, "Group Comparison and Sources of Conflict" and the section in Chapter 5 entitled "Political Domination."

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 189.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 184. The internal quotes are a reference to Erving Goffman's *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1963), p. 130. In a more recent paper, after reviewing the literature on sociality and ethnicity, Horowitz concludes that "Members of ethnic groups seem to partake of all of these tendencies to cleave,

Leon Festinger, the inspiration of much of Tajfel's work, showed how the competitive spirit influencing the comparison process can result in hierarchy.<sup>6</sup> For both Festinger and the Bristol school, social comparisons are an absolute necessity for the creation and sustenance of the self.<sup>7</sup>

Social Dominance Theory, a psychological approach associated with the work of James Sidanius, is much more emphatic and explicit on the issue of hierarchy.<sup>8</sup> In fact, Sidanius and his collaborators hold that "all human societies are inherently group-based hierarchies and inherently oppressive."<sup>9</sup> Sidanius and Felicia Pratto's empirical work certainly supports the idea that individuals perceive social hierarchies. In 1989, Sidanius and Pratto sampled 723 UCLA undergraduates and asked them to rate five ethnic groups on a one (very low status) to seven (very high status) scale.

compare, specify inventories of putative collective qualities, seek a favorable evaluation, manifest ingroup bias, exaggerate contrasts with outgroups, and sacrifice for collective interests." See "Structure and Strategy in Ethnic Conflict" Paper prepared for the Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington DC, April 20–21, 1998.

<sup>6</sup> Leon Festinger, "A Theory of Social Comparison Processes" *Human Relations* 7 (1954): 117–40.

<sup>7</sup> On some fundamental points, the symbolic interactionist school associated with George Herbert Mead can be seen as a forerunner of both Tajfel and Festinger. Mead emphasized that "it is impossible to conceive of a self arising outside of social experience." One of Mead's more famous statements holds that "A person who is saying something is saying to himself what he says to others; otherwise he does not know what he is talking about." In effect, conversation and communication involve two simultaneous processes: the creation of the self and the creation of an image of the self to the others. If we agree with Tajfel that an individual has a need to have a positive social identity, then the individual must say positive things about himself to others. Of course, the necessity of saying positive things about one's self in a society that is ethnically stratified may involve, or require, statements creating or supporting hierarchy. Mead's work goes beyond the scope of the present book. See George Herbert Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1934).

<sup>8</sup> James Sidanius, "The Psychology of Group Conflict: A Social Dominance Perspective" in Shanto Iyengar and William J. McGuire, eds., *Explorations in Political Psychology* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993), pp. 183–219. Social Dominance Theory deals not only with ethnic and racial groups but also with gender. For a study that compares the gender aspect across Australia, Sweden, the United States, and Russia see Jim Sidanius, Felicia Pratto, and Diana Brief, "Group Dominance and the Political Psychology of Gender: A Cross-Cultural Comparison" *Political Psychology* 16(2) (1995): 381–96. Also see James Sidanius and Felicia Pratto, *Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) and Felicia Pratto, James Sidanius, Lisa Stallworth, and Malle, "Social Dominance Orientation: A Personality Variable Predicting Social and Political Attitudes" *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 67 (1994): 741–63.

<sup>9</sup> Sidanius, "The Psychology of Group Conflict and the Dynamics of Oppression" p. 196.

African Americans, Latino Americans, Asian Americans, and Euro Americans all saw whites at the top of the hierarchy; moreover, the mean value for each group's rating was nearly identical – about 6.4. Each group rated Asians as second on the status scale; remarkably, all four groups produced a mean score of about 4.8. Likewise, the mean rating for Black status was also very similar, ranging from 3.0 to 3.4.<sup>10</sup>

Clearly, these data show a remarkably high level of consensus in perception of status. In the United States, a clear status hierarchy exists. Whites are at the top, Asians are in the middle, and Blacks, Latinos, and Arabs reside farther down the status ladder. All groups held a similar perception of this order. Sidanius and Pratto replicated the study four years later and came up with similar findings.<sup>11</sup> The United States is supposedly a mobile and egalitarian nation, yet its citizens form highly consensual beliefs about group status hierarchies. The same phenomenon will be seen in the Eastern European case studies found in the empirical chapters of this volume.

### *Belief, Emotion, and Desire*

Why should an *individual* emotionally react to the status position of his or her *group*? Resentment is built on the assumption that individuals care deeply about group status. Group-based goals can be linked to the individual's need for esteem. The appraisal of self, however, is only done comparatively, and when one's everyday experience is permeated by an ethnic/linguistic reality, comparison is likely to be done with groups as a basic point of reference. There are three connected points – individuals desire esteem; individuals identify with groups; therefore, individuals want to feel that their group is esteemed. The importance of high esteem is recognized by most psychologists.<sup>12</sup> This need seems like common sense, it is difficult to imagine that an individual would not desire esteem. It is the individual identification with groups that is more of a mystery.

The ease with which individuals identify with groups is striking. Perhaps Henri Tajfel and his associates, sometimes referred to as

<sup>10</sup> These figures are summarized by Sidanius and Pratto (1999), Figure 2.3, p. 53.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 53.

<sup>12</sup> Freud saw positive self-esteem as protection for the ego against anxiety. Others have explicitly placed the drive for self-esteem as the dominant motive of human life. See E. Becker, *The Birth and Death of Meaning* (London: Penguin Books, 1971).

the Bristol school, have conducted the most cited research on group identification.<sup>13</sup> In one set of experiments, subjects were divided into groups on the most flimsy criteria (style of estimating dots on a page, preferring one picture over another). No actual contact among members ever takes place. Then these subjects were asked to allocate points on a pay-off matrix to in-group and out-group members. The matrix contained a range of pay-offs that included maximum fairness as well as maximum in-group favoritism. Although no previous history of contact among subjects existed, nor any history of a group based on the created trivial difference, subjects chose a strategy of in-group favoritism over fairness in every trial of the test. These "minimal group paradigm" tests have been run in England, Germany, Switzerland, the United States, New Zealand, and Hong Kong with similar findings. The absence of in-group favoritism has not yet been found in any culture.<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, the Bristol school ran tests giving subjects the option to either maximize the absolute gains of the in-group or to maximize the difference in return among the in-group and the out-group. Subjects consistently chose to maximize group difference at the cost of lowering in-group profit. The experiments clearly provide evidence of a human tendency to form groups and to act to establish the advantage of their group relative to other groups.

There are several explanations for this finding. Following the reasoning above, Tajfel and the Bristol school centered their explanation around a drive to achieve positive social identity. Cognitive categories based on race or ethnicity serve to simplify a highly complex world; however, once established these categories take on a life of their own. The individual comes to accept the category assigned by the social system. The category then becomes a vehicle for esteem.

Other psychological theories pick up on the human imperative to find positive social identities and defend them, some highlighting the necessity of esteem even more prominently. The core concept of Identification Theory, as formulated by William Bloom, holds that:

In order to achieve psychological security, every individual possesses an inherent drive to internalise – to identify with – the behaviour, mores and attitudes of significant figures in her/his social environment; i.e. people actively seek identity.

<sup>13</sup> For a summary, see Michael Billig, *Social Psychology and Intergroup Relations* (London: Academic Press, 1976), pp. 343–52.

<sup>14</sup> See Sidanius, "The Psychology of Group Conflict" p. 189.

Moreover, every human being has an inherent drive to enhance and to protect the identifications he or she has made; i.e. people actively seek to enhance and protect identity.<sup>15</sup>

Following Erik Erikson, Bloom's Identification Theory holds that identity formation is crucial for psychic survival. Following Freud and Herbert Mead, Bloom proposes that identification begins as "a psycho-biological imperative based in the earliest infantile need to survive."<sup>16</sup> While the vulnerable infant has no choice but to identify with parents, Bloom, focusing on the development of nationalism, points out that identity formation and defense takes place throughout adulthood as well and will likely involve larger social groups such as the ethnic group and the nation. Crucially, shared group identifications often develop in response to changing historical circumstances.

Yet, other social scientists have looked beyond the need for positive social identity to more "hard-wired" sources.<sup>17</sup> Psychological theories based in evolutionary theory hypothesize that the ubiquity of identification has been created in the competition among gene pools. As survival is awarded to the species most able to avoid death and successfully reproduce, sometimes the best genes for this battle produce sharper teeth or protective coloration. Some social scientists, on the other hand, emphasize the utility of genes producing "social" weapons such as reciprocal altruism, nepotism, and other group-centric behaviors.<sup>18</sup> If a species is genetically "hard-wired" to help and protect its own, then the chances of its survival and reproduction may be greatly enhanced. Seen in this light, the universal tendency toward in-group identification and favoritism seen in the Bristol school experiments is hypothesized to be an inbred mechanism working to maximize fitness. It is worthwhile to note that all of the scholars mentioned above see identification processes as fundamental for survival and most basic to human existence. While Mead and Tajfel see identification as oriented toward individual survival, the evolutionists see identity formation in terms of species survival.

<sup>15</sup> William Bloom, *Personal Identity, National Identity, and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 50.

<sup>17</sup> See the collection of essays found in Vernon Reynolds, Vincent Fagler, and Ian Vine, eds. *The Sociobiology of Ethnocentrism: Evolutionary Dimensions of Xenophobia, Discrimination, Racism, and Nationalism* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1986).

<sup>18</sup> See the general work of Pierre Van den Berghe, especially *The Ethnic Phenomenon* (New York: Elsevier, 1981).

The exact reason or reasons why individuals so easily identify with groups remains largely a matter of speculation beyond the present capacity of science. Yet, the empirical evidence supports the assumption. Recent studies have found that collective deprivation, rather than individual deprivation, is the best predictor of willingness to participate in collective action.<sup>19</sup>

It is important to keep in mind that this concern for group status is treated as only one among multiple individual interests; it forms the basis for hypotheses. I would only emphasize that the exclusion of group status concerns, rather than their inclusion among a set of plausible concerns, would seem to require more in the way of justification.

### *Desires and Violent Action*

There is one final link to be considered. What is the evidence that positive in-group appraisal must involve negative out-group appraisal and even out-group denigration? What triggers individuals to beat or discriminate against an "other," in pursuit of a collective goal of "just" group status?

Again, several types of evidence support the general relationship between esteem and out-group denigration. There are dozens of anthropological, psychological, and sociobiological studies establishing the common phenomenon of ethnocentrism, a concept involving out-group denigration. To cite one study already mentioned, the Bristol school found that positive social identity of one's own group required that some other groups must be seen as less positive.<sup>20</sup> Social dominance theory, also discussed previously, posits mechanisms of hierarchical maintenance and reordering similar to those of Resentment: An integral element of social dominance theory posits an "out of place principle" – violence is most likely when a subordinate group has "stepped out of place."<sup>21</sup> Social dominance theory sees state institutions as inevitably discriminatory: "The

<sup>19</sup> Marilyn Brewer, "The Social Self: On Being the Same and Different at the Same Time" *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 7(5) (1991): 475–82.

<sup>20</sup> For an extensive review of the literature on ethnocentrism, see John M. G. van der Dennen, "Ethnocentrism and In-group/Out-group Differentiation: A Review and Interpretation of the Literature" in Vernon Reynolds et al., eds., *The Sociobiology of Ethnocentrism: Evolutionary Dimensions of Xenophobia, Discrimination, Racism, and Nationalism* pp. 1–47.

<sup>21</sup> Sidanius, "The Psychology of Group Conflict" p. 199.

legal and criminal justice system will be one of the major instruments used in establishing and maintaining the hierarchical caste system."<sup>22</sup>

While psychology presents experimental and theoretical work on ethnocentrism and social dominance, political anthropology provides some of the most vivid evidence for the pervasiveness of status-based violence. James Scott provides broad and cross-cultural support for an ubiquitous desire for group reversal, the collective nature of this desire, and the utility of violence in establishing reversal. In *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, Scott shows how subordinate groups develop hidden transcripts ("off-stage" discourses versus the public discourses that are the stuff of historical record) that allow for the maintenance of personal dignity and self-worth. These discourses develop from actual day-to-day experiences of subordination and the near-automatic responses that result from common humiliations. Scott argues for the rather mundane origins of the hidden transcript: "Who, having suffered an indignity – especially in public – at the hand of someone in power or authority over us, has not rehearsed an imaginary speech he wishes he had given or intends to give at the next opportunity?"<sup>23</sup>

Scott has identified a common origin of the emotion of Resentment. For our purposes, we wish to know what happens when individuals of an entire ethnic group perceive unjust subordination, when large numbers of an entire ethnic group compose speeches and form hidden transcripts. Scott provides a possible answer:

An individual who is affronted may develop a personal fantasy of revenge and confrontation, but when the insult is but a variant of the affronts suffered systematically by a whole race, class, or strata, then the fantasy can become a collective cultural product. Whatever the form it assumes – offstage parody, dreams of violent revenge, millennial visions of a world turned upside down – this collective hidden transcript is essential to any dynamic view of power relations.<sup>24</sup>

Although Scott is most concerned with the hidden transcripts of long-term subordinate groups, formerly dominant groups newly out of power will have a rich hidden transcript as well. As we will see in the case studies, this transcript will contain dreams of violent revenge and visions of a world

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 201.

<sup>23</sup> James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990), p. 8.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

turned upside down (or more accurately in the case of Resentment, dreams of an upside-down world turned right-side up).<sup>25</sup>

Scott also provides examples showing the utility of public violence in quickly and clearly destroying the root feelings of Resentment. Perhaps his mention of the 1910 Johnson-Jeffries fight most vividly establishes this point:

Whenever a rare event legitimately allowed the black community to vicariously and publicly savor the physical victory of a black man over a white man, that event became an epoch-making one in folk memory. The fight between Jack Johnson and Jim Jeffries (the "White Hope") in 1910 and Joe Louis's subsequent career, which was aided by instant radio transmission of the fights, were indelible moments of reversal and revenge for the black community. "When Johnson battered a white man (Jeffries) to his knees, he was the symbolic black man taking out his revenge on all whites for a lifetime of indignities."<sup>26</sup>

Throughout *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, Scott underlines two of the essential claims of the present work: First, domination and hierarchy are essential parts of most social systems; second, day-to-day experiences of subordination (emotion) can lead to powerful collectively held desires for changes and reversal of group status. Finally, Scott's cultural analysis of the thinking of subordinate groups concurs with the essential view of Resentment put forth here: "Fantasy life among dominated groups is also likely to take the form of *schadenfreude*: Joy at the misfortunes of others."<sup>27</sup>

Finally, Donald Horowitz's recent study of hundreds of ethnic riots provides empirical support for the employment of violence as a tool to "teach them a lesson." Horowitz describes a similar phenomenon occurring in Russia, East Saint Louis, Delhi, Detroit, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, Malaysia, and other locations around the world.<sup>28</sup>

Scholars of ethnocentrism, social dominance theorists, political anthropologists, not to mention figures such as Frantz Fanon,<sup>29</sup> all posit a plau-

<sup>25</sup> In my work on the development of Lithuanian resistance to Soviet rule during 1940-41, I extensively detail this hidden transcript. See Roger Petersen, *Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

<sup>26</sup> Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance* p. 41. Scott's quote is from Al-Tony Gilmore, *Bad Nigger!: The National Impact of Jack Johnson* (Port Washington, NJ: Kennikat Press, 1975), p. 5.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 41.

<sup>28</sup> Horowitz, *The Deadly Ethnic Riot* pp. 368-70.

<sup>29</sup> Frantz Fanon urged colonized peoples to purge themselves of deprecating self-images through the use of violence. See *Wretched of the Earth* (Paris: Maspero, 1961).

sible link between violence and status change. As the emotion theorist Nico Frijda has observed, "cruelty provides the most unambiguous proof of power over someone else. One fully controls the victim's most inner feelings."<sup>30</sup> Status is largely a matter of these inner feelings – an unspoken knowledge of dominance. Violence and cruelty can, with swiftness and devastation, establish new status realities.

### *Summary of Resentment and Additional Hypotheses*

Resentment is the intense feeling that status relations are unjust combined with the belief that something can be done about it. As with Fear and Hatred, Resentment is instrumental in the sense that it alerts and compels the individual to take action toward a pressing concern.

Three points should be emphasized. First, as developed here, the Resentment argument is about a political, not economic, sense of subordination.<sup>31</sup> The relevant indicators are political positions, military positions, the legal status of language, and the laws of citizenship. The fundamental reasoning holds that the motivation to commit violence stems from the grinding experiences of small but numerous face-to-face humiliations.<sup>32</sup>

Second, a sense of subordination does not always breed Resentment. Under certain structural conditions, individuals accept a subordinate status as "just"; under other structural conditions, the emotion will follow and heighten chances for ethnically based violence and discrimination. The broadest outlines of crucial conditions follow commonsense. A sense of injustice is likely to form when a majority perceives its position as "below" a minority (when the language of the minority is the language of state and

<sup>30</sup> Nico Frijda, "Lex Talionis: On Vengeance" in Stephanie H. M. van Goozen, Nanne E. Van de Poll, and Joseph A Sergeant, eds. *Emotions: Essays on Emotion Theory* (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1994), p. 280.

<sup>31</sup> In his 1985 study of ethnic conflict, Donald Horowitz also weights politically based resentments as more important than economically based ones. He writes: "(E)thnic groups with a strong position in trade and commerce have been the victims of mass violence. But the available evidence suggests it is a distortion to attribute these attacks to economic resentment. What emerges from the data with much greater frequency is political resentment against the groups so attacked." Horowitz reiterates this finding in his more recent work *The Deadly Ethnic Riot* p. 5.

<sup>32</sup> James Kellas sees this type of face-to-face contact as the root of "cultural deprivation," certainly a concept related to Resentment. See James G. Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 69.



education, when minorities hold disproportionate numbers of political positions, and so on). Of course, the majority has to come to think of itself in terms of being a majority, a process again linked to structural change and the information it produces. Perhaps most importantly, a belief of injustice results from status reversals. After having been on the top of an ethnic hierarchy, most groups come to see their dominant status as part of a natural order.

Third, aggression is more likely *when it is able* to reorder the status hierarchy in a desired direction. This point is critical. Resentment-based aggression will not be targeted against groups that are perceived as lower on the ethnic hierarchy. Likewise, small or less powerful groups will not value aggression because such a strategy will probably not be effective. Here, beliefs about the possibility of aggression affect the intensity of emotion.

Fourth, picking up on the last point, Resentment will vary in intensity. If the perception of status hierarchy is weak, beliefs of injustice and corresponding emotion of Resentment are unlikely to follow. If the perception of status hierarchy is deep and well-established, reversals are very likely to create Resentment – and the desire to rapidly reestablish the former hierarchy.

Given these points, several additional hypotheses can be formed. As opposed to the general hypotheses listed in the beginning of the chapter, these more specific hypotheses incorporate intensity of Resentment.

- 3a. Status reversal creates the highest intensity of Resentment and produces the highest likelihood of *violent* conflict. Status reversal results when a more regionally powerful group in an established hierarchy is dislodged from its position and placed below a less powerful group.
- 3b. When Resentment develops from gradually changing perceptions created by slower structural processes such as modernization, the emotion is less intense and the conflict is most likely to develop in nonviolent institutional forms.

Finally, some hypotheses can be formed concerning situations favoring cooperation among ethnic groups.

- 3c. If the hierarchy among groups is not clearly established, *cooperation* among them is likely, at least until a hierarchy is formed.

If there is a low perception of hierarchy, then there will be a correspondingly low intensity of Resentment. In this case, cooperation is more likely simply due to an absence of Resentment.

- 3d. If in the period immediately after dislodging the empirical or occupying regime the remaining groups are of relatively equal status and power, then *cooperation* is more likely.

If no group perceives itself as deserving dominance, the possibilities for experiencing Resentment are lowered and cooperation (and equality) are raised.

### ***Macrolevel Application: Resentment and Eastern European Ethnic Conflict***

The previous section explained how Resentment motivates individuals to participate in ethnic violence. As discussed in the introduction, one of the goals of this work is to link individual level mechanisms to broader macrostructural changes. This task requires linking explanation of individual motivation to the historical periodization previously outlined. During which periods should we expect to see Resentment as the driving force behind ethnic violence in Eastern Europe?

Resentment should motivate violence in periods when ethnic hierarchies are established and strong, when dominant groups within these hierarchies experience status reversals, and when a collapse of constraints allows violence to become a feasible and effective option. Resentment should motivate support for institutional discrimination (institutional dominance) rather than violence when members of a group develop an awareness of status inconsistency during a period when a functioning and stable state exists. In this situation, dominance is sought by shaping the nature of the state rather than through violence.

We should not expect to witness the path of Resentment during Period One. Resentment's foundation is the widespread perception of status hierarchy. Given a lack of modernization, rurality, and illiteracy, such a perception was not widespread. Period Two is the era of World War I and the collapse of empires. In terms of Resentment, the period would seem to be the most ambiguous – states collapsed, but most of the East European societies emerging from the rubble did not possess established hierarchies. According to hypotheses 3b, 3c, and 3d, Period Three should see Resentment produce either institutional discrimination against minorities

or cooperation among ethnic minorities depending upon the strength of hierarchy and the status ordering among groups. After the fall of the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman Empires, rural regional majorities found themselves in charge of states. Resentment, if operative, would drive these majorities to establish their dominant position through biased staffing policies in the police, military, and bureaucracy. The majority would establish their own language as the official language and make their own group's symbols synonymous with those of the state. However, if no clear status hierarchy was in place, either due to never being established (3c) or an ambiguous ordering among roughly equal groups (3d), then Resentment would not form. Cooperation, at least in the short run, would be likely. Importantly, without an established ethnic hierarchy, violence would not be predicted. Resentment should be most intense, and more likely lead to violence after strong perceptions of ethnic hierarchy have been established and reversed.

Ethnic hierarchies were well-established by Period Four. If the policies of the successive German and Soviet occupations changed these established orders in a way to place formerly dominant groups in subordinate positions, we should expect intense Resentment. In periods of occupier retreat, with the constraints off, we should expect intense violence to reestablish the previous ethnic hierarchy.

In Period Five, with most of the region in the grip of powerful Communist regimes, we should expect little violence. Furthermore, the elimination of the Jewish and German minorities and other population movements greatly reduced the complexity of ethnic relations. With fewer ethnic groups, fewer groups could be "out of place" on any ethnic hierarchy. Populational homogenization greatly reduces the risk of Resentment.

In Period Six, with the constraints of powerful states again collapsing, Resentment could be expected to surface in regions where regional majorities did not clearly dominate status positions. Again, violent ethnic conflict, as well as institutional discrimination, could be predicted in those areas.

Resentment can also be tied to the most outstanding feature of modern Eastern European history: the formation of nearly homogeneous nation-states. Twenty-odd nation-states now stand on the territory of three former multinational empires. These states are politically dominated by one linguistically defined nation. From one of the most heterogeneous states in Europe, Poland today is nearly entirely Polish. Interwar Czechoslovakia, ethnically intermixed in the interwar period to a great degree, has

disintegrated into two homogenized states. The dominant nation, in almost every case, comprised the rural majority of the region in the late nineteenth century. Most of these nation-states have gone through a process of ethnic homogenization. In most of these states, ethnic violence and ethnic discrimination have been important tools in both establishing, or reestablishing, independence of a nation-state and in homogenizing the state. Istvan Deak summarized this phenomenon in the following passage:

The establishment of East European nation-states has been the most spectacular political change on the European continent in the last 150-odd years, and the only one to prove lasting. Consider the fact that in 1848 there was not a single truly independent nation-state in the region, and in 1914 only a few minor independent nation-states, all of them in the Balkans! Since that time, however, East European nation-states have multiplied rapidly.<sup>33</sup>

Rural regional majorities have been the great victors of twentieth century Eastern Europe. First, they threw off their imperial overlords, then they subordinated, or eliminated urban minorities. Deak again succinctly summarizes the effects of the peasants' triumph:

Rather than leading to liberation, they resulted in ever-increasing oppression of ethnic minorities. Furthermore, they hastened the native populations' conquest of the cities, which in Eastern Europe had been customarily inhabited by alien elements. I dare say even, with some obvious exaggeration, that all these revolutions aggravated xenophobia and hostility of the countryside to an alien, Westernized, and culturally more developed city. Only when seen in this light can the East European revolutions be called successful, for whereas 100 or 150 years ago most inhabitants of East European cities spoke languages and represented cultures other than those of the rural population, today there exist no such differences between country and city.<sup>34</sup>

Resentment provides a micronarrative explaining why rural masses participated in ethnic conflict during the past century. During modernization, regional majorities came into contact with the larger world through literacy, the growth of state bureaucracy, universal education, and conscription. They learned that they were second class citizens – and some resented it. When granted an opportunity, sections of this disgruntled rural population, led by the newly educated patriots described by Miroslav Hroch, set up states. The policies of these states reflected the majority's drive for

<sup>33</sup> Istvan Deak, "The Rise and Triumph of the East European Nation-State" *In Depth: A Journal for Values in Public Policy* 2 (1992): 77-95.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 82.

status and recognition, and dominance. Resentment fueled policies that drove minorities into subordinate positions. In periods when status reversals occurred, for instance during the series of occupations of the Second World War, Resentment provided the motivation for violence that would recreate the "just" order among groups.

This story should be familiar to students of nationalism. Its opening stages are a version of Ernest Gellner's famous tale of the Ruritians found in *Nations and Nationalism*.<sup>35</sup> Resentment, as I argue immediately as follows, provides one of the key microlevel mechanisms implicit in Gellner's argument.

### *Resentment and Gellner's Ruritians*

Gellner's argument can be easily related to Figure 2.1. The very opening lines of *Nations and Nationalism* link belief (principle), emotion (sentiment), and action (movement):

Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent.

Nationalism as a sentiment, or as a movement, can best be defined in terms of this principle. Nationalist *sentiment* is the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of this principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfillment. A nationalist *movement* is one actuated by sentiment of this kind.<sup>36</sup>

As with Resentment, an individual belief in an unjust situation produces an emotion that helps trigger an action. As with the emotional approach, Gellner ties the formation and intensity of the belief to structural change. His story of the Ruritians living in the empire of Megalomania captures the essence of Period One in the categorization above. In his abstracted story of structural modernization, Gellner discussed how the Ruritians left the countryside to enter into the cities of the Megalomanian Empire. While some assimilated, for many, this migration, and the accompanying expansion and bureaucratization of the state, produced "very concrete experiences" in which individuals "soon learned the difference between dealing with a co-national, one understanding and sympathizing with their culture, and someone hostile to it."<sup>37</sup> The discrepancies between the Ruritians' own life and the ethnically distinct administrators of the

<sup>35</sup> Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). The tale of the Ruritians is found on pp. 58–62.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1. <sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 61.

Empire of Megalomania became more and more clear and less and less acceptable. In the end, Gellner concludes, "In our Ruritanian case, nationalism was explained in terms of an economically and politically disadvantaged population, able to distinguish itself culturally, and thus impelled towards the nationalist option."<sup>38</sup>

In effect, the Ruritians, through modernization, developed a sense of an unjust status hierarchy. They developed, for Gellner, a "nationalist sentiment" that fueled nationalist movements. Clearly, this structurally formed and mass experienced force was more important than elite ideology. In fact, the role of ideology and ideologists is very small: "Their precise doctrines are hardly worth analyzing. We seem to be in the presence of a phenomenon which springs directly and inevitably from basic changes in our shared social condition, from changes in the overall relation between society, culture, and polity."<sup>39</sup> The process and emergence of nationalist movements also had little to do with rational choices of elites<sup>40</sup> and little to do with deep-seated and mysterious psychological forces. Common people experienced the forces of broad structural change and were "impelled towards the nationalist option."

But what precisely was the force that "impelled" the Ruritians toward action? Gellner, operating at a historical/structural level and interested in nationalism as a broad phenomenon, is not particularly inclined to specify the force or the mechanisms that so "impelled" the Ruritians. As David Laitin and Mark Beissinger have clearly pointed out, Gellner's theory suffers from its lack of specific microlevel mechanisms.<sup>41</sup> Both argue that some calibration of micro and macro stories is needed to avoid the functionalism inherent in Gellner's work. In fact, Gellner chose only to speculate in very general terms on the emotions and motivations of Ruritanian nationalists:

Subjectively, one must suppose that they had the motives and feelings which are so vigorously expressed in the literature of the national revival. They deplored the

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 108. <sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 124.

<sup>40</sup> See Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* pp. 60–62.

<sup>41</sup> David Laitin has also attempted to specify implicit micromechanisms in Gellner's theory. Laitin accuses Gellner of a type of reification that gives "human attributes to unspecified globs of humanity or territory." See David Laitin, "Nationalism and Language: A Post-Soviet Perspective" in John A. Hall, ed., *The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 135–57. The quote is on p. 137. In the same volume, Mark Beissinger makes much the same point in "Nationalisms that Bark and Nationalisms that Bite: Ernest Gellner and the Substantiation of Nations" pp. 169–90.

squalor and neglect of their home valleys, while yet also seeing the rustic virtues still to be found in them; they deplored the discrimination to which their conationals were subject, and the alienation from their native culture to which they were doomed in the proletarian suburbs of the industrial towns.<sup>42</sup>

Resentment brings out Gellner's implicit views. As Beissinger notes, "Like Marxism without a theory of revolution, Gellner's theory provides no coherent vision of how nationalism works its way into the realm of substantive human action."<sup>43</sup> The concept of Resentment gives the sentiments of Gellner's Ruritarians an explicit form, helps build hypotheses to be tested on important phenomena of more restricted scope, such as variation in timing of ethnic violence and target of violence.<sup>44</sup> To further quote Beissinger, "Without a mechanism tying broad social forces to concrete human action, Gellner's ideas can never really be subjected to a rigorous empirical test."<sup>45</sup> Resentment aims to provide that mechanism.<sup>46</sup> The cases that follow provide at least an exploratory test.

### *Resentment and Brubaker's Nationalizing State*

While Gellner's work primarily addresses nationalism during the first and second eras of the introductory chapter's periodization, Rogers Brubaker's conception of "nationalizing states" describes discriminatory actions of the

<sup>42</sup> Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* p. 60.

<sup>43</sup> Beissinger, "Nationalisms that Bark" p. 170.

<sup>44</sup> Another of the most widely read theorists of nationalism, Eric Hobsbawm, also builds on Gellner's story of the Ruritarians and also sees a form of resentment as central to nationalism. Hobsbawm writes, "All that was required for the entry of nationalism into politics was that groups of men and women who saw themselves, in whatever manner, as Ruritarians, or were so seen by others, should become ready to listen to the argument that their discontents were in some way caused by the inferior treatment (often undeniable) of Ruritarians by, or compared with, other nationalities, or by a non-Ruritanian state or ruling class." See Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since the 1780s: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 109.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 170.

<sup>46</sup> I am not the first to link Gellner's theory to the emotions involved with a perception of second class citizenship. Nicos Mouzelis asserts that Gellner spells out mechanisms linking the development of nationalist idiom with the emotions that come with failure to acquire that idiom. Mouzelis writes, "These mechanisms are related to the fact that people who fail or refuse to acquire such a nationalist idiom feel frustrated, disadvantaged, second-class citizens." See Mouzelis, "Ernest Gellner's Theory of Nationalism: Some Definitional and Methodological Issues" in John A. Hall, ed., *The State of the Nation* pp. 158-65. The quote is from p. 161. Also, in the same volume, John Hall argues that Gellner has made it clear that "humiliation rather than material self-interest provides the heart of his theory." See John A. Hall, "Introduction" pp. 1-20. I am quoting from p. 11.

third period, the interwar period. Brubaker distinguishes between *polity-upgrading nationalism* and *polity-seeking nationalism*. In the latter, Gellner's primary focus, the nation establishes a state; in the former, the nation uses the state and its institutions to establish its dominance. As Rogers Brubaker aptly describes, nationalizing states employ the discriminatory institutional measures: educational policy, language policy, staffing of the military and bureaucracy, and redistribution of land to ethnic conationals. As Brubaker sums up:

A nationalizing state, I have suggested, is one understood to be the state *of and for* a particular ethnocultural "core nation" whose language, culture, demographic position, economic welfare, and political hegemony must be promoted and protected by the state. The key elements here are (1) the sense of "ownership" of the state by a particular ethnocultural nation that is conceived as distinct from the citizenry or permanent resident population as a whole, and (2) the "remedial" or compensatory project of using state power to promote the core nation's specific (and heretofore inadequately served) interests.<sup>47</sup>

As discussed in the introduction, Brubaker describes how the interwar Polish state developed differentiated policies toward its various minorities, especially in the areas of language, schools, and employment in the civil service.

Again, and similarly to Gellner, Brubaker does not well specify any underlying force driving the policies of the nationalizing state. What he does provide is a definition of nationalism that is, like Gellner's, similar to Resentment. Like Gellner, Brubaker begins his chapter on the nationalizing states of the interwar period with a definition of nationalism that contains reference to emotion:

Nationalism can be understood as a form of remedial political action. It addresses an allegedly deficient or "pathological" condition and proposes to remedy it. The discourse that frames, and in part constitutes, nationalist political action – and the subdiscursive sentiments which nationalist political stances seek to mobilize and evoke – can be conceived as a set of variations on a single core lament: that the identity and interests of a putative nation are not properly expressed or realized in political institutions, practices, or policies.<sup>48</sup>

Brubaker identifies a "single core lament" – the identity of the nation is not expressed in the state's political institutions. More specific to the

<sup>47</sup> Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 103-04.

<sup>48</sup> Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed* p. 79.

concern here, Brubaker's single core lament can be seen as the belief that the majority ethnic group of the new states, in almost every case the former rural regional majority, did not clearly occupy the dominant position in the status hierarchy. The nationalizing state, in addressing the demands of the "single core lament" engaged in discriminatory policies in order to subordinate other ethnic groups. Although Brubaker does not explicitly say so, the "single core lament" appears to be a widely held emotion formed from a belief about the justness of a status hierarchy. The "lament" heightens perception of group status and drives certain group-oriented actions. Brubaker's micro story again would seem to link belief, emotion, and action to explain ethnic outcomes.

It is not difficult to see a common motivation running through these nationalisms and the different periods in which they played out. The same emotional force driving the Ruritians in the first period would seem to again be at play in the interwar period. In both periods, members of the preponderant regional majority seem driven to take actions that will establish status dominance.

Despite his convincing description of the nationalizing state, Brubaker does not attempt to specify the motivations behind this type of discriminatory state. *Why* do the peoples of Eastern Europe seek dominance? What is behind the drive to "correct" the political position of the majority group? Brubaker implies, I believe, that the nationalizing nature of Eastern Europe states is based on ideas or "understandings" concerning the appropriate role of the state. Here, the "single core lament" is treated as an emotion rather than as an idea. It forms the basis of one competing emotion-based hypothesis concerning ethnic violence and conflict. In fundamental ways, Resentment specifies the core psychological-emotional nature of the "single core lament," links it to structural change (rather than ideology), and attempts to draw out its more nuanced implications. While Brubaker is basically concerned with the overall institutional changes, the general "remedial political action" wrought by the nationalizing state, the focus here is on specifying when the "single core lament" will translate into action, when it varies in intensity, and when it might be overridden by other mass emotions such as Fear and Hatred.

### Summary

The concept of Resentment is in no way original. Its micro story is built upon a wide variety of social science literatures. Its macro story has much

### Resentment

in common with some of the best known theories of nationalism.<sup>49</sup> This work's contribution lies in its effort to make its essence comparable to that of competing explanations. Resentment takes a form that is capable of hypothesizing the targets of ethnic violence and punitive discrimination at specific historical junctures. As opposed to the general forms found in macro theories, the actions of actual human beings can be assessed in confirming or disconfirming whether this motivation drove certain outcomes. There is clearly an intuition among a variety of social scientists that status concerns often drive ethnic conflict. Resentment specifies that intuition and tries to bring it into the realm of social science.

<sup>49</sup> Liah Greenfeld's work could also have been discussed at length here. See *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992). Greenfeld links nationalism to what she terms "*ressentiment*" – a psychological state resulting from suppressed feelings of envy and hatred (existential envy) and the impossibility of satisfying these feelings (p. 15). In certain cases, this psychological state generates the creative power essential in the development of national identity. "Wherever it existed it fostered particularistic pride and xenophobia, providing emotional nourishment for the nascent national sentiment and sustaining it whenever it faltered (p. 16)." Similar to the present work, Greenfeld sees structural roots of *ressentiment* in the comparability between the subject and object of envy and the inability to achieve equality. The scope and purpose of Greenfeld's work is much different than the present work, however. She is most concerned with the development of national identity and the ideational properties of nationalism.

## *Fear, Hatred, and Rage*

Resentment tells one story of how individuals come to participate in ethnic conflict. It is a story that seems especially suited to Eastern Europe. In that region, a coherent narrative can be told of how the status concerns of modernizing rural majorities compelled them to commit violence and support discriminatory policies in order to clearly establish a dominant position within the nation-state. But a coherent and compelling narrative does not necessarily mean that things actually happened that way. This chapter develops three alternative narratives of social processes capable of producing ethnic conflict. As was the case with Resentment, each narrative distills an account of individual motivation from well-known theories. In combination, these four paths to ethnic conflict cover the thrust, if not the nuances, of a wide range of the social science literature on ethnic strife. As with Resentment, each narrative describes a process predicting the timing and target of ethnic violence. The strength and coherence of these competing narratives is compared and tested in the empirical chapters.

### *Hatred: "Ancient Hatreds"*

Hatred: Structural changes such as the collapse of the center eliminate constraints and produce an opportunity to commit aggression against other groups. *The target of ethnic violence will be the group that has frequently been attacked with similar justification over a lengthy time period.* If the target has not been a long hated or frequently attacked ethnic group, or if the target is attacked with a completely new justification, then the logic is not supported.

Most academics dismiss the "ancient hatreds" argument. They show how violent interethnic "histories" are often fabrications, inventions that

## Fear, Hatred, and Rage

serve the interests of rabble-rousing elites. If "ancient hatreds" means a hatred that has produced constant uninterrupted ethnic warfare, or an obsessive hatred consuming the daily thoughts of great masses of people, then the "ancient hatreds" argument deserves to be readily dismissed. However, if hatred is conceived as a historically formed "schema" that guides action in some situations, then the conception should be taken more seriously.

### *Hatred as a Cultural Schema*

The concept of a cultural schema is aptly explicated by Sherry Ortner:

In effect, the cultural schema has been moved by an actor from an external to an internal position, from an abstract model of deeds done by ancient heroes and ritual participants to a personal program for understanding what is happening to one right now, and for acting upon it . . . there is a distance between actors' selves and their cultural models, in the sense that not all of a culture's repertoire of symbolic frames make sense to all actors at all times.<sup>1</sup>

The schema is an external, abstract model that *sometimes* informs a personal program for understanding and action. An ethnic hatred is defined by an antagonism against a group as an object; the antagonism is focused on purported innate characteristics of the opposing group. The two concepts of schema and hatred can be linked. Schemas can contain fairly constant representations of the innate nature of other ethnic groups. Some of these representations may be of a very negative nature. A culture possesses, as Ortner suggests, a repertoire of symbolic frames. At any given point a particular schema, although constantly existing as part of a repertoire, will not be guiding a large number of the ethnocultural group. However, the external model is always available for activation. Here is the basis for a more realistic view of "ancient" hatred. The innate negative features of an ethnic group may persist, almost indefinitely, within a cultural schema, but the emotive force of that schema is only seldom activated. Most of the time, individuals go about their business without the schema working to heighten any concern or guide any action. But the possibility always exists.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Sherry B. Ortner, "Patterns of History: Cultural Schemas in the Foundings of Sherpa Religious Institutions" in Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney, ed., *Culture Through Time: Anthropological Approaches* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), p. 89.

<sup>2</sup> A primary debating point among social science disciplines concerns the "distance between the actors' selves and their cultural models." Those using a "thin rational view" posit an

This fact produces the constant, "ancient," quality that is so often sensed by journalists and travelers.<sup>3</sup>

The conception of cultural schema also addresses the nature of action that the emotion triggers. The schema provides a "script" that may specify the action to be taken. In effect, a historically and culturally formed schema embodies a liturgy and the actions are specific rituals within that liturgy. When a schema is activated, the violent and humiliating actions of one's ancestors may serve as rituals to be repeated.

Hatred, like the other instrumental emotions addressed in this project, attempts to tell a coherent story linking observable structural change, belief formation, emotion, and action. Emotions heighten basic concerns and, for some individuals, "switch on" certain desires in the manner of compulsion. Hatred heightens the desire for historically framed violence. As the state collapses or transforms, symbolic frames shift as well. The contest over certain territories, a contest long suppressed by the state and dormant in the minds of most citizens, resurrects the latent schema. The absence of state constraints, or perhaps state-encouraged opportunities, produces the belief that now is the time to act. The schema identifies the innate aggressive and unjust characteristics of "ancient" enemies, the hateful characteristics, the former violent and oppressive interactions. It becomes time "to take back what is ours," time to "settle old scores." This is the emotion of Hatred.

If Hatred is based on the existence of certain schemas, then the schema should also shape individual actions. These actions, in turn, should help us distinguish when Hatred is operative. Given the relatively unchanging scripts and rituals embodied in the schema, the justification for action should be the same across historical periods. The same innate qualities of

actor whose more immediate and personal economic or political goals dominate the murkier culture frame and push its significance to the background. Along this line of thinking, culture is more likely to be viewed as a resource than an unconscious constraint. Following this view, culture might help produce a set of roles, but the individual is relatively free to choose among them. Others scholars see the cultural frame as heavily constraining, or even programming, the individual's choices. Roles are not chosen, but rather accepted. Ortner takes an intermediate position where "actors may internalize a schema under certain conditions and thus may be constrained by its forms, but under other conditions may reestablish a distance between themselves and the schema." Ortner, "Patterns of History" p. 84.

<sup>3</sup> Rebecca West, *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon; A Journey through Yugoslavia* (New York: Penguin Books, 1995) and Robert Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993) provide compelling travelogues along these lines.

the target group should be taken as the reason for violence and discriminatory actions. Secondly, the acts of violence and humiliation, the acts of vengeance, should possess ritualistic qualities. In sum, Hatred predicts action against a historical target, one identified in a well-known schema. Hatred also predicts that violence will be justified in a similar manner across time periods and that the action will also appear similar across time periods.

#### *Comments on the Plausibility of Hatred*

Hatred, as formulated here, need not reach into "ancient" times. All that is needed is enough time and tradition to establish a coherent schema. In the Balkans, for example, schemas and their emotionally laden roles may not have been created in "ancient" times, but rather formed or reinforced from the more recent period of state formation. In his conclusions, the author of the 1913 Carnegie Endowment Inquiry on the Balkan Wars saw the nature of those brutal ethnic battles as setting down precedent and patterns that might later be activated. Here the analogy is one of biology and disease. Hatred is a virus that lies dormant within the ethnic group or nation, but one that can emerge with predictable effects:

Reference has already been made to the reflex psychological effect of these crimes against justice and humanity. The matter becomes serious when we think of it as something which the nations have absorbed into their very life, — a sort of virus which, through the ordinary channels of circulation, has infected the entire body politic. Here we can focus on the whole matter, — the fearful economic waste, the untimely death of no small part of the population, a volume of terror and pain which can be only partially, at least, conceived and estimated, and the collective national consciousness of greater crimes than history has recorded. This is a fearful legacy to be left to future generations. . . . Events, however revolting, are soon forgotten by the outside world and it is the inner consciousness of moral deterioration and in the loss of self-respect that the nations will chiefly suffer.<sup>4</sup>

It might be easy to dismiss this 1913 report except for the fact that the very quality of ethnic violence in the Balkans during both the Second

<sup>4</sup> *The Other Balkan Wars* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1993), p. 269. This volume reprints the *Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars* (Carnegie Endowment for Peace, Division of Intercourse and Education, Publication No. 4, Washington DC, 1914).

World War and the 1990s is, at least on the surface, so strikingly similar to that described in detail in the Carnegie report.<sup>5</sup>

Second, as it is worth emphasizing and repeating, the emotion does not necessarily dominate, or even enter into, most of everyday life. For any culture, multiple schemas exist. Only with a particular change in structural and political realities will one of these multiple schemas emerge to motivate violent action.<sup>6</sup> At this juncture, I am by and large passing over the critical question of how these schemas emerge. Elites no doubt have incentives to raise one particular schema to the forefront of group consciousness. On the other hand, given an existence of multiple elite factions, we often see competing elites promoting competing schemas. Thus, violence-oriented schemas often compete with peace-oriented schemas. The question is which of these competing schemas will win out. One particular schema might win out because of the brilliance of a demagogue. However, one historical schema may dominate because it resonates with the emerging political situation. An elite may not be manipulating the situation as much as going along with, or simply exacerbating, the flow of events. At this point, the work adopts this latter view. I will come back to this question in the concluding chapters.

Third, Hatred, like Resentment and Fear, is instrumental in that it facilitates the accomplishment of a certain goal. It may be a goal that most humans find repulsive or incomprehensible, but that is not the point. As some emotion theorists point out, hatred catalyzes action in more than one way. Claire Armon-Jones writes:

The functional role of 'hatred' in these cases can be located not only in its special affective role vindicating the agent's commitment to those values which are alleged

<sup>5</sup> In *The Deadly Ethnic Riot* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), Donald Horowitz describes the persistence of historically framed schemas among his own large data set. He comes to the following conclusion: "The resurrection of traditional practices during the course of rioting is supporting evidence for the role of historical memory in violent behavior" (p. 157).

<sup>6</sup> I have addressed this issue at length in a previous work. See the ninth chapter of *Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). In that chapter, I discussed how political events in January 1991 in Vilnius, Lithuania unfolded in such a way as to produce a recognizable schema that motivated some individuals to participate in dangerous forms of protest. In this earlier work, the emergence of a schema was tied to a reworking of rational behavior. Individuals who recognized a historical schema derived a benefit from performing a paradigmatic role that helped to offset the costs and risks of protest. While a cost-benefit approach may be highly relevant in explaining risk-laden behavior, its relevance for other actions is limited. The relationship between historical schema, rationality, and emotion is complex and controversial.

to warrant the emotion, but also in its role of perpetuating attitudes which themselves serve to justify the practices of the communities in question. 'Hatred' involves critical attitudes, such as the appraisal of the object as in salient respects 'unpleasant' or 'bad,' and appetitive attitudes, in so far as they are used to dehumanize the object of 'hatred,' can be regarded as sociofunctional in that dehumanization is necessary to the agent's justification of his otherwise immoral treatment of the object.<sup>7</sup>

Hatred, with its history of negative appraisals, provides a ready means of essentialization and dehumanization necessary for justifying ethnic conflict.

Fourth, hating in the sense of Hatred may not be particularly unpleasant, in fact there may be some sense of fulfillment in acting as the avenger of one's ethnic group. Ivo Andric, the Nobel-winning author from Bosnia, wrote a classic description of "ancient hatred" in his short story "A Letter From 1920."<sup>8</sup> One of Andric's characters describes the emotional character of Bosnia with a particular and sophisticated view that summarizes Hatred:

Yes, Bosnia is a country of hatred. That is Bosnia. And by a strange contrast, which in fact isn't so strange, and could perhaps be easily explained by careful analysis, it can also be said that there are few countries with such firm belief, elevated strength of character, so much tenderness and loving passion, such depth of feeling, of loyalty and unshakeable devotion, or with such a thirst for justice. But in secret depths underneath all this hide burning hatreds, entire hurricanes of tethered and compressed hatreds maturing and awaiting their hour. The relationship between your loves and your hatred is the same as between your high mountains and the invisible geological strata underlying them, a thousand times larger and heavier. And thus you are condemned to live on deep layers of explosive which are lit from time to time by the very sparks of your loves and your fiery and violent emotion. Perhaps your greatest misfortune is precisely that you do not suspect just how much hatred there is in your loves and passions, traditions and pieties. And just as, under the influence of atmospheric moisture and warmth, the earth on which we live passes into our bodies and gives them colour and form, determining the character and direction of our way of life and our actions – so does the strong, underground and invisible hatred on which Bosnian man lives imperceptibly and indirectly enter into all of his actions, even the best of them.

There are several revealing qualities of this passage. First of all, there is a sense of the *enjoyment* of this form of hatred. Being able to passionately

<sup>7</sup> Claire Armon-Jones, "The Social Functions of Emotion" in Rom Harre, *The Social Construction of Emotions* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 73.

<sup>8</sup> From *The Damned Yard and Other Stories* (London: Forest Books, 1992), pp. 107–19. The quote is from p. 115. This passage is commonly cited; Robert Kaplan and Russell Hardin also discuss this passage.



hate heightens and develops other passions, even tenderness and love. The bedrock of hate supports and produces the wondrous peaks of other emotions and desirable qualities. One wonders what geographical analogy Andric would use for some Western European countries – perhaps Sweden would be a flat plane. Would Andric trade his hate-based terrain? Probably not. Radovan Karadzic is known to recommend this story to foreigners to explain the nature of Bosnia;<sup>9</sup> certainly, he does not recommend it because he believes it casts a negative light on Bosnian Serbs. It is likely that other Bosnians, especially rural Serbs and Croats whose actions were so critical in the mobilization of ethnic violence, also see their hatred in this light.

### Fear

Fear: Structural changes such as the collapse or weakening of the political center eliminate institutional constraints and guarantees to produce a situation characterized as anarchy or emerging anarchy. Under these conditions, Fear heightens the desire for security. *The target of ethnic violence will be the group that is the biggest threat.* The theory is not supported if the target of attack is not a threat.

Following Figure 2.1, ethnic violence results from changes in both desires (heightened by emotions) and beliefs. Individuals come to want to commit ethnic violence and they need to believe it is a feasible strategy. There are multiple versions of the Fear narrative with differing emphases on belief versus emotion. Perhaps the most common Fear accounts are security dilemma accounts derived from International Relations theory. These accounts never directly refer to any microlevel mechanisms at all, let alone emotion. In these versions, reference to emotion would provide no added value; beliefs about structural change are sufficient in themselves to explain why individuals commit ethnic violence. The series of Fear arguments presented below begin with purely structural and belief-centered theories and then move toward those that include reference to the individual and explicit discussion of emotion.<sup>10</sup> All of these theories, however, rotate on a common assumption: that dangerous threats actually exist.

<sup>9</sup> Personal communication with Gordon Bardos, former translator for the U.S. military in Bosnia.

<sup>10</sup> Many of these theories are also covered in David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict" *International Security* 21 (2) (1996): pp. 41–75.




Figure 4.1 Reciprocal Vulnerability Game

### Barry Weingast's Reciprocal Vulnerability Game

When two sides have the ability to attack one another without having a means to convincingly signal peaceful intentions or credibly commit to nonaggression, a security dilemma exists.<sup>11</sup> One game theory application of a form of the security dilemma illustrates the fundamental properties of that dilemma. Barry Weingast has laid out a "Reciprocal Vulnerability Game." There are four relevant aspects to the game: a one-time pay-off for aggression (A), a pay-off for cooperation (C), a pay-off for victimhood (V), and a probability for being attacked (p). The game assumes two players of roughly equal strength, that is, both possessing enough force to inflict heavy damage on their opponent in a first strike. The strategies are cooperation and aggression with the players acting sequentially. The pay-off for Player 1 is listed first. The game is represented in a slightly modified version in Figure 4.1.<sup>12</sup>

The basic insight of Weingast's game, and the security dilemma on the whole, is that even if both groups are "peaceful" or "trusting" by nature,

<sup>11</sup> See in particular, Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma" *World Politics* 2 (1978): pp. 167–213, and Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).

<sup>12</sup> Barry Weingast, "Constructing Trust: The Political and Economic Roots of Ethnic and Regional Conflict" (unpublished manuscript, 1994). The diagram is a slightly revised version of the game on p. 6. I have added the p term to the figure. I believe this addition captures Weingast's discussion of group one's subjective estimate of the aggressive or trusting nature of group two, a distinction that plays a crucial role in the analysis of the game.

and even if long-term cooperation (C) will produce the most benefits, the group playing first is likely to choose aggression.<sup>13</sup> Three factors work to produce this outcome. First, the cost of victimhood is assumed to be so enormous that even a small probability of being attacked in the second round yields a heavy negative expected value. Second, in the presence of anarchy, or at least in the absence of effective institutions, the group playing second has no way to commit itself to playing cooperation. Third, the cost of aggression is lower in earlier stages of conflict before the other side can build its defensive capabilities. In sum, because groups cannot commit themselves to cooperation,  $p$  is judged to be significantly greater than zero. Aggression by Player 1 becomes the rational choice because it precludes any possibility of receiving the high costs of victimhood. As an illustration, Weingast discusses the ethnic violence in the Krajina region of Croatia. Krajina Serbs launched a strike to separate themselves from Croats for basic security dilemma reasons: The Croats could not guarantee fair treatment in the future and the Serbs had a short-term advantage in the balance of military power.

There need be no reference to individual human beings or emotions in this game. Two unitary actors representing corporate ethnic groups engage in ethnic war for purely rational reasons.<sup>14</sup> The actor is driven entirely by perception of threat and the heightened concern for security at all costs, even bloody ethnic war.

#### Barry Posen's "Emerging Anarchy"

While Weingast's interpretation rotates around the high cost of victimhood, other security dilemma explanations of ethnic conflict have a somewhat different emphasis. Barry Posen specifies additional reasons why the perception of threat, the essence of the Fear argument, is the main cause of ethnic conflict.<sup>15</sup> First, when offensive strategies cannot be readily stopped by existing defensive countermeasures, concern with threat naturally heightens. Second, threat becomes more salient when the offense cannot be distinguished from the defense. Third, threat becomes the chief motivator of action if the opposing groups have a history of ethnic bloodshed.

<sup>13</sup> This game is similar to the prisoner's dilemma, only in sequential form and with a more extended view of the probability term.

<sup>14</sup> For further discussion of rationality and war, see James Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War" *International Organization* 49(3) (1995): 379-414.

<sup>15</sup> Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict" *Survival* 35 (1993): 27-47.

Posen shows why periods of state collapse, what he terms "emerging anarchy," are especially likely to engender these conditions. First of all, when an ethnic group organizes and arms itself, other groups will not be able to determine whether that mobilization is for defensive or offensive purposes. The form of organization, that of loosely and rapidly formed infantry, is suited for offensive operations. In ethnic war, there is no readily available deterrent (as with nuclear weapons) and few technologies that allow for easy defensive superiority (as in World War I, as Posen argues). Furthermore, in order to induce men to join these units, leaders often appeal to group solidarity and refer to bloody interethnic histories. These words will undoubtedly create an aggressive aura to mobilization. Second, the offense is likely to dominate the defense when "ethnic islands" exist within regions demographically dominated by another ethnic group. The regional majority will have strategic incentives to attack these vulnerable ethnic pockets, while ethnic brethren have an incentive to quickly rescue them. This situation is completely unfavorable for cool-headed diplomacy. If a violent interethnic history exists alongside these factors, then the intentions of the other group, and the probability of attack, must be interpreted in the worst light and may well lead to preemptive strikes along the lines of the logic outlined by Weingast. In either case, it is fear of physical attack, and balance-of-power advantages in the present, that drive ethnic conflict.<sup>16</sup>

Posen's treatment of ethnic violence is structural and rational. The perception of threat is not created by human beings, but by the nature of the situation. As Posen writes in defense of his structure-based argument,

Analysts inclined to the view that most of the trouble lies elsewhere, either in the specific nature of group identities or in the short-term incentives for new leaders to 'play the nationalist card' to secure their power, need to understand the security dilemma and its consequences. Across the board, these strategic problems show that very little nationalist rabble-rousing or nationalistic combativeness is required to generate very dangerous situations.

Within Posen's discussion and case examples, though, it is possible to glean a good deal of material relating to individual-level motivations. Clearly,

<sup>16</sup> Jim Fearon's paper, "Ethnic War as a Commitment Problem" (unpublished manuscript, 1993), might be considered here as a security dilemma approach if a broad view of the security dilemma is taken. My own interpretation of Fearon is that he is specifying the low value of cooperation in the first round and that "fear" is not the driving motivation behind his model.

perception of threat and heightened concern for security motivate the mass of individuals operating within security dilemma conditions. Posen boldly states, "the drive for security in one group can be so great that it produces near-genocidal behavior toward neighboring groups."<sup>17</sup> Groups that engage in conflict, like the Serbs and Croats, have a "terrifying oral history" of violence that affects their understanding of probabilities in times of emerging anarchy.

Other scholars emphasize individual-level, emotional factors to a much greater and more explicit extent. David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild cite the security dilemma as a cause for ethnic violence but see emotions as important magnifiers and accelerators of conflict. They mention the unifying effects of fear: "People who have little in common with others may unite when they feel threatened by external enemies."<sup>18</sup> Charles Taylor, in an argument that will come up again, sees Resentment inspiring elite behavior and Fear driving the mass of individuals acting in the wake of elite action. While elites are motivated by a desire for recognition and dignity, "for the masses the motivation may have little to do with a call to difference, and a sense of threatened identity. It is a nationalism born of a sense of physical threat, of the fear of displacement, even extermination, by a hostile other. Each community has the sense that the other united first against its unsuspecting members, and that its own mobilization is secondary and defensive in nature."<sup>19</sup> Taylor gives the power of the security dilemma life at the individual level. More biologically oriented social scientists could further specify the individual level story. Rapid structural collapse of the state, caused by war or disintegration, produce a situation in which guarantees of protection no longer hold. The cognitive-emotive cycle then comes into play. Information regarding the collapse of previous protections and the build-up of the "other side" produces a belief that one's life, family, and property are in danger. This belief produces an emotion, an action tendency, that affects not only the nervous system of individuals, but further sensitizes their cognitive capacities. The fearful individual is "activated" to become exceptionally alert to any signals

<sup>17</sup> Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict" p. 106.

<sup>18</sup> Lake and Rothchild, "Containing Fear" p. 56.

<sup>19</sup> Charles Taylor, "Nationalism and Modernity" in John A. Hall, ed., *The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 19.

regarding the safety of the environment. The emotion then works to filter information, selecting out the evidence of danger. The result is a confirmation of previous beliefs and a further heightening of fear. By this time, the state of "action readiness" has changed and the individual is ready for fight or flight. While this story fits many descriptions of ethnically violent events, the theoretical social science treatment of Fear usually fails to specify all of these links, especially any systematic link to emotion.

### *Russell Hardin's One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict*

Posen concludes that "if outsiders wish to understand and perhaps reduce the odds of conflict, they must assess the local groups' strategic view of their situation. Which groups fear for their physical security and why?"<sup>20</sup> For Posen, the perception of threat arises from the situation. In other versions, the perception of threat is largely created by elites and then magnified by group norms and ignorance.

Hardin summarizes his approach by stating, "In this study, I wish to go as far as possible with a rational choice account of reputedly primordial, moral, and irrational phenomena of ethnic identification and action."<sup>21</sup> Although not listed in this statement, Hardin clearly wishes to make no explicit reference to emotion. Yet, like Posen and Weingast, Hardin's argument is a Fear argument in that the perception of threat motivates individual action. Furthermore, at a certain point in Hardin's story, the security dilemma structure arises. One of Hardin's main contributions is specification of the coordination mechanisms that unite individuals into the unitary actors assumed in the game tree above.

Conflict is described in terms of a progression. First, political elites ("jingoists") begin the process of ethnic group coordination for self-interested reasons. Their calls for ethnic group solidarity trigger norms of exclusion in the mass population. These norms overcome the collective action problem largely through their appeal to self-interest. For instance, once the other group is identified as a threat, appeals to rally around the group for safety carry normative strength, but their power also derives from the interest of safety. Participating in the group may provide

<sup>20</sup> Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict" p. 119.

<sup>21</sup> Russell Hardin, *One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995) p. 16.

protection from outside attacks and help secure refuge if needed. Individuals in the mass population follow the “jingoists” for several reasons. These individuals are rational but rather ignorant as well. This ignorance stems from several sources: the jingoist elite’s control of the media, the predisposition not to seek better knowledge but instead rely on the “epistemological comforts of home” – stereotypes, slogans, and so on.

This combination of elite self-interest, exclusionary norms, and epistemological flaws and limitations of the masses produces even higher coordination power. As the ethnic group achieves yet higher levels of solidarity and organization, the political and physical capabilities of the group and its leaders grows. A point is reached when even those previously on the sidelines cannot resist the pressures to participate. Even those adamantly opposed to the aggressive regime may not be able to avoid the sanctions involved with dissent. Given ethnic group mobilization and the lack of credible commitment to act differently, the logic of the Fear hypothesis comes into play. With both sides mobilizing, a preemptive strike becomes necessary. Ethnic conflagration becomes almost inevitable.

In contrast to Posen, Hardin sees “rabble-rousers” as a far more crucial element of ethnic violence. In the beginning stages, they create fear. First, their ability to mobilize ethnic groups breaks down the fabric of the state and creates the structural breakdown that characterizes the Fear scenario. As the constraints of the state break down, these elites build on the emerging anarchy they themselves have created by appealing to exclusionary norms and using their control of the media to manipulate the general population. In the end, the fearful structural logic of the security dilemma may unfold. The perception of threat, a real threat in the final stages of the processes, becomes the motivating force behind much individual participation in ethnic violence. Hardin, however, concentrates on the agency of elites in making this result come about.

### *Summary of Fear*

There are three popular versions of the Fear story that can be discussed along lines of the relative weights of structure versus emotion. In one, the fears of the mass and the political elites are similar and both respond to an existing anarchic structure that has unfolded through processes outside the agency of actors. In a second, the fears of the population are manipulated and artificially heightened by a political elite for their own ends. A third version, a modification of the second, primarily focuses on a politi-

cal struggle between elite factions. One faction creates fear, and possibly a security dilemma, as an effective mobilization strategy against the other.<sup>22</sup>

As presented here, the Fear narrative holds that an actual threat does exist. It rests on an observable reality regarding power structures: Identifiable groups have the mutual ability to inflict physical attacks against each other. This reality makes the hypothesis falsifiable. Fear assumes that when the perception of threat becomes the primary concern, then the most threatening ethnic group becomes the most likely target of attack. Thus, Fear creates a specific prediction.

The Fear narrative subsumes situations when the security dilemma structure exists. It can incorporate both situations in which this structure developed outside the agency of elites and situations when elites created it. However, the hypothesis does rest on an observable structural property. It does not incorporate a situation when elites have totally manufactured fear in the absence of any realistic threat. While it may be true that there is an “art” to the creation of fear, that certain charismatic leaders can manipulate fear to their own ends, it is also true that this “art” and “charisma” is basically impossible to systematically compare and test across diverse cases. It may be true that leadership can be a decisive force in ethnic conflict, but that factor, like many others, is not directly tested here.

### *Rage: Noninstrumental Emotion*

The primary purpose of this work is to explain variation in the timing and targets of ethnic violence. Resentment, Fear, and Hatred all explain this variation by telling a narrative in which cognition precedes emotion. For these instrumental emotional paths to ethnic violence, the source of the process is an observable change in status, power, and overall conditions. A relatively straightforward course linking belief, emotion, and change in desire then leads to a choice of a specific ethnic target. The instrumental emotions are defined as instrumental because they work to change the relationships among groups in a particular way through specification of an ethnic target. There are several alternative theories that see a period of multiple or long-term frustrations leading to an ill-defined desire to “lash out.” The individual then creates “enemies” to be attacked; these targets are only sometimes, or partially, directly connected to realistic conflicts.

<sup>22</sup> See V. P. Gagnon for a discussion on the collapse of Yugoslavia. Among other articles, see “Serbia’s Road to War” *Journal of Democracy* 5 (1994): 117–31.

With this thinking, the emphasis is on committing the violent action itself and less on the relational properties of groups that might motivate that action. While many approaches strike a balance among these elements, several important schools of research do follow a certain general form that rotates around a heightened desire to lash out. The broad outlines of form, here entitled Rage, can be briefly summarized:

1. Rage narratives often see the process beginning from a diffuse or unconscious source – multiple sources, long-term sources, and culturally formed personalities. The instrumental paths, on the other hand, begin with observable structural changes that provide blunt information about power and status relationships.
2. In Rage explanations, this diffuse source creates an emotion early on in the process. With Rage, emotion precedes cognition. In the instrumental paths, information converts into beliefs which only then create the emotion.
3. In Rage, the search for a target happens after the emotion is operative. The emotion elevates a desire to lash out. But at whom? Irrational psychological mechanisms may work to identify and justify a particular target.

Rage would seem a plausible explanation for ethnic violence in twentieth century Eastern Europe. The region has suffered immensely. Wars, occupations, hunger, political upheavals, economic depression, and a host of other privations have hit Eastern Europe like biblical plagues. It would not be surprising if masses of frustrated and alienated individuals occasionally lashed out against their lot. Undoubtedly, there is an element of rage (lower case) in most events of ethnic violence. The key question here is how often Rage, a path centered on the overwhelming desire to simply lash out, has commanded the process. The obvious next question is how to identify when Rage is dominant.

Rage differs from the instrumental emotions in terms of source of the emotion, nature of target selection, and justification for violence. These issues are addressed in turn.

### *The Sources of Rage*

Where does the emotion directing one to lash out come from? As opposed to the instrumental emotions, the source may be general and perhaps

amorphous. This makes sense. If the source of the emotion produces blunt information about status and power, then one of the instrumental paths defined by that source is likely to obtain. If the source itself is general, or perhaps hidden in some way, Rage would be more likely.

One such source is found in culture and personality. In the wake of the Second World War, numerous studies attempted to uncover the forces behind the rise of Nazism. The roots of this virulently nationalist, racist, and antisemitic force were often sought in prejudiced and highly ethnocentric personalities. The work of Theodore Adorno and his colleagues is a well-known example of this approach.<sup>23</sup> In *The Authoritarian Personality*, the Adorno group identified characteristics of a personality type prone to the appeals of ethnocentrism and fascism. These traits included submissive attitudes toward authority figures of the in-group, opposition to the imaginative and tenderminded, the belief in mystical determinants of fate, preoccupation with power and toughness, generalized hostility, the disposition to believe wild and dangerous things, and, perhaps most importantly, generalized hostility. The authoritarian personality lives in a harsh psychic environment, a rigid world without imagination, pity, or love. In response to this conflicted and painful existence, the individual seeks to find a villain to lash out against. For this to happen, cognitive distortions concerning out-groups are likely. The authoritarian personality comes to see out-groups as threatening and hostile. In effect, Adorno et al. believed that the modern world had created a new type of “anthropological species,” an individual with a generalized destructive urge that could be targeted against almost any group. Here are the key elements of Rage.

Hans Magnus Enzensberger claims that modern civil wars are “about nothing at all.”<sup>24</sup> Perpetrators of violence act from a position of complete alienation. There is no specific source of emotion and no specific target: “Their aggression is not directed only at others but at themselves. It is as if it were all the same to them not only whether they live or die, but whether they had ever been born, or had never seen the light of day.”<sup>25</sup> Here again is a new type of “anthropological species” ready to commit

<sup>23</sup> Theodor W. Adorno et al., *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper, 1950).

<sup>24</sup> Hans Magnus Enzensberger, *Civil Wars: From L.A. to Bosnia* (New York: The New Press, 1993), p. 30.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 27–28.

violence against a variety of targets in response to some vague, unconscious angst.<sup>26</sup>

Another source of the Rage process, perhaps one more relevant for the case material here, might be seen in "frustration." In 1939, John Dollard and a group at Yale wrote that "aggression is always a consequence of frustration."<sup>27</sup> In the ensuing six decades since this work, frustration-aggression theory has been worked and reworked in a variety of directions. The core definitions and propositions of Dollard et al., however, have been maintained in most forms of the theory. Dollard et al. defined frustration as a thwarting of expected goal attainment. It is important to note that the Dollard group was concerned with the external thwarting of an expected goal. In clear opposition to the personality forms of Rage just discussed, Dollard et al. focused on external occurrences rather than internal psychological developments. Relatedly, frustration arises not from unconscious forces, not from a battle between the superego and the id for example, but from the failure to receive an expected gratification. Individuals learn to expect a reward to result from a given action; frustration stems not from general deprivation, but rather deprivation of an expected reward.

Only certain forms of a frustration-aggression argument would fit Rage. Rage would *not* fit the following sequence: An accurate belief forms that an agent is responsible for the thwarting of a goal; emotion follows that heightens the saliency of the blocked concern; emotion then directs the individual to take aggressive action against this agent. Here, beliefs precede emotions, no cognitive distortions can be identified. This version of frustration-aggression fits an instrumental view of emotion. Two versions of frustration-aggression do fit Rage, though.

<sup>26</sup> As Enzensberger notes, this general orientation toward violence has some resemblance to perpetrator mentalities of the interwar years. A general rage can be seen as the essence of 1920s and 1930s fascism. It is captured in the phrase, "Born a man, died a grocer." The entire materialistic and rationalistic bourgeois world was held in contempt by significant numbers, especially those alienated through experiences in the First World War. In the vein of Rage, they were searching for an outlet for their destructive impulses. Violence was glorified even when a specific target (the bourgeoisie cannot be labeled specific) could not be readily identified. Enzensberger rejects parallels between the two periods by stating that "... in contrast to the thirties, today's protagonists have no need for rituals, marches and uniforms, nor for agendas and oaths of loyalty. They can survive without a Fuhrer. Hatred on its own is enough" (Ibid., p. 27).

<sup>27</sup> John Dollard, L. Doob, N. Miller, O. Mowrer, R. Sears, *Frustration and Aggression* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1939), p. 1. For an examination of Dollard's hypothesis, see Leonard Berkowitz, "Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis: Examination and Reformulation" *Psychological Bulletin* 106 (1989): 59-73.

Any frustration-aggression approach where the frustration comes from many sources over a relatively long time period may fit Rage. In this case, frustration may form a general mindset disconnected from any single source. This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as cumulative ethnic aggression. Donald Horowitz provides a definition - "aggression produced by the conjunction of different sets of frustrations or grievances but directed at fewer than all of the frustrating groups."<sup>28</sup> Under this conception, multiple thwartings arise from multiple agents. Frustration "builds up" from a variety of sources and then explodes against one or a few targets. Clearly, any frustration-aggression theory incorporating cumulative aggression does not accept a one-to-one correspondence between the source of frustration and the target of attack. Frustration is at least a somewhat generalized state, a pent-up force. Release is required, but the direction, the target, of the release of cumulative frustration cannot possess any determinative logic.

Consider, for example, the following hypothetical sequence: Group A prevents Group X from reaching a highly important goal in Time Period One; Group B prevents Group X from achieving an equally important goal at Time Period Two; Group C thwarts Group X regarding a much lesser goal during Time Period Three. Frustration is accumulating over time. If and when violence occurs, who will be the target? Several possibilities exist. Despite thwarting a lesser goal, Group X might attack Group C, the most recent frustrating agent. The action of Group C might be the "straw that broke the camel's back" or they may have pushed the group "over the brink," or "raised the temperature past the boiling point." The English language is filled with metaphors describing processes of cumulative frustration that result in a rapid collapse or explosion. It makes sense that this explosion might be directed against the most recent, and thus most visible, frustrating agent.

Alternatively, aggression might be directed against Group A or Group B, agents that blocked similarly valued goals. But which of these two groups would be the target? Here is the crux of the matter. With cumulative frustrations, the nature and level of frustration at a latter time period relates to actions connected to many groups and events, but not to any single group or event. With an increasing number of time periods and frustrating events, the connection between this increasingly generalized

<sup>28</sup> Donald Horowitz, "Direct, Displaced, and Cumulative Ethnic Aggression" *Comparative Politics* 6(1) (1973): 1-16. Also see Horowitz, *The Deadly Ethnic Riot* pp. 136-47.

type of frustration and the specific form of aggressive action that might be taken becomes weaker and weaker. The attack on any given single group cannot be a direct response toward a frustrating agent because the existing frustration is the result of the actions of several groups and several different types of frustrations. At a certain point, this generalized frustration must be seen as having a life of its own. It drives the individual to seek relief, to strike out.<sup>29</sup>

A second form of frustration that can be seen as the source of Rage can be labelled residual frustration. Imagine that Group A prevents Group X from reaching a certain goal, thus creating a frustration. It is possible that Group A flees or disappears. Although the frustrating agent is no longer available for redress, the frustration remains. The emotion still compels the person to lash out. The emotion can now be seen as the prior element in the sequence of emotion and cognition. The individual needs a target to lash out against. The existing emotion will affect, and possibly distort, subsequent information collection and belief formation.

#### *Nature of the Target*

As a key feature of Rage, the emotion exists before targets are selected. Building on the previous paragraph, residual frustration might operate to find a target through substitution. The group that is the cause of the frustration is unavailable, but the emotion remains and drives the individual to find a new object, a substitute target.<sup>30</sup> For the instrumental emotions,

<sup>29</sup> Perhaps the most well-known work employing the assumptions of cumulative aggression is Ted Gurr's *Why Men Rebel*, the classic statement of relative deprivation theory. There are many versions of this theory, but most involve some conception of cumulative discontent. For Gurr, a necessary factor for political violence is a discrepancy between average value expectations, what members of a collectivity believe they deserve, and value capabilities, what members believe themselves capable of receiving or maintaining. In Gurr's theory, and many other similar theories, this gap develops over time and may involve numerous events and many thwartings of diffuse goals. See Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970). For a summary and critique of the relative deprivation literature see Barbara Salert, *Revolutions and Revolutionaries* (New York: Elsevier, 1976), especially Chapter 3, "The Psychological Basis of Revolutionary Action."

<sup>30</sup> Horowitz uses the term *displaced* instead of *substitute*. The term *substitute* is used here to avoid confusion with Freudian displacement, a mechanism associated with the authoritarian personality school.

the targets are direct targets, that is, groups that are connected to the source of the problem whether it be in terms of status, threat, or historical rivalry. An attack on a clear substitute target suggests that the individual is being driven largely by the need to lash out rather than being directed by an instrumental emotion.

It is often very difficult to identify a clear substitute target, however. Horowitz points this out in his discussion about targets under the effects of cumulative frustration.<sup>31</sup> He points out that targets may be both direct and substitute. The target may not be the primary source of frustration, but may be a source of frustration nonetheless. Second, it might be hard to draw any conclusions from the intensity of the violence against a single target. Horowitz writes:

If a target group simultaneously receives direct and displaced aggression, then it is easier to understand the intensity of certain violent outbursts, which otherwise seems inexplicable. Some initiators of violence may well be fighting what amounts to two wars on two fronts, but all their fire may be trained on one target.<sup>32</sup>

#### *Irrational Mechanisms of Target Selection*

Within the course of Rage, emotion-laden searches for targets may trigger irrational psychological mechanisms. The individual may feel the need to find a target and justify aggression in any possible manner. There are many such relevant mechanisms, but the two most relevant for the cases here are projection and attribution. As defined by Gordon Allport in his classic text, "Projection may be defined as the tendency to attribute falsely to other people motives or traits that are our own, or that in some way explain or justify our own."<sup>33</sup> With attribution, the individual believes that an out-group's behavior derives from inherent characteristics.

<sup>31</sup> Horowitz, *The Deadly Ethnic Riot* pp. 146-47.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 138.

<sup>33</sup> Gordon Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 382. Allport discusses three types of projection: direct, mote-beam, and complementary. For something of a recent revisiting of Allport's work, see Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, *The Anatomy of Prejudice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996). For a broad discussion of psychological defense mechanisms and their relation to ethnic conflict, see Vamik D. Volkan, "Psychoanalytic Aspects of Ethnic Conflicts" in Joseph V. Montville, ed., *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987), pp. 81-92.

*Distinguishing Rage from Hatred: Comparing Justifications for Violence*

A final task at this point is to distinguish Rage from Hatred. Rage is closely related to hatred in a general form. Emotion theorists often categorize and define emotion by whether the emotion is event based or object based. Fear and Resentment are event based. With these two emotions, there is nothing intrinsic about other ethnic groups that produces the emotion. Rather, events have produced conditions that create antipathy toward the other ethnic group. For Fear, it is the condition of vulnerability that produces the antagonistic emotion; if new events remove the threat of attack, the emotion will fade. For Resentment, events that change the status hierarchy produce negative emotions; the emotion arises even in the absence of any preexisting negative feeling toward the other ethnic group and the emotion can fade with changes in the status hierarchy. Hatred is another matter. Hatred is about the object itself, in this case the object being another ethnic group. For the Hatred path identified above, the other ethnic group possesses an intrinsic property as the traditional enemy. There is a constant, underlying, historically developed and ingrained antagonistic property of the "anciently" hated ethnic group. The violent and conflictual role between such groups is always present. Events are important in taking off constraints, in cueing individuals when to actively take on the violent role, but the role itself, based on properties of the groups, is a constant.

Rage is also object-oriented, not event-based. In both Hatred and Rage, the target group, as an object, is the focus of aggressive action. However, the two predict very different qualitative forms of aggression. The Hatred path involves a role, a tradition of a form of qualitative violence or humiliation. The reasons for aggression, embedded in historical grievances, remain constant and recognizable. Both Hatred and Rage involve negative images of the opponent, but with Hatred that image remains fairly constant, framed by historical schemas. With Rage, the negative images change to fit any current situation that requires release of internalized tensions. With Rage, the forms of violence and discrimination can also widely vary.

In effect, the target of Rage can be somewhat of a "living inkblot," a Rohrschach inkblot upon which the aggressor can inject various meanings at different times and under varied conditions. The Rage emotion can usually generate a reason for attacking or discriminating against the target: At one time, the group will be too rich, at another too poor; at one time

the group is an economic threat, at another it will be a security threat; at one time, members of the group will remain too separate from society, at another their efforts at assimilation will prove disturbing.

The following example can serve as an illustration. Some have claimed that Serbs possess a historical antipathy against Bosnian Muslims, an antipathy that came to the fore with the collapse of the former Yugoslavia. In other words, they posit that Serbian violence against Bosnian Muslims was motivated by Hatred. Hatred, based on culturally embedded schemas and roles, should generate familiar historic justifications for violence. With this in mind, consider the following passage:

In justifying the atrocities in Bosnia, Serb nationalists would point to atrocities by Croatian army forces in World War II or in the 1991 Serb-Croat war. When it was pointed out that the largely Muslim population selected for extermination had nothing to do with the Croat army and indeed had been attacked by the Croat army in 1993, Serb nationalists would shift to blaming all Muslims for the acts of those who fought with the Ustashe in World War II. When it was pointed out that many of the families who suffered worst in the Serb onslaught in Bosnia were families of World War II partisans who fought against the Ustashe, Serb nationalists would shift to claims of Ottoman depravity and treat the Muslims as Turks. When it was pointed out that the Slavic Muslims were just as indigenous to the region as Orthodox Christians or Catholics, the discussion would then shift to allegations that the Bosnian Muslims were fundamentalists and that Serbia was defending the West against the fundamentalist threat of radical Islam. When it was pointed out that most Bosnian Muslims were antifundamentalist by tradition and character, the Serb nationalist would move to a final fallback position: that this was a civil war in which all sides were guilty, there were no angels, and the world should allow the people involved to solve their own problems.

In comparing Hatred and Rage, this passage provides clear evidence against Hatred. If emotion connected to a historical schema is guiding action, the perpetrators of violence would be readily able to employ that schema in their justifications. Here, the quality of the target, the object of hatred, continually shifts. In comparing Hatred and Rage, the passage clearly supports Rage – the perpetrators simply wish to commit violence, have found a target, and will commit it for any of several reasons.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>34</sup> This passage is from Michael Sells, *The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), pp. 66–67. In Chapter 10 I will argue that, while elements of Rage were present, the larger pattern supports Resentment as the driving force of Serbian action against Bosnian Muslims.



*Application of Rage to the Case Material*

Rage is a general form of a noninstrumental path, a path that resonates with strands of the psychological literature. The goal is to assess the prevalence of this phenomenon in comparison to Fear, Hatred, and Resentment. The question becomes how best to define and distinguish these different paths to ethnic violence.

Rage tells a plausible story in which a frustrated, alienated, or beaten down ethnic group develops a general emotion that heightens a desire to lash out, a general desire that can be satisfied without a specific target. The path of Rage delineated here allows an outside observer to judge whether such a path is operating by examining the possible sources of the emotion (although this is very difficult), the nature of the target, the nature of targeting, and the justifications for violence. The presence of a type of Rage must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. If the process contains significant cognitive distortions in target selection, Rage gains support. If the target is clearly a substitute target, Rage gains support. If the target is an "inkblot," Rage gains support. In many of the cases, elements of Rage will be observable. There will be evidence of projection and attribution. It is a judgment call whether these are only minor phenomena within the contours of Fear, Hatred, or Resentment or whether their sum and coherence constitutes a process on their own.

*Summary*

The second chapter laid out four paths to ethnic violence in theoretical terms. The third chapter outlined Resentment and identified its specific and general implications. The present chapter has summarized the intellectual heritage of three alternative paths to ethnic violence and persecution. It is now time to apply this knowledge to the case material, beginning with an overview of the Baltics.

## Comparisons: The Baltic States in the Twentieth Century

The histories of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia contain all of the elements necessary for a study of Fear, Hatred, Resentment, and Rage. In the course of the twentieth century this region witnessed the slow structural change of modernization, rapid changes created by numerous wars and occupations, reorderings and reversals of ethnic hierarchies, and changing power balances among ethnic groups. This section contains three historical chapters: (1) Chapter 5: "1905"; (2) Chapter 6: "In the Wake of Barbarossa"; and (3) Chapter 7: "The Reconstruction of Independent States." Proceeding chronologically across the entire twentieth century, these chapters cover, to varying extents, the entire periodization outlined in the Introduction. The section as a whole aims to assess and compare the explanatory and descriptive abilities of the four emotions. The fifth chapter provides historical background while addressing the 1905 failed Russian Revolution. The sixth and seventh chapters address specific puzzles regarding variation in ethnic targets and nature of violent action. These three chapters are used to assess the "fit" of the Fear, Hatred, Resentment, and Rage narratives, that is, how well each can explain important enigmas in target patterns and general processes within a given period. A summary chapter, Chapter 8, assesses the "fit" of each emotion across time and draws some general conclusions.

## Conclusion

People hate. They resent the authority of ethnically different others. They can find themselves in situations in which they fear for their lives and the lives of their families. No one denies that these emotions exist, but few have tried to systematically link them to ethnic conflict. This work has treated these emotions as central to four narratives of social processes leading to ethnic violence and discrimination. Because individual intentions and motivations are difficult to discern and sometimes contradictory, leading scholars of revolution and political violence have chosen not to pursue them as a central object of study.<sup>1</sup> While it may be difficult to study these elements of ethnic conflict, motivation poses a major puzzle for many of the violent outbursts and ethnic cleansings of Eastern Europe. In these events, significant numbers of individuals participated or tacitly supported brutal actions against a relatively defenseless people. Despite the difficulties and ambiguities in the study of emotion and motivation, this phenomenon demands an answer. The present work contributes to the literature on ethnic conflict by identifying four emotion-based paths to ethnic conflict and systematically comparing their abilities to explain variation within limited puzzles and across broad historical sweeps. What have we learned through this exercise?

### *Summary of Findings*

First, one of the most widely accepted theories of political science, Fear, is not very helpful in explaining ethnic violence in the majority of cases

<sup>1</sup> See Tilly's discussion in "Revolutions and Collective Violence" in F. I. Greenstein and N. W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science: Macropolitical Theory* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 483-555.

## Conclusion

found in Eastern Europe. Based on the logic of the security dilemma, Fear provides a coherent and straightforward explanation, but one that is applicable to only a minority of cases. The structural conditions that define the security dilemma and Fear simply were not present in most of the cases here. While Krajina Serbs and all Bosnian groups may have been driven by Fear, other emotions were also apparent. Croatian provocations of the then powerful Serb regime have no place in the Fear narrative; neither do the similar Croatian and Serb actions and atrocities versus Muslims. Fear does not explain the Baltic puzzles of 1905, the pattern of interwar discrimination, the variation witnessed in the 1939-41 period, nor the difference in Baltic policies after the collapse of Communism. Fear does not help explain German actions in Czechoslovakia nor the Czech postwar expulsions. In short, individuals in Eastern Europe have been very capable of attacking and denigrating their ethnically different neighbors in the absence of threat.

Second, this work challenges two major conventional wisdoms concerning Hatred, or "ancient hatred." In opposition to the popular journalistic conventional wisdom, "ancient hatreds" do not seem to drive many cases. Only one case, the Serbian expulsion of Albanians in Kosovo, possesses an excellent fit. The cases show that social relationships have usually varied over time – members of other ethnic groups have been seen as allies at one point and enemies at another. During outbreaks of violence, the targets have often changed accordingly. The changes in targets of violence, as well as in justification and the nature of action, argues against Hatred. As defined here, the process is based on the existence of a constant, if usually latent, script capable of generating roles and actions. Few such scripts could be identified in the case material here.

On the other hand, this work argues against the academic conventional wisdom that dismisses Hatred out of hand. Powerful cultural schemas do exist and can motivate individual action; history's images and symbols can affect behavior. Twentieth century Eastern Europe, however, has witnessed a fluidity of social interaction that has constantly created new experiences and images. The establishment of a coherent and specific schema is unlikely given the rapid changes produced by industrialization, births and deaths of empire and ideology, and multiple wars and occupations. Yet, as argued, a schema defined by a script, roles, and well-known justifications guided Serbian actions during the mass expulsions of Albanians from Kosovo. While ethnic identity is usually in flux, some elements may harden and become the foundations for the cultural schemas of Hatred.

The cases demonstrated little support for Rage, at least as a complete and coherent narrative, capable of explaining variation in ethnic violence. Elements of the Rage narrative, however, appeared within the cases. Certainly, some measure of frenzy and vehemence were behind the violent actions witnessed in the preceding chapters. Rage fits the Czech anti-German pogroms of the immediate postwar period. Rage is a strong competitor in the 1941 Baltic and Poland B cases. However, as far as coherently linking changes in the social and political environment, intervening mechanisms, and observed overall patterns in targets, Rage generally failed to present a convincing alternative to the instrumental narratives. In the conflicts between Czechs and Germans, Slovaks and Hungarians, and Serbs and Albanians, as well as among Croats and Serbs and Muslims, and among the peoples of the Baltic, the instrumental narratives explained more variation in ethnic violence and discrimination.

Among the four emotion-based paths to violence outlined here, Resentment provides the best descriptive and predictive fit. With Resentment, structural changes produce new day-to-day experiences of dominance and subordination. These experiences provide information regarding ethnic status hierarchy – which groups are on top and which are on the bottom. Beliefs form about the justice of this hierarchy. The belief that one's group is in an unjust position leads to the emotion of resentment and, in turn, the desire to act to rearrange the hierarchy. Resentment predicts that the ethnic target will be the group perceived as farthest up the ethnic status hierarchy that can be most surely subordinated through ethnic/national violence. Resentment combines the feeling that status relations are unjust with the belief that something can be done about it. Whether Resentment produces violence or not depends in large part on the intensity of the emotion. Four hypotheses about intensity were developed in the third chapter:

1. Status reversal creates the highest intensity of Resentment and produces the highest likelihood of *violent* conflict. Status reversal results when a more regionally powerful group in an established hierarchy is dislodged from its position and placed below a less powerful group.
2. When Resentment develops from gradually changing perceptions created by slower structural processes such as modernization, the emotion is less intense and the conflict is most likely to develop in nonviolent institutional forms.
3. If the hierarchy among groups is not clearly established, *cooperation* among them is likely, at least until a hierarchy is formed.

4. If in the period immediately dislodging the empirical or occupying regime the remaining groups are of relatively equal status and power, then *cooperation* is more likely.

Underlying all of these intensity-related hypotheses is the degree of clarity and strength of perception of ethnic hierarchy. Reversals of established hierarchies are more likely to breed Resentment than hierarchies in the process of formation. Resentment is less likely to emerge to prevent cooperation if the ethnic hierarchies are unclear or if no group has reason to feel itself entitled to dominant status.

With the exception of (4), the empirical puzzles at the center of each substantive chapter provide evidence to confirm these hypotheses. In the cases of Baltic states and Poland B, the interwar years worked to create widely established and deeply held perceptions of ethnic status hierarchy. Along the lines of Resentment, the nature of the changes in that hierarchy predicted the variation in ethnic targets that occurred in the shifting occupations of the Second World War. Resentment provides an answer for why Lithuanians assaulted Jews in Kaunas but not Vilnius, why Ukrainians attacked Poles in 1939 and Jews in 1941, why Belorussians and Russians are seldom targeted. Resentment helps us make sense of the nature of the action – the targeting of community symbols and the acts of humiliation. In the Czechoslovakian territories, Resentment does not yield answers to all events but furnishes an explanation for why Slovaks expelled Czechs during the Second World War but passed language laws detrimental to Hungarians in the post-Communist period. Resentment suggests why Germans were unhappy with their situation in interwar Czechoslovakia. However, Resentment has little to say about interwar Czech tolerance toward Germans, or their violent attacks on Germans in the immediate postwar period. For the Yugoslav puzzles, Resentment appears at the root of Croatian actions toward Serbs; it helps explain the similarity in actions of Croats and Serbs toward Bosnian Muslims. However, Fear and Hatred also possess explanatory power for the violence that occurred during the collapse of the former Yugoslavia. In sum, Resentment provides an answer to most, but by no means all, of the puzzles presented by the empirical chapters.

Resentment also helps explain the broader contours of Eastern European ethnic politics. In one sense, Resentment supplies a plausible micro-mechanism driving Gellner's Ruritaniens toward nationhood in the era of modernizing empires. Resentment also seems to furnish the microlevel

motivations fueling the interwar consolidation of titular group dominance (Poland for Poles, Latvia for Latvians) in the nationalizing states described by Rogers Brubaker. Building on the conclusions of the Yugoslavia chapter, I will argue, though, that the empirical material as a whole suggests something different, something beyond the theories of Gellner and Brubaker.

In Gellner's view, the passion underlying nationalism resulted from modernization. Requiring a single language for efficiency, the machinery of the industrialized state inevitably produced noncongruence between an individual's culture, embodied almost exclusively in language, and the broader environment. As he clarified in later writings, Gellner stated:

Modern life *is* contact with bureaucrats: shop assistants, railway clerks, etc., etc.

It is this which pushes people into nationalism, into the need for the congruence between their own 'culture' (the idiom in which they can express themselves and understand others) and that of the extensive and interconnected bureaucracies which constitute their social environment. Non-congruence is not merely an inconvenience or a disadvantage: it means perpetual humiliation. . . . The passion is not a means to some end, it is a reaction to an intolerable situation, to a constant jarring in the activity which is by far the most important thing in life – contact and communication with fellow human beings.<sup>2</sup>

In response to their day-to-day humiliation, the resulting passion motivated individuals to do whatever it took to create linguistic congruence in their own efficient modern state. Shop assistants and railway clerks would still speak one language, but, as common sense or justice dictated, it would be the language of the territorial majority. Drawing out the implications of this argument, when language congruence is in place, the humiliation ends and the passion recedes.

The passions and humiliations identified by Gellner resonate with the Resentment narrative. Gellner's story describes the Baltic and Slovak experience especially well. Taken as a whole, however, the substantive chapters suggest that Gellner is describing only one subset of Resentment. Language, the basis of Gellner's argument, is only one daily marker of subordination and humiliation; other markers can also produce Resentment's passion. The Yugoslavian cases provide ample evidence. Serbs, Croats, and

<sup>2</sup> From Ernest Gellner, "Reply to Critics" in John A. Hall and I. C. Jarvie, eds., *The Social Philosophy of Ernest Gellner* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1996), pp. 625–87. Passage is from p. 626. John Hall discusses this text in the "Introduction" in John A. Hall, ed., *The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 11.

Muslims all spoke Serbo-Croatian, yet as the last chapter has argued, Resentment rose through symbolic politics. Croats expelled Serbs from most positions of political authority and resurrected Croatian nationalist symbols, almost taunting the Serbs. Some Croats and Serbs, especially those living in rural areas, found the possibility of residing in a Muslim-dominated state humiliating. In contrast to Gellner, Yugoslavian Resentment did not possess a mechanical quality, it developed in different ways depending on the historical, cultural, and economic backgrounds of the region and the set of ethnic groups residing there. In Croatia, the seeds of Resentment were planted at the very inception of the state. Croats, as former residents of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, perceived themselves as culturally and economically more advanced than their Serbian "big brothers." Serbs, as the masters of their own prewar state, perceived themselves as superior to the Croats. The implementation of Serbian administrative policies, the branding policy for example, and the gross overrepresentation of Serbs in the interwar state, established early on a set of structures, information, and beliefs that would repeatedly set the stage for the formation of Resentment. Bosnia's ethnic relations have not exhibited anything like the constancy of Croatia's. The first Yugoslavia – the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes – did not recognize Muslims as an equal people. Many Serbs and Croats saw Tito's creation of a Bosnian Socialist Republic as a way to reduce Croatian and Serbian power by scattering their numbers across republic boundaries. Given this background, as well as the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, significant numbers of Serbs and Croats would not tolerate the prospect of living in a Bosnian state as second-hand citizens. The possibility of this status change transformed the nature of interethnic relations in Bosnia.

*Why Has Resentment Been so Prevalent in Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century?*

Is there something special about Eastern European mentality or culture? Is it because Eastern Europe serves as a faultline for the "clash of civilizations"?<sup>3</sup> A review of the links of Figure 2.1 helps address this question. Resentment describes a process linking structure to information, information to belief, belief to emotion, and emotion and belief to action. A

<sup>3</sup> See Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations" *Foreign Affairs* 72(3) (1993): 22–49.

review of each of these links shows why and how Eastern European history and politics have created strong links at each point of this chain.

**Structure and Information** Few areas of the world have ever witnessed rapid structural changes in the manner of Eastern Europe in the twentieth century. In massive numbers, illiterate peasants learned to read and moved to the cities. With the collapse of the empire, these former peasants and sons of peasants became masters of their own house. In the words of Istvan Deak (also quoted earlier): "The establishment of Eastern European nation-states has been the most spectacular change on the European continent in the last 150-odd years, and the only one to prove lasting."<sup>4</sup> When given the chance, the interwar governments created grossly skewed proportions in the military and bureaucracies. Consider again some examples cited earlier: Toward the end of interwar Yugoslavia, Serbs held 161 of 165 generalships in the army and 150 of 156 positions in the Ministry of Education; in the latter years of interwar Czechoslovakia, Slovaks, although comprising 23% of the population, held only 1.7% of positions in the central administration; in interwar Lithuania, Jews and other minorities held few positions of authority after the 1926 coup. These figures represent the type of information produced by the structural changes of the third period, the interwar era. Resentment is based on the perception of ethnic status hierarchy. The intensity of the emotion relates to the strength of ethnic hierarchy. Given these figures from the tail end of the third period, it is hard to see how the newly literate and urbanizing ethnic groups could help but develop a strong sense of ethnic hierarchy. It is worth recalling the experience described by a Lithuanian Jew during the Soviet occupation of 1940–41: "Every Jew held his head high. If he met a Lithuanian on the sidewalk, the Lithuanian would step off the curb to let him by. Before the Russians came, it had been just the reverse." In interwar and wartime Eastern Europe, the simple act of walking down the street could be an experience imbued with ethnic dominance. In some cases, the rise of the peasants and their pursuit of status dominance created this situation. In other cases, the political or economic development at the time of formation created skewed numbers in the positions of power. Across every case in this book, however, the structural processes of mod-

<sup>4</sup> Istvan Deak, "The Rise and Triumph of the East European Nation-States" *In Depth: A Journal for Values in Public Policy* 2 (1992): 77–95.

ernization and state formation helped create a mentality permeated by status consciousness.

Furthermore, few regions of the world ever witnessed the rapid structural upheavals seen in Eastern Europe from 1939 to the late 1940s. Consider Lithuania. In the course of a few years, Lithuania went from independence, to Soviet occupation, to German occupation, to Soviet reoccupation. Czechoslovakia saw partition of the Sudetenland, followed by German occupation, followed by quasi-independence, followed by Soviet control. In 1939, Yugoslavia was struggling with new decentralized political structures (recall the 1939 Sporazum). In 1940, the Germans, Italians, Hungarians, and Bulgarians, along with the newly formed Independent State of Croatia, occupied and partitioned the Yugoslav state. After a partisan and civil war, a new federated socialist state composed of six republic-level units was born. During this era, structural upheavals reversed established interwar hierarchies. The result was the gruesome violence described in previous chapters. Again, the Soviet and German occupation policies provided experiences (information) that reinforced consciousness of ethnic status hierarchy (given the racist theories and racial hierarchies of the Nazis, this effect is hardly surprising).

The postwar system of federated socialist republics were political forms that maintained consciousness of group status. In Czechoslovakia, the relationship between the Czech and Slovak halves of the federation were a continual matter of debate. In Yugoslavia, the Croats and Slovenes asked why they should fund the southern republics. These federations were not designed to quell ethnic consciousness. Rather, their explicit ethnic form came to breed information used in ethnic comparison. Indeed, in retrospect the informational qualities and mobilizational potential of these ethnically federated structures seems more important than the fact that these systems sometimes reduced ethnic gaps in education or income.

In sum, the types of structural change seen in Eastern Europe – rapid modernization, collapse of empire, multiple occupations by brutal regimes, formation of ethnically federated states – produced information and experiences (including the episodes of violence and humiliation) that created and maintained perception of ethnic status hierarchy.

**Information and Beliefs** Resentment posits a straightforward progression from structural change to information and then a second step from information to beliefs that ethnic status orderings are unjust and offensive. Culture, ideology, or elite persuasion could alter the interpretation or

appraisal of information. For instance, two cultures, one religiously oriented and the other secular, might form different beliefs regarding the justice of ethnically skewed bureaucracies. The local moral order is a "cognitive repertoire of the community" informing one of the range of appropriate attitudes.<sup>5</sup>

Despite these possibilities, the case material demonstrates more similarities than differences in the linkage of information to belief. Few regional majorities failed to form the belief that demographic dominance should be reflected in numerical dominance in positions of authority. Almost all of these regional majorities negatively reacted to rapid reversals of those numbers. This lack of variation is not surprising given the blatancy of the information. Consider the numbers mentioned above. How could Croats fail to develop a belief that the gross Serb overrepresentation in the military constituted unjust dominance? How could Slovaks, holding a number of administrative positions that was just one thirteenth of their populational percentage, fail to form a belief that they were a subordinated ethnic group?

Secondly, state formation involves symbol formation. New states require flags, insignia, the renaming of streets, the rewriting of history texts. These symbols provide a cheap and quick way to establish group dominance and they can serve as badges of ranked order. I can remember crossing the border between Lithuania and Latvia in the summer of 1992, in the early days of Latvian independence. The Latvian border guards, youth wearing new uniforms, were determined to go through the process of having everyone get off of the bus, have luggage searched, and carefully check documentation. Their function was symbolic more than anything else – to demonstrate that they were an independent country. In Weber's famous dictum, statehood is defined by a monopoly of force. In general in Eastern Europe, nation-statehood is defined by the monopoly of force primarily by one national group. Through their ability to force people to leave the bus, through their right and practice of searching luggage, through their presence with uniforms and guns, Latvians were establishing dominance that helped define the new political entity as a Latvian nation-state.

Thirdly, new states change language laws. Following Gellner, language is the most powerful marker of status dominance. Across the century,

<sup>5</sup> See Rom Harre, "An Outline of the Social Constructionist Viewpoint" in Rom Harre, ed., *The Social Construction of Emotions* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986).

emerging East European nation-states have passed laws establishing language dominance of the titular group. Slovakia, Latvia, and Estonia, for example, passed laws that clearly established the subordinate position of minority languages.

Finally, violence is another blatant form of information that is largely immune to cultural nuances.

In sum, the prevalence of Resentment in Eastern Europe has resulted in large part from the blatant nature of information. Undoubtedly, culture and ideology can impact belief formation. Elite persuasion and framing can alter mass beliefs. In Eastern Europe, however, these forces could not significantly influence the appraisal and interpretation of gross imbalances in the visible positions of authority, the symbols of statehood, the imposition of language laws, and the brutal acts of violence and humiliation. The majority of people would interpret the imbalances, symbols, language laws, and violence as clear indications of a status hierarchy and clear evidence of the position of their own group within that hierarchy.

***Beliefs and Emotion*** Resentment holds that a belief that one's group is unjustly subordinated will trigger an emotion that heightens the saliency of status concerns. One feels compelled to act against the unjustly dominant groups as a way of changing the imbalance, or putting the other group "in its place." Why did a belief in unjust group hierarchy so consistently lead to the emotion of resentment in Eastern Europe?

This question raises the issue of culture. As in the previous link, culture can affect how beliefs translate into emotions.<sup>6</sup> A similar belief may initiate a strong emotional reaction in one culture, while the same belief may cause a weaker, or different, emotion in another. Was there something specific to twentieth century Eastern European culture that served to frequently translate the belief of unjust hierarchy into such intense emotion?

The substantive chapters do suggest at least one specific area in which culture intervenes between belief and intensity of emotion. The belief that one was subordinate to Jews, rather than other ethnic groups, appears to have created an especially intense emotion of resentment. Recall Jan Gross's description of how Poles reacted to the sight of Jews in the Soviet administration: "It is a reflection of how unseemly, how jarring, how

<sup>6</sup> One of the most convincing studies of the link between culture and emotion is Richard E. Nisbett and Dov Cohen, *Culture of Honor: The Psychology of Violence in the South* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996).

offensive it was to see a Jew in a position of authority." The quoted passage of the Lithuanian writer recalling the role of Jews in the 1940–41 Soviet occupation mirrors this reaction: "They interfered in everything and told everyone how to live. Jewish agitators flooded the villages. They called upon the peasants to begin the sowing or the reaping. The people were silent and bit their tongues. But as soon as the agitators left, the people began to spit in rage: Of what value is the advice of a person who had never in his life held a scythe in his own hands, who had never pushed a plow in his life." While any minority group that advances far up the status ladder during an occupation will likely be the target of Resentment, the fact that Jews were that group in 1940–41 led to an especially strong emotion, an exceptionally obsessive drive to act to use violence to put the group "in its place." Historically, Eastern Europeans, as indicated by the previous quote, saw Jews as a foreign element unconnected to the land, an urban and effeminate group.

But is there an identifiable regional cultural influence on emotion formation? This question is obviously beyond the scope of this project. However, one must ask in how many modern or modernizing societies does such a belief *not* elicit resentment? Donald Horowitz's passage describing the developing world comes to mind: "Everywhere the word *domination* (emphasis in original) was heard. Everywhere it was equated with political control. Everywhere it was a question of who were 'the real owners of the country' and of who would rule over whom." The psychological research cited in the fourth chapter suggests that one of the fundamental underpinnings of Resentment, the desire for esteem, is part of human nature.<sup>7</sup> While perhaps less ingrained, a second key element of Resentment assumes that human beings easily and naturally identify with the experience of their groups. Emotions may be socially constructed to a great degree, but they are not infinitely malleable. Some emotions may have been "hard-wired" to some degree during sociobiological evolution. Eventually, biological research may provide solid answers to whether the need for self-esteem and the individual identification with groups are part of the human genetic constitution. The substantive material here, though, does little to discount such a conjecture.

<sup>7</sup> For a particularly relevant recent source see Albert Somit and Steven Petersen, *Darwinism, Dominance, and Democracy: The Biological Bases of Authoritarianism* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997). See especially the discussion in Chapter 5, "Dominance and Hierarchy."

***Emotion and Action*** The final link in Resentment's chain connects the emotion-produced desire to "put groups in their place" to violence and punitive or discriminatory laws. It is important to note that these actions result from both the desire to commit them and the belief that punishment can be avoided. While emotion heightens certain desires and creates compulsions to act, individuals will not completely ignore dangers and penalties. Even the most resentment-filled individual may be deterred. Resentment has led to violence in Eastern Europe partly because constraints on behavior have collapsed so often. The two world wars and their brutality created situations of near anarchy seldom seen in this century. The regional collapse of empires and states also eliminated deterrents to violence (witness Bosnia).

***Summary of Resentment*** In retrospect, it is hardly surprising that Resentment has been the motor for ethnic conflict in twentieth century Eastern Europe. Modernization brought the rural, regional majorities in contact with the ethnically foreign cities in their midst. The collapse of empires created the opportunity for the emergence of nation-states and the pursuit of nationalizing agendas. The Second World War brought multiple occupations and status reversals and rereversals. Individuals witnessed rapid changes in the states they lived in and the symbols around them. Ethnically based federations arose and disintegrated. The entire century was punctuated with periods of near anarchy when the most emotionally driven were relatively free to act on their desires. Modern Eastern European history has been a recipe for Resentment.

### ***Caveat***

As discussed in the introduction, Fear, Hatred, Resentment, and Rage are parsimonious narratives created for comparison with each other. Each narrative links a micromechanism to macrostructural changes. Clearly, ethnic violence is a complicated manner and any approach seeking parsimony will leave out many important elements. Seeking a century-wide sweep, this book has left out much of the politics of ethnic violence.

To be sure, specific political decisions have been discussed in the cases. For example, while the Yugoslav chapter dismissed the effects of charisma, it did include many of the policies of Tito and the Yugoslav Communist Party that eventually led to Resentment. As argued, Yugoslav Resentment has, in major part, stemmed from the nature of the formation of the state (creating the template for Croatian Resentment against Serbs) and the

reforming of the state as a socialist federation. Without the mobilization potential and symbolic significance of republic-level government, the Bosnian events may not have taken the course they did. If Tito and the Communists had not created a Bosnian Republic in the wake of the Second World War, it is unlikely that modernization would have produced a Muslim-led drive for a Bosnian state. Certainly, in contrast to Gellner, language incongruence would never have furnished the passion needed for such a movement. Some of the more specific policies also had an impact. Tito played the ethnic issue both ways – he jailed nationalists who broke certain taboos (Tudjman and Izetbegovic, for example) but pacified ethnic groups through territorial and cultural concessions. It was a balancing act that could be sustained in a powerful one-party state, but a strategy that produced embittered ethnic entrepreneurs and mobilizational capabilities to bring down a weakened state. This policy was not directly related to macrostructural changes of language and modernization. Industrialization may have exacerbated the situation by increasing the intrusiveness of the government and creating federal investment strategies that pitted one republic against another. But specific historical and political features did have a major part in producing the status inconsistencies and status reversals underlying Resentment in Bosnia.

Politics can also matter when sequences of emotions open up opportunities for leaders to exploit. In the Croatian case, for example, Resentment, Fear, and possibly Hatred, were all present. Barry Posen's security dilemma argument outlined earlier actually mixes Fear and Hatred. The breakdown of the state and the introduction of emerging anarchy sets Fear into motion, but Hatred schemas possessing threatening roles and scripts may then arise as well. Some leaders will have incentives to make sure that the Hatred schemas come to the fore. As posited by the Hatred narrative here, these schemas will only be effective if they have historical resonance and they may emerge without leadership or manipulation. In contrast, other scholars view leaders as being able to largely create new schemas, or at least creatively manipulate old ones. Elite ability to manipulate history is an important issue, but also an empirical one.<sup>8</sup> Either way, however, leaders and politics may come into play given this sequence of emotions.

<sup>8</sup> Stuart Kaufman's work is perhaps the most sophisticated treatment of this question. Kaufman, concentrating on a form of hatred, distinguishes between elite-led and mass-led paths to ethnic violence. He tests his theory on several cases from regions from the former Soviet Union. See Stuart Kaufman, *Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001).

Politics and leadership do matter. But politics must be played within the constraints that history and structure provide. This statement leads into a discussion of the politics of prevention.

### *Lessons for Prevention of Ethnic Violence*

A major implication of this book is that ethnic violence is very difficult to prevent. A review of Fear, Hatred, and Resentment shows why this is so.

Fear, Hatred, Resentment, and Rage are all plausible explanations of ethnic violence. For each, a different set of preventions would apply. One reason why social scientists tend to favor the Fear argument is that it holds out the best chances for successful intervention. If the structure of the security dilemma is producing Fear, then steps could be taken to reduce the military vulnerabilities of groups. In effect, outsiders considering intervention can act to close windows of opportunity either through transferring armaments to threatened groups or sending in peacekeeping troops. These solutions, though, are not easy to implement. Above all, states are reluctant to send troops into these situations. Furthermore, if states do develop policies to intervene, ethnic groups will have incentives to avoid serious negotiations with their opponents and try to accomplish their own narrow goals by enticing international intervention. The Kosovo Liberation Army, to take one example, chose to escalate violence in order to heighten chances of Western intervention. At the time of this writing, Kosovo is a NATO protectorate largely cleansed of Serbs and other minorities while elements of the KLA are destabilizing neighboring Macedonia. Kosovo illustrates the complexities of intervention.

This book also provides a warning against the tendency to place too much emphasis on countering the structural logic of Fear. The lesson here is to avoid the temptation to see Fear as the most common path to ethnic conflict in the modern world. Simply changing the military potentials that underlie the security dilemma will help in some cases, but the prevalence of Resentment points out that the basis of conflict is often wider than the nature of threat. Fear helped drive the bloody outcomes in Croatia and Bosnia, but so did the Resentment that propelled the Tudjman regime to power. As was argued, Resentment also helps explain similar Croatian and Serbian attacks on Bosnian Muslims.

Stopping Hatred is very difficult. It is not clear how much deeply embedded and latent cultural schemas can be changed. Certainly, education and fair renditions of history might help in some cases. Education and



a freer and better press may have helped to counter the myths, gross exaggerations of persecution, and talk of Albanian genocide against Serbs that inflamed the Kosovo conflict. Yet, at the base of that conflict lay a history, not a mythology, peppered with mass expulsions. The scripts and roles played by Serbs during the 1999 expulsions had roots based more in repetitions during the twentieth century than the 1389 battle that most commentators usually mention. This schema cannot be easily changed. Serbs could easily be mobilized to participate in brutal actions in Kosovo (as compared to mobilization against Slovenia). Outsiders could have deterred Serbs from the policy of expulsion, but, given the Serbs' widely held schema, they were unlikely to persuade the Serbian population that it was an inhuman act worthy of world contempt. Efforts to "educate" the Serbs would have been counterproductive. Fortunately, the book has shown that Hatred is rare.

The major finding of this book is the ubiquity of Resentment. Can there be interventions within this path? The possibilities for intervention can be discussed by going through the Resentment narrative link by link.

#### *Structural Preventions*

Structural changes may prevent the process from ever beginning. Two structural programs come to mind. Partition, possibly accompanied by population transfers, can obviously eliminate the basis for Resentment. Homogeneous states have no ethnic status hierarchies. Partition will prevent daily interactions (and status reversals) among ordered groups, the starting point of Resentment. A retrospective look at the course of Eastern Europe, makes homogenizing policies not look so bad. Do we really want a million Germans in the Sudetenland again? Does anybody really think the breakup of Czechoslovakia was a tragedy? If Kosovo Albanians and Serbs never live together again, is that such a loss given their history?

Achieving homogeneity, though, is a drastic process usually involving massive human suffering. Furthermore, partition will create a myriad of other problems, especially if significant minorities remain. It may be true that Eastern Europe has been homogenized and will no longer see Resentment the way it once did. This being said, the genocides and mass expulsions that created this homogeneity are hardly examples of prevention. In large part, this book is a testimony to the misery, suffering, and carnage created by Eastern Europe's homogenizing history. Peaceful partition does

#### Conclusion

have its advocates, and debate on this issue will continue.<sup>9</sup> As with the interventions involved with preventing Fear, this book provides no easy answer to this controversy.

Federalism is a clear alternative to partition. By granting autonomy, especially cultural and linguistic autonomy, societal features of dominance and subordination are dulled. Each ethnic group, while not the master of its own house, can at least be the master of one of the rooms. Twentieth century Eastern European experience and history does not offer much support for the longevity or peacefulness of federations. All three federations in the region – Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, the USSR – collapsed. Despite the claims of those extolling the virtues of postwar Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav experience provides real doubts as to the effectiveness of federation. Even the smallest differences could provide the sparks for simmering resentments. Croats, for example, bristled at the overrepresentation of Serbs in the Communist Party in Croatia. And, as I have argued, the change in status of a group like the Muslims brought out emotional responses by active segments of both Croats and Serbs. Although highly autonomous and relatively prosperous under the former federation, the Slovenians today do not seem to lament the death of Yugoslavia.

#### *Information*

State policy on information could retard the development of Resentment. Information in the premodern period was limited. The illiterate, immobile, and isolated peasants of the premodern era in Eastern Europe had little opportunity or information to form beliefs about hierarchies or their unjustness. They may have occasionally killed their landlords, but they did not experience ethnic resentments. Ethnic ignorance could lead to ethnic bliss. Today, many states do not publish figures on the ethnic composition of the police force or officer corps. Perhaps, if these numbers were unavailable, ethnicity itself would be harder to talk and think about.

It is doubtful that either institutional or societal ignorance can be a viable policy in the twentieth century. As formulated here, Resentment is

<sup>9</sup> Recent proponents of partition plans include Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars" *International Security* 20(4) (1996): 136–75 and John Mearsheimer and Steven Van Evera, "When Peace Means War" *The New Republic* December, 1995. Also see Robert Hayden, "Schindler's Fate: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, and Population Transfers" *Slavic Review* 55(4) (1996): 727–48. One recent opponent of partition is Radha Kumar, *Divide and Fall: Bosnia in the Annals of Partition* (London: Verso, 1997).

based on the actual day-to-day experiences of subordination. Restriction of information by the state will not change this experience; in fact, it is likely that overestimations of outgroup dominance would result. Furthermore, purposeful ignorance is hardly a normatively appealing policy.

### *Beliefs*

In the Resentment progression, beliefs reside between information and emotion. Elites are often seen as framing events in ways that provoke and inflame violent resentments. However, it is possible that elites could use persuasion and reason at this juncture to shape more benign beliefs. For example, while many commentators admit that there may be a kernel of truth in Serbian complaints regarding underrepresentation and the form of the 1974 constitution, they see the belief in Serbian "victimhood" as largely a creation of demagogues like Milosevic and Karadzic. Some argue that if there were better outlets of information, more opportunities to hear voices of reason and moderation, alternative beliefs would form.<sup>10</sup> To a great extent, this book presents a counterargument to elite-based arguments and the view that ethnic conflict is the result of "the forces of darkness – separatists, racists, war criminals, and crooks" [see page 1]. If beliefs are almost infinitely malleable and arise out of elite discourse, then the entire conception of Resentment and the other structurally based emotional processes must be rejected. The empirical material, the recurring patterns and outcomes, suggest the opposite, however. Discourse, at least to a considerable extent, follows large scale structural change at least as much as it shapes it.

### *Action*

While it is extremely difficult to stop structural changes and the information, beliefs, and emotions that flow from them, it may be somewhat more possible to deter actions. The members of Group X may come to want to commit violence against Group Y. Emotion heightens the desire to do so. However, at least for the instrumental Fear, Hatred, and Resentment, emotion does not lead to insanity or even gross forms of irrationality. Outsiders can hold perpetrators responsible by threatening economic and

<sup>10</sup> For an analysis of this argument, see Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine, "Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas" *International Security* 21 (1996): 5–40.

## Conclusion

political sanctions. Such threats will not stop all forms of emotion-based ethnic violence, or perhaps most of them. But it may be the best that outsiders can do.

### *Final Thoughts*

There is a clear need in the social sciences to study the role of emotion. As the theoretical sections point out, emotions underlie a host of existing approaches. It is difficult to study emotions and almost impossible to measure them. But they are too important to be ignored.

In particular, social scientists need to examine the role of group status and related emotions. I doubt that resentment, in some form, will cease to play a major role in political and social life. Anyone who has experienced the emotion knows its power. Jackie Robinson is considered one of America's greatest heroes. In the face of constant harassment, he persevered to become baseball's first African-American major league player. Despite daily taunting by opposing teams, Robinson refrained from retaliation. Beneath this restraint, as Robinson would write, a violent passion sometimes simmered:

What a glorious, cleansing thing it would be to let go. To hell with the image of the patient black freak I was supposed to create. I could throw down my bat, stride over to the Phillies dugout, grab one of those white sons of bitches and smash his teeth in with my despised black fist.

Robinson reacted to harassment with emotion that heightened a desire for violent action, a release of fury that would be "a glorious, cleansing thing." Human nature provides a capacity for an emotion capable of motivating violence toward ethnically distinct others. This capacity existed in Jackie Robinson whose number prominently hangs in honor from every major league baseball stadium in America. It clearly existed in Robinson's white tormentors. It existed in the Eastern Europeans described in this book. It will continue to exist in a host of societies around the world. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that most human beings will be able to exercise the restraint and self-control of Jackie Robinson.