

***Transitions from
Authoritarian Rule***

**Tentative Conclusions about
Uncertain Democracies**

by

***Guillermo O'Donnell and
Philippe C. Schmitter***

1986

The Johns Hopkins University Press
Baltimore and London

Contents

© 1986 The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
All rights reserved. Published 1986
Printed in the United States of America

Third printing, 1991

The Johns Hopkins University Press,
701 West 40th Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21211
The Johns Hopkins Press Ltd., London

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

O'Donnell, Guillermo A.

Transitions from authoritarian rule. Tentative conclusions about
uncertain democracies.

Papers originally commissioned for a conference sponsored by the
Latin American Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center
for Scholars between 1979 and 1981.

Bibliography: p.

Includes index.

1. Representative government and representation—Case
studies. 2. Authoritarianism—Case studies. 3. Democracy—
Case studies. I. Schmitter, Philippe C. II. Woodrow Wilson Inter-
national Center for Scholars. Latin American Program.

JF1051.0317 1986 321.09 86-2714

ISBN 0-8018-2682-9 (pbk. : alk. paper)

Foreword

Abraham F. Lowenthal • vii

Preface • xi

1. Introducing Uncertainty • 3
2. Defining Some Concepts (and Exposing Some Assumptions) • 6
3. Opening (and Undermining) Authoritarian Regimes • 15
4. Negotiating (and Renegotiating) Pacts • 37
5. Resurrecting Civil Society (and Restructuring Public Space) • 48
6. Convoking Elections (and Provoking Parties) • 57
7. Concluding (but Not Capitulating) with a Metaphor • 65

Notes • 73

Index • 79

funds and a generalized revulsion against materially rewarding the armed forces for what many are bound to feel is the mess they have made of civic life and, often, of the economy during the authoritarian period. It may even be tempting to disarm them or, at least, to scale down their salaries, perquisites, and equipment,²⁰ but this would conflict with the goal of encouraging professionalization—and it may trigger a violent reaction. We have not systematically inquired into the effects of a transition on military expenditures, but our impression from available evidence is that they tend to increase or, at least, not to decline. What seems crucial is not so much a crude buying off of the military as the devising of a shift in the strategic doctrines and operational capabilities of the armed forces which can provide them with a credible role in society—and that costs money.²¹

Our conclusion, then, is that there are conditional possibilities for coaxing the military out of power and inducing them to tolerate a transition toward democracy. The most difficult immediate problems are how to administer justice to those directly responsible for past acts of repression and how to assert some degree of civilian control over decisions about promotion and resource allocation within the armed forces. As we argued before, the longer-term issues—and hopes—involve a gradual change in the military's image of itself as ultimate guardian of the national interest and a shift from preoccupation with internal security to some more credible and orthodox role as defender of the country's (or the region's) external security.

While we are guardedly optimistic about the prospects for controlling the behavior of those within the armed forces who are antagonistic to democracy, the success of the transition may depend even more on whether some civilian, as well as military, leaders have the imagination, the courage, and the willingness to come to interim agreements on rules and mutual guarantees.

Capitalize

Negotiating (and Renegotiating) Pacts

Pacts

The concept of "pact" emerged rather early in our discussions about possible transitions from authoritarian rule and was subsequently reiterated on many occasions. Only Terry Karl's chapter on Venezuela deals explicitly and thoroughly with such arrangements, but repeated pacts have also been an important feature of the Spanish transition. If Colombia had been included in our sample, we would have encountered more evidence for their crucial significance.¹ While we are not claiming that such arrangements are necessary features of a successful transition, we believe that they can play an important role in any regime change based on gradual installment rather than on a dramatic event.

A pact can be defined as an explicit, but not always publicly explicated or justified, agreement among a select set of actors which seeks to define (or, better, to redefine) rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the "vital interests" of those entering into it.² Such pacts may be of prescribed duration or merely contingent upon ongoing consent. In any case, they are often initially regarded as temporary solutions intended to avoid certain worrisome outcomes and, perhaps, to pave the way for more permanent arrangements for the resolution of conflicts. Some of the elements of those pacts may eventually become the law of the land, being incorporated into constitutions or statutes; others may be institutionalized as the standard operating procedures of state agencies, political parties, interest associations, and the like.

Otto Kirchheimer, who may have been the first to recognize the emerging importance of pacts in the contemporary world, pointed out that these compromises involve adjustments to standing contradictions between social content and political form.² Where the underlying distribution of de facto power in classes, groups, and institutions differs from the distribution of de jure authority, such arrangements permit a polity to change its institutional structure without violent confrontation and/or the predominance of one group over another. Moreover, he argued, the nature of these compromises was shifting away from the traditional liberal pact based on a strict delimitation of the spheres of civil society and the state, guaranteeing the individual right to dissent and the private privilege to own property, toward modern, "post-liberal" pacts based on complex exchanges between public and private groups, mutually guaranteeing their collective right to participate in decision-making and their respective privilege to represent and secure vital interests.

Ironically, such modern pacts move the polity toward democracy by undemocratic means. They are typically negotiated among a small number of participants representing established (and often highly oligarchical) groups or institutions; they tend to reduce competitiveness as well as conflict; they seek to limit accountability to wider publics; they attempt to control the agenda of policy concerns; and they deliberately distort the principle of citizen equality. Nonetheless, they can alter power relations, set loose new political processes, and lead to different (if often unintended) outcomes.

At the core of a pact lies a negotiated compromise under which actors agree to forgo or underutilize their capacity to harm each other by extending guarantees not to threaten each others' corporate autonomies or vital interests. This typically involves clauses stipulating abstention from violence, a prohibition on appeals to outsiders (the military or the masses), and often a commitment to use pact-making again as the means for resolving future disputes. Certain national symbols and institutions (e.g., the flag, the anthem, holidays, uniforms, the monarchy, territorial integrity, international alliances, and federal structure) may also be protected against claims by "extremists." Pacts may also contain elaborate arrangements for regulating group competition (e.g., over members, voters, clients, and resources) and for distributing group benefits (e.g., positions of representation, cabinet offices, public jobs, career promotions, and budget shares).

Pacts exemplify a point made some time ago by Dankwart Rustow in a seminal article which has inspired much of our thinking on this point.³ He argued that democratization advances "on the installment plan" as collective actors, each preferring a different mode of governance or a different configuration of institutions, enter into a series of more or less enduring compromises. No social or political group is sufficiently dominant to impose its "ideal project," and what typically emerges is a second-best solution which none of the actors wanted or identified with completely but which all of them can agree to and share in. Perhaps Adolphe Thiers—one of the founders of the French Third Republic, which came into existence by a single vote and lasted from 1875 to 1940—put it best when he said, "La République est le gouvernement qui nous divise le moins." A contemporary illustration of the ambiguity of such compromised beginnings of democratization is furnished by Spain, where the Right referred to the emerging regime as the result of a "reforma pactada," and the Left called it a "ruptura pactada," and both, so far, have learned to live with it.

The general scenario for negotiating a pact is fairly clear: it is a situation in which conflicting or competing groups are interdependent, in that they can neither do without each other nor unilaterally impose their preferred solution on each other if they are to satisfy their respective divergent interests. Subsequent changes in the relations between the actors and—especially in liberalized, partially democratized societies—the emergence of new actors who cannot be ignored and who desire to be "cut into" the game tend to change that scenario and impose the necessity of renegotiating, if not dissolving, existing

pacts. We propose, therefore, to analyze this theme in terms of a series of temporary arrangements modifying rules of governance and mutual guarantees.

Let us first insist, however, that we do not regard pacts as a necessary element in all transitions from authoritarian rule—even in those which are gradual or continual. The outgoing rulers may be so discredited and in such disarray that it is not possible for them to negotiate with their successors. The authoritarian rulers may be compelled by pressure or anticipated reaction to abandon power without the exchange of mutual guarantees, the outcome being left open to the subsequent uncertainty of factional struggle or electoral competition. Conversely, the transition may be initiated from above by authoritarian incumbents with sufficient cohesion and resources to dictate the emerging rules of the game. Under these circumstances, their opponents must either acquiesce and compete under unilaterally determined conditions, or resist and risk being shut out of (or being victimized by) subsequent developments. Pacts are therefore not always likely or possible, but we are convinced that where they are a feature of the transition, they are desirable—that is, they enhance the probability that the process will lead to a viable political democracy.

It is tempting to conceptualize the transition as involving a sequence of "moments," to use Gramsci's expression: military, political, and economic. To each of these may correspond a different pact, or pacts, with a distinctive subset of actors negotiating about a distinctive cluster of rules.⁴ The real world is hardly so accommodating, and actual transitions do not usually unfold through such incremental problem-solving; "moments" tend to overlap and confound each other. Nevertheless, while acknowledging that no empirical case exactly replicates our scheme, we will distinguish analytically between a series of possible *pactos*, each coming at a specific "moment" of the transition.

The Military Moment

The first moment focuses primarily on the military and involves the conditions under which they may tolerate some insignificant liberalization and begin to extricate themselves from direct responsibility for ruling. This sort of arrangement is irrelevant for those cases in which civilianization has already been accomplished under authoritarian auspices, for example, Spain and Mexico. Where the dictatorship is military and where the intent is to create some liberalized version of it (*dictablanda*), the *crux* of the problem seems to involve a prior concentration of executive power. Since the *junta* style of rule is the norm among contemporary bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, some leader must emerge as capable of inspiring sufficient confidence among his followers to serve as guarantor for significant changes in power relations affecting military officialdom as a whole.

This *primus inter pares* ruler must then somehow find and empower valid

interlocutors outside the regime itself, with whom to negotiate an extrication from government. It is difficult to predict who these are likely to be. Much will depend upon the effort previously expended to suppress parties, associations, and movements inherited from the preauthoritarian period, as well as the length of time which has elapsed before liberalization is attempted. Given the previous repression and disarticulation of intermediaries, "notables"—respected, prominent individuals who are seen as representative of propertied classes, elite institutions, and/or territorial constituencies and, hence, capable of influencing their subsequent collective behavior—seem to offer the best available interlocutors with whom to negotiate mutual guarantees. The basis of an extrication pact might well be the following: in exchange for restoring basic individual rights and tolerating some civic contestation over policy, the leader obtains an agreement from notables and/or moderate opponents that they will neither resort to disruption or violence, nor press too insistently or immediately their claim to govern, nor seek sanctions against military officers for "excesses" committed under the aegis of the authoritarian regime. Usually, the principal goals of such a liberalized dictatorship (*dictablanca pactada*) are to exert centralized state control over arbitrary and illegal acts of force by the armed forces, to prevent acts of vengeance against them, and to establish safe (if limited) channels for the articulation of interests and the discussion of policy alternatives. Such a compromise between military reassurance and political decompression involves a complex set of calculations. To be successful, the leader and his palace guard must retain the loyalty of the soft-liners, keep their former hard-line allies out of the main game,⁵ locate and empower notables who can speak for and control their relevant constituencies, and inspire sufficient confidence among them to induce them to play the first rounds of the game according to the rules agreed upon.

If such a pact succeeds, liberalization and a not insignificant degree of civilianization may predictably ensue. But these developments are usually overtaken by the "resurrection of civil society," which we shall discuss below.

The Political Moment (or Moments)

The dynamics of the transition, plus the self-exhausting quality of an eventual *pacto militar*, imply that other actors and processes are likely to appear quite soon. This, in turn, suggests the possibility (but not the necessity) of a change in the nature of the compromises and in the identity of the actors entering into them, as new contradictions between social content and political form emerge. This time a pact would be based, not on a concentration of executive power and an arrangement of mutual guarantees with social and economic notables, but on a distribution of representative positions and on collaboration between political parties in policy-making. For reasons we will discuss below, the mobilization following initial liberalization is likely to bring political parties to the forefront of the transition and make the convocation of elections an increasingly attractive means for conflict resolution. At its core,

such a pact involves a package deal among the leaders of a spectrum of electorally competitive parties to (1) limit the agenda of policy choice, (2) share proportionately in the distribution of benefits, and (3) restrict the participation of outsiders in decision-making. In exchange, they agree to forgo appeals to military intervention and efforts at mass mobilization. The capstone may be a "grand coalition" in which all the contracting parties simultaneously share in executive office, or a rotational scheme under which they (and no others) sequentially occupy it. But other, less rigid and visible, formats have also been imagined. Whatever the general format, the formation of such a "cartel of party elites" involves a certain amount of detailed, explicit—if often informal—institutional craftsmanship: an electoral law that discriminates against "unwelcome voters and/or unwilling parties"; a party finance arrangement that privileges contracting parties; a distribution of parliamentary districts and seats that protects the representation of minority members to the pact; a formula for apportioning public positions and budgets that ensures an "equitable" division of spoils; a restrictive policy agenda that guarantees the essential interests of supporters; a suprapartisan arrangement that deals with military affairs; and, finally, a commitment for some period to resolve conflicts arising from the operation of the pact by renegotiating its terms, not by resorting to the mobilization of outsiders or the elimination of insiders.

In the recent literature on democracy, this sort of pact is associated with "consociational" solutions to deep-seated ethnic, cultural, linguistic, or religious conflicts, and tends to be regarded as a stable, quasi-permanent form of democratic rule. Yet such arrangements might well be drafted to cover less communitarian cleavages, such as those of class, sector, region, institution, or even generation. As we shall see, it is not impossible that, via further pacts or ruptures, such formulas may last only for a while and then lead to a more egalitarian, individualistic, competitive, and broadly accountable democratic outcome.⁶ However, our hypothesis is that pacts involving such coalescent and "cramped" behavior by dominant civilian party elites—pacts establishing limited democracy, or *democraduras*—will last longer than the military pacts which sponsor the transition to liberalized authoritarian regimes, or *dictablandas*. In the former case, the self-interest of participating party politicians and of established leaders of coopted subcommunities encourages the perpetuation of such cartels even after the initial conflicts and dangers which gave rise to such arrangements have diminished.

The succession problem which continues to plague even liberalized authoritarian regimes is resolved in *democraduras* by proportional adjustment, or by fixed rotation where there are presidencies. In any case, *democraduras* are protected from rapid swings in electoral popularity. In parliamentary regimes, subtle coalitional shifts may be sufficient. Regular elections and some opportunities for contesting policy may satisfy, at least for some time, minimal informational requirements for government responsiveness to meet changing demands and enough of the long-standing aspirations for citizen

participation to ensure political peace. Therefore, unlike dictablandas, which are almost immediately transformed through the distinctively political process of liberalization, democraduras tend to be affected more by long-term changes in national socioeconomic structures and normative contexts, as well as by international political and ideological trends.

[Subsequent socioeconomic changes may affect limited democracies in multiple ways.] Growing individuation and secularization, coupled with increased social mobility and market vulnerability, undermine the capacity of contracting oligarchic leaders to control the behavior of their followers; voters will eventually become more free-floating in their preferences; association members will demand greater autonomy from partisan, ideological, religious, or cultural controls; new groups which cut across traditional cleavages will form; parties outside the pact may grow in strength and begin to play disruptive roles in parliament and cabinet formation. Under these circumstances, it will become increasingly difficult to hold the elite cartel together.

Limited democracies also have to cope with the fact that in contemporary times the normative standards of democratic theory and discourse do not correspond to the practices of such regimes. Citizen equality, majority rule, direct participation, parliamentary sovereignty, voluntary associability, accountable representation, unrestricted political choice, honest apportionment, public disclosure, *altérmance* between incumbents and challengers, and the like are not the usual practices of democraduras. The constitution and civil code may proclaim these rights, but their violation may be buried in administrative regulations, suffocated by informal norms, or masked by secret agreements. The transitional solution embodied by limited democracy, then, suffers a serious medium- and long-run legitimacy deficit when compared to regimes where citizens seem to be offered real opportunities to throw out incumbents and where leaders seem to be more truly accountable to mass publics.

As we have seen, one element motivating the search for an initial transitional pact is institutional decay within the military under the stresses (and personal opportunities) of direct responsibility for governing. In limited democracies it is the civilian apparatus of political parties, interest associations, and government agencies that is subject to decay. The guaranteed participation of these civilian elites in power and their stable share in the spoils of office, coupled with their protection from outside competition and from strict accountability to voters, members, or clients, are likely to produce complacency and corruption over time. These actors do not have to struggle continuously to stay in the game and to obtain significant rewards. Conformity to internal criteria of advancement within increasingly oligarchic institutions tends to become more important than responsiveness to demands from below or capacity to mobilize support. In short, the very success of such pacts can generate an organizational sclerosis that will deprive its contracting parties of their most crucial capacity—that of controlling the behavior of their followers.

When generalized disenchantment and institutional decay combine with policy disagreements within the elite cartel, some members of it may be tempted to ally with outsiders or to mobilize their followers to act in less conventional ways. Presuming that it proves impossible to renegotiate the relationship among the partners or to coopt opponents to join it, and providing none of the aggrieved parties resorts to (or succeeds in) bringing the military in on its side, movements toward a more thoroughgoing democratization of political life are likely to occur. The last restrictions on full political citizenship may then be removed.

The Wilson Center working group paid little attention to processes of consolidation and “advanced democratization” for the obvious reason that the cases and countries which preoccupied us were involved in the much more proximate and hazardous business of extricating themselves from various versions of authoritarian rule. But it seems relevant to sketch out how such a transformation might occur, if only because confidence that it can eventually occur may be a factor enhancing actor tolerance for more limited transitional forms. At other critical points of regime choice, we emphasized the role of possible pacts (if in some cases informal and even secret). They set the rules of the game, the continuing conditions, for political developments in the foreseeable future until, eventually, accumulated consequences make possible another change—an institutional breakthrough—in regime (or make change within the existing regime impossible).⁷

Movement toward more advanced forms of political democracy does not seem to require such explicit and multi-item renegotiations. Rather, it is more likely to occur through a sequence of piecemeal reforms, in response to a wide range of political pressures and policy calculations. Extensions of the franchise were perhaps the most visible and noisy of such modifications in the past, but by now that is almost an accomplished fact, even in most of the limited democracies. “Historic compromises,” which bring long-excluded participants into partial governing responsibility, are another form of democratization for some polities. Elsewhere, the reforms are likely to be more discrete: changes in the electoral code and party finance statutes; more effective voter registration; more equal legislative apportionment; more transparent public information acts; greater administrative decentralization; lower barriers to party formation and parliamentary representation; dissolution of corporatist monopolies and obligatory associations; easing of citizenship requirements; and so forth. These are not dramatic changes in themselves, but their cumulative effect can be a substantial democratization of political life.

Some of these reforms may be associated with measures aimed at what we have called “social” and “economic” democracy: social security, state-provided health services, mandated sexual equality in employment, union recognition, worker representation in management, student participation in educational administration, children’s rights, and so on. As Göran Therborn has pointed out, such “breakthroughs” in social and economic citizenship have often coincided with war or its aftermath.⁸ In these cases, the advances in

democratization did not involve a personal deal with a transitional leader or an institutional pact among political parties, but a diffuse agreement with the people compensating them for sacrifices demanded of them by the war effort.

Some American political scientists have argued that "critical elections" involving substantial realignments in the social bases of party support have provided an equivalent mechanism of democratic responsiveness in United States politics.⁹ These seem rather modest accomplishments when compared with the accession to power of Social Democrats, Labourites, or Socialists in Western Europe, if only because it may take some time for actors to learn whether a lasting realignment has in fact occurred, and because the ensuing policy changes have been so limited. Roosevelt's New Deal should probably be considered the closest approximation to a turning point in democratization in the United States.

This scenario of democratization "on the installment plan," each stage laying down more inclusive and tolerant rules of competition and cooperation, is obviously a cautious, not to say outright conservative, transition path. Under such conditions, the Right is relatively strong and veto power remains largely and continuously in its hands. This has the advantage of tranquilizing the hard-liners of the nostalgic or reactionary Right and serves to differentiate them more clearly from the soft-liners, who progressively demonstrate their willingness to play politics according to procedural democratic rules; and it makes the spectrum of implicated actors wider than it would be if the transition were guided only by the authoritarian regime's "historic" opponents. This, in turn, lessens the fears of moderates that they will be overwhelmed by a triumphant, radical majority which will implement drastic changes in property rights, distribution of wealth, international alliances, military command structures, and so forth.

As already noted, the principal disadvantages of such sequential changes are twofold: one, they tend to make possible only marginal and gradual transformations in gross social and economic inequities (a point to which we shall return); and two, they foster disenchantment (*desencanto* was the expression we used in the working group for this phenomenon, having picked it up from the current Spanish political jargon) on the part of those who struggled for democracy in the expectation that it would bring them immediate benefits either in the form of control over the state apparatus or rapid, substantial improvements in the welfare of the actors and classes with whom they identify.

But the timing of the transition and the learning effects passed from one national experience to another may be changing the scenarios and accelerating the process to the point that, at least in contemporary Southern Europe, countries are moving toward full political democracy without pausing for "prudent" consociationalism or other such interim arrangements. Indeed, Spain, Portugal, and Greece have attained the hallmark of full political democracy in surprisingly short order. Parties previously excluded from power have won a subsequent electoral majority and been permitted to assume exclusive governing responsibility—something which has yet to happen at the national

level in Italy, and which took several decades to accomplish in France. Undoubtedly, in these latter two cases, the presence of a large, well-established Communist party, which would have had to be included in the governing coalition, was a major factor in inhibiting such an alternation for a long time. Only once the Socialists became a demonstrably larger force than the Communists did this take place in France; Italy's party system has not yet met this crucial test.

The available experience from Latin America is ambiguous in this respect. Older transitions, such as those in Venezuela and Colombia, have been marked by a series of detailed and explicit pacts. As Terry Karl points out in her chapter in Volume 2, those arrangements have resulted in heavy social costs. But it should be noted that with the exception of Costa Rica (to which we shall return), all of the unpacted democracies existing at different times in other Latin American countries were destroyed by authoritarian reversals. It is worth noting, too, that the social costs of those democratic and authoritarian alternations have been as bad as or even worse than those of the pacted democracies of Venezuela and Colombia.¹⁰ On the other hand, the transitions in the contemporary scene—those of Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, and Argentina—are characterized by the absence of political (and economic) pacts. The least that can be said about these cases is that the prospects of consolidation of their democratic regimes look less encouraging than those of Southern Europe. The present and future probable exception is Brazil, where what we term a "military pact" and a "political pact" were clearly, if not explicitly, made, and where an economic pact may still be likely. Aside from other characteristics already noted, what differentiates Brazil from the other Latin American cases is the relative success of its authoritarian regime and, hence, the firm and inordinately enduring control that its transitional governments have been able to keep on the process. On the other hand, the authoritarian regimes of Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, and Argentina (1972 and 1982) collapsed in total discredit with the armed forces profoundly demoralized and fractionalized. In contrast to Brazil, this meant that neither the transitional governments nor the armed forces could, as the Argentine generals said in 1972, "bring all parties to the table of negotiations." This does not preclude that, in an effort to salvage those shaky democracies, political and economic pacts may be attempted in the future—but this leads us away from the theme of democratic installation toward that of consolidation.

The Economic Moment

Getting the military back to their barracks and subject to civilian control and getting political parties to compete according to the rules of political democracy are sufficient achievements to ensure significant regime change. Increasingly, however, there is evidence that these accomplishments must be supplemented by another type of concerted effort: some sort of socioeconomic pact.

The reason for this is simply the increased role of the modern state appa-

ratus, regardless of regime type, in economic and social affairs. To the extent that complex sets of collective actors have emerged to represent the class, sectoral, and professional cleavages intrinsic to capitalist social relations, it has become necessary to reach some agreement on how state agencies, business associations, trade unions, and professional organizations will behave during the transition and beyond it. Whether such a "social contract" can be agreed upon, and implemented, may have a major impact on the economy's performance at a time of considerable uncertainty over property rights, mobilized pressure for redistribution of benefits, and nervousness among external creditors, customers, and suppliers.

As the chapter by John Sheahan in Volume 3 points out, authoritarian regimes typically leave a difficult economic legacy. They often act as agents of transnationalization, opening the economy to foreign trade and investment, increasing its vulnerability to externally generated impacts, and heavily mortgaging future earnings to outside creditors. Those regimes may also have increased the scope of technocratic intervention, through government planning, monetary controls, and/or state ownership. Grandiose development projects, increased military spending, compressed wages, rigid adherence to fashionable economic doctrines and/or expensive foreign adventures are other facets of their legacy. Regardless of the magnitude of structural changes and the severity of the circumstances which characterize each transition, however, it is virtually inconceivable that the transitional incumbents will be able to postpone taking major social and economic decisions.

This is where the idea of a social and economic pact is particularly appealing. Yet, such a pact is probably more difficult to reach (and, above all, to make effective) than military or political pacts.¹¹ Trust and willingness to compromise may be less pronounced among class and sectoral actors than among politicians. The capacity of such negotiators to deliver the subsequent compliance of their members is problematic, if only because the outgoing regime may have systematically repressed unions and professional associations and sporadically manipulated organized expressions of business interests. It is problematic also because interest associations that emerge or are resuscitated in the aftermath of liberalization are likely to be highly politicized and fragmented along ideological and territorial lines. If there are any lessons to be gleaned from analogous efforts by consolidated political democracies at pursuing incomes and other "concerted" neocorporatist policies, it is that success depends on the presence of authoritative, monopolistic, and centralized class associations sharing a high degree of consensus about macroeconomic goals.¹² Neither condition is likely to obtain during contemporary transitions from authoritarian rule.

This is not to say that such efforts are doomed to fail entirely (as shown by the partial—and controversial—achievements of the Spanish Pacto de Moncloa and successor agreements), or that this kind of pact is essential for stabilizing a newly installed democracy. It seems crucial that, during the transition, a compromise among class interests somehow be forged to reassure the

bourgeoisie that its property rights will not be jeopardized for the foreseeable future, and to satisfy workers and various salaried groups that their demands for compensation and social justice will eventually be met. Central to any such compromise is the institutionalization of representation rights and bargaining mechanisms to enhance the role of organized intermediaries. Employer associations and trade unions must recognize each other's rights to act autonomously in defense of their respective interests and to be present at multiple levels of consultation, from the shop floor to macroeconomic policy-making. These conflicting class agents must help each other to acquire a reciprocal capacity for governing the behavior of their respective members, or else the compromises they hammer out will be voided by the defections of opportunistic capitalists and intransigent workers.¹³ Again, what is ultimately at stake in this form of implicit compromise and, eventually, formal pact is less the exchange of substantive concessions or the attainment of material goals, however much these may be in dispute, than the creation of mutually satisfactory procedural arrangements whereby sacrifices bargained away in the present have a reasonable probability of being compensated for in the future.¹⁴

Whether or not such undemocratic means of negotiating (and renegotiating) agreements will be compatible with a viable political democracy is not simply a function of whether the governments, political parties, and class associations can somehow reach and implement them. These efforts may be helped or nullified by the forces of civil society which tend to erupt in the aftermath of the initial steps toward liberalization. It is to this theme that we now turn.