

**Governing Anarchy:
A Research Agenda for the
Study of Security Communities**
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Scholars of international relations are generally uncomfortable using the language of community to understand international politics. The idea that actors can share values, norms, and symbols that provide a social identity, and engage in various interactions in myriad spheres that reflect long-term interest, diffuse reciprocity, and trust, strikes fear and incredulity in their hearts. This discomfort and disbelief is particularly pronounced when they are asked to consider how international community might imprint international security. Although states might engage in the occasional act of security cooperation, anarchy ultimately and decisively causes them to seek advantage over their neighbors, to act in a self-interested and self-help manner. The relevant political community, according to most scholars, is bounded by the territorial state, and there is little possibility of community outside of it.

Let us think the unthinkable: that community exists at the international level, that security politics is profoundly shaped by it, and that those states dwelling within an international community might develop a pacific disposition. In staking out this position we summon a concept made prominent by Karl Deutsch nearly forty years ago: "security communities."¹ Deutsch observed that pluralistic security communities arise whenever states become integrated to the point that they have a sense of community, which, in turn, creates the assurance that they will settle their differences short of war. In short, Deutsch claimed that those states that dwell in a security community create not simply a stable order but, in fact, a stable peace.

¹ Karl Deutsch, Sidney A. Burrell, Robert A. Kann, Maurice Lee, Jr., Martin Lichterman, Raymond E. Lindgren, Francis L. Loewenheim, and Richard W. Van Wagenen, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

Deutsch's observations of forty years ago seem particularly relevant today because of changes in global politics and international relations theory. Policymakers are indeed pointing to the same sets of variables as Deutsch—the development of shared understandings, transnational values, and transaction flows to encourage community building—to conceptualize the possibility of peace. Articulating a desire to escape realism's pessimism and reliance on abject force and balance of power, policymakers are actively searching for new institutional arrangements that use assurance rather than deterrence as the primary method for keeping the peace. Moreover, some states are redefining the concept of power to mean the ability of a community to defend its values and expectations of proper behavior against an external threat, and the ability of this community to attract new actors and to convey a sense of purpose. Increasingly, then, those within the community identify international security less with balancing and more with establishing communities within the neighborhood. Security, in short, is becoming a condition and quality of these communities; who is inside, and who is outside, matters most.

Scholars, too, finally seem to have caught up to Deutsch's vision. Looking into the possible, some are departing significantly from realist-based models to understand the present and future security debates; looking into the past, others have noted that the realist paradigm is better realized in theory than in practice, that states are not as war-prone as believed, and that many security arrangements once assumed to derive from balancing behavior in fact depart significantly from realist imagery.² Accordingly, Deutsch's suggestion that states can overcome the security dilemmas and recurring fear assumed by realist theories is less shocking than it once was, and his understanding that the causal mechanisms for this outcome could be found in the development of social networks and the quickening of transnational forces is consistent with the return by some international relations theorists to sociological models. The concept of community, which departs from the economism and rationalism that have dominated models of

² Emanuel Adler, "Europe's New Security Order: A Pluralistic Security Community," in Beverly Crawford, ed., *The Future of European Security* (Berkeley: University of California, 1992), 287–326; Adler, "Seasons of Peace: Progress in Postwar International Security," Adler and Crawford, eds., *Progress in Postwar International Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 133–34; Peter Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Patriek Morgan, "Multilateralism and Security: Prospects in Europe," in John Ruggie, ed., *Multilateralism Matters* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 327–64; Steve Weber, "Shaping the Postwar Balance of Power: Multilateralism in NATO," in *ibid.*, 233–92; and Paul Schroeder, "The New World Order: A Historical Perspective," *Washington Quarterly* 17 (1994), 25–43.

security politics and international relations for the past two decades, demands that we take both sociological theorizing and the profoundly social character of global politics seriously. Simply put, the question is not whether there is such a thing as an international community, but rather when does it matter, where does it matter, and how does it matter?

The nostalgia for security communities expressed in this article, therefore, is driven by changes occurring in, and theories of, international politics; both deal damaging blows to a realist paradigm that has dominated how policymakers and scholars alike think about international politics. Yet our nostalgia does not drive us toward romanticism. Notwithstanding our tremendous admiration for Deutsch's scholarly and political vision, we believe his conceptualization of security communities was fraught with theoretical, methodological, and conceptual difficulties. Therefore, our resuscitation of Deutsch's concept of security communities after decades of neglect and criticism is intended both to draw attention to the concept's importance for understanding contemporary events and to suggest refinements of its initial formulation in order to generate a viable research program.

This paper is organized as follows. Section I provides an abbreviated overview of, first, Karl Deutsch's concept of pluralistic security communities and, second, recent developments in international relations theory that point toward a reintroduction of the sociological theorizing that was a hallmark of Deutsch's approach to international politics. Section II offers the conceptual architecture for organizing the causal processes that create a security community. Section III isolates the conditions under which the development of a community produces dependable expectations of peaceful change. Section IV offers a highly stylized, three-stage model for the formation of a security community with a corresponding set of indicators and then advances a set of research questions that derive from our conceptualization and process-oriented model. This paper intends to clarify key issues, to raise critical questions, and to point to future directions for doing comparative and historical research on security communities.

Reconsidering Security Communities

Although the concept of security communities was initially proposed in the early 1950s by Richard Van Wagenen,³ it had to wait until the pioneering 1957 study

³ See Donald J. Puchala, *International Politics Today* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1971), 165.

by Karl Deutsch and his associates for fuller conceptual and empirical treatment. In Deutsch's study, a security community is defined as a group of people integrated to the point of "real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way." Security communities, they observed, come in two varieties. An amalgamated security community exists whenever there is the "formal merger of two or more previously independent units into a single larger unit, with some type of common government after amalgamation."⁴ Deutsch offers the United States as an instance. Alternatively, a pluralistic security community "retains the legal independence of separate governments," possesses a compatibility of core values derived from common institutions and mutual responsiveness—a matter of mutual identity and loyalty, a sense of "we-ness"—and is integrated to the point that members entertain "dependable expectations of peaceful change."⁵ It is a matter of sociological curiosity that in their quest for "social laws" that rule the relationship between integration and peace, Deutsch and his colleagues stumbled onto "half-baked" integrative processes that offered "a more promising approach to the elimination of war over large areas."⁶

At the heart of Deutsch's "pluralistic," "cybernetic," or "transactionalist" approach is the assumption that communication is the cement of social groups in general and political communities in particular: "Communication alone enables a group to think together, to see together, and to act together."⁷ Moreover, communication processes and transaction flows between peoples become not only "facilities for attention" but factories of shared identification. Through transactions such as trade, migration, tourism, cultural and educational exchanges, and the use of physical communication facilities, a social fabric is built

⁴ Deutsch et al., *Political Community*, 6.

⁵ Ibid., see also the following works by Deutsch: *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1953); *Political Community at the International Level: Problems of Measurement and Definition* (New York: Doubleday, 1954); *Politics and Government* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970); and his essays in Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano, eds., *The Integration of Political Communities* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964): "Communication Theory and Political Integration," 46–74, "Transaction Flows as Indicators of Political Cohesion," 75–97, "The Price of Integration," 143–78, and "Integration and the Social System," 179–208.

⁶ Deutsch et al., *Political Community*, 30–31. Ernst Haas similarly argues that "modern nation-states" can be thought of "as communities whose basic consensus is restricted to agreement on the procedure for maintaining order and settling disputes among groups, for carrying out well-understood functions." Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), 39.

⁷ Norbert Wiener as cited in Karl W. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government* (New York: The Free Press, 1966), 77.

not only among elites but also among the masses, instilling in them a sense of community, which then becomes

a matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties; of 'we feeling,' trust, and mutual consideration; of partial identification in terms of self-images and interests; of mutually successful predictions of behavior...in short, a matter of a perpetual dynamic process of mutual attention, communication, perception of needs, and responsiveness in the process of decision making.⁸

To measure this "sense of community," Deutsch and his associates quantified transaction flows, with particular emphasis on their volume, within and among nation-states. A relative growth in transaction flows between societies, when contrasted to flows within them, was thought to be a crucial test for determining whether new "human communities" might be emerging.

Deutsch's "transactionalist" perspective, which takes the possibility of community seriously, offers an alternative understanding of international politics. While most international relations theories use material forces, the language of power, and a very thin conception of society to understand interstate outcomes, the Deutschian perspective relies on shared knowledge, ideational forces, and a dense normative environment. Yet Deutsch is not arguing that all interstate interactions can be characterized as transpiring within the same international environment. After all, states are embedded in different environmental contexts, and some interactions occur within a thick social environment and others in a world that approximates that envisioned by neorealism. Therefore, it is important to problematize what most international relations theories assume: that the context of interstate interaction can be situated within one model of the international environment.⁹

Deutsch attempts to connect the development of international community with a transformation of security politics. Specifically, he locates the dynamics for peaceful change as the result of a transformation at the international and the individual level. At the international level, community formation has transformed the very character of the states system—states are integrated to the point

⁸ Deutsch et al., *Political Community*, 36.

⁹ This is consistent with Robert Powell's observation that whether states are or are not relative-gains seekers is an effect of the structure. Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate," *International Organization* 48 (Spring 1994), 337–38.

that peaceful change becomes taken for granted. By making this move, Deutsch challenges international relations theory's reliance on rationalistic, atomistic models of interstate behavior and forwards the central role of transnational forces in transforming the behavior, if not the very identities, of states. At the individual and intersubjective levels, community formation leads to the development of a "we-feeling," trust, and mutual responsiveness, suggesting that transnational forces have altered the identities of peoples. The transmission belt of values, in other words, is located at the interstate and transnational levels. By daring to contemplate the possibility of community, Deutsch reminds us of how a sociological spirit can enrich our understanding of international politics and security.

Despite its potential theoretical and practical importance, the concept of security community never generated a robust research agenda. The closest approximations were the regional and integration studies of the period, which elevated the importance of values, learning, and socialization to how separate political communities interacted, merged, and unified;¹⁰ these literatures, however, eventually yielded to a barrage of damaging blows.¹¹ Theoretical fashion also changed. Increasingly, scholars interested in ideas of regional integration and international cooperation used the vehicles of international interdependence and, later, international regimes. Moreover, any talk of a community of states, not to mention a security community, seemed hopelessly romantic, especially in light of the Cold War and the threat of nuclear attack. Quickly distancing themselves from the sociological spirit of these studies, scholars and policymakers became enamored with structural realism, rational choice methods, and other approaches to political life that excluded identities and interests as phenomena requiring explanation.

¹⁰ As exemplified in Joseph Nye, *Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), there was an emerging sense that self-identified regions might organize their relations to promote their self-interests and a sense of collective interest and even perhaps collective identity. See also Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958) and Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold, eds., *Regional Integration: Theory and Research*, special issue of *International Organization* (Vol. 24, Autumn 1970).

¹¹ Deutsch himself concluded that European integration had effectively stopped by 1958. See his "Integration and Arms Control in the European Political Environment: A Summary Report," *American Political Science Review* 60 (June 1966), 354-65.

Between the "Logic of Anarchy" and the "Logic of Community"

It is a sign of the times that sociological theorizing and Deutsch's concept of security communities are becoming fashionable once again. That this is so can be attributed not only to the end of the Cold War but also to a movement in international relations theory away from rationalism and materialism toward explorations of the role of identity, norms, and the social basis of global politics. The manner of this sociological resurgence and return to the concept of security communities, however, suggests not simply "old wine in new bottles" but rather new theoretical developments that conceivably enable scholars to overcome some of the conceptual and methodological difficulties that undermined Deutsch's arrested research program of thirty years ago. Below we provide a brief survey of this emerging sociological disposition and its relationship to Deutsch's focus on peaceful change.

Theories of international relations that explain the absence of war can be categorized according to whether they see structure as composed of material forces or of material and normative forces.¹² Indeed, these theories can be arrayed on a continuum depending on how "social" they conceive the international environment to be: on one end is realism, which posits a highly asocial environment with an emphasis on a series of discrete exchange relations among atomistic actors, and on the other end is constructivism's recognition of the possibility of a community of actors with shared identities embedded in a structure that is both normative and material. Below we briefly consider their position vis-à-vis the possibility of the absence of war in general and stable peace in particular.

Neorealist and realist theories stress the notion that while war does not take place all the time, like rain, it is always expected. If it does not occur, it is because balances of power, alliances, hegemonies, and deterrence are able to prevent it, though only temporarily.¹³ Stephen Walt explicitly rejects the

¹² Most accounts of structure in international relations theory are exhaustively material. See, for instance, Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979). We, on the other hand, take a structurationist view of the social world as comprising both material and normative elements. See Anthony Giddens, *Constitution of a Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984) and William Sewall, "A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation," *American Journal of Sociology* 98 (July 1992), 1-29.

¹³ The seminal work is, of course, Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*. Some realists have also stressed the notion that diplomatic prudence may momentarily achieve a truce. See Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 4th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1968). Yet one influential realist, Reinhold Niebuhr, saw the creation of a world community realized through daily practices and actions rather than through discourse and lofty ideals and imagined that it would come into existence when there was mutual loyalty and

proposition that states might overcome the fears and dynamics associated with anarchy and argues that it is "unclear how a shared 'civic identity' will inhibit conflict. Groups sharing similar traits and values are hardly immune to discord: indeed, 'family quarrels' are often especially bitter and difficult to resolve. 'Shared identity' is a weak reed on which to rest a forecast in any case, given the malleability of changing loyalties and the speed with which they can change."¹⁴ Based on the assumptions of anarchy and the self-interest of states as defined by military security, neorealists espouse that the absence of war can be only temporary and attributed to material considerations.

Neoliberal institutionalism and the "British school" focus respectively on how states construct institutions to encourage cooperation and to further their mutual interest in survival.¹⁵ Those neoliberal institutionalists who cut their teeth on integration dynamics in general and Europe in particular have once again picked up many of the themes once explored by Deutsch and other early integrationists.¹⁶ Nevertheless their general commitment to rationalism prevents them from fully considering how a community might be forged through shared identities rather than through pre-given interests and binding contracts alone; or how interstate and transnational interactions can alter state identities and interests. In many respects, they share with neorealists the assumption of anarchy but are more explicitly interested in how self-interested states construct a thin version of society through the guise of institutions and regulative norms in order to promote their interests.

Although Hedley Bull, the dean of the "British School," once portrayed security communities as "pregnant with implications of a general international relations,"¹⁷ the society of states literature generally focused not on peaceful change but rather on the norms of the society of states—which include sovereignty and admit balancing behavior and conflicts—that create an "anarchical society." Still, some followers of the British school have recently been flirting with the concept of security communities; specifically, they have resurrected the

concept to conceive of security communities as "islands" of international society that achieve the status of "mature anarchy" due to their high interaction capacity and dense networks of common rules and institutions.¹⁸ In short, they are interested in how the society of states (or, more specifically, certain states) might "upgrade" its norms from the recognition of the individual states' right to survival (which does permit the occasional war) to the normative prohibition and empirical decline of war. In many respects, these scholars are moving fairly close to Deutsch's position, though they still weigh their equation toward interstate interactions and away from transnational forces.

The burgeoning literature on the "pacific thesis"—that democratic states do not wage war among themselves—revives classic liberalism and Kantian republicanism and attempts to trace how international trade and domestic politics, respectively, affect foreign policy orientations.¹⁹ As one leading interpreter of the Kantian perspective observed: "To use or threaten to use force is not usually normatively acceptable behavior in disputes among democracies.... Relations between democracies therefore fit into the category of... 'security community'... in which states not only do not fight each other, they do not expect to fight each other, or significantly prepare to fight each other."²⁰ Common to their arguments is a combination of both rationalist and normative claims concerning the incentives and restraints on state leaders by their societies and the international system. However, they limit their analyses to democracies, which are assumed to possess certain essentialized qualities, and therefore omit from their purview the possibilities that a stable peace might also emerge among nondemocracies.

Constructivist scholars have been most prominent in resurrecting Deutsch's concept of security community. They urge international relations scholarship to depart from dominating assumptions of materialism and rationalism and recognize the social character of global politics; forward the need to consider state identities and the sources of state interests; suggest that the purposes for which power is deployed and is regarded as socially legitimate may be changing; and posit that the cultural similarities among states might be shaped by institutional agents. Consequently, constructivist scholarship is well suited to consider

trust rather than mutual dependence. See Niebuhr, *The World Crisis and American Responsibility* (New York: Association Press, 1950), 80–86.

¹⁴ Stephen Walt, "Commentary: Is There a Logic of the West?" *World Policy Journal* 11 (Spring 1994), 118.

¹⁵ The outstanding works are, respectively, Stephen Krasner, ed., *International Regimes* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), and Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).

¹⁶ For example, see Richard N. Rosecrance, "Trading States in a New Concert of Europe," in Helga Haftendorn and Christian Tuschhoff, eds., *America and Europe in an Era of Change* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 127–46.

¹⁷ Hedley Bull, "The Theory of International Politics, 1919–1969," in Brian Porter, ed., *The Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics, 1919–1969* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), 42–43.

¹⁸ Barry Buzan, "From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School," *International Organization* 47 (Summer 1993), 327–52.

¹⁹ Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12 (Spring 1983), 205–35 and (Summer 1983), 323–53; Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

²⁰ Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, 42.

how social processes and an international community may transform security politics.²¹ This is not the place to detail the constructivist ontology, epistemology, and methods. Here it will suffice to say that constructivism, which should be clearly distinguished from nonscientific post-structuralist approaches, takes the social world to be emergent and constituted both by knowledge and material factors. Far from denying a reality to the material world, constructivists merely claim that how the material world shapes, changes, and affects human interaction, and is affected by it, depends on prior and changing epistemic and normative interpretations of the material world.²² In any event, constructivist scholars actively forward a theoretical agenda that holds out the possibility for the transformation of global politics as a consequence of changes in domestic, transnational, and interstate forces.

In sum, much of international relations theory has difficulty considering the possibility of community.²³ While scholars are grappling with recent international events by departing from the rationalist and materialist assumptions that have dominated the discipline over the past two decades, the challenge is to theorize about interstate interactions and transnational processes that might shape state identity, interests, and security relationships. The Deutschian challenge and promise, in our view, is to conceptualize international politics as holding out the possibility of international community and to consider how it might imprint international security.

²¹ See Alex Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46 (Spring 1992), 391-425; Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation," 386, and Emanuel Adler, "Cognitive Evolution: A Dynamic Approach for the Study of International Relations and Their Progress," in Adler and Crawford, *Progress in Postwar International Relations*, 43-88; Ernst B. Haas, *When Knowledge is Power* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); John Gerard Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematising Modernity in International Relations," *International Organization* 47 (Winter 1993), 161, 174.

²² For overviews see Emanuel Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground" (unpublished manuscript); Emanuel Adler, "Cognitive Evolution"; Alex Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," *American Political Science Review* 88 (June 1994), 384-96; Alex Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," *International Security* 20 (Summer 1995), 71-81. The most accessible introduction to a social constructionist view is John Searle's *The Construction of Social Reality* (New York: Free Press, 1995).

²³ On this point see Andrew Linklater, "The Problem of Community in International Relations Theory," *Alternatives* 2 (Spring 1990), 135-53, and Andrew Hurrell, "International Society and the Study of Regimes: A Reflective Approach," in Volker Rittberger, ed., *Regime Theory and International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 61-65.

The Conceptual Fabric of Security Communities

In earlier papers we detailed many of the theoretical, conceptual, and methodological problems that beset Deutsch's conceptualization of security communities in order to identify the principal issues that must be considered in order to advance a viable research agenda.²⁴ Our present goal is to use Deutsch as a guidepost to build a conceptual architecture for thinking about the development of security communities.

This article is concerned with pluralistic and not amalgamated security communities. By a pluralistic security community we mean a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change. Pluralistic security communities can be categorized according to their depth of trust, the nature and degree of institutionalization of their governance system, and whether they reside in a formal anarchy or are on the verge of transforming it. On this basis we distinguish between two ideal types, namely loosely and tightly coupled pluralistic security communities.²⁵ The former observe the minimal definitional properties and no more: a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change. The latter, however, are more demanding in two respects. First, they have a "mutual aid" society in which they construct collective system arrangements. Second, they possess a system of rule that lies somewhere between a sovereign state and a regional, centralized government; that is, it is something of a post-sovereign system, endowed with common supranational, transnational, and national institutions and some form of a collective security system.²⁶ This system of rule, while reminiscent of medieval heteronomy due to its "pooled" sovereignty, is a relatively novel development in global politics. We will return to the distinction between loosely and tightly coupled security communities throughout the remainder of the paper. In general,

²⁴ For fuller critiques of Deutsch, see Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "Pluralistic Security Communities: Past, Present, Future," *Working Paper on Regional Security*, no. 1 (Madison: Global Studies Research Program, University of Wisconsin, 1994); and Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, "Security Communities in Comparative and Historical Perspective," paper presented at a conference on "Security Communities in Comparative Perspective," sponsored by the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, New York, December 1-2, 1995. Also see Arend Lijphart, "Karl W. Deutsch and the New Paradigm in International Relations," in Richard L. Merritt and Bruce M. Russett, eds., *From National Development to Global Community: Essays in Honor of Karl W. Deutsch* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981), 246; and Donald J. Puchala, "Integration Theory and the Study of International Relations," in *ibid.*, 157.

²⁵ We thank John Ruggie for this suggestion.

²⁶ Ruggie, "Territoriality," 172.

we (like Deutsch) are interested in the transnational and interstate interactions that can produce a transnational community with an informal governance system that helps to account for dependable expectations of peaceful change.

We now want to more fully explicate the definitional properties of a security community. We begin with the concept of community. While dependable expectations of peaceful change might be produced through various mechanisms, we are interested in the transnational social processes that produce a community, which in turn creates dependable expectations of peaceful change. What defines a political community? It would be only a slight exaggeration to claim that there are as many definitions as there are actual communities.²⁷ We follow Michael Taylor's three-pronged definition.²⁸ First, communities are identified by the existence of shared values and beliefs; in other words, members of a community share identities and meanings. Charles Taylor writes, "Intersubjective meaning gives a people a common language to talk about social reality and a common understanding of certain norms, but only with common meanings does this common reference world contain significant common actions, celebrations, and feelings. These are objects in the world everybody shares. This is what makes community."²⁹ Second, those in a community have many-sided and direct relations; interaction consists not indirectly and in only specific and isolated domains, but rather through some form of face-to-face encounter and relations in numerous settings. Third, communities exhibit a reciprocity that expresses some degree of long-term interest and perhaps even altruism; long-term interest derives from knowledge of those with whom one is interacting, and altruism can be understood as a sense of obligation and responsibility.³⁰

²⁷ In recent years, sociologists have generally eschewed the slippery and value-packed concept of communities in favor of "networks." See, for instance, Barry Wellman, Peter Carrington, and Alan Hall, "Networks as Personal Communities," in Barry Wellman and S. D. Berkowitz, eds., *Social Structures: A Network Approach* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 130-84. Briefly, networks have two basic components: a set of objects, referred to as nodes, positions, or actors, and a set of relations among these objects, variously labeled edges, ties, or links. David Knoke, *Political Networks: The Structural Perspective* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

²⁸ Michael Taylor, *Community, Anarchy, and Liberty* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 25-33.

²⁹ Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," in Paul Rabinow and William Sullivan, eds., *Interpretative Social Science: A Reader* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 51.

³⁰ This is consistent with a variety of perspectives and suggests a *Gemeinschaft* rather than a *Gesellschaft* conception; the former refers to an organic community involving bonds generated by tradition and culture while the latter sees society as a more contractual arrangement that emerges from self-interested behavior. Ferdinand Tönnies, *Community and Association* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955). Max Weber's definition of community borrows from Tönnies and is in many respects consistent with the definition of

Although most political communities will have mechanisms to handle and regulate conflict, not all will develop dependable expectations of peaceful change.³¹ Said otherwise, political communities can be expected to have norms to regulate security and to foster order, but there is no reason to assume (as Deutsch did) that they will generate the assurance of nonviolent dispute settlement. These norms of conflict management might be not only regulative, designed to overcome the collective actions problems associated with interdependent choice, but also constitutive, a direct reflection of the actor's identity and self-understanding.³² In any event, we expect that all communities will have norms for conflict regulation but recognize that not all communities will eschew violence to settle their disputes.

The existence of a community does not mean that interest-based behavior will end or that material factors will cease to shape interstate practices. Although many suggest that there is a continuation between association and community—where the former admits self-interest and the latter denies it—it is foolish to believe that actors within communities do not have or act on their interests. Expecting that identity and interests will become more collective and less individualistic is consistent with the understanding that states continue to have conflicts and distinct interests. We can hardly imagine otherwise. Perhaps in distinguishing between association and community, we should consider not the presence of self-interested behavior but rather the degree of diffuse reciprocity, where associations are distinguished by immediate reciprocity and communities have diffuse reciprocity, and the extent to which the actor's interests are interchangeable with those of the group. Nor does the existence of a community extinguish security dilemmas. Members of a community of states might exhibit rivalry and other interactions associated with mixed-motive games, but what matters is that they have attained a level of mutual trust that eliminates reciprocal military threats or the use of violence as a means of statecraft.

security community. Weber, *Economy and Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 901-4. See Buzan, "From International System," for a related treatment of these two concepts of community as it applies to international relations. For related conceptions of communities, see Deutsch et al., *Political Community*. 3; Peter Hamilton, "Editor's Forward," in Anthony P. Cohen, *The Symbolic Construction of Community* (New York: Tavistock, 1985), 9; R. M. MacIver, *Community, A Sociological Study* (London: Macmillan Press, 1917), and Reinhard Bendix, "Definitions of Community in Western Civilization," in his *Unsettled Affinities* (New Brunswick: Transaction Press, 1993), chap. 3, for a discussion of how the concept of community varies from culture to culture.

³¹ See Marc Howard Ross, *Conflict in Cultures* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993).

³² See Martin Hollis, *The Cunning of Reason* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 137-41, for a discussion of the distinction between regulative and constitutive norms.

The outcome to be explained—dependable expectations of peaceful change—can be best analyzed in its two companion elements. First, dependable expectations can be explained by various theories of social interaction; specifically, stable expectations can emerge among either presocial, atomistic actors with pre-given interests and preferences, that is, market behavior, or actors with shared identities, whose very identities and interests are shaped by their social environment. In contrast to neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism which posits actors with pre-given interests and identities, constructivist approaches and Deutsch suggest that the fundamentally social character of international politics can transform the identities, interests, and behaviors of states. In other words, the “thickness” of the social environment both describes and explains the emergence of dependable expectations among people who, while organized around states, nevertheless share the same transnational environment.

This suggests that the knowledge that drives dependable expectations is not only an understanding of the state’s behavior in the international sphere but also a reading of its domestic behavior and arrangements. Although Deutsch and other early explorers of security communities focused on the interstate practices and transnational forces that created the assurance that states would not settle their differences through war, equally important is that states govern their domestic behavior in ways that are consistent with the community. That is, being a member of the community is shaped not only by the state’s external identity and associated behavior but also by its domestic characteristics and practices.³³ Therefore, the failure to order the domestic polity in a particular way not only can challenge the state’s ability to maintain membership in the security community, but also might be taken as an “early warning indicator” by other state officials living in the community.

Peaceful change can be best defined as neither expectations of nor preparations for organized violence as a means to settle interstate disputes. A reasonable assumption, therefore, is that states undertake no—and, indeed, do not consider—security actions that can be interpreted by others within the community as militarily threatening. Therefore, security communities can exist in the absence of well-developed strategic ties or a formal alliance, but in any case there are tacit and/or formal normative prohibitions against states settling their disputes

³³ Michael Barnett, “Identity and Alliances in the Middle East,” in Peter Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 400–47.

by military means.³⁴ We want to consider two additional issues on this point. For how long must the community resolve its conflicts peacefully before one can proclaim the existence of a security community? Do states have to exist within a pacific setting for ten years? Twenty years? Pass through two traumatic crises without waging war or hinting at war? According to Deutsch, “integration is a matter of fact, not of time. If people on both sides do not fear war and do not prepare for it, it matters little how long it took them to reach this stage. But once integration has been reached, the length of time over which it persists may contribute to its consolidation.”³⁵ Here Deutsch was attempting to find a middle ground between two positions: that a security community that comes and goes with the night will be of little interest to most scholars and might, in fact, be nothing more than an alliance; and that it makes little theoretical sense to erect some arbitrary passage of time to proclaim a security community. We can do no better than Deutsch and must search for evidence that neither side is expecting nor preparing to settle their differences through violence.

Second, the recognition that the boundaries of the community are marked by ideational features broadens the general conceptual understanding of “regions.” Deutsch’s concept of security community generally conceived of regions as contiguous spatial entities. Although most scholars recognize the difficulty of identifying precisely where one region ends and another begins, there is a sense that states can be grouped into regions because their geographical proximity generates shared interests that derive from a common culture and common economic circumstances and security concerns. The end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the debate over “where is Europe?” dramatically highlight that regions are socially constructed and are susceptible to redefinition. Although most discussion of the redrawing of regional boundaries focuses, still, on geographically and culturally based identities, the fact that participants of a particular locale organize and define themselves based on markers that are not necessarily tied to space suggests something of an “imag-

³⁴ Deutsch confused the matter by suggesting that peaceful change means avoiding “large-scale physical force.” Deutsch et al., *Political Community*, 5. That states might engage in “small-scale” physical force or periodically threaten the use of force stretches most understandings of a pluralistic security community. Yet he has a point: a dyad within the community might go to war without necessarily leading the researcher to declare the end of the community; after all, murders occur within communities without necessarily defining their end.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 6.

ined" or "cognitive" region.³⁶ Perhaps most prominent is the notion of the "family of democracies," which groups democracies as a particular region. The Organization of American States' (OAS) Santiago Declaration of June 1991 essentially separates the organization's democratic states from the others and nearly claims that this represents a separate region. The United States and Israel can be conceptualized as a security community, and Australia is a member of the Western security community even though it is located thousands of miles from the "core" members; in short, a shared identity need not be tied to contiguous space.³⁷

In general, while dependable expectations can emerge among actors without any social bonds or shared identities, identities and interests that derive from a social process can also be a source of shared understandings. While peaceful change might be explained through the language of power politics and the calculation of expected material benefits to be derived from a course of action, we attempt to isolate social knowledge, learning, and the existence of norms that emerge from both interstate practices and, more fundamentally, transnational forces.

Any discussion of political community and the prospect of norms-generated order raises the issue of governance, which is any activity backed by shared goals and intersubjective meanings that "may or may not derive from legally and formally prescribed responsibilities and that do not necessarily rely on police powers to overcome defiance and attain compliance."³⁸ Deutsch, for instance, expects the population of a political community to have some degree of cohesion and coherence, generated by both enforcement mechanisms from above and self-enforcement mechanisms from below. This distinction strikes us as crucial; indeed, an argument can be made that a security community that depends more on

³⁶ Emanuel Adler, "Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations," *Working Paper on Political Relations and Institutions* (Center for German and European Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1995). The sociological literature on communities and networks similarly recognizes that communities need not be tied to physical space but rather are dependent on ties and relations. See Wellman, Carrington, and Hall, "Networks as Personal Communities."

³⁷ For the U.S.-Israeli case, see Barnett, "Identity and Alliances in the Middle East"; for the Australian case, see Richard Higgott and Kim Richard Nossal, "Australia as a Liminal State," paper presented at a conference on "Security Communities in Comparative Perspective," sponsored by the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, New York, December 1-2, 1995.

³⁸ James Rosenau, "Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics," in James Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, *Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 4.

enforcement mechanisms than on the acceptance of collectively held norms might not be a security community at all.

A related item and a distinction between a loosely and tightly coupled system is the nature of sovereignty and authority relations. While states composing a security community are still sovereign in a formal-legalistic sense, their sovereignty, authority, and legitimacy depend on the security community in two respects. First, while a security community does not delegitimize or replace the state, the more tightly coupled a security community is the more the role of the state will be transformed. In other words, if in a presocial environment the state's role is limited to and understood as "protector of the national good," the emergence of a transnational civic community will expand the role of the state as it becomes an agent that furthers the various wants of the community: security, economic welfare, human rights, a clean environment, and so on. Second, the conditions under which the state is viewed as part of the community and given certain rights, obligations, and duties depend on its ability to abide by the region's normative structure.³⁹ Because members of a community receive their very legitimacy and authority to act from the community, they frequently share their authority in certain spheres with the larger community. Hence, states in a tightly coupled arrangement, while retaining their juridical sovereign status in the outside world, can be seen as agents of the transnational community. This means that states can express their agency insofar as they meet and reproduce the epistemic and normative expectations of the community. States remain "free agents," acting on the basis of their own preferences, as long as these preferences are cognitively framed by their shared understandings.⁴⁰ In tightly coupled security communities, therefore, while people remain nationals of their respective states, they also become its "citizens" insofar as they are actively involved in the community's political life. In both cases, though, the emergence of a security community admits a governance system that encourages states and their peoples to expect peaceful change.

The Conceptual Foundations of Security Communities

Thus far we have defined a security community and provided our answer to some definitional and conceptual questions. The present challenge is to isolate the conditions under which the development of a community produces dependable

³⁹ Thomas Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 196; Adler, "Imagined (Security) Communities."

⁴⁰ Adler, "Imagined (Security) Communities," 39.

expectations of peaceful change. To do so we proceed in a highly stylized manner, building deductively from past research and inductively on recent empirical studies that attempt to delineate the factors contributing to peaceful change. Specifically, our preliminary framework that identifies the conditions under which a security community might emerge is organized around tiers. The first tier concerns the dynamic relationship between process and structure: the "process" categories include (1) transactions and (2) organizations and institutions; the "structure" categories are (1) power and cores of strength and (2) cognitive structures. The positive and dynamic interaction between these tiers undergirds the process of collective identity formation and the development of trust, which, in turn, drives dependable expectations of peaceful change. Below we briefly visit each of these elements.

The process categories involve transactions, and organizations and institutions. A transaction can be defined as a "bounded communication between one actor and another."⁴¹ A transaction, therefore, admits various types of exchanges: symbolic, economic, material, political, technological, and so on. The more intensive and extensive transactions are related to the concept of "dynamic density," defined by John Ruggie as "the quantity, velocity, and diversity of transactions that go on within society."⁴² According to Durkheim, dynamic density can create and transform social facts. In this respect, social facts do not depend on material resources alone but also on collective experience and human consensus. Thus, a qualitative and quantitative growth of transactions reshapes collective experience and alters social facts.

Actors interact within an environmental context that is comprised of social institutions and formal organizations. Following Oran Young here, we differentiate between social institutions and formal organizations by defining social institutions as "social practices consisting of easily recognized roles coupled with clusters of rules or conventions governing the relations among the occupants of these roles" and organizations as "material entities possessing physical locations, offices, personnel, equipment, and budgets."⁴³ Although social institutions might have a concrete organizational expression, it is important not to conflate the two.

⁴¹ Charles Tilly, "Durable Inequality," Center for Studies of Social Change, Working Paper Series No. 224 (New York: New School for Social Research), 20.

⁴² John Gerard Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis," *World Politics* 35 (January 1983), 148. The concept derives from Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society* (New York: Free Press, 1984).

⁴³ Oran Young, *International Cooperation* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 32.

In any event, these institutions and organizations can serve many different functions, but most important for our purposes is that they facilitate and encourage transactions and trust by establishing norms of behavior, monitoring mechanisms, and sanctions to enforce those norms.⁴⁴ A principal concern, therefore, is how these institutions and organizations assist and reinforce the community-building process and trust among actors.⁴⁵

Our primary concern is with the role of both security and nonsecurity institutions and organizations in fostering interstate and transnational interactions and trust among actors. Because of anarchy and the absence of trust or formalized governance, states have experimented with different institutional forms for securing their survival, sometimes through unilateral or multilateral mechanisms and sometimes through a mixture of informal institutions such as sovereignty and the balance of power.⁴⁶ Some of these methods are associated with the outcome of a stable peace—for instance, sovereignty and some forms of multilateralism—while others are associated with attempts to maintain security in a hostile neighborhood—for instance, balancing and deterrence. Still, states have constructed diverse security institutions and organizations to encourage transactions and minimize uncertainty and fear; what is true for states at the international level is also true for individuals at the micro level.

In examining the role of organization and institutions in promoting the possibility of dependable expectations of peaceful change, we are sensitive to three issues. First, Deutsch's relative lack of attention to institutional agents, and, indeed, to political elites and even charismatic individuals, was a crucial shortcoming that we wish to correct.⁴⁷ While communication between peoples, learning processes, and the thickening of the social environment—the develop-

⁴⁴ See W. Richard Scott, *Institutions and Organizations* (Thousand Oaks: Sage Press, 1995) for a good overview of the institutions literature. See Richard Burt and Marc Knez, "Kinds of Third-Party Effects on Trust," *Rationality and Society* 7 (July 1995), 255–92, for a discussion of organizations and trust.

⁴⁵ By trust we mean "committing to an exchange before you know how the other person will reciprocate." Burt and Knez, "Kinds of Third-Party Effects on Trust," 256.

⁴⁶ Bull, *Anarchical Society*, chap. 5.

⁴⁷ John Hall argues that while "the creation of new social identities by intellectuals—that is, their capacity to link people across space as to form a new community—is necessarily a rare historical phenomenon," it is one that scholars of international relations need to take seriously. "Ideas and the Social Sciences," in J. Goldstein and R. Keohane, eds., *Ideas and Foreign Policy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 51. Similarly, Iver Neumann claims that identity is inextricably linked to a "region-building approach," where the existence of regions of common identity are preceded by region-builders who imagine spatial and chronological identities and who, by means of discourse, talk and write these regions into existence within a permissive political context. "A Region-Building Approach to Northern Europe," *Review of International Studies* 20 (1994), 53–74.

ment of shared norms and identities—all play a crucial role in the evolution of political communities, these are but propensities until agents, acting within the political environment, transform them into political reality, in part by means of institutional and political power.

Second, because institutions and organizations reflect transnational and interstate forces, their specific influences will change over time. For instance, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and its leadership have played very different roles at different times; similarly, the function of many other international and regional organizations has shifted in relationship to the environment.

Third, there is no a priori reason to limit the analysis to formal security organizations. Various economic agreements, for instance, might very well serve the function of encouraging greater interaction and producing the trust that is required for the development of a security community: we detect in the debate surrounding the North American Free Trade Agreement the view that the agreement might encourage mutual prosperity and expand the “zone of peace”; the belief that economic organizations and institutions further this pacific propensity is one of the enduring principles of neofunctionalism and a hallmark of Deutsch’s framework. The OSCE and the United Nations might also encourage this development by attempting to “teach” states how to settle their differences.⁴⁸ In this respect, we are primarily interested in how organizations and institutions encourage transactions.

At the structural level we are particularly interested in power and ideas. The development of security communities is not hostile to the idea of power; in fact, past theoretical work and empirical studies suggest that power is central for understanding their development. According to Deutsch, “larger, stronger, more politically, administratively, economically, and educationally advanced political units were found to form the cores of strength around which in most cases the integrative process developed.”⁴⁹ We also hypothesize that power plays a major role in the development and maintenance of security communities. To understand why, however, it is important to transcend the materialist view of power as

⁴⁸ See Emanuel Adler, “Seeds of Peaceful Change: The OSCE as a Pluralistic Security Community—Making Institution,” and Bruce Russett, “The Role of the United Nations in Developing Norms for Security Cooperation and Regional Security Communities.” Both are papers presented at the conference on “Security Communities in Comparative Perspective” sponsored by the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, New York, December 1–2, 1995.

⁴⁹ Deutsch et al., *Political Community*, 38.

advanced by realists. In fact, the relationship between power and the development of a security community is better understood if power is conceptualized as the authority to determine shared meaning that constitutes the “we-feeling” and practices of states and the conditions that confer, defer, or deny access to the community and the benefits it bestows on its members. In other words, power can be a magnet; in a community formed around a group of strong powers, weaker members will expect to share the security and (potentially) other benefits associated with the stronger ones. Thus, those states that belong to the core of strength do not create security, per se; rather, because of their positive image, security communities develop around them. This is clearly the case in Europe, where the former communist states, rather than being invited to form part of the security community, issued their own invitations.

On the ideational side of structure we are interested in cognitive structures, or the shared system of intersubjective meanings, which, we argue, is a necessary condition for the development of a shared identity and thus for dependable expectations of peaceful change. Members of a community must share some basic understandings and meanings about how to organize political life, and we are particularly attentive to ideas that encourage trust and are analytically tied to conflict and conflict resolution. The causal connection between a particular set of intersubjective ideas and the development of security communities must be theoretically and empirically demonstrated rather than simply asserted. Deutsch offers little guidance on this issue because he merely asserted the connection between liberal democracy and market values and the formation of the North Atlantic community.

To demonstrate that a liberal cognitive structure is a necessary condition for the formation of security communities, however, it becomes necessary to show that liberal ideas are more likely than other ideas to promote a collective identity, mutual trust, and peaceful change. In other words, one has to establish that there is something in the quality of the ideas themselves—rather than the mere fact that they are shared—that leads people in different territorial spaces to feel safe from organized violence in a liberal security community.

Two related hypotheses might account for a connection between liberalism and security communities. First, liberal ideas are more prone to create a shared transnational civic culture, whose concepts of the role of government, tolerance, the duty of citizens, and the rule of law may shape the transnational identity of individuals in the community. Second, liberal ideas may be better able to promote strong civil societies—and the networks of organized processes between

them—through the exchange of people, goods, and ideas. Yet other inter-subjective ideas may also account for the formation of security communities. For example, a shared developmentalist ideology, perhaps similar to that pursued by East Asian states, may promote not only transnational exchanges and policy coordination but, more fundamentally, a joint project characterized by increasing dynamic density and the development of common institutions; such a project might conceivably promote collective purposes around which emerge a shared identity and, thereafter, dependable expectations of peaceful change.

The dynamic and positive relationship among the aforementioned variables is the wellspring of shared identity. Although there are many definitions of identity, most begin with the understanding of oneself in relationship to others. Identities are not only personal or psychological but also social, defined by the actor's interaction with and relationship to others; therefore, all political identities depend on the actor's interaction with others and exist within an institutional context. This perspective informs the view that national and state identities are formed in relationship to other nations and states—that corporate identities are tied to their relationship to those outside the boundaries of the community and the territory, respectively.⁵⁰ To be sure, not all transactions will produce a shared identity; after all, interactions are also responsible for creating an "other" and defining threats. Therefore, we must consider not only the quantity but also the quality of the transactions in order to gauge the conditions and prospects for collective identity.

Although state identities are shaped by various social and interactive forces, including relations with peoples of other states and their domestic cultural context, one of the important markers of those states that exist within an international community is that their peoples' identity no longer derives from the international environment (if it ever did) or from the self-contained nation (if it ever existed) but rather from the community's identity and norms. This is particularly true in a tightly coupled pluralistic security community. In this instance, the meaning, purpose, and role of the state derives from this community. The state's interests, and the identity of its people, are interchangeable with those of the community, and the foreign policy of the state takes on a whole new meaning and purpose. The discourse of the state and the language of legitima-

⁵⁰ For discussions of national and state identities that build on this definition, see Lowell D. Dittmer and Samuel Kim, "In Search of a Theory of National Identity," in Kim and Dittmer, eds., *China's Quest for National Identity* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 1–31; Anthony Smith, *National Identity* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991); and Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation."

tion, moreover, also should reflect that the relevant community is coterminous not with the state's territorial boundaries but rather with those of the region.

In sum, we envision a dynamic and positive relationship between transactions and organizations, on the one hand, and core powers and cognitive structures, on the other. The positive and dynamic interaction between these tiers undergirds the development of trust and the process of collective identity formation, which, in turn, drives dependable expectations of peaceful change.

Toward a Research Program

The Deutschian promise is a framework for understanding how the development and existence of a community influences interstate relations in general and security politics in particular. In this section we aspire to take another step toward translating that promise into a viable research program by (1) presenting three stylized stages in the development of a security community: "nascent," "ascendent," and "mature"; (2) considering the attributes of "mature" security communities, differentiating them according to loosely and tightly coupled variants, and offering a corresponding set of indicators; and 3) contemplating the disintegration of security communities.

The Development of Security Communities

Our understanding of the development of security communities can be broadly termed as social constructivist and path dependent. In the words of Stephen Krasner, "path-dependent patterns are characterized by self-reinforcing positive feedback. Initial choices, often small and random, determine future historical trajectories. Once a particular path is chosen, it precludes others, even if these alternatives might, in the long run, have proven to be more efficient or adaptive."⁵¹ Initial choices persist because individuals and social groups come to identify and benefit from them, and because the cost of change becomes greater over time. Our path-dependent approach involves tracing the institutionalization of dependable expectations of peaceful change. We are neither so pretentious nor so foolhardy as to believe that we can offer a theory of community development or security communities. Our objective at this preliminary stage is modestly ambitious: to offer one conceptualization of how a security community develops. We want to be very clear here. We do not see this pathway as exhausting all

⁵¹ Stephen Krasner, "Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective," *Comparative Political Studies* 21 (April 1988), 83. Also see Stephen Jay Gould, *Wonderful Life: The Burgess Shale and the Nature of History* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1989).

possibilities; rather we see it as merely suggested by Deutsch's observations, prior theorizing on community building and security communities, and recent empirical studies that have built on Deutsch's insights.

Phase I: Nascent

In this initial phase the peoples and/or governments of two or more states begin to consider how they might coordinate their relations in order to increase their mutual security, lower the transaction costs associated with their exchanges, and/or encourage further exchanges and interactions. Accordingly, we expect to see various diplomatic, bilateral, and multilateral exchanges—something akin to “search” missions—designed to determine the level and extent of cooperation that might be achieved. In order to deepen and extend their interactions, foster cooperation, and verify in the absence of trust, states will frequently establish “third parties,” that is, organizations and institutions that can observe whether or not the participating states are honoring their contracts and obligations.

There are undoubtedly many mechanisms that “trigger” the desire to create institutions or organizations to organize and foster multilateral relations. One is a mutual security threat. Deutsch posited that war or a common threat is a sufficient or necessary condition for generating an interest in a security community. In this instance, a security organization is virtually indistinguishable from a strategic alliance, and there is no expectation that members will have a shared identity or knowledge of each other (at least in a prosocial and other-regarding sense). What matters is that they recognize or discover that they can mutually benefit from some modest coordination of security policies. The resulting acts of security cooperation, therefore, are likely to include greater specification of those actions that are and are not considered threatening, policies that are designed to overcome collective action problems associated with interdependent choice, and the development of security programs that are intended to achieve mutual interests. Yet states frequently develop close security ties not only to provide for collective defense against a common threat but also to: deepen the institutional and transnational linkages that bind them together, capitalize on visions of material progress (in the areas of economics, the environment, health, human rights, and so on), and promote ideas about “cooperative security,” that is, the notion that the security of states—defined in terms of military, economic,

environmental, and human rights issues—is interdependent.⁵² This highlights that a broad effect of security organizations, if not the very intent behind them, is the nourishing of mutual trust.

The existence of, or the desire to capitalize on, an international division of labor and/or the potential benefits to be gained from trade can also encourage the development of international organizations and institutions. This, of course, is a standing argument of neoliberal institutionalism. We anticipate, however, that there will be a relationship between the establishment of international economic associations that are designed to encourage economic interchange and the presence of international arrangements intended to produce order and security. The relationship between economic and security organizations is most obvious in the corporate body of the state, which is charged with enforcing property rights and which monopolizes the means of coercion. Transboundary economic relations are similarly dependent on a stable international order. The parallel development of associations to encourage economic interchange and agreements to foster regional security is evident in Western Europe and present in regional organizations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

A shared identity can also lead to greater interaction and association and the development of new organizations and institutions. It may even create the desire, and the very expectation that it is possible, to develop a security community. People sharing identities across national borders frequently voice an interest in developing not simply a defensive strategic posture but also an institutional form intended to give muscle to already existing expressions of mutual obligation. As H. Field Haviland notes, “One of the most deep-seated sentiments in favor of a stronger Atlantic political association is the view that, because our Atlantic neighbors seem to think, act, and look so much the way we do, they are the countries with which we could most agreeably and successfully enter into a political marriage.”⁵³ Pan-Arabism held that Arab states should deepen their security and political ties not only because of an external threat but also to nurture and develop a political community; consequently, they proposed, albeit unsuc-

⁵² See Janne E. Nolan, ed., *Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1994).

⁵³ H. Field Haviland, “Building a Political Community,” *International Organization* 17 (Summer 1963), 735.

cessfully, various organizations and mechanisms that were so intended.⁵⁴ That a common future might be as important as a shared threat in producing the desire for a security community is also evident in the various debates over the post-Cold War security architecture.

In general, the trigger mechanisms of a security community are likely to have material and normative bases, which can include, for instance, rapid shifts in the distribution of military power; cataclysmic events that produce changes in material structures, mindsets, and sensibilities and new ways of thinking about organizing political life; and transnational, domestic, or international processes that generate common interests. In other words, a security community "gets out of the gate" because of push or pull factors that cause states to reconsider how to organize their relations.⁵⁵

Transnational and interstate interactions are accompanied and encouraged by the development of social institutions and organizations for a variety of reasons, though most relevant here is to facilitate trust. Although trust might be encouraged through political and economic agreements and through symbolic events that increase the assurance and knowledge of the "other," organizations traditionally play a critical role. And while organizations that oversee functional areas other than security can also contribute to the development of trust (after all, this was a principal insight of the neofunctionalist literature), security organizations are particularly symbolic and prominent. In this regard, we are particularly attentive to the development of multilateral security organizations, for they reflect a belief that security is interdependent and should be overseen by a collective body. The ability of multilateral security organizations to alleviate the security fears of their members can be detected in changes in patterns of military spending, deployment, and planning.

Parenthetically, a striking development of the post-Cold War period is organizational emulation; that is, regional organizations are attempting to learn from others what practices might encourage mutual trust if not build a sense of community. Notable here is the OSCE. Sparked by the accomplishments of the OSCE's activities and trust-building practices, some old and many new regional organizations have adopted its model of community building to promote a

⁵⁴ Michael N. Barnett, "Nationalism, Sovereignty, and Regional Order in Arab Politics," *International Organization* (Summer 1995) 479-510.

⁵⁵ This is akin to the concept of complex interdependence, in which there are multiple channels connecting societies and an absence of hierarchy among issues. See Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), 24-25.

transnational identity and mutual trust; ASEAN, the multilateral negotiations in the Middle East, and the Organization for African Unity have all modeled some of their activities after the OSCE. In any event, interstate and transnational interactions can produce and are facilitated by international organizations and institutions that: contain norms and provide mechanisms that make states accountable to each other; institutionalize immediate (if not diffuse) reciprocity; identify common interests (or even identities) among a selected population; and produce charters and agendas, and convene meetings and seminars, that reflect the attempt to create a binding set of interests and a collective future. Said otherwise, "third-parties" become region builders.⁵⁶

We posit that the existence of powerful states that are able to project a sense of purpose, offer an idea of progress, and/or provide leadership around central issues is an important factor in facilitating and stabilizing this phase.⁵⁷ These states can provide leadership, side payments, and perhaps protection to other members of the group. This reiterates an earlier point: that the development of a security community is not antagonistic to the language of power; indeed, it is dependent on it. What is important, however, is that power is not simply coercive but also conveys a sense of purpose and, potentially, a vision of the future.

In sum, we expect there to be a dynamic and positive relationship between the transactions that occur between and among states and their societies, the emergence of social institutions and organizations that are designed to lower transaction costs, and the possibility of mutual trust. A core state or coalition of states is a likely facilitator and stabilizer of this phase, for only such a state or group of states can be expected to provide the leadership, protection, material benefits, and sense of purpose that are frequently required.

Phase II: Ascendant

This phase is defined by increasingly dense networks, new institutions and organizations that reflect tighter military coordination and/or decreased fear that the other represents a threat, and intersubjective meanings and the emergence of cognitive structures and collective identities that begin to encourage dependable expectations of peaceful change.

⁵⁶ Neumann, "A Region-Building Approach to Northern Europe."

⁵⁷ This is consistent with James Caporaso's concept of "k-groups." See Caporaso, "International Relations Theory and Multilateralism: The Search for Foundations," in John Ruggie, ed., *Multilateralism Matters*, 58-59.

At the level of interactions, a noteworthy development is in the area of transnational ties among and between states and their societies. In other words, the multiple channels that existed in the nascent phase are extended and intensified, and states and their societies are increasingly embedded in a dense network of relations with those who are identified as "friends." An increase in dynamic density, moreover, might be encouraged and facilitated by the existence of common ideas of material progress and security that increasingly converge around a key, shared expectation: that material progress and security, broadly defined, can be best guaranteed among members of the region.⁵⁸

Increased interactions, moreover, encourage the development of new social institutions and organizational forms that reflect diffuse reciprocity, shared interests, and perhaps even a shared identity (if one is not already present). Indeed, the attempt to encourage greater regional interaction and acceptance of certain "ways of life" is frequently promoted by governments, security and other intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, epistemic communities, social movements, and even imaginative individuals who, placed in positions of power, are able to turn their personal ideas into institutional ones. The socialization of the former communist countries to a liberal "way of life" has been particularly striking in the case of the OSCE. To fulfill its community-building mission, the OSCE has not only promoted greater regional interaction and a shared identity at the level of state elites but, more important, has attempted to empower various groups in civil society—including nongovernmental organizations, social movements, and "expert groups"—which become the carriers and builders of a shared civic culture that promotes the bonds of community.⁵⁹ Security communities, therefore, are not born with the cultural traits that create authoritative shared normative frameworks and a transnational identity—they are created. In any event, the interactive processes of new organizations and institutional forms generate, first, social learning and socialization and, second, an increasing sense of regional civility.

The widening networks and intensified relations between and among societies, states, and organizations institutionalize cognitive structures and deepen mutual trust and responsiveness. Trust continues to develop in and through various interactions and organizational contexts. Although evidence of mutual trust can be discerned in a variety of institutional and organizational forms that reflect

diffuse reciprocity and so on, the key indicators are in the security sphere; specifically, growing evidence of trust in military matters can be found in those instances when military procurement decisions reflect interdependent military postures, and states begin to share intelligence information. Other indicators of a step-wise increase in mutual trust can be detected when organizations that were originally designed for verification and monitoring are increasingly dismantled or become less important for maintaining cooperation; therefore, there should be a change in bureaucratic structures that emerged in the nascent phase.

The interactive process increases the knowledge that individuals in states have not just about each others' purposes and intentions but also about each other's interpretations of society, politics, economics, and culture; to the extent that these interpretations are increasingly shared, we can talk about the emergence of cognitive structures. Consequently, a collective identity should now be present. One way of ascertaining whether or not two actors have a shared identity is through narratives. According to Karl Schiebe, "human identities are considered to be evolving constructions: they emerge out of continual social interactions in the course of life. Self-narratives are developed stories that must be told in specific historical terms, using a particular language, reference to a particular stock of working historical conventions and a particular pattern of dominant beliefs and values."⁶⁰ Because actors locate themselves within a story line, an actor's identity is lived history and continues a story line from the past through the present and into some imagined future.⁶¹ To the extent that actors locate themselves within a shared or congruent story line they can be said to have a collective identity. But, just as actors can have multiple identities, depending on the institution in which they are embedded and the relations in which they are engaged, so, too, can actors have multiple narratives. Ole Weaver, for instance, argues that European states have been able to maintain both a state identity and a European identity that have been generally consistent and have both reflected and helped produce the European security community.⁶²

In general, the ascendant phase is defined by an intensive and extensive pattern of relations between states. Although various functional organizations

⁵⁸ Karl Schiebe, "Self-Narratives and Adventure," in Theodore Sabine, ed., *Narrative Psychology: The Storied Nature of Human Conduct* (New York: Praeger Press, 1986), 131.

⁶¹ Also see Donald Polkinghorne, *Narrative Knowing and the Human Sciences* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1986); and W. J. T. Mitchell, ed., *On Narrative* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).

⁶² Ole Weaver, "Security Community in Western Europe," paper presented at a conference on "Security Communities in Comparative Perspective," sponsored by the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, New York, December 1–2, 1995.

⁵⁸ Adler and Crawford, *Progress in Postwar International Relations*.

⁵⁹ Adler, "Seeds of Peaceful Change."

might help to encourage the mutual trust that makes this pattern possible, we look to changes in the organization and production of security for both the primary mechanisms by which this trust is produced and for its evidence. We expect that a core state or a coalition of states remains important for stabilizing and encouraging the further development of the security community (and for the same reasons cited in our discussion of the nascent phase). By and large, because it is now harder for states and their peoples to imagine settling their differences through violence, we expect that states have altered the way they organize their security and define the threat.

Phase III: Mature

The more these expectations are institutionalized in both domestic and supranational settings, the more war in the region becomes improbable. At this point, regional actors entertain dependable expectations of peaceful change and a security community now comes into existence. A threshold has been crossed; it becomes increasingly difficult for the members of this "region" to think only in instrumental ways and prepare for war among themselves. At this point we want to distinguish between the loosely and tightly coupled variants. In the former, minimalist, version: states identify positively with one another and proclaim a similar "way of life"; multiple and diverse mechanisms and patterns of interaction exist that reinforce and reproduce the security community; there is an informal governance system based on shared meanings and a collective identity; and while there remain conflicting interests, disagreements, and asymmetric bargaining, states are expected to resolve their disputes peacefully.

Evidence of the emergence of a security community can be found in various indicators that reflect a high degree of trust, a shared identity and future, low or no probability that conflicts will lead to military encounters, and the differentiation between those within from those outside the security community.

- *Multilateralism.* Decision-making procedures, conflict resolution, and processes of conflict adjudication are likely to be more consensual than in other types of interstate relations.⁶³ This type of architecture reflects the high degree of trust present in the relationship and that common interests are

⁶³ See John Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution," in Ruggie, *Multilateralism Matters*, 3-47; and Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation Among Democracies: Norms, Transnational Relations, and the European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

handled through common and consensual mechanisms that automatically incorporate the interests of all members.

- *Unfortified borders.*⁶⁴ Although still existent, border checks and patrols are undertaken to secure the state against threats other than an organized military invasion.
- *Changes in military planning.* "Worst-case" scenarios do not include those within the community. Although there might be some concern about the degree of cooperation and contribution to a joint military campaign, those within the community are not counted as potential enemies.
- *Common definition of the threat.* This depends on the identification of core "personality" features of those within the security community. Self-identification frequently has a corresponding "other" that represents the threat.
- *Discourse and the language of community.* The state's normative discourse and actions reflect community standards. Thus, the discourse is likely to reflect the norms of the specific community and refers to how its norms differ from those outside the community.

In a tightly coupled security community, national identity is expressed through the merging of efforts. The institutional context for the exercise of power changes; the right to use force shifts from the units to the collectivity of sovereign states and becomes legitimate only against external threats or against community members that return to their "old" ways. Power balances, nuclear deterrence, and threats of retaliation retain meaningful and functional roles, but are only conceptualized in terms of the community as a whole vis-à-vis other political units. In case of an external threat or attack, the security community may respond as a collective security system or even as an integrated military defense organization.

The indicators of loosely coupled security communities also apply to tightly coupled security communities, but to distinguish between the two variants the following indicators apply only to the latter:

⁶⁴ Deutsch et al., *Political Community*, 34-35.

- *Cooperative and collective security.* There is movement from reciprocal arms control and confidence building to "cooperative security," with regard to security problems within the community, and to collective security, with regard to threats from outside the community.
- *High level of military integration.* Although a security community does not require this, it is quite likely that shared identities and a high degree of trust will produce a desire for military cooperation; this will be particularly true if there was military cooperation in earlier phases of development. We expect that if there was no such cooperation, the emergence of a common threat at this stage will produce the desire for it. This indicator reflects not only high trust but also a view of security as interdependent.
- *Policy coordination against "internal" threats.* There is greater policy coordination among those within the security community to watch for and "patrol" internal threats, as commonly defined. (Although most working within this tradition point to the existence of external threats, many territorially based communities also derive their identity from internal threats to the community.)
- *Free movements of populations.* Allowing free movement into and out of the state reflects that there is less differentiation between "us" and "them." For instance, visas are no longer required and routine movements are no longer restricted because they are no longer seen as a potential threat.
- *Internationalization of authority.* In a security community, shared and coordinated practices, and public policies, can further the creation of an informal system of rule. However, authority may also become internationalized, or, alternatively, states may attempt to coordinate and harmonize their domestic laws; as law becomes internationalized, so too will enforcement mechanisms.
- *"Multiperspectival" polity.* Rule is shared at the national, transnational, and supranational levels.⁶⁵

⁶⁵ Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond."

Disintegration

One of the startling tragedies of the post-Cold War period is the implosion of many political communities. Individuals, nationalities, and ethnic groups that coexisted in relative peace have quickly and sometimes savagely taken revenge on their neighbors. The post-Cold War period is not the first in which political communities have disintegrated and clashed, for such problems frequently follow the decline of empires and other systemic shocks. Indeed, an important topic in Third World studies is the intrusion of external forces into the local community, an intrusion which leaves conflict, alienation, and anomie in its wake. In short, political communities can be disrupted from within and without. Because one of the necessary conditions of a security community is a shared identity and compatibility of core values, and identities and values are not static but are susceptible to change,⁶⁶ the same forces that "build up" security communities "tear them down." Therefore, many of the social processes that encourage and serve to reproduce the security community are also associated with its decline. Of course, war or large-scale organized violence among the members of the community is compelling evidence that a security community has ceased to exist.

In sum, the following questions guide the historical and comparative research on security communities:

- What are the likely paths along which a security community will develop? Is there a clear point at which the development of a security community becomes more likely?
- Does a security community "triggered" by different mechanisms—that is, by shared security or economic interests or a common identity—have a different path from the nascent to the ascendant phase?
- What sorts of domestic coalitions encourage the government to undertake a community-building exercise? To move from one phase to the other?

⁶⁶ Van Wageningen, "The Concept of Community and the Future of the United Nations," *International Organization* 19 (Summer 1965), 812-27.

- What norms emerge in informal and formal security institutions and organizations? How do they reproduce the security community and shape the state's identity?
- What institutional forums help generate a sense of trust? What sorts of organizations and institutions encourage states to extend their relations into other spheres? What is the role of indigenous organizations? Of exogenous organizations?
- Under what conditions do security communities develop strategic associations or undertake military integration?
- How do different security communities define "security"?
- Are threats a direct reflection of security communities and shared identities?
- How do different security communities defend their boundaries? What sorts of security arrangements and decision-making mechanisms are developed?
- How are the boundaries of the community defined? Are there probationary members? How does their status affect their foreign policy behavior? Are there "liminal" states—that is, states that are somewhat between different communities? What characteristics distinguish their foreign policy behavior vis-à-vis the security community and those outside it?
- What are the systemic, transnational, and domestic forces that challenge the state's membership in the community?
- How do the boundaries of the security community expand?
- What is the relationship between the security community and other regional and international organizations?

Conclusion

This paper aspired to demonstrate the importance of the concept of international community in understanding international security. By thinking the unthink-

able—that community exists at the international level, that security politics are profoundly shaped by it, and that those states dwelling within an international community might develop a pacific disposition—we have attempted to show how the concept of security community can reinvigorate our understanding of global change, security politics, and international relations theory.

The concept of security community reflects what currently exists in various regions, including South America, North America, Western Europe, and Scandinavia. Yet, here we observe the important distinction between loosely and tightly coupled security communities. South America reflects the former type, which suggests the development of dependable expectations of peaceful change and little else. Europe, however, suggests the tightly coupled variety, extending beyond dependable expectations of peaceful change to include the development of new forms of regional governance, thereby radically transforming, though not completely rendering obsolete, the Westphalian system of international relations that was defined by sovereign states, power balancing, and weak international institutions. Equally provocative is that state officials of other regions are advocating various mechanisms that resemble the early stages of a security community; using the language of transnational values, community, and cognitive interdependence to conceptualize the foundations of a peace system; sometimes drawing on and importing institutional mechanisms devised in other regions; and attempting to fashion and foster the architecture for a security community.

In this respect, security communities may become not merely "half-baked" integration processes on the road to amalgamation but somewhat permanent international (and transnational) actors whose boundaries are determined by shared understandings rather than geography. If so, pluralistic security communities may be a radically new form of regional governance, far more complex than their historical counterparts. The chances of survival, institutionalization, and expansion, however, may be enhanced by the fact that this type of governance system lies between the anarchical arrangement of sovereign states—and national identities—on the one hand, and a system of rule endowed with strong norms, institutions, transnational civic traditions, and trust—and transnational identities—on the other. The implication of these "half-baked" communities for the study of peace is profound: quasi-Kantian peaceful change without its teleological, deterministic, and universal elements might be presently evolving.⁶⁷ If so, peaceful change need not rely on the transcendence of the nation-state or the

⁶⁷ Adler, "Europe's New Security Order," 289.

elimination of existing cultural and ethnic loyalties and identities; what matters is the creation of regions of social cognitive and normative bonds that can encourage peoples to identify and to expect their security and welfare to be intimately intertwined with those that exist on the same side of spatial and cognitive borders.

It follows, then, that the study of security communities suggests not just a rethinking of regional or even global security issues but rather a paradigm shift in international relations theory. This shift, as Donald Puchala once argued, involves the intellectual conjecture that violent conflict can be mitigated and even eliminated by the development of mutual identification among peoples, not by conventional practices such as balancing and collective security schemes.⁶⁸ Realist and neoliberal institutionalist approaches, by bracketing the very phenomenon we are interested in studying, are ill-equipped to entertain the possibility of community. On the other hand, the constructivist approach, which recognizes the potential existence of transnational values, intersubjective understandings, and shared identities, is well suited for a serious inquiry into how the international community can shape security politics and create the conditions for a stable peace.

⁶⁸ Puchala, "Integration Theory and the Study of International Relations," 151.

Just War Principles and Economic Sanctions

Albert C. Pierce

It is a familiar argument, often heard when the nation approaches a decision to use military force overseas: "Try economic sanctions first." With military force, there is always the risk of loss of life—of "our" troops, of "theirs," of innocent civilians—and the employment of economic sanctions is seen as a "more humane" way to achieve national political objectives. Once sanctions are underway, the argument often becomes "give them enough time to work before employing military force."¹

Is imposition of economic sanctions always morally preferable to the use of military force? And in contrast to the always potentially dangerous, and therefore always potentially morally troublesome, use of military force, are sanctions essentially without moral consequences? Fortunately or unfortunately, it is not at all that simple. Indeed, the first premise of this article is that economic sanctions (as Michael Walzer has pointed out about classic siege warfare) are intended to inflict great human suffering, pain, harm, and even death and thus should be subject to the same kind of careful moral and ethical scrutiny given to the use of military force before it is chosen as a means to achieve national political objectives.²

The essential point is not new. A decade ago David A. Baldwin argued that economic statecraft could, and indeed should, be evaluated not only by political and economic criteria but by moral and ethical standards as well.³ In 1994, Lori Fisler Damrosch wrote in these pages that "the choice of means is not merely a policy question bearing on effectiveness of sanctions. It is also an issue entailing

¹ See Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict 1990–1991* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 292–93; and Bob Woodward, *The Commanders* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 338, 342.

² See Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument With Historical Illustrations*, 2nd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1992), 161; and Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy*, 2nd ed. (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1990), 2.

³ David A. Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 359.