

Europe's Second Demographic Transition

By Dirk J. van de Kaa

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Last summer, like many Dutch people heading for holidays in the south of France or Spain or Portugal, I drove through Belgium. Just across the border a large billboard caught my eye. It showed an attractive girl and a slogan that a Dutchman would translate as "Driving fast is as stupid as making love fast" (see photo, Figure 1, page 4).

I was so surprised I nearly drove off the road. Who in the world thought of that?, I asked myself. Who went along with the idea and put up these posters along the highway? Who was the girl and is that

how women look when they want to convey such a message? And, finally, how could this happen in Belgium, of all places?

Since then I've learned that the posters were put up by the Belgian High Council for Traffic Safety and aimed at adolescents with the sensible message: Is it really wise to see fast driving as a demonstration of virility? I read somewhere that the girl's name is Nicky, that she is not Belgian but a native of Texas, and has returned there. But I have no clearcut answer to the question I find most intriguing: How could this happen in Belgium.

For that poster did not fit with my view of Belgian society. Historically, and probably still today, Belgian public life and politics have been dominated by the "language problem"—the competition between its French-speaking and Dutch-speaking groups—and by powerful, center-right religiously inspired political parties. At international meetings, representatives of the Belgian government are almost invariably conservative on matters dealing with the family, sex, or contraception. Unlike most of the rest of Europe, Belgium has not legalized abortion. The legal status of sterilization is unclear and advertising of contraceptives is still prohibited. In 1971, in his second national survey of fertility and family planning, Belgian socio-biologist Robert Cliquet found that more than half of married women aged 30-34 using contraception were relying on withdrawal, a quarter used rhythm, and scarcely one-fifth used the pill.¹ These figures differ markedly from those of the Netherlands and Denmark, for example, and un-

Figure 1. Symbol of Europe's Second Demographic Transition



A billboard in traditionally conservative Belgium publicly referring to sex—"Driving fast is as stupid as making love fast"—symbolizes the profound shift in attitudes that forms the background to Europe's second demographic transition.

doubtedly reflect dominating norms that would inhibit public discussion of sexual behavior.

That is why the billboard unnerved me somewhat. Had I underestimated how fast attitudes were changing even in Belgium? Could that poster be seen as *the* symbol of the profound shift in norms and attitudes regarding personal relationships, fertility, and the family that has led to dramatic, rapid change in Europeans' demographic behavior? Even though I saw other such posters that had been deliberately defaced or torn and later learned that the term "vrijen" used in the slogan does not sound nearly so sexually explicit to a Dutch-speaking Belgian as it does to a Dutchman, I have no doubt that the Belgian poster *is* such a symbol. It signifies a stage in Europe's demographic development in which the countries that still have above-replacement

fertility can be counted on the fingers of one hand and with a few where births no longer exceed deaths. As a result, according to current United Nations medium projections, Europe's population will increase a scant 6 percent between 1985 and 2025, from 492 to 524 million, while the world's population nearly doubles, from 4.5 to 8.2 billion, and nearly one in every five Europeans in 2025 will be pensioners aged 65 and over, with a shrinking working-age population to support them.

The new stage in Europe's demographic history might be called its "second demographic transition."² Europe's first demographic transition began with a gradual decline in death rates dating generally from the early 19th century, followed by fertility decline beginning around 1880 in most countries, though earlier in France. By the 1930s, both birth

and death rates were generally at low levels. Emigration played an important role in the first transition by relieving population pressures built up by the large gap still remaining between birth and death rates in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

The start of the second transition can arbitrarily be set at 1965. In the interim had come World War II and the baby boom that followed it. The principal demographic feature of the second transition is the decline in fertility from somewhat above the "replacement" level of 2.1 births per woman, which ensures that births and deaths will stay in balance and population remain stationary over the long run, to a level well below replacement.

If fertility stabilizes below replacement, as seems likely in Europe, and barring immigration, population numbers will sooner or later decline, as had begun already by 1985 in four countries (Austria, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Hungary). Changes in mortality and migration—the other two variables that shape changes in population numbers—have had relatively little impact in the second transition, although in northwestern Europe, immigration was substantial before restrictions were imposed when economic recession set in after the oil crisis of 1973 and remains a controversial issue.

Early descriptions of and theories about the demographic transition, based on Europe's experience to the 1930s, usually ended with the stage of "zero" or stationary population growth. The stage of long-term population decline, now imminent in Europe, has since been called "beyond the demographic transition," but its special features in Europe seem to merit the label of the "second demographic transition."

This *Bulletin* describes the broad features of this second demographic transition as it has evolved among Europe's some 30 heterogeneous countries and the public and policy reactions to it. It begins with a description of the dramatic

shift in norms and attitudes that forms the background.

Second Demographic Transition: The Background

Two keywords characterize the norms and attitudes behind the first and second demographic transitions and highlight the contrasts between them: *altruistic* and *individualistic*. The first transition to low fertility was dominated by concerns for family and offspring, but the second emphasizes the rights and self-fulfillment of individuals. Demographers Ron Lesthaeghe and Christopher Wilson argue convincingly that industrialization, urbanization, and secularization were the indirect determinants of the first transition.³ The shift from family-based production to wage-paid labor that accompanied industrialization and urbanization reduced the economic utility of children. They could no longer serve as cheap labor for the parental farm or business but instead required investment in schooling and training to give them a reasonable chance in life. As Australian demographer John Caldwell puts it, the "net flow of wealth" now favored children rather than parents. Moreover, a large number of children could mean the dissipation of family assets like land after the parents' death, so birth control became a sound strategy. Secularization reduced the influence of the churches and increased couples' willingness to practice family planning.

Demographically, the first transition reflected the disappearance of the Malthusian pattern of family formation. Couples no longer had to delay marriage until they acquired a separate means of existence by succeeding their parents. The age at marriage declined and so did the number of people who remained permanently single. Within marriage, the

number of children was controlled; quality replaced quantity.

The indirect determinants of the second transition cannot be summed up so neatly. Researchers have not reached a consensus about them, although many would agree that they are strongly related to the functioning of *individuals* in fast-changing, postindustrial societies.

In these societies, one's standard of living is largely determined by one's level and quality of education, degree of commitment to societal goals, and motivation to develop and use one's talents. This holds for women as well as men; both sexes tend to strive to earn a personal income. Getting married and/or having children may involve considerable opportunity costs for—most often—the female partner. She may have to give up her job if the husband accepts one somewhere else or if he owns a business to which they both should devote their energies. And although a two-income family may enjoy a higher standard of living than one with a single income, the partners may not be so free to spend their incomes as they were before marriage. Moreover, to achieve the cost benefits of pooled resources, a temporary partnership may serve as well as a formal marriage.

For a couple, children involve not only opportunity costs and direct expenditures, but also their utility has declined even further. They are no longer either expected or legally required to support their parents in old age or help with family finances. The emotional satisfactions of parenthood can be achieved most economically by having one or perhaps two children.

Beyond the simple calculation of economic utilities, social and cultural changes play a role in people's move away from marriage and parenthood in postindustrial societies. The forces behind these changes have been described in various ways. Some observers see continued secularization and individuation in the new values that encourage people to break with long-standing behavioral patterns. Others say



Young couple in a West Berlin nightclub. Low fertility in Western societies could stem from today's quest for greater individual self-fulfillment.

it is the trend toward greater "self-fulfillment"—the desire to realize more of one's own potential—which makes people react in an individualistic manner, with little regard for collective interests. "Individualism is the underlying cause of low fertility and marks a new stage in the awareness of fertility control," writes Austrian demographer Josef Schmid.⁴ Swiss sociologist Hans-Joachim Hoffmann-Nowotny goes so far as to ask whether we are not on the way to an "autistic society."⁵

Several authors see a dichotomy in present-day Western society between groups with marked differences in life styles and in attitudes toward social change and family formation. The Scientific Council for Government Policy in the Netherlands distinguishes between sociocratic and technocratic views.⁶ Sociocratic people tend to be anti-establishment and believe in the value of social processes: egalitarianism, participation and "emancipation," or the full participation of women and disadvantaged groups in society. The technocratically oriented tend to seek solutions for society's ills through careful reasoning, planning, and implementation.

The approach of U.S. political scientists

Ronald Inglehart is to distinguish values associated with "materialism" and "postmaterialism."⁷ Postmaterialists are suspicious of technological innovation, criticize production processes that damage the environment and the endless acquisition of luxury goods, and put the emphasis on meaningful personal relationships, spontaneity, and self-reliance. Schmid sketches "older" and "newer" branches of postmaterialism:⁸

Older branch: adhering to the achievement motive and attainment of status:

- (a) rising expectations;
- (b) desire for status goods;
- (c) feelings of relative deprivation.

Newer branch: adhering to cultural subgroups and postmaterial values.

In other research, Felling and his colleagues list three "bourgeois" dimensions (family-oriented, economic advancement and security, altruism) in contrast to three "nonbourgeois" dimensions (social egalitarianism, hedonism, inner harmony).⁹ I personally use the terms progressiveness and conservatism to describe the dichotomy.¹⁰ I have argued that most European societies have shifted remarkably toward greater progressiveness in the postwar period and this helps explain many demographic changes. Philosophically, "progressiveness" characterizes a tendency to embrace the new, look critically at the present, and largely disregard the past. Conservatism characterizes the converse tendency to stress the value of customs and tradition and oppose changes.

Used in this sense, "progressive" is meant to indicate a shift toward increasing emphasis on "equality" and "freedom." However, this emphasis is not the same in the different spheres of life:

"In the socio-economic sphere, freedom is, from the progressive point of view, seen as a potential danger to equality, and where a conflict between the two arises, 'equality' usually prevails over 'freedom.' To achieve equality, solidarity is called for and expected. In the socio-cultural sphere the opposite tends to be the case. As long as one's behaviour does not

interfere with the freedom of others to act freely, one is free to behave as one sees fit. Different forms of behaviour are considered to be of equal value, even though this will lead to considerable pluriformity.

"In summary, the progressive point of view stresses the equality of opportunities (income, education, etc.) and freedom of choice in behaviour (dress, sexual behaviour, etc.). It can easily be seen that the first line of approach stimulates the growth of the welfare state and its distributive functions. . . . The second line of approach stimulates changes in collective and individual attitudes in many fields, including those regarding fertility and family formation."¹¹

The terms used by different authors vary considerably and some may now be inadequate to describe the present situation.¹² But they have so much in common that most likely they essentially reflect the same phenomenon: a large change in norms and attitudes.

Progressiveness in the Netherlands and Western Europe

The change can be traced in a series of surveys conducted since 1965 in the Netherlands which ask national samples of adults their views on a variety of cultural, social, and economic questions. As shown in Table 1 (page 8), the proportions giving a "progressive" answer to these statements relevant to demographic factors changed dramatically from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s, although most of the change occurred before 1980. For example, approval of outside employment for a mother of school-age children jumped from 17 percent in 1965 to 69 percent in 1986. Tolerance of new types of behavior is now high: voluntary childlessness (86 percent in 1985, up from 22 percent in 1965); cohabitation with no intention of marrying (56 percent in 1985); and "living-apart-together," or a sexual partnership but with separate liv-

Table 1. Attitudes Regarding Marriage, Family, Sexuality, and Euthanasia in the Netherlands: 1965-1986

(Percent agreeing with the statement)

Statement	1965	1966	1968	1970	1975	1980	1983	1985	1986
There is no objection to sexual relations for people intending to marry.	21	—	—	60	59	72	—	—	—
A girl can have sexual relations with a boy if she likes him a lot.	—	—	19	45	44	59	—	—	—
A woman should be free to have an abortion if she wishes.	—	—	—	43	48	55	53	53	49
In certain cases a husband's infidelity is acceptable.	20	—	—	48	49	45	—	—	—
Voluntary childlessness of a couple is acceptable.	22	27	—	60	70	79	85	86	—
Married people are generally happier than single people.	60	—	—	—	35	25	18	—	21
In a bad marriage it is better to divorce even if there are still children living at home.	12	—	—	40	40	48	45	—	43
Labor force participation of a married woman with school-age children is acceptable.	17	—	—	56	58	65	64	70	69
Homosexuals should be free to live as they like.	—	—	64	—	83	93	—	93	92
Cohabitation with no intention of marrying is acceptable.	—	—	—	—	—	41	55	56	—
Living-apart-together is acceptable.	—	—	—	—	—	56	64	63	—
Euthanasia should be permissible.	—	40	—	—	53	52	57	55	51

Sources: Surveys of adults, usually aged 16-74, *Social and Cultural Reports*, 1982 and 1986.

ing accommodations (63 percent in 1985). Barely a fifth of Dutch adults now agree that married people are generally happier than the single.

The change is also documented in similar data from "Eurobarometer" surveys conducted in countries of the European Economic Community (EEC). From the 11 surveys of 1970 to 1984 in the six original EEC countries, Inglehart shows a pattern of increased postmaterialism from the oldest cohort, born in 1886-1905, to the youngest, born in 1956-1965 (see Figure 2). The data also show short-term fluctuations, with postmaterialism losing ground to materialism in years of high inflation.

There are no such data for Eastern Europe, so it is difficult to judge whether norms and attitudes have also changed there. But in Western Europe at least, the shift toward progressiveness and postmaterialism appears strong. The trend is not independent of socioeconomic conditions common to modern Western societies, but at the same time seems fairly insensitive to economic recessions or crises. Recessions do alter attitudes somewhat but their impact is limited


compared with the increased postmaterialism from cohort to cohort. This is all the more remarkable in light of the rather unfavorable economic conditions and high unemployment that younger Europeans have faced most of their adult lives. The shift in norms appears to have a momentum of its own, and it is against this background that many demographic phenomena should be seen. It is also against this background that the feasibility of government policies to raise fertility significantly should be judged. Economic pronatalist measures are likely to be ineffective and so are other policies which go against or disregard the trend to individualism.

A Sequence of Events in Family Formation

A standard sequence with variations?

An interesting perspective on recent population change in Europe is to see the

Figure 2. Shift to Postmaterialism Among Birth Cohorts and Inflation Rates in Six West European Countries: 1970-1984



Source: R. Inglehart, "Aggregate Stability and Individual-Level Flux in Mass Belief Systems: The Level of Analysis Paradox," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 79 (1985) pp. 97-116.

Note: See text for description of postmaterialism and materialism. Data are for the six original members of the European Economic Community: Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands.

changes that have occurred in factors bearing on family formation as a sequence through which all countries pass. The timing and speed of the sequence have differed substantially between Eastern and Western Europe and within these regions, but there is strong evidence of a logical ordering. Each step taken seems to have led to the next; each option chosen made a further choice possible. Looking back, the sequence of events that led to today's low fertility seems both logical and understandable. One wonders why it was not predicted! Reflecting the shift to progressiveness and individualism, the sequence involves shifts from marriage toward cohabitation, from children to the adult couple as the focus of a family, from contraception to prevent unwanted births to deliberate,

self-fulfilling choices whether and when to conceive a child, and from uniform to widely diversified families and households. Let us sketch the sequence as it has progressed to completion in a "standard" European country.

To trace the story, one must begin with the great impact of World War II. Virtually all European countries were involved in the fighting, suffered from occupation and shortages, and experienced the uncertainties and sorrows that war brings. Many young men saw military service and became familiar with techniques to prevent conception and venereal disease. Retrospective surveys document a steady increase from cohort to cohort in the proportions of adults who have experienced premarital intercourse and a sharp postwar decline in the age at which

such sexual relations begin. Geeraert, citing a long list of research in Western European countries since 1900, concludes that among young women in particular, both students and working women, premarital intercourse is increasingly common.¹³ By 1971, 83 percent of 21-year-old employed men and women in the Federal Republic of Germany reported having experienced premarital sexual relations. In Denmark in the ten years from 1958 to 1968, the proportion of 21-year-old female students who had had premarital sexual intercourse increased from 60 to 97 percent. Figures reported by sociologist Gerrit Kooy for the Netherlands show an increase in these proportions from 57 percent for men and 32 percent for women born 1903-1918 to 85 and 79 percent, respectively, for the cohort born 1943-1947.¹⁴

Social attitudes regarding premarital or extramarital sexual relations did not change so rapidly. Most couples therefore sought official sanction through marriage. This was also the solution in the case of an out-of-wedlock pregnancy.

Besides official sanction to live together, most couples who married in the early 1950s also wanted and were economically ready to start a family. The average age at first marriage declined, the interval between marriage and the first birth remained short, and birth rates for lower-order births began to rise. The increase in fertility in the early childbearing ages more than made up for the decline in higher-order births, so that the total fertility rate increased—at least to the mid-1960s.

The decline in higher-order births reflected general acceptance of birth control as a means to limit family size. This was the tail end of the first demographic transition in which birth control was used not for spacing but to bring completed family size down from seven or eight children in the 1880s to two or three some 50-60 years later. But the contraceptives available before the mid-1960s were not very effective or suitable for in-

experienced couples and many “unwanted” children were no doubt born.

The decline in age at first marriage loosened the link between marriage and the start of childbearing. Marriage was still desired to earn official approval of sexual relations (certainly by a couple's parents), but for many young couples it no longer marked a readiness to have children. Parents anxious to help their just-married children avoid the burdens of an immediate birth may well have introduced them to family planning. Family planning organization enrollments soared. Membership in the Dutch organization (Netherlands Association for Sexual Reform, NVSH) more than doubled from 97,000 in 1955 to a peak of 206,000 in 1965 (and now has almost evaporated). As contraception became more popular for avoiding births early in married life, the age at marriage could decline further. Young married couples could accumulate assets together before deciding to take on the care of children.

Just about that time, in the mid-1960s, the effective, as well as safe, pills and IUDs came on the market. They were readily adopted. First and second birth intervals lengthened, and there were somewhat fewer lower-order births. Doubtless due also to further reductions in family-size norms, fertility above age 30 plummeted and the birth of fourth, fifth, and later children became an exception. The proportion of unwanted births—conceived out of marriage or too late in marriage—declined.

By the early 1970s, actual or anticipated changes in abortion law made it possible to terminate unintended premarital pregnancies safely, so the frequency of unwanted first births declined further. The gradual disappearance of “forced marriages” slowed the decline in age at first marriage and this age began to climb.

Abortion could, of course, also be used to avert unwanted births among married women—high-order births, risky and socially unacceptable births to older women, and, if so desired, births con-

ceived extramaritally. Increased adoption of sterilization to control fertility after couples had all the children they wanted further cut the number of higher-order births in the early 1970s. Fertility fell below replacement level.

Once it was generally accepted that sexual relations in marriage were not solely or primarily aimed at procreation and contraceptives of high quality had become available, a further step was taken. Law changes had already increased the frequency of divorce and legal separation. Divorce and separation were also occurring at earlier ages and sooner after marriage. Since young people now married with the intention of delaying childbearing for several years, it is understandable that the need to seek a seal of approval for such an arrangement was questioned. Why not start living together and marry only when children were wanted or on the way? Stable unions were formed, differing from early marriage mainly in that they were "paperless." The first marriage rate began to decline and the age at first marriage went up.

Initially, there was evidently some pressure on couples in "paperless marriages" to marry when a birth was desired or on the way. Premarital pregnancies resulting in births within eight months after marriage increased. But after a while the pressure to marry eased so much that couples no longer felt required to marry before having children. The proportions ever-marrying declined markedly; age at first marriage rose further. Remarriages became much less common. A rise in out-of-wedlock fertility became noticeable, particularly among somewhat older women. Some of these women deliberately chose to bear a child without having a stable relationship with a male partner. The proportions of out-of-wedlock births legitimated by marriage or the male partner declined. In addition, voluntary childlessness was no longer solely an option for men and women who elected not to marry. Being married or living in a stable union no longer differen-

tiated people strongly with regard either to having children or desired family size. Fertility seemed to stabilize well below replacement level.

This "standard" sequence of changes in family formation is obviously impossible to trace in detail for all 30 of Europe's heterogeneous countries and the sequence itself is likely to be different as it evolves among them. However, the countries can be grouped roughly according to their place in the sequence as it has evolved so far and fairly simple period data available for a reasonable number of the countries demonstrate the basic features of the second transition to low fertility. These features involve four related shifts that can be summarized as follows:


1. Shift from the *golden age of marriage* to the *dawn of cohabitation*;
2. Shift from the era of the *king-child with parents* to that of the *king-pair with a child*;
3. Shift from *preventive contraception* to *self-fulfilling conception*;
4. Shift from *uniform to pluralistic families and households*.

Where countries are in the sequence

Only two European countries appear to have experienced the full sequence of changes in family formation that have led to very low fertility—Denmark and Sweden. Even here there have been deviations from the "standard" sequence described above. However, it is in these two countries that the proportion of out-of-wedlock births has risen from about 10 percent in 1956-60 to well over 40 percent currently. And it is the tremendously changed social significance of the "married" status that probably best demonstrates the transition toward greater individualism.

The following four groups indicate where European countries now are in relation to the standard sequence.

First group. In addition to Denmark and Sweden, this group includes the



Street scene in Sweden. Sweden and Denmark have progressed furthest with the family formation changes that have led to very low fertility.

Northern and Western European countries which appear to be following close in their tracks. The birth rates of these countries as of the mid-1980s generally fall between 10 and 12 per 1,000 population and the rate of natural increase (births minus deaths) is no more than 0.4 percentage points above zero or actually negative (see data for 1985 in Table 2). Finland, Norway, the United Kingdom, Austria, Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Italy (in Southern Europe) all qualify for this group. Here the second demographic transition is well advanced.

Second group. This group includes Greece, Malta, Portugal, Spain, and Yugoslavia in Southern Europe. The fertility decline has been less marked in these countries; they follow the first group at a distance. Current birth rates range from 12 to 16 per 1,000 population and the rate of natural increase usually exceeds 0.4 percent. The second transition is late, but there is little doubt that it has begun

and will be completed.

Third group. The six Eastern European countries make up this group: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. Political developments after World War II have set this group apart from the rest of Europe in many respects. Here the second demographic transition has a different shape. For example, the postwar trend toward greater sexual freedom appears to be less pronounced. In reaction to forcible attempts to change the structure and norms of society after the political change, many people have clung tenaciously to traditional mores in their personal lives. On the other hand, legal abortion became available in these countries earlier than in most other European countries, while government intervention to raise birth rates has had some impact on fertility trends. Current birth rates are close to 14 per 1,000 population, except for Hungary (12.2 in 1985) and Poland (18.2).

Fourth group. This group covers the remaining countries which, for a variety of cultural and historical reasons, are all late in completing the *first* demographic transition. It includes Iceland and Ireland in Northern Europe and Albania and Turkey in Southern Europe. Even parts of the USSR belong to this group. Whether or when they will begin the second demographic transition is not easy to predict. Their current birth rates tend to be high by European standards and rates of natural increase range from about 0.9 percent in Iceland and Ireland to 2.1 percent in Turkey.

This grouping helps put trends in context in presenting the following data which demonstrate how the second demographic transition has evolved.

Marriage, Divorce, Cohabitation Marriage

Numerous measures illustrate the rather dramatic swing from the altruistic to the

Table 2. Population Statistics for European Countries: 1985

Region and country	Population mid-1985 (thousands)	Birth rate (per 1,000 population)	Death rate	Natural increase (percent)
Northern Europe				
Denmark	5,114	10.6	11.4	-0.08
Finland	4,908	12.8	9.8	0.30
Iceland	241	15.9	7.1	0.88
Ireland	3,552	17.5	9.0	0.85
Norway	4,153	12.4	10.6	0.18
Sweden	8,350	11.8	11.3	0.05
United Kingdom	56,125	13.3	11.9	0.14
Western Europe				
Austria	7,555	11.5	11.8	-0.03
Belgium	9,903	11.5	11.2	0.03
France	55,172	13.9	10.1	0.38
Fed. Rep. Germany	61,020	9.6	11.5	-0.19
Liechtenstein	28	13.2	5.7	0.75
Luxembourg	366	11.1	10.8	0.03
Netherlands	14,484	12.1	8.5	0.36
Switzerland	6,374	11.5	9.2	0.23
Southern Europe				
Albania	2,962	26.2	5.8	2.04
Greece	9,935	11.7	9.3	0.24
Italy	57,128	10.1	9.5	0.06
Malta	383	14.2	7.4	0.68
Portugal	10,229	12.8	9.6	0.32
Spain	38,602	12.5 ^a	7.8 ^a	0.47 ^a
Turkey	49,272	30.2 ^b	9.4 ^b	2.08 ^b
Yugoslavia	23,123	15.9	9.1	0.68
Eastern Europe				
Bulgaria	8,957	13.2	12.0	0.12
Czechoslovakia	15,500	14.5	11.8	0.27
German Dem. Rep.	16,644	13.7	13.5	0.02
Hungary	10,649	12.2	13.9	-0.17
Poland	37,203	18.2	10.3	0.79
Romania	23,017	15.5 ^c	10.3 ^c	0.52 ^c
USSR	278,618	19.6 ^c	10.8 ^c	0.88 ^c

Sources: United Nations (UN), *Population and Vital Statistics Report: Data Available as of 1 October 1986*, Series A, Vol. 38, No. 4, and for Turkey: *World Population Prospects: Estimates and Projections as Assessed in 1984* (New York: 1986); and A. Monnier, "La conjoncture démographique: l'Europe et les pays développés d'outre-mer" (Demographic Trends: Europe and Overseas Developed Countries), *Population*, Vol. 41, No. 4-5 (July/October 1986) Table 2, p. 838.

^a1983. ^bAverage for 1980-85. ^c1984.

individualistic marriage pattern and the concomitant shift from "the golden age of marriage to the dawn of cohabitation." A particularly interesting one is the total first marriage rate: the sum of age-specific first marriage rates per 1,000 single men or women under age 50 in a given year. This indicates the proportion of men and women who would ever marry, given the situation of that year.

Although its method of calculation can result in rates of more than 1,000 first marriages per 1,000 single persons, which is impossible for a real cohort, it nevertheless reflects changes well. Table 3 presents these rates for 1965 to the mid-1980s, as published by French demographer Alain Monnier.

In 1965 the rates for Group 1 countries of Northern and Western Europe were

Table 3. Total First Marriage Rates Below Age 50 in European Countries: 1965-1985

(First marriages per 1,000 never-married persons)

Region and country	Males					Females				
	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985
Northern Europe										
Denmark	1,026	752	621	491	527 ^a	984	799	661	592	559 ^a
Finland	959	896	638	608	610 ^b	930	939	702	671	668 ^b
N. Ireland	980	1,134	900	750	—	952	1,086	942	766	—
Norway	921	922	755	615	546 ^a	872	956	794	648	571 ^a
Sweden	986	584	566	486	479 ^a	957	624	628	525	514 ^a
England and Wales	1,038	1,009	840	754	666 ^a	1,002	1,040	876	761	669 ^a
Scotland	1,112	1,055	899	786	749 ^c	1,023	1,030	889	792	750 ^c
Western Europe										
Austria	923	854	731	690	637	994	913	751	675	613
Belgium	992	966	854	746	688 ^d	1,002	981	888	775	718 ^d
France	1,013	915	822	689	530	993	919	858	706	542
Fed. Rep. Germany	913	896	734	644	578	1,102	974	764	656	591
Luxembourg	—	870	852	653	567 ^a	—	870	799	661	579 ^a
Netherlands	1,124	1,013	767	671	627 ^c	1,130	1,062	827	691	647 ^c
Switzerland	892	868	624	643	651 ^a	897	829	650	659	671 ^a
Southern Europe										
Greece	1,218	1,080	1,180	848	942 ^c	1,185	1,056	1,158	875	986 ^c
Italy	998	1,017	894	764	731 ^c	1,024	1,007	931	765	733 ^c
Portugal	1,105	1,187	1,450	840	798 ^a	1,012	1,090	1,275	808	811 ^a
Spain	1,008	1,030	949	749	684 ^c	982	1,003	1,024	735	675 ^c
Yugoslavia	991	991	865	—	—	1,027	970	892	—	—
Eastern Europe										
Bulgaria	951	963	969	923	878 ^b	893	976	1,010	981	943 ^b
Czechoslovakia	965	918	927	796	870 ^b	901	906	976	892	934 ^b
German Dem. Rep.	858	989	901	789	686 ^b	991	1,025	930	818	710 ^b
Hungary	986	990	944	767	796 ^a	978	968	998	894	880 ^a
Poland	—	—	948	838	870 ^b	—	—	940	900	967 ^b
Romania	909	891	993	—	—	942	840	998	—	—

Sources: Monnier, "La conjoncture démographique," Table 4, p. 840, and personal communication, 1986.

^a1984. ^b1983. ^c1981. ^d1982.

close to 1,000, indicating an era when almost everyone married. This was the golden age of marriage.¹⁵ The decline clearly started in Sweden, where the rates had already dropped to 584 for men and 624 for women by 1970. Denmark and Switzerland followed suit in 1975. The most recent figures suggest that not much more than 50 to 60 percent of men and women in Northern and Western European countries will ever marry if conditions remain as they are. This is not very likely, for it is the unusual combination of the lowering of the age at first marriage until the 1970s, followed by "postponement" of marriage that results

in the pattern shown in Table 3 and it is not yet certain how permanent this postponement will be. However, it seems clear that the proportions of each generation who ever marry are likely to be much lower in the coming decades than they were in the 1960s and 1970s.

The change began later in Southern Europe. Total first marriage rates were still high in 1975 and it is only after the mid-1970s that the effects of postponement and the reversal in the decline of age at first marriage become evident. In the Eastern European countries, the total first marriage rates were generally higher in 1975 than ten years earlier. The

Table 4. Marriage Statistics for European Countries: 1970 and 1984

Region and country	Marriage rate per 1,000 population		Mean age of women at first marriage 1984 or latest available date ^a	Mean age of women at first birth 1984 or latest available date ^a
	1970	1984		
Northern Europe				
Denmark	7.4	5.6	26.1	25.4
Finland	8.8	6.0	24.8	25.7 ^b
Iceland	7.8	5.9	24.4	22.9
Ireland	7.1	5.2	25.1	25.7
Norway	7.6	5.0	24.4	26.1 ^c
Sweden	5.4	4.5	27.3	26.5
United Kingdom	8.5	7.0	23.6	25.6 ^d
Western Europe				
Austria	7.1	6.1	23.7	24.8 ^c
Belgium	7.6	6.0	22.3	24.9 ^c
France	7.8	5.1	23.9	25.6 ^c
Fed. Rep. Germany	7.3	5.9	24.4	26.0 ^c
Luxembourg	6.4	5.4	23.3	25.5 ^c
Netherlands	9.5	5.7	24.1	26.3
Switzerland	7.4	6.0	25.9	26.8 ^c
Southern Europe				
Greece	7.7	5.3	22.5	23.4
Italy	7.4	5.2	24.0	25.2
Malta	7.3	7.9	24.4	—
Portugal	9.0	6.9	22.7	23.6
Spain	7.3	4.8	25.4 ^e	23.9 ^e
Turkey	—	6.9	17.7 ^b	20.1 ^e
Yugoslavia	9.0	7.3	22.1 ^e	23.1 ^e
Eastern Europe				
Bulgaria	8.6	7.5	20.8	22.3
Czechoslovakia	8.8	7.9	21.1	22.9
German Dem. Rep.	7.7	8.0	21.5	22.4
Hungary	9.3	7.0	21.6	23.1
Poland	8.6	7.7	22.6	23.6
Romania	7.2	7.8	—	22.9
USSR	9.7	9.6	—	23.2 ^f

Sources: Council of Europe, *Recent Demographic Developments in the Member States of the Council of Europe* (Strasbourg: 1986); Monnier, "La conjoncture démographique" and personal communication, 1986; G. Calot, Institut National d'Études Démographiques (INED), personal communication, 1986; Eurostat *Demographic Statistics*, 1986; UN, *Demographic Yearbook*, 1984 and earlier editions.

^aMost data are for 1984 or close to it. Data for 1979 and earlier are noted.

^b1978. ^cLegitimate births only. ^dFirst marital child in first marriage of mother. ^e1979. ^f1974.

decline thereafter is most noticeable in the German Democratic Republic and Hungary.

The marriage rate per 1,000 total population also illustrates the rapid change. In 1984 these rates in Northern and Western European countries ranged between 5 and 7 per 1,000 population,

while rates between 7 and 10 were common in 1970 (see Table 4). Significant declines have also occurred in Southern Europe even though the total first marriage rate indicates that marriage is still substantially more likely there than in Group 1 countries. In Eastern Europe, declines in marriage rates have so far

been limited and the latest reported mean ages at first marriage for women are somewhat lower (20-22) than elsewhere (Table 4). Mean ages at first marriage for women about 1984 were highest in Denmark (26.1) and Sweden (27.3). In these two countries, as well as in Iceland, where the proportion of out-of-wedlock births is also well above 40 percent, the mean age of women at first marriage is now higher than the mean age of women at first birth (Table 4). But elsewhere the relationship between age at first marriage and age at first birth is still fairly strong. Except for Turkey, the lowest mean ages at first birth are found in Eastern Europe.

For seven Northern and Western European countries for which a good time series is available, French demographer Gérard Calot has shown how the mean age at first marriage first declined and then rose again.¹⁶ In 1955 the mean age at first marriage for women in these countries ranged between 23 and 25 years. The low points were reached in 1966 in Denmark (22.4 years) and in Sweden (23.4), followed by Finland in 1968 (23.3), Norway in 1973 (22.4), France in 1974 (22.4), the Federal Republic of Germany in 1975 (22.5), and the Netherlands in 1976 (22.6).

In Northern and Western Europe, the decline in the propensity to marry has been paralleled by a reluctance to remarry. Although the number of second marriages has increased, many divorced or widowed men and women now choose to remain unmarried rather than enter a new legal bond. In many instances, that decision may be swayed by financial concerns—the prospective loss of pensions and benefits derived from the former marriage—but a more basic reason is doubtless the waning of marriage as an institution. U.S. sociologists John Modell, Frank Furstenberg, and Douglas Strong have pointed out that traditionally marriage has been an integral part of a tight sequence of status transitions and a keystone in everyone's life course.¹⁷ It was bound up with leaving the parental

home, initiation into a regular sex life, parenthood, position in the labor market, setting up an independent household, and so on. Now with the dramatic improvement in living conditions that has come with the advent of welfare states, marriage has fewer implications for one's early adult life. Thus, not marrying or remarrying has become a reasonable option and divorce is far easier to consider than a few generations ago.

Divorce


Available statistics on divorce in Europe invariably show a substantial rise since at least 1965. In the countries where divorce is most common—Austria, Denmark, England and Wales, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, and Sweden—the annual rate about 1980 was 10 to 12 divorces per 1,000 existing marriages. The total divorce rate shown in Figure 3, which is comparable to the total first marriage rate, indicates the proportions of marriages likely to end in divorce, under the conditions of the given year. Currently topping the list are Sweden (45.4 percent in 1982), Denmark (45.1 percent in 1983), England and Wales (40.4 percent in 1983), and Hungary (32.4 percent in 1983). In Poland, where the Roman Catholic Church remains strong, the increase has been negligible: 14.6 percent in 1970 to 15.5 percent in 1983. Divorce also tends to be infrequent in Southern Europe; in some countries, it is still prohibited and in others, the law has been relaxed only recently. The steep rise in divorce in Northern and Western Europe is related to law changes of the early 1970s permitting divorce by "mutual consent," which has since replaced "matrimonial offense" as the most common grounds for divorce.

Cohabitation

To reach full adulthood, Europe's young people no doubt still consider the most decisive steps to be the entries into employment, marriage, and parenthood. These statuses represent financial independence, commitment to another per-

Figure 3. Total Divorce Rates in Selected European Countries: 1965-1984

Divorces per 100 marriages



Source: Monnier, "La conjoncture démographique," p. 841.

different from marriage in one respect, that is, all marrieds have experienced cohabitation without marriage but not all cohabitants have experienced marriage."

Many Northern and Western European countries seem to be following the Swedish and Danish pattern and have at least reached the stage of "change and acceptance," signaling the dawn of cohabitation. The process can be traced in responses of a national sample of women interviewed in 1982 in the Netherlands. Those who started cohabiting for the first time at ages 18-25 were asked about the outcome of this first union. The outcomes at the three-year mark were as follows:²⁰


Began cohabiting	Status three years later (in percent)		
	Separated	Married	Still cohabiting
1971-73	12	55	33
1974-76	7	46	47
1977-79	14	41	45

It appears that from the early to the late 1970s the idea of cohabitation as "trial marriage" was rapidly replaced by its being regarded as a distinct alternative to marriage. Of the respondents who had cohabited for more than six years (some 20 percent of all cohabitants), about half indicated that they did not intend to marry. This suggests that for at least 10 percent of young people who started cohabiting after the mid-1970s, unmarried cohabitation will be a permanent status.

The changes in the propensity to marry clearly have a profound impact on age-specific nuptiality curves. Figure 4 (page 18) shows 1984 age-specific first marriage rates for women in Hungary, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden, provided by Calot. They form a pattern that indicates the stages in a likely development. In Hungary, marriage is still popular and early, peaking at age 20 for women in these rates for 1984. By now in Sweden, marriage—if it occurs at all—is delayed to a fairly late age, typically age 26 for women as of 1984, and children

son, and long-term responsibility for dependents. Ending full-time education, leaving home, and starting to cohabit are more diffuse steps and represent statuses that are less permanent.¹⁸ However, once cohabitation has shed its deviancy, cohabitation without marriage becomes a social institution. Swedish sociologist Jan Trost states: "In today's Sweden and Denmark, couples do not choose to cohabit instead of marry. They just cohabit."¹⁹ He considers that cohabitation was uncommon in Sweden until the end of the 1960s, that a period of change and acceptance followed, and since 1972 or 1973 it has become "normal" behavior and in no way regarded as deviant. To illustrate the final stage, he writes: "Thus, unmarried cohabitation can be classified as a category slightly

Figure 4. Age-Specific First Marriage Rates for Women in Denmark, Hungary, the Netherlands, and Sweden: 1984



Source: G. Calot, INED, personal communication, 1986.

tend to be present at their parents' first wedding ceremony.

Since unmarried cohabitation is unrecorded in national vital registration systems, country comparisons are possible only from survey and census data available for a few countries. The following table shows the percentage of cohabiting women among all women aged 20-34 who were married or cohabiting in Sweden, Denmark, France, and Great Britain in 1980 or 1981, and in the Netherlands in 1984.²¹

Country	Percent cohabiting of women cohabiting or married at ages:		
	20-24	25-29	30-34
Sweden	69	37	18
Denmark	65	29	13
Netherlands	28	13	5
France	16	6	2
Great Britain	11	6	2

It is essential to understand that cohabitation and marriage can in many respects be regarded as two sides of the same coin. Both represent "pair-bonding." And although Sweden tops the above list, if cohabitants are added to married women, the proportions of the "de facto" married in each age group are very similar. Among women aged 25-29, this proportion was 81 percent in Great Britain in 1980 and 78 percent in both Sweden and France in 1980-81.²² In that sense, it is wrong to conclude that "the end of marriage implies the end of the family." In assessing the demographic impact on family formation, it would be irrelevant to distinguish cohabiting couples or women from those who are married if the stability and fertility of these unions were the same.

Fertility

Total fertility rates

The days of the "king-child" are over in Europe. With few exceptions, current levels of fertility foretell population decline—which had already arrived by 1985 in Austria, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Hungary (see Table 2, page 13). As of 1984 or 1985, total fertility rates were above 2.10 lifetime births per woman—which is about the replacement fertility level needed to keep births and deaths in balance over the long run—only in Ireland, Malta, and Poland, as well as the USSR, among the countries shown in Table 5. Omitted from the table but also in this category were Albania and Turkey, with 1985 rates of about 3.4 and 3.8, respectively, according to current United Nations medium estimates. In Eastern Europe, Hungary's rate is lowest at 1.74 in 1984 and 1.83 in 1985. Most rates in the other three regions as of 1984 or 1985 were closer to 1.5. But Luxembourg's rate was down to 1.39 in 1985 and the rate of 1.29 in the Federal Republic of Germany for both 1984 and 1985 was the lowest ever recorded for any country in the world.

Table 5. Total Fertility Rates in European Countries: 1950-1985

(Average number of lifetime births per woman at current age-specific fertility rates)

Region and country	1950	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1983	1984	1985
Northern Europe									
Denmark	2.58	2.54	2.61	1.95	1.92	1.55	1.38	1.40	1.45
Finland	3.16	2.71	2.47	1.83	1.68	1.63	1.74	1.70	1.65
Iceland	3.86	4.29	3.71	3.00	2.65	2.48	2.24	2.08	1.93
Ireland	—	3.75	4.03	3.87	3.41	3.23	2.74	2.58	2.49
Norway	2.53	2.85	2.93	2.51	1.98	1.72	1.66	1.66	1.66
Sweden	2.30	2.17	2.42	1.94	1.77	1.68	1.61	1.65	1.73
United Kingdom	2.22	2.69	2.83	2.44	1.82	1.92	1.77	1.77	1.80
Western Europe									
Austria	—	2.65	2.68	2.30	1.83	1.65	1.56	1.52	1.47
Belgium	2.34	2.52	2.60	2.24	1.73	1.69	1.56	1.52	1.49
France	2.93	2.73	2.84	2.47	1.93	1.94	1.79	1.81	1.82
Fed. Rep. Germany	2.10	2.37	2.50	2.02	1.45	1.45	1.33	1.29	1.29
Liechtenstein	—	—	—	2.61	1.67	2.02	1.62	1.93	—
Luxembourg	—	2.29	2.41	1.97	1.63	1.51	1.45	1.43	1.39
Netherlands	3.09	3.12	3.04	2.57	1.66	1.60	1.47	1.49	1.50
Switzerland	2.40	2.44	2.61	2.10	1.61	1.55	1.52	1.53	1.51
Southern Europe									
Greece	2.57	2.23	2.32	2.36	2.33	2.21	1.94	1.82	—
Italy	2.49	2.41	2.55	2.43	2.19	1.66	1.51	1.50	1.42
Malta	—	—	—	—	2.20	2.20	2.20	2.20	—
Portugal	3.04	3.13	3.07	2.76	2.59	2.14	1.95	1.87	—
Spain	2.46	2.79	2.97	2.82	2.80	2.22	1.71	—	—
Yugoslavia	3.74	3.80	2.71	2.29	2.27	2.13	—	—	—
Eastern Europe									
Bulgaria	2.94	2.30	2.03	2.18	2.23	2.05	2.00	1.99	—
Czechoslovakia	3.04	2.39	2.37	2.07	2.43	2.16	2.08	2.07	2.07
German Dem. Rep.	2.30	2.33	2.48	2.19	1.54	1.94	1.79	1.74	—
Hungary	2.60	2.02	1.82	1.96	2.35	1.91	1.75	1.74	1.83
Poland	3.71	2.98	2.52	2.20	2.27	2.26	2.40	2.37	2.31
Romania	3.17	2.34	1.91	2.89	2.60	2.43	2.00	—	—
USSR	2.88	2.84	2.46	2.39	2.41	2.26	2.37	2.41	—

Sources: Council of Europe, *Recent Demographic Developments*, 1986, p. 67; Calot, personal communication, 1986; and Monnier, "La conjoncture démographique," and personal communication, 1986.

Note: A total fertility rate of 2.10 is about the "replacement" level of fertility needed to keep births and deaths in balance over the long run.

As seen in Table 5, fertility trends since 1950 have varied from country to country, but the greatest contrast is between Eastern Europe (Group 3 countries) and the rest of Europe. In Eastern Europe, a decline in the total fertility rate began after a brief postwar baby boom and was generally marked between 1950 and 1965. The exception was the German Democratic Republic, which followed one of the two patterns characteristic of the rest of Europe in this period: The rate tended to rise in countries where it had

been fairly low in 1950 (as in the GDR) but remained stable in countries where the 1950 rates were well above average. In 1965, the year of the "Great Divide," nearly all countries of Northern, Western, and Southern Europe had a total fertility rate above 2.50, and often well above, while the rates in Eastern Europe were almost all below that level.

Fertility trends since 1965 have been irregular in Eastern Europe. At some point the rates have risen and then usually dropped again in all six countries

Box 1. German Democratic Republic: Pronatalist Measures Reap Success

From the late 1960s, the population of the German Democratic Republic aged rapidly as the birth rate fell from 16.5 per 1,000 population in 1965 to 10.4 in 1974. Deaths exceeded births. This trend came to a halt in the mid-1970s. Natural increase turned positive again and since the early 1980s, births have exceeded deaths by about 2,300 a year. There are three reasons why the GDR is one of the few countries in the world that has managed to reverse a decline in fertility. First, the standard of living of young families improved. Second, a pronatalist population policy was introduced in 1976. Third, there was an increase in the number of women in the childbearing ages (women born during the birth rate rise in the 1960s).

The upturn in births occurred despite the unrestricted availability of contraceptives and legal abortion on request during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy. The government measures were based on two principles. Most important is that women and families must be given the opportunity to have children, while at the same time women must be guaranteed the economic independence of employment. The second principle is that single measures to increase fertility can only lead to short-term effects.

The measures introduced in 1976 include:

- Beginning with the second birth, mothers are entitled to a "baby year," or year of leave, with an allowance amounting to 70-80 percent of salary.
- Mothers may take leave up to a child's third birthday, with reemployment guaranteed after that.
- Mothers have an extra day of leave per month to work at home.



A family outing in the GDR.

- Mothers of two children and more may work a 40-hour week (instead of 43¾ hours) at full pay.
- Day care nurseries were expanded to meet 70 percent of needs.
- Priority in allocation of housing is given to households with a certain number of children.
- Low-interest loans are available at the time of marriage and birth of each child to subsidize buying a home or home equipment.

Source: W. Speigner and G. Winkler, *Pronatalist Population Policy in the GDR*, paper presented at the DGWB/EAPS Conference on the Demographic Impact of Political Action, Bielefeld, March 11-14, 1986

of the region. In five countries, the rise was associated with government pronatalist measures (see boxes on the German Democratic Republic, this page, and Romania, page 30). However, the upswing in Poland in the early 1980s seems to have been spontaneous (see box, page 53).

The history of fertility change in the

rest of Europe after 1965 is one of decline, with some signs of stability in recent years. In a few countries, the total fertility rate has turned up slightly since 1983, most notably in Denmark and Sweden, which suggests that the low point may have been reached. Apparently not all "king-pairs" want to have only one child!

That the rise in fertility in Northern and Western Europe until the mid- to late-1960s was associated with the decline in age at first marriage is evident from a comparison of the contribution to the total fertility rate of women under age 25 with that of women aged 30 and over, as shown in Figure 5 (next two pages). In the six countries of these regions included in the figure, the part of the total fertility rate accounted for by women under age 25 increased until 1965, reaching a range generally between 0.85 and 1.10 births per woman. At the same time, the contribution of women over 30 fell and in 1975 was only about 0.40 to 0.50 births per woman in this age group. After 1975 the level stayed more or less constant for women over 30 but fell markedly for women under age 25. In Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Netherlands, women under 25 now account for less of the total fertility rate than women older than 30.

In the three Southern European countries shown in Figure 5, the level for women under 25 continued to rise until 1975 and then also plunged, particularly in Italy (a Group 1 country). The steady decline since 1965 in the share of the total fertility rate accounted for by women over 30 suggests the increasing popularity of contraception among older women, although modern contraceptives have not been easily available in Italy, Portugal, and Spain until recently.

In Eastern Europe since at least 1955, fertility among women under age 25 has averaged more than one birth per woman—much higher than the level of women this age elsewhere in Europe—and women over 30 have accounted for very little of the total fertility rate. In 1983 women under 25 in the German Democratic Republic contributed 1.09 births per woman to the total fertility rate of 1.75 births per woman, while the figure for women this age in the Federal Republic of Germany was 0.40 of the total fertility rate of 1.33. For women over 30, these figures were just 0.23 in the GDR and nearly twice as high—0.43—in the FRG.

Birth order


Fertility trends since 1950 are of course also reflected in the distribution of births by birth order. Almost everywhere, the share of third and higher-order births among all live births dropped rapidly after the 1950s, particularly after 1965. This trend clearly reflects improved contraception, including sterilization among couples who consider their families complete, and easier access to abortion. Illustrative of the latter was the dramatic rise in the proportion of third and higher-order births in Romania following the legal abortion restrictions of October 1966 (see box, page 30).

In some Northern and Western European countries, the proportion of third and higher births has risen perceptibly since the late 1970s. Among the reasons for this are the “marriage bust,” which reduces the number of first and second births, and the presence in some countries of sizable immigrant groups whose fertility is relatively high. But a third element, undoubtedly, is that the decline in marital fertility appears to have ended in these countries. Couples who elect to marry apparently want about as many children as their predecessors.

In Northern, Western, and Southern Europe, third and higher-order births now typically account for 20 to 25 percent of total births. The distribution of the other three-quarters by birth order is strikingly similar: In 1984 in Denmark, Norway, the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany, first births made up almost exactly 45 percent of all births and second births, 35-37 percent. The share of first and second births has gone up significantly since the 1950s in these five countries.





The pattern is more varied in Eastern Europe, probably as a result of government measures to raise birth rates and restrict abortion in some countries, and limited access to modern contraceptives. In 1980 more than 30 percent of total births were third and higher order in Romania, but only 10 percent in the Ger-

Figure 5. Contribution of Women Under Age 25 and 30 and Over to the Total Fertility Rate in Selected European Countries: 1950-1984



Sources: UN, *Demographic Yearbook* 1965 (New York: 1966) and *Demographic Yearbook, Special Issue: Historical Supplement* (New York: 1979); Council of Europe, *Recent Demographic Developments*, 1986; and Eurostat *Demographic Statistics*, 1986.

Births per woman aged 30 and over



Box 2. Unmarried Motherhood in Austria

A relatively large number of children are born out of wedlock in Austria. This is only partly attributable to "modern" trends in life styles and sexual ethics as in Sweden, for example. In Austria, the main factors are tradition, family policy, and the fact that the Roman Catholic Church has recovered little of its influence lost during the German occupation of 1938-1945.

During the 19th century, about a third of women were unmarried at birth. The proportions were especially high in the districts of Karnten and Salzburg, as well as in the eastern districts of North Tirol, southwest Oberösterreich, the Inn Valley, and Western and Upper Styria.

The overall proportion of out-of-wedlock births declined dramatically to 11.2 percent in 1965 and then rose, even though marital fertility has remained relatively constant since 1977 after an initial drop. At present, more than 22 percent of children are born out of wedlock, and more than 35 percent in some districts. The Murau district in south-central Austria is highest at 42 percent during 1981-83.

Extramarital fertility is highest in districts where it was a widespread, socially accepted phenomenon during the last century. Rural hereditary rights prescribed that only children who had the right to inherit the fam-

ily farm could marry, unless the partner was heir to the farm of his or her father, and only one child—usually the eldest—had the right to inheritance. As a result, many remained unmarried. Moreover, the heir him/herself was not allowed to marry until the father died. Before the father's death, the heir and his/her partner as well as the unmarried children all lived in the parental home. Children born out of wedlock were very welcome as labor for the farm.

Although the influence of hereditary rights is waning in agricultural communities and no more than 10 percent of all women work in rural areas, people are still tolerant of unmarried mothers and more accepting of changing sexual and marital norms in these districts than in districts without this tradition. The "modernization" of life styles which has increased extramarital fertility elsewhere in Northern and Western Europe has not played such an important role in Austria, as witnessed by the fact that unmarried mothers are not common among the social *avante-garde*, but rather among the farming population and lower classes.

Source: R. Münz, *Family and Socio-political Measures in Austria: Planned and Unplanned Effects*, paper presented at the DGBW/EAPS Conference on the Demographic Impact of Political Action, Bielefeld, March 11-14, 1986.

man Democratic Republic. In the GDR, the proportion of first births has dropped from 59 percent in 1974 to 54 percent currently, but early marriage is still linked with an early first birth in that country (see Table 4, page 15).

Out-of-wedlock births


Virtually all European countries have experienced an increase in out-of-wedlock births since the mid-1950s, the important exceptions being Czechoslovakia, Portugal, and Yugoslavia. However, the variation in proportions of out-of-wedlock births among total births is a particularly revealing measure of Europe's cultural diversity. Currently, the figures range from 0.6 percent in Malta and 1.6 percent

in Greece in 1983 to 45 percent in Iceland in 1983 and 46 percent in Sweden in 1985.

Some variation has been evident for a long time. In certain districts of Austria, for example, out-of-wedlock childbearing has been common for generations (see box). In general, countries where out-of-wedlock fertility has traditionally been high or low still tend to have rates well above or below the European average. In countries where the levels have traditionally been high, the proportions of out-of-wedlock births are usually highest in rural areas: among farmers because of inheritance rules and among landless farm workers because of their traditional religious nonconformity.

Figure 6. Out-of-Wedlock Fertility in Selected European Countries: 1950-1985

(Out-of-wedlock births as percent of total births)



Sources: Council of Europe, *Population Studies No. 16* (Strasbourg: 1985) and *Recent Demographic Developments*, 1986, p. 66.

In Eastern Europe, the proportions of out-of-wedlock births have been fairly stable at 5 to 10 percent since 1950, except in the German Democratic Republic where the figure was up to 23 percent in 1980 (see Figure 6). The proportions are generally low in Southern Europe, with Portugal currently highest at 10 percent. In Northern and Western Europe, increases have been substantial in recent decades, with a tripling or quadrupling in the proportion in Scandinavian countries.

In most of Europe, illegitimacy is still negatively correlated with the proportion of Catholics in the population and posi-

tively with the proportions of the non-religious or nonpracticing.²³ However, it is important to recall that the concept of "illegitimate" is changing greatly as European countries go through the "standard" sequence of changes in family formation. Technically, the measure remains the same but it covers different realities in countries at different stages of development. In one country it may still reflect failed "preventive" contraception; in another it will be accepted as normal. Somewhat paradoxically, it was the advent of "perfect" contraception that initially enabled couples to live together outside marriage without fear of unwanted pregnancy and forced marriage and now enables them to make a deliberate, self-fulfilling choice to have children. And since norms have changed, they can do so without fear that such children will be stigmatized. In fact, even a woman who does not want a stable relationship with a man can decide to have a child.

In an analysis of illegitimacy rates as a proportion of marital fertility rates, Swiss demographer François Höpflinger has shown that most of the increase in Northern and Western European countries reflects increases in sizes of the populations at risk—never-married, divorced, and widowed women.²⁴ Older women appear more likely than younger women to bear an out-of-wedlock child, though teenage pregnancy is significant in some of these countries. The analysis also shows a loosening of the relationship between marriage and childbearing over time.

That the availability of efficient contraceptives after the mid-1960s and wider access to legal abortion somewhat later reduced forced marriages in Northern and Western Europe is evident from the decline after 1970 in the number of births within eight months of marriage per 100 marriages among women aged 15-49. Now many of such births that may occur are likely to signify a deliberate decision to have a child and to marry once one is on the way. Höpflinger has also

shown, however, that an out-of-wedlock pregnancy is increasingly unlikely to prompt a marriage. Between 1970 and 1980, there was an increase in all the Northern and Western European countries he studied in the proportion of out-of-wedlock pregnancies (out-of-wedlock births plus births within eight months of marriage) that ended in an out-of-wedlock birth. By 1980 the proportion was over 80 percent in Denmark and Sweden. Elsewhere it was lower—62 percent in England and Wales, 61 percent in France, 50 percent in the Netherlands, 28 percent in Switzerland—but still indicative of a trend toward greater tolerance of births outside marriage. There is a clear recognition of the right to have a child, not only for unmarried couples in a stable union but also, in some countries, for other unmarried women.

The right *not* to have a child, or voluntary childlessness, is now also recognized. Höpflinger, in estimating the proportions of women born around 1940, 1945, and 1950 in five Western European countries who are likely to remain childless, found the proportions highest for the youngest cohort: 31 percent in Austria, 21 percent in the Federal Republic of Germany, and 20 percent in England and Wales. In France it was only 10 percent—another evidence of Europe's rich diversity.

Below-replacement fertility

The overall result of the changes in fertility behavior in European countries after 1950 has been that since the famous year of 1965, virtually all have reached a net reproduction rate well below 1.00. (The net reproduction rate is derived from the age-specific fertility and mortality rates of a given year and refers to women and their daughters. A rate of 1.00 signifies that each generation of women is having exactly enough daughters to replace itself in the population.) The first country to experience below-replacement fertility was Hungary in 1958; the most recent additions are, for example, Greece in 1981 and Portugal in

1982 (see Figure 7).

In the countries where the changes have been allowed to run their "natural course" without government intervention, trends in the net reproduction rate are very similar. The shift from the era of the king-child with parents to that in which king-pairs (or individuals) elect to have one or two children to enrich their own lives seems to have run along parallel lines. Figure 7 illustrates this particularly well for Northern and Western Europe. Elsewhere, government intervention has influenced the timing of events considerably.


Birth Control

Contraception and sterilization

The improvement in contraceptive technology in the mid-1960s and increased access to legal abortion and sterilization are important milestones in the standard sequence of family formation events. Indeed, it would be difficult to overestimate the socio-cultural, as well as demographic, impact of these phenomena. Contraception shifted from a measure used primarily to prevent births that would reduce a family's well-being and standard of living to a means toward achieving greater self-fulfillment. Modern contraception permits greater freedom in sexual relations and for the fecund, the choice for children is made only when it is felt this would enrich a relationship or realize more of the potential of the individuals concerned.

This is not to suggest that the fertility decline would not have occurred without improved contraception and easier access to legal abortion. It is well known that if the motivation is strong enough, people will find ways to control their fertility. But the timing and pace of the second demographic transition would have been different, different age groups would have been affected, more mistakes would have occurred, and the shift in norms might have been less spectacular.

Figure 7. Net Reproduction Rates in Selected European Countries: 1950-1985



Sources: UN, *Demographic Yearbook: Historical Supplement and Demographic Yearbook 1981* (New York: 1983); and Council of Europe, *Recent Demographic Developments*, 1986.

Note: See text for definition of the net reproduction rate. A rate of 1.00, exactly one daughter per woman, is the replacement level of fertility needed to keep births and deaths in balance over the long run.

The rapid change in contraceptive behavior can be traced through surveys conducted in several countries between 1966 and 1972 and another set of 1975 through 1978.²⁵ In the first period, the percentage of married women of child-bearing age currently using any form of contraception was just 35 percent in Turkey, but ranged from 59 to 77 percent elsewhere. Hungary in 1966 already had a net reproduction rate well below replacement level but 66 percent of contraceptive users practiced withdrawal and 16 percent used the condom; also, there were 1.3 abortions per live birth (see Figure 9, page 32). This was a clear demonstration of what strong motivation and tradition can achieve. In the other countries also in this first period, high proportions of married women using contraception relied on withdrawal and other traditional methods. In Dutch-speaking areas of Belgium (1966), 51 percent relied on withdrawal and 26 percent on the rhythm method. In France (1972), these proportions were 52 and 14 percent. In Yugoslavia (1970), 73 percent used withdrawal, as did 49 percent in Poland (1972) and 52 percent in Czechoslovakia (1970), while in England and Wales (1967), the condom was popular (41 percent). Around 1970, it was only in the Netherlands (1969), Denmark (1970), and Finland (1970) that the pill had already gained some popularity, with proportions of 45, 37, and 26 percent, respectively, among married women using contraception.

Surveys taken in the second period, 1975-78, revealed that the pill had become the most widely used method in most Northern and Western European countries, particularly among young women. Also important in some countries were the IUD (28 percent of contraceptive users in Norway in 1977) and sterilization (15 percent in Great Britain in 1976; 10 percent in Denmark in 1975). Traditional methods had lost ground in almost all countries. Withdrawal accounted for only 17 percent of contraceptive use in Hungary by 1977. How-

ever, the proportions using traditional methods were still high in other Eastern European countries. In Czechoslovakia in 1977, for example, 42 percent used withdrawal compared with 24 percent for the pill and IUD combined. In Romania, only 58 percent of women under 45 and married to their first husbands interviewed in a national survey of 1978 were using contraception; of these, 44 percent relied on withdrawal and 41 percent on rhythm. Also in Dutch-speaking Belgium in 1975-77, withdrawal and rhythm, used separately or together, were still practiced by 37 percent of current users.

Later surveys in a few countries indicate that the shift to more efficient methods continues. Robert Cliquet and Hein Moors have traced the current contraceptive use of birth cohorts interviewed in successive surveys conducted from the late 1960s to the early 1980s in the Netherlands and Dutch-speaking areas of Belgium. Pill use increased with women's age up to a peak in the late twenties or early thirties, and sterilization is clearly now popular to prevent births toward the end of the childbearing ages (see Table 6).

That sterilization is likely to become still more popular is evident from the researchers' estimates of the proportions of the married couples covered in the surveys who would ever adopt sterilization—the proportions already sterilized, either wife or husband or both, plus the proportions who might or intended to undergo sterilization, based on the wife's survey responses. For Dutch-speaking Belgian couples with wives born in 1947-51, this proportion was 76 percent. Most couples in this part of Belgium apparently prefer not to use the pill or IUD for extended periods of time. Once they have all the children they want, they are very likely to turn to sterilization to avoid further pregnancies.

Abortion

Although Northern and Western European countries were the first in Europe to adopt modern, efficient contraception of

Table 6. Contraceptive Use Among Birth Cohorts in Belgium and the Netherlands: 1966/69-1982/83

Women born:	Belgium (Dutch-speaking areas)			Netherlands			
	1942-1946			1945-1949			
	1966	1976	1983	1969	1975	1977	1982
Year surveyed:	1966	1976	1983	1969	1975	1977	1982
Age at survey:	20-24	30-34	37-41	20-24	26-30	28-32	33-37
<i>Percent distribution of women currently using contraception, by method</i>							
Withdrawal	60	24	11	7	3	—	—
Rhythm	18	8	5	13	3	—	—
Withdrawal and rhythm combined	3	7	10	—	—	—	—
Douche	1	—	—	—	—	—	—
Condom	8	9	8	28	12	9	10
Diaphragm	1	0	—	1	0	—	—
IUD	—	6	8	1	6	8	13
Pill	10	40	23	51	71	60	26
Sterilization	2	6	35	—	5	16	48

Source: R. L. Cliquet and H. G. Moors, "De anticonceptionele revolutie in Vlaanderen en Nederland" (The Contraceptive Revolution in Flanders and the Netherlands), in D. J. van de Kaa and R. Lesthaeghe (eds.), *Bevolking: Groei en Krimp* (Population: Growth and Decline) (Deventer: van Loghum Slaterus, 1986) Tables 3 and 4.

— = no data available or not reported.

a large scale, Eastern Europe was the forerunner in permitting freely available legal abortion. The USSR, in 1920, was the first country ever to legalize abortion at the request of any woman without restrictions in the first 12 weeks of pregnancy. Abortion was banned again in 1936 but reinstated, on request, in 1955. Following this lead, five of the six Eastern European countries have permitted abortion on request for varying periods since the mid-1950s: Bulgaria, April 1956-January 1968; Czechoslovakia, broad liberalization December 1957-December 1962, on request from January 1987; German Democratic Republic, March 1972 to the present; Hungary, June 1956-January 1974; Romania, September 1957-October 1966.²⁶ Except in the GDR and with the latest change in Czechoslovakia, these periods of unrestricted abortion were followed by moderate or broad legal restrictions or restrictive interpretations of the law (see box on Romania, page 30). Poland's law of 1956, permitting abortion on broad socioeconomic grounds though not on request, still stands.

Legal abortion on broad grounds or on

request came much later in the rest of Europe. Abortion is still permitted only to save a woman's life in Belgium, Malta, and Ireland. Yugoslavia followed the Eastern European pattern: liberalization began in 1952 and since 1974, the right to a "free decision on childbirth" is guaranteed in the country's constitution. Liberalization began in the 1930s in Iceland, Denmark, and Sweden and spread to Finland and Norway after World War II. But most broad changes in Northern and Western Europe occurred in the early to mid-1970s. As in Eastern Europe, individual countries have their own specific sets of requirements, safeguards, and limits. In several countries, interpretation of the law changed over time, while de facto liberalization may have preceded de jure changes by years. One example is the Netherlands, where nonprofit abortion clinics operated freely from the early 1970s, although a liberalized abortion law was not passed until 1981. Long and bitter struggles have usually preceded and followed parliamentary debates and decisions on abortion law. In Italy, for example, the law was liberalized in 1978. A subsequent attempt to repeal this stat-

Box 3. Romania: Permanent Struggle Against Falling Birth Rates



A Romanian country girl. The government wishes there were many more like her.

Following the lead of the USSR and other Eastern European countries, Romania legalized abortion on request in September 1957. By 1965 the abortion ratio had soared to about 4,000 per 1,000 live births and the birth rate had dropped to 14.6 per 1,000 population.

To reverse these trends, legal abortion was suddenly and drastically restricted and the import of contraceptives curtailed in October 1966. Abortion was authorized only for victims of rape or incest, for women over 45

or with four living children, where there was a chance that the child would be handicapped, and under a few other special mental and physical conditions.

The following year, in 1967, abortions dropped to about the 1958 level and the birth rate surged to 27.4. However, the trends reversed again and by 1983 the birth rate had dropped to 14.3 and abortions were up to 1,300 per 1,000 births—most of them provided on "mental health" grounds. In March 1984, President Nicolae Ceausescu announced dramatic new pronatalist measures:

- Doctors who perform abortions other than under the strict terms of the 1966 law (only for women over 45 or with four living children and for medical reasons) are subject to 25 years' imprisonment or even death.
 - The minimum age at marriage for women was lowered to 15.
 - Childless couples will be taxed an extra 5 percent on top of a surcharge already levied.
 - All women aged 20-30 must regularly undergo a pregnancy test, followed by a monthly checkup in the event of pregnancy.
- The official target is a fertility rise to four children per woman. This number is now held up as "the most sublime duty toward the nation and its people." Women who do not meet the target risk their careers.

Sources: "Romanian Population Policy," *Population and Development Review*, Vol. 10, No. 3 (September 1984) pp. 570-537; "In Brief: Romania," *People*, Vol. 11, No. 4 (1984) p. 35; "How Romania Tries to Govern Fertility," *Population Today*, February 1987.

ute was defeated by popular referendum. In the United Kingdom, at least 11 attempts have been made in parliament to restrict the liberal abortion act of 1967. "So far, these attempts have been unsuccessful," reported abortion statistics experts Christopher Tietze and Stanley Henshaw in 1986.²⁷

Reliable data even on legal abortion are not easy to obtain. The most frequently available measure is the legal abortion ratio: the number of legal abortions per 1,000 live births. Figure 8

shows the current ranking on this measure for the 19 European countries with recent data. The ratio for Romania at the top of the list—1,300 in 1983, before the 1984 restrictions—is 12 times the ratio of the Netherlands at the bottom, 107 in 1984. Except for Poland, the ratios of Eastern Europe are generally higher than in the rest of Europe. Women in Eastern Europe average 1 to 2.5 legal abortions in their lifetime, in contrast to a general range of 0.2 to 0.6 elsewhere in Europe. Figure 9 (page 32) shows trends in

legal abortion ratios since 1960 for eight countries. It can be seen that legalization was relatively late in Western Europe and especially that significant fluctuations in abortions occurred in Eastern Europe. These resulted from changes in legal provisions and/or practice.

Tomas Frejka has analyzed the impact of such changes on contraceptive behavior and fertility in Eastern Europe.²⁸ He estimates that in the mid-1960s in Romania and also in the USSR, the total abortion rate, or average number of lifetime abortions per woman under the prevailing conditions, was well over 7. In such situations, he writes: "... where modern contraceptive means are scarce ... legal induced abortions can perform a role modern contraceptive devices now commonly perform where they are available." He notes that abortion liberalization invariably led to an increase in the incidence of abortion, moderate in the countries like Czechoslovakia with "widespread experience with traditional contraceptives," but large elsewhere. Where modern contraceptives became widely used, as in the German Democratic Republic and Hungary in the 1970s, the incidence of abortion declined. He concludes that legal abortion has had more "fertility inhibiting" effect in Eastern Europe than in other regions of the world, but the impact of abortion has been less than that of contraception, even though legal abortion levels have been the world's highest and withdrawal, at least through the 1970s, was the most commonly used contraceptive method. Summing up, he writes:

"The extent to which fertility trends were affected by the relatively easy access to induced abortion remains an open question. The early years of the liberal abortion legislation [the late 1950s] were also years of fertility decline. It is likely that the abortion legislation facilitated and possibly expedited the ongoing fertility declines. Restrictions in the liberal abortion legislation—which were almost always coupled with pronatalist economic and social measures—generated some fertility increases of a transitory nature. In the long run, however, it would seem that even

Figure 8. Legal Abortion Ratios in 19 European Countries: Latest Available Year

(Legal abortions per 1,000 live births)


Romania 1983	1,311
Yugoslavia 1984	1,022
Bulgaria 1984	925
Hungary 1984	691
Czechoslovakia 1985	529
German Dem. Rep. 1984	422
Denmark 1984	400
Italy 1984	382
Sweden 1984	328
Norway 1984	280
France 1984	232
Austria 1983	225
Finland 1984	209
United Kingdom 1984	199
Poland 1984	190
Iceland 1983	162
Fed. Rep. of Germany 1985	143
Netherlands 1984	107

Sources: Monnier, INED, personal communication, 1986; *Eurostat Demographic Statistics*; and C. Tietze and S. K. Henshaw, *Induced Abortion: A World Review 1986*, 6th edition (New York: Alan Guttmacher Institute, 1986).

though the incidence of induced abortion might be high, fertility levels have been only marginally affected by abortion legislation."

Frejka appears to believe that easier access to abortion (and efficient contraception) has mattered less in Europe's second demographic transition than motivation, or as phrased at the beginning of this section: "If the motivation is strong

Figure 9. Legal Abortion Ratios in Selected European Countries: 1960-1984



Sources: Eurostat Demographic Statistics, 1984; H. P. David, "Eastern Europe: Pronatalist Policies and Private Behavior," *Population Bulletin*, Vol. 36, No. 6 (Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau, 1982); Monnier, personal communication, 1986; Tietze and Henshaw, *Induced Abortion*: 1986; UN, *Demographic Yearbook*, 1972, 1980, 1984.

enough people will find ways to control their family size." Perhaps that is so. But it should also be noted that Frejka does not deal with the socio-cultural aspects of contraception and abortion and thus with the ideological or normative shifts in

thinking which liberalizations and restrictions represent. And these will be correlated with changes in the status of women and other variables, so the indirect effects may thus be considerable. Moreover, it should be recognized that abortion is by nature more a "preventive" than a "self-fulfilling" means of birth control. One has to make a decision "not to have" rather than "to have" a child. This in itself may help explain the differences in fertility behavior between Eastern European countries and the rest of Europe.

Household Patterns

The changes in the propensity to marry, divorce, separate, remarry, or cohabit and changes in fertility behavior and in the ages at which children leave home, along with mortality trends and differentials, have had a marked impact on household patterns in Europe. The once uniform pattern of the nuclear family household comprised of a married couple and their children has been replaced by a much more complex and diverse pattern. Two women without partners may jointly care for their children, a divorced man may do it alone, a pair may raise their children in good harmony but in two different places, more people now live alone, and so on. Comparative data are scarce, partly because statistical definitions of households vary from country to country, and some relevant events, like children leaving the parental home, seldom appear in statistics. But some research gives a picture of the current diversity.

Living arrangements of young people

Recent research by British demographer Kathleen Kiernan casts light on young people's shift to independence and their living arrangements in Northern and Western Europe. For the United Kingdom as of 1981, she calculated that by age 21, 34 percent of men and 52 percent of

women have left their parental home, 4 percent of men and 9 percent of women have entered a first cohabiting union, 7 percent of men and 24 percent of women have married, and 4 percent of men and 13 percent of women have had a child.²⁹ These figures portray a gradual transition to independence, related, for example, to leaving full-time education and entering a job.

Data for six countries in 1982 (United Kingdom, Ireland, the Netherlands, France, Federal Republic of Germany, and Denmark) reveal considerable differences in living arrangements of 20-24 year-olds.³⁰ Among men, the proportion still living with parents was highest in Ireland (62 percent) and lowest in Denmark (26 percent). For women, those figures were 57 and 11 percent. The great majority of the men and women who had left home were living with a partner, almost all in a marriage in the U.K. and Ireland, but often in cohabitation elsewhere, especially in Denmark. Living alone or sharing accommodations with unrelated persons were 39 percent of men in Denmark, 26 percent in the Federal Republic of Germany, and about 15 percent in the Netherlands and France. The proportions were only marginally higher for women.

Country variations in the proportion of young people living independently of parents may partly reflect stages in the move toward greater "individualism." However, many other factors will also be involved, such as the availability of cheap rental housing and of jobs and training facilities in the home locality. In countries with housing shortages, young people are probably particularly less likely to leave home to live alone or share accommodations.

One-person households

Between about 1960 and 1980, proportions of one-person households rose markedly and average household size shrank in virtually all European countries for which data are available (see Table 7, page 34). Demographer Karl Schwarz

correctly points out that in addition to the shift toward more independent life styles, other important factors in these trends are the improved health and financial situation of the elderly, the fact that few European households now have live-in servants, and the unsuitability of most urban housing for more than a one-generation family.³¹

The increases in one-person households are generally most marked and the proportions of such households around 1980 are highest in Northern and Western Europe. In 1980 the proportion of households with only one person ranged as high as 33 percent in Sweden and 30 percent in the Federal Republic of Germany. In the four Southern European countries shown in Table 7, these proportions were still only 11 to 13 percent.

French sociologist Louis Roussel has shown that men form an increasingly large share of persons in one-person households in some European countries.³² Between 1960 and 1980, the number of males per 100 females in one-person households remained unchanged at 45 in the Federal Republic of Germany, but increased from 47 to 53 in France, 42 to 55 in the Netherlands, 66 to 77 in Sweden, and 40 to 60 in Switzerland. The shift did not follow a straight line, which again may reflect different stages of development. It is possible, for example, that in a first stage large numbers of widows dominate the sex ratio of persons living alone and at a later stage, represented probably by Sweden, there are relatively large numbers of divorced or separated men who opt to live alone and this moves the sex ratio in a different direction. It needs to be emphasized that economic conditions have a direct bearing on the possibility of being able to live alone. If the economic climate is unfavorable for the young, the divorced, and the elderly, the ultimate expression of individualism—"living alone"—has little chance of becoming widespread.

Data for Switzerland suggest how the trend in persons living alone may be evolving. Between 1960 and 1980

**Table 7. Household Size in Selected European Countries:
Around 1960 and 1980**

Region and country	Year	Percent distribution of households by number of persons					Average persons per household
		One	Two	Three	Four	Five or more	
Northern Europe							
Denmark	1960	20	27	20	18	15	2.9
	1981	29	31	16	16	8	2.4
Finland	1960	22	19	18	16	25	3.3
	1980	27	26	19	18	10	2.7
Ireland	1966	13	20	17	14	36	4.0
	1977	16	22	15	15	32	3.9
Norway	1960	18	24	21	19	19	3.1
	1980	28	26	16	18	12	2.7
Sweden	1960	20	27	22	18	13	2.8
	1980	33	31	15	15	6	2.3
England and Wales	1966	15	31	21	18	15	3.0
	1981	22	32	17	18	11	2.7
Western Europe							
Austria	1951	18	27	22	15	18	3.1
	1980	26	26	17	16	14	2.8
France	1962	20	27	19	15	20	3.1
	1975	22	28	19	15	15	2.9
Fed. Rep. Germany	1961	21	26	23	16	14	2.9
	1980	30	29	18	15	8	2.5
Netherlands	1960	12	24	19	18	27	3.6
	1979	21	29	16	21	13	2.9
Southern Europe							
Greece	1951	9	16	18	19	39	4.1
	1979	11	21	21	24	22	3.8
Italy	1961	—	—	—	—	—	3.6
	1977	13	22	22	21	22	3.3
Portugal	1960	8	19	22	19	32	3.9
	1981	—	—	—	—	—	2.9
Yugoslavia	1961	14	15	17	19	35	4.0
	1971	13	16	19	21	31	3.8
Eastern Europe							
Bulgaria	1956	6	18	23	24	28	3.7
	1975	17	23	21	21	18	3.1
Czechoslovakia	1961	14	27	22	20	17	3.1
	1980	22	—	66	—	12	2.8
Hungary	1960	15	26	24	19	17	3.1
	1980	20	28	22	19	11	2.8
Poland	1960	16	19	19	20	27	3.5
	1978	17	22	23	21	17	3.1
USSR ^a	1959	—	26	26	22	26	3.7
	1979	—	30	29	23	19	4.0

Source: K. Schwarz, "Household Trends in Europe After World War II," in N. Keilman, A. Kuijsten, and A. Vossen (eds.), *Modelling Household Formation and Dissolution*, forthcoming.

^aData are for family households only.

among persons living alone, there was a marked increase in never-married males (22 percent of all persons living alone in 1980), an increase in the fraction of divorced or separated men (10 percent of the total in 1980), a decline in never-married women (28 percent in 1980), and a decline in widows (33 percent in 1960; 26 percent in 1980).

Single-parent family households

Among families and households, those headed by a single parent deserve special attention. In comparing figures for three different dates in six Western European countries, Roussel noted a slight but not insignificant increase in the proportion of single-parent families among all households. Around 1980, the highest proportion was found in the Netherlands (6 percent), followed by Switzerland and France (5 percent), Sweden and the Federal Republic of Germany (4 percent), and England and Wales (3 percent). The proportions appear to be higher in Eastern Europe. For Hungary, Kamarás reports one-parent families at 13 percent of all families in 1984 and 20 percent of families with children.³³ Women headed 82 percent of one-parent families in 1984 and men, 18 percent—up from 9 percent in 1960. In Poland, one-parent families increased slightly from 13 percent of all families in 1970 to 14 percent in 1984, when close to 90 percent of these families were headed by a woman.³⁴

The proportion of one-parent families headed by women rose between 1960 and 1980 in almost all countries for which there are data; by about 1980, the proportions generally ranged from 80 to 90 percent. As might be expected, fewer of these lone mothers were widows by the later date: 21 percent in the Netherlands and 22 percent in Czechoslovakia, although still 75 percent in Italy. Many more were divorced or separated: 71 percent in Czechoslovakia, 66 percent in the Netherlands, 48 percent in Switzerland, 42 percent in the Federal Republic

of Germany. Proportions of never-married mothers among these families were small, ranging only up to 13 percent in the Netherlands.³⁵

The increase in divorce and cohabitation clearly has implications for the lives of children in Europe. Today's children are much more likely than their predecessors in the 1960s to experience the dissolution of their parents' marriage, living in a one-parent family, or being a child in a cohabiting union. From the little evidence available, it appears that apart from Denmark and Sweden, the one-parent situation is still generally temporary. However, children born to mothers living alone will, on average, spend more of their young lives in a one-parent family than those born in a marriage and children born to cohabiting couples are similarly more likely to spend part of their childhood with only one parent than those born to married couples. But the overwhelming majority of children still live with two parents: 83 percent of children under age 18 in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1981, for example.³⁶

This completes the story of how the "standard" sequence of changes in fertility and family formation behavior has evolved so far during the course of Europe's second demographic transition. Mortality and migration trends have had relatively little impact on population numbers, but immigration has left a lasting imprint on the population composition of many Northern and Western European countries.

Mortality Differentials

Mortality changes are of secondary importance in the second demographic transition. However, long-term population trends are being shaped significantly by the impact on aging patterns of the continued and substantial increase in

life expectancy everywhere except in Eastern Europe, by mortality differentials and changes associated with individual types of behavior and life styles, and by the growing gap in life expectancy between males and females.

Eastern Europe and the rest of Europe

Life expectancy at birth in Eastern Europe has historically been low by

European standards, so it is not surprising that this is still the case. Male life expectancies of less than 70 years now occur almost exclusively in that region (see Table 8). What is surprising, perhaps, is that life expectancy gains have been so modest in Eastern Europe in the past few decades. In fact, male life expectancy has declined since the mid-1960s in Czechoslovakia and Hungary and since the early 1970s in Bul-

Table 8. Life Expectancy and Infant Mortality Rates in European Countries: 1950, 1970, 1984

Region and country	Life expectancy at birth (years)						Infant mortality rate (Deaths under age one per 1,000 live births)		
	Males			Females			1950	1970	1984
	1950	1970	1984	1950	1970	1984			
Northern Europe									
Denmark	67.8	70.7	71.5	70.1	75.9	75.9	24.0	11.3	7.8
Finland	62.9	65.9	70.4	69.1	74.2	78.7	43.5	13.2	6.5
Iceland	66.1	70.7	74.0	70.3	76.3	80.2	18.6	10.7	6.1
Ireland	64.5	68.8	70.1 ^a	67.1	73.5	75.6 ^a	36.0	16.6	10.1
Norway	70.8	71.2	72.9	74.4	77.4	79.6	20.2	10.4	8.3
Sweden	70.0	72.0	73.8	72.7	77.0	79.9	17.0	9.5	6.4
United Kingdom	66.2	68.7	71.1 ^b	71.2	75.0	77.0 ^b	23.8	18.5	9.6
Western Europe									
Austria	61.9	66.6	70.1	67.6	73.7	77.3	42.4	22.2	11.4
Belgium	65.2	67.8	70.0 ^a	70.3	74.2	76.8 ^a	40.8	17.6	10.7
France	63.6	68.3	71.3	69.3	75.8	79.4	34.2	12.7	8.3
Fed. Rep. Germany	64.6	67.4	70.5 ^b	68.5	73.8	77.1 ^b	40.6	20.2	9.6
Luxembourg	61.7	67.0	70.0 ^a	65.8	73.9	76.7 ^a	40.7	20.0	11.7
Netherlands	70.6	70.8	73.0	72.9	76.8	79.7	19.4	10.7	8.3
Switzerland	66.4	70.2	73.1	70.9	76.2	79.7	25.6	12.4	7.1
Southern Europe									
Albania	57.2	—	—	—	—	—	108.0	—	—
Greece	63.4	72.0	72.2 ^c	66.7	76.1	76.3 ^c	46.5	25.7	14.3
Italy	63.9	69.0	70.6 ^c	67.5	75.0	77.4 ^c	56.5	25.8	11.1
Malta	60.7	68.2	70.4	63.3	72.7	75.0	63.2	23.3	11.7
Portugal	56.3	63.7	68.9 ^a	61.5	70.3	76.6 ^a	87.4	48.7	16.7
Spain	59.8	69.7	72.5 ^c	64.3	75.0	78.6 ^a	59.1	17.2	10.5 ^e
Yugoslavia	62.2	65.6	67.7 ^d	65.3	70.4	73.2 ^d	118.6	55.5	28.9
Eastern Europe									
Bulgaria	64.2	68.8	68.4 ^e	67.7	73.5	74.4 ^e	95	27.3	16.1
Czechoslovakia	60.9	66.2	67.1	65.5	72.9	74.3	78	22.1	15.1
German Dem. Rep.	65.1	68.9	69.5	69.1	74.2	75.4	72	18.5	10.0
Hungary	58.8	66.3	65.6	63.2	72.1	73.7	86	35.9	20.4
Poland	55.6	66.8	66.8	64.5	73.8	75.0	108	33.2	19.2
Romania	61.5	66.3	66.9 ^e	65.0	70.9	72.5 ^e	117	49.4	23.4
USSR	61	65	—	67	74	—	84	24.4	27.7 ^f

Sources: Council of Europe, *Recent Demographic Developments*, 1983, 1986; P. Józán, *Recent Mortality Trends in Eastern Europe*, paper presented at the Conference on Health for All in the Year 2000: The Case of Europe, British Society for Population Studies, London, June 23, 1986; Monnier, "La conjoncture démographique" and personal communication, 1986; UN, *Demographic Yearbook*, various editions.

^a1981. ^b1982. ^c1980. ^d1979. ^e1983. ^f1974.


garia and Poland.

Hungarian demographer Peter Józán suggests that differentials between Eastern Europe and other European countries should be viewed in light of the epidemiologic transition which occurred in Europe after World War II.³⁷ Infectious diseases (like pneumonia and influenza) and parasitic diseases (typhoid, diarrhea) were controlled, to be replaced by chronic degenerative diseases (heart disease, cancer, stroke) as the leading causes of death. This transition was completed by the late 1950s or early 1960s in most of Northern and Western Europe. The decline in adult mortality rates then leveled off, especially for males, while infant mortality rates continued to decline (Table 8). The plateau in adult mortality rates, or post-transitional stage, lasted some 10 to 15 years until mortality rates for heart disease and stroke in particular began to decline again with improvements in life styles and treatment methods. Life expectancy consequently rose further; a life expectancy of about 80 years at birth is now standard for women in Western Europe. In Eastern Europe, the post-transitional stage began later, in the mid-1960s or early 1970s. Infant mortality continued to decline, but adult mortality rates increased, mainly among males but also among women, and particularly above age 30. This can be seen in the trends in mortality rates for Eastern European males aged 40-44 in contrast to the trends in Austria and Sweden, as shown in Figure 10.

No single group of diseases appears to account for Eastern Europe's higher adult mortality (as well as infant mortality), although deaths from diseases of the circulatory system contribute substantially to the differential. A comparison of cause-specific mortality rates for 40-44 year-olds in 1964 and 1985 in Hungary reveals a rise in almost all the rates.³⁸ The rise was particularly marked for cirrhosis of the liver among both sexes, for lung cancer and ischemic heart disease among males, and ische-

Figure 10. Mortality Rates for Males Aged 40-44 in Eastern Europe, Austria, and Sweden: 1950/54-1985

Deaths per 1,000 males aged 40-44



Sources: P. Józán, *Recent Mortality Trends in Eastern Europe* (Budapest: Central Statistical Office, 1986).

mic heart disease and road accidents among females. This suggests that unhealthy practices, such as smoking, drinking, fat-laden diets, and careless driving exact a heavy toll in Hungary, and probably also in other Eastern European countries.

Sex differentials

A striking feature of European mortality patterns, as in most developed countries of the world, is the large differential in life expectancy between males and females. Female life expectancy now exceeds

male life expectancy by more than eight years in several countries and differences of less than five years are rare (Table 8). Male mortality exceeds female mortality especially in adolescence and early adulthood and after age 60. In the European Economic Community countries of Western Europe, male mortality at ages 15-19 and 20-24 is generally two to three times that of females.³⁹ Illnesses account for about half of female deaths in these age groups and a quarter of male deaths. Traffic accidents and suicide account for the remainder and are largely responsible for the excess male mortality.

In the general population of Southern, Western, and Northern Europe, cardiovascular diseases (heart disease and stroke) and cancer account for well over half of all deaths. This proportion increases progressively from southern to northern countries.

International Migration: Europe on the Receiving End

Historically, Europe has been a theater of emigration, populating many parts of the globe. Now Europe attracts people and has all the potential to do so in large numbers. Wages and incomes in almost all European countries are much higher than in the origin countries of prospective immigrants, even in times of economic recession and stagnation. Moreover, most European countries have comprehensive social welfare systems that particularly benefit low-income groups, including immigrants. With the added impetus of free-flowing communication and easy transportation, millions of people from other regions, especially Third World countries, would settle in Europe, given a reasonable chance to do so. That this does not actually happen is due entirely to the elaborate systems of immi-

gration control now in place in all European countries. These usually require a migrant to have residence and work permits before being allowed in. Although numerous aliens dodge these barriers to become "undocumented" or "illegal" immigrants—up to 1 million currently in Italy alone⁴⁰—the systems of control are basically effective.

Important to note is that Eastern Europe is currently little affected by international migration. Large numbers of refugees left the region in the first 15 years after World War II. In the 1960s, temporary labor migration was organized within the Comecon (the six Eastern European countries, plus the USSR). Bulgaria, Poland, and Hungary were the sending countries and the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR received immigrants. But this international migration within the region did not reach significant numbers, was not continued, and may not start again. Regarding the prospects for future international migration within or to Eastern Europe, Yugoslav demographer Milos Macura observes:

"Such ideological concepts as proletarian internationalism and workers' solidarity, and the theory of socialism as a world system, seem to favor international migration, at least between socialist countries. On the other hand, there must be political or other considerations which rule out international migration as a viable proposition."⁴¹

The story of postwar international migration in the rest of Europe falls broadly into two periods—before and after the 1973 OPEC quadrupling of oil prices which touched off a worldwide recession.⁴² From 1945 to 1973, emigrants still left several European countries for the classical destination countries: Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States. Immigrants began arriving in Western Europe's major industrialized countries in the early 1960s. These early influxes peaked around the mid-1960s, subsided with the recession of 1967, and mounted again between

1969 and 1973.

The major migration streams began as planned recruitment of guestworkers. Before 1967 these flows originated mainly from Northern Mediterranean countries—Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Yugoslavia. After 1967 Turkey and the Southern Mediterranean countries of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia became more important. Countries of settlement also followed a time sequence. Switzerland, Belgium, and France received the first wave of recruited workers, followed by Austria and the Federal Republic of Germany, and then the Netherlands.

Other important streams flowed toward countries with a colonial past. France took in a million residents from Algeria in the early 1960s. The Netherlands received sizable numbers from Indonesia and Suriname, while the United Kingdom became the focus of immigration from newly independent Commonwealth countries. Belgium and Portugal saw influxes from their former African colonies.

The final important streams stem from the establishment of the Nordic Council in the early 1950s. The largest of these is from Finland to Sweden.

After the oil crisis, the pattern and context of European immigration changed. Economic recession and stagnation relegated the severe labor shortages of the 1960s to the past. The receiving countries tried to stimulate return migration and to stem the tide of immigration and the effect of family reunification preferences by imposing a variety of restrictions. Liberal regimes were replaced by restrictive policies.

But change was not confined to the industrialized countries of Northern and Western Europe. Conditions improved in the countries of Southern Europe, both politically—in Portugal, Spain, and Greece—and socioeconomically. They adopted some welfare state policies and thus became more attractive to their own populations. Dutch sociologist Rinus Penninx observes that therefore, the “rather massive return flows to Spain, Greece, Italy, and Yugoslavia” cannot be

attributed solely to the deteriorating situation in Northern and Western Europe.⁴³ In fact, Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal became immigration countries themselves, attracting migrants from Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt across the Mediterranean and from more distant countries like Pakistan and Iran.

Also in this period, immigration from former colonies remained important. Portugal absorbed several hundred thousand people from Angola, Mozambique, and Cape Verde, with little trace statistically since they are considered Portuguese citizens and not aliens. Similarly, France has taken in some 10,000 a year of its citizens from its overseas departments, like Guadeloupe. The United Kingdom and the Netherlands also received their share. A large fraction of the population of Suriname left the country in the two years before independence in November 1975 and again in the late 1970s as conditions deteriorated. The population in the Netherlands originating from Suriname or the Netherlands Antilles is now estimated at a quarter of a million. In the United Kingdom, the population originating from Pakistan and other Commonwealth countries is well over 2 million.

Recent migrants fall into four broad categories: those who circulate freely among the ten (as of 1985) countries of the European Economic Community and the five Nordic countries, and those from Northern Mediterranean, Southern Mediterranean, and Third World countries. Table 9 (page 40) shows the numbers in these streams and rates of return migration for Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden in 1976 and the early 1980s.

It is apparent that entry restrictions cut the inflows sharply after 1980. However, by 1984 in all but the Netherlands there was a pickup in flows from Third World countries; these are mainly family members joining immigrants who arrived earlier. As might be expected, return migration rates are generally lowest for immigrants coming from Southern Medi-

Table 9. Immigration, Emigration, and Return Rates of Foreigners in Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Netherlands, and Sweden, by Region of Origin and Destination: 1976 and 1980-1984

Country	Year	European Economic Community and Nordic countries ^a			Southern Mediterranean countries ^b			Northern Mediterranean countries ^c			Third World countries ^d		
		Immigration	Emigration	Return rate	Immigration	Emigration	Return rate	Immigration	Emigration	Return rate	Immigration	Emigration	Return rate
Denmark	1976	6,900	5,900	13.4	1,400	800	9.5	1,100	1,100	10.9	3,000	2,100	12.6
	1980	7,800	7,300	15.7	1,600	400	2.8	900	700	6.9	3,500	1,600	8.0
	1984	6,200	4,700	10.1	800	300	—	900	500	—	3,600	1,400	—
Federal Republic of Germany	1976	116,500	172,800	14.6	109,400	133,700	11.9	135,200	262,400	13.8	41,900	33,900	15.1
	1980	156,000	134,100	11.1	218,600	73,600	4.8	153,200	158,800	8.6	92,800	40,600	11.3
	1982	92,600	136,600	11.1	46,800	91,000	5.5	82,100	160,700	8.7	53,000	64,800	—
	1983	76,000	122,000	10.5	31,100	104,800	6.5	67,200	146,300	8.4	46,700	55,200	—
	1984	78,500	107,700	9.4	37,800	219,900	14.7	70,700	141,900	8.5	62,600	51,800	—
Netherlands	1976	14,500	8,500	7.5	15,700	4,500	3.8	2,400	4,300	8.8	17,400	5,300	—
	1980	16,700	10,000	7.4	27,600	3,600	1.9	2,000	2,000	4.5	40,100	6,500	4.3
	1982	12,700	9,700	6.9	11,700	7,300	2.9	1,400	2,200	4.9	17,900	6,700	3.7
	1984	12,100	8,800	6.1	8,900	8,800	3.4	1,200	2,100	5.0	16,300	7,200	—
Sweden	1976	22,100	12,200	4.8	2,900	180	1.8	2,300	1,900	3.2	10,400	2,100	5.0
	1980	16,200	13,600	5.4	1,700	140	0.7	1,700	2,200	4.2	11,900	2,400	3.3
	1982	7,400	14,500	6.3	1,300	150	0.8	1,200	1,700	3.2	9,800	2,000	2.7
	1984	8,400	10,000	4.9	1,200	190	0.9	1,100	1,100	2.1	11,900	2,000	2.5

Source: R. Penninx, *International Migration in Europe: Developments, Mechanisms and Controls*, paper presented at the DGBW/EAPS Conference on the Demographic Impact of Political Action, Bielefeld, March 11-14, 1986.

^aEuropean Economic Community countries (1985): Belgium, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom; Nordic countries: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden.

^bSouthern Mediterranean countries: Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey.

^cNorthern Mediterranean countries: Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Yugoslavia.

^dThird World countries: Generally defined as all non-European countries (Turkey regarded as Asian by Sweden; European by the other three countries), minus North America.

terranean and Third World countries.

Besides immigrants, Europe, outside Eastern Europe, continues to receive refugees—32 percent of the 2.1 million refugees resettled or granted asylum in developed countries between 1980 and 1985, according to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee records. At the beginning of 1985, there were close to 700,000 persons counted as refugees in 17 European countries, as shown to the right.⁴⁴

In recent years, several European countries have imposed stricter controls on refugees in an effort to stem the surge in Third World people who arrive claiming to be refugees but who do not qualify on grounds of political persecution. Denmark, for example, passed a law in 1985

Country of asylum	Refugees as of Jan. 1, 1985
Austria	20,500
Belgium	36,400
Denmark	8,500
Finland	500
France	167,300
Fed. Rep. Germany	126,600
Greece	4,100
Italy	15,100
Netherlands	15,000
Norway	10,000
Portugal	600
Romania	1,000
Spain	9,900
Sweden	90,600
Switzerland	31,200
United Kingdom	135,000
Yugoslavia	1,600
Total:	673,000

Box 4. Federal Republic of Germany: Asylum-Seekers Pose a Problem

In 1986 the number of refugees seeking political asylum in the Federal Republic of Germany surged. Usually entering the country via the German Democratic Republic, there were 7,340 in June, 9,710 in July, and 9,241 already by August 22. The total for 1986 was expected to be over 100,000 and possibly break the record of 107,818 set in 1980.

Only some 16 percent qualify as politically persecuted persons under article 16 of the federal constitution: for example, Tamils from Sri Lanka, refugees from Cape Anamur in southern Turkey, and adherents of the Baha'i religion in Iran. This article, the only one like it in any other national constitution, was introduced following World War II to guarantee a place in the West for people wishing to leave Eastern Europe. Now most asylum-seekers come from Third World countries.

The FRG annually earmarks more than two billion marks to support refugees, pending a decision on whether they are eligible for asylum, which takes at least three years. Refugees not declared eligible for political asylum are subject to deportation. Refugees are not allowed to work for two years after arrival, a period that will now be extended to five years.

The government adopted measures to control the flood of uninvited refugees in August 1986. Announcing the measures at a press conference on August 27, Chancellor Helmut Kohl stated:

"I am not prepared to sit back and watch this development. For we want to remain a country . . . in which people who are truly persecuted for political reasons will find refuge However, we cannot permit this article of our constitution to be increasingly perverted and abused. It is simply impossible for the Federal Republic to grant asylum to anyone who is in economic distress but who is not politically persecuted. If we really want to help the deprived of the Third World, we must ensure that we put an end to the continuing abuse of our asylum laws. The federal government and the coalition partners have therefore implemented effective and far-reaching measures to protect the right to asylum."

Sources: "Cabinet Takes Measures on Asylee Problem," Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, news release, August 29, 1986; "West Germany Tightening Its Policy Toward Refugees," *The Washington Post*, August 16, 1986.

stipulating that refugees can be deported after two weeks if authorities determine that they do not meet this qualification and the Federal Republic of Germany also imposed stricter controls in 1986 (see box above).

Multi-Cultural Europe: The Minorities

The immigrant streams have had a tremendous impact on the ethnic, racial, cultural, and language composition of many European populations. In relative terms, Liechtenstein probably has the largest foreign population—36 percent of the total population in 1982—but there are also large proportions in Luxembourg

(26 percent in 1981) and Switzerland (15 percent in 1985). Table 10 (page 42) shows the foreign percentage of the total population in 11 Northern and Western European countries and in Italy for several years from 1960 to 1985.

In most countries, the increase has been continuous, with the few decreases occurring mainly after 1980. It should be stressed that the foreign proportion of the total population is not a very accurate measure of the size of the immigration streams. Immigrants who arrive with citizenship are not counted as foreigners. Immigrants also disappear from foreign population statistics after naturalization. Country attitudes and regulations regarding naturalization vary. Some countries feel it will facilitate integration and grant citizenship quickly; others see it as a final

Table 10. Foreign Proportion of Total Population in Selected European Countries: 1960-1985

(Numbers in percent)

Country	1960	1970	1976	1981	1985
Austria	1.4	2.8	3.6	3.9	3.6
Belgium	4.9	7.2	8.5	8.9	—
Denmark	0.4	0.8	1.8	2.0	2.1
France	4.7	5.3	6.6	6.8	—
Fed. Rep. Germany	1.2	4.9	6.4	7.5	7.1
Italy	—	0.3	—	0.5	—
Luxembourg	—	—	24.0	26.3	—
Netherlands	1.0	2.0	2.6	3.7	3.9
Norway	0.7	—	1.8	2.0	2.4
Sweden	—	5.1	5.1	5.0	4.7
Switzerland	9.2	16.3	16.4	14.5	14.5
United Kingdom	—	—	2.9	3.9	—

Source: Penninx, *International Migration in Europe*.

step in a long process of adjustment and assimilation. In the early 1980s, naturalization rates measured as the proportion of the foreign population acquiring citizenship each year were high in Sweden (4.6 percent), Norway (3.6 percent), Denmark (3.6 percent), the United Kingdom (3.0 percent), the Netherlands (2.8 percent), and Austria (2.7 percent). Remarkably low fractions were registered for the Federal Republic of Germany (0.3 percent), Luxembourg (0.7 percent), and even in the countries with the longest postwar immigration history: Belgium (1.0 percent), France (1.3 percent), and Switzerland (1.6 percent).⁴⁵

Foreign populations encompass a wide range of nationalities, but three or four usually make up a core. Sometimes these differ in religion from the host country and there are numerous instances of mosques converted from churches or synagogues or new mosques built and the amplified voice of the muezzin now calls followers to prayer in areas hitherto strictly Christian.

Of most interest demographically are the age structure, sex ratio, and fertility differentials between the foreign and host populations.

Sex ratio

As one might expect, males usually outnumber females in the foreign popu-

lation. The number of females per 100 males is lowest at 70 to 75 in the Netherlands, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany. The ratios are higher in Scandinavia, especially counting only the ever-married. This yields ratios close to or over 100 in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, though only 69 in Switzerland.⁴⁶ The difference reflects different approaches to family reunification and in the way residence and work permits are granted.

Fertility

Fertility trends among immigrant populations are difficult to establish and interpret. Changes in total fertility rates or levels of marital fertility may result from changes in policy. If, for example, a government decides that henceforth only women eligible for family reunification will receive residence permits, those who arrive will be mainly young brides or wives joining their husbands after a long separation. This will inflate the proportions of women at risk of conception and birth and consequently fertility levels. Conversely, if immigration from a certain region is greatly reduced, the proportion of newcomers in each age group will be small. Time and the processes of adaptation and adjustment will also have been at work and the combined result is likely to be a substantial

drop in average fertility.⁴⁷ In short, the composition of immigrant groups by duration of stay, type of immigration, marital status, rural or urban origin, level of education, etc. is highly important in judging fertility levels and trends.

Available data suggest that fertility rates of immigrant groups drop markedly once immigration streams have dried up; total fertility rates of the early 1980s were generally lower than those measured in the late 1960s or early to mid-1970s. The rates are now below replacement level for virtually all groups in Western Europe originating from elsewhere in Europe, except for Turks. Among Turks in the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands, total fertility rates have dropped from about 4.5 births per woman in the mid-1970s to less than 3.75. In the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, the rates of Caribbean women are now down to about 2.0. Indian-born women living in the United Kingdom had a total fertility rate of 4.3 in 1971, which was down to 3.1 in 1982. Only women of some North African (Moroccan) and Asian (Pakistani, Bangladeshi) groups still tend to give birth to more than six children on average.

Because of differences in age composition, marital status, and usually higher fertility levels, immigrant groups contribute more than their share to births in the countries of settlement. Figures in the mid-1970s were as follows:⁴⁸

Country of settlement	Percent immigrant of total births	Percent foreign of total population
Luxembourg	42.9	24.0
Switzerland	26.4	16.4
Belgium	14.5	8.5
Fed. Rep. Germany	14.4	6.4
Sweden	9.6	5.1
Austria	7.4	3.6
Netherlands	5.0	2.6
Denmark	2.8	1.9

Comparable figures are not available for France and the United Kingdom, but the foreign contribution to the national

birth rates at this time is put at well over 10 percent.

By the early 1980s, the proportions of immigrant births had gone up in some countries and down in others. This is partly related to the ethnic composition of the foreign population and, implicitly, fertility behavior, and partly to changes in definition. In Switzerland, for example, a law change of 1978 stipulates that a child born of a Swiss mother and a foreign father now acquires Swiss nationality at birth. Figures for the early 1980s were:

Country of settlement	Percent immigrant of total births	Percent foreign of total population
Luxembourg	38.5	26.3
Switzerland	16.5	14.5
Belgium	15.5	8.9
Fed. Rep. Germany	11.7	7.6
Sweden	10.2	5.1
Netherlands	8.1	3.7
Austria	7.3	3.9
Denmark	3.3	2.0

In contrast to fertility, immigrant populations still contribute less than their proportional share to total deaths. The younger age structure of foreign populations, return migration of older immigrants, and naturalization all contribute to this phenomenon.

Adjustment

European populations will no doubt adjust to the foreigners in their midst, for that "the guests have come to stay" can no longer be doubted. That was not the expectation or intention when the labor recruitment schemes of the 1960s were launched. But by now, multi-cultural Europe is a reality.

In Switzerland, for example, foreign children comprised 14 to 18 percent of all age groups below 22 at the beginning of 1983 and their presence is felt at all levels of schooling and training. There are marked differences by national origin. German children make up only 13 percent of all foreign children in Switzerland but 23 percent of foreign students in academic high schools. Italians, on the other hand,



Refugees seeking asylum in Switzerland. Europe is now tightening restrictions on refugees, as well as immigrants, in an effort to stem the influx of Third World people claiming to be refugees who do not meet the criteria of political persecution.

comprise 53 percent of foreign children but only 26 percent of the foreign-born among academic high school students.⁴⁹ Schools in the less privileged sections of larger Northern and Western European cities now frequently have a majority of foreign-born children among their pupils. Stories abound about the difficulties this creates. Governments differ in their views on how best to handle the situation. At first it was felt that training the young in their own language and emphasizing their separate cultural heritage would facilitate an eventual return to their home countries. Now that this prospect has faded, gradual integration and mutual adaptation of host and guest populations, coupled with increased emancipation, are seen as more realistic alternatives. One might say that the dilemma governments faced after 1973—a choice between politics stressing the “temporary” or the “permanent” nature of the immigration—has been solved by time.

Population Prospects

Seven European countries, in addition to the USSR, ranked among the world's 25 most populous countries in 1985: Federal Republic of Germany (No. 12), Italy (14), United Kingdom (15), France (16), Turkey (19), Spain (24), and Poland (25). The latest United Nations medium projections of 1984 show five still on the list in 2000, but only two in the year 2025: Turkey (16) and France (25). The UN comments:

“According to the medium variant, Western Europe is expected to enter a phase of negative population growth around the year 2000, and Northern Europe around the year 2020, following a period of almost zero growth at the beginning of the twenty-first century. These low growth rates imply that Europe, which was still the third most populous region in 1980, following South Asia and East Asia, will have a population in 2025 which is about two-thirds that of Latin America and only one-third that of Africa.”⁵⁰

The medium variant projections indicate that while the world's population nearly doubles from 4.5 to 8.2 billion between 1985 and 2025, Europe's population (excluding the USSR) will inch up only 6 percent, from 492 to 524 million. Several countries will lose population, with the loss greatest in Northern and Western Europe. The population of the Federal Republic of Germany could well decline from 61 million in 1985 to 53 million in 2025.

The UN medium variant projections assume that Europe's total fertility rate will remain below replacement level until the end of this century and then rise to 2.05 births per woman in 2020-2025. Even the low variant projections assume some “recovery,” although to a level still well below replacement.

How reasonable are such assumptions? Almost all European countries also make their own population projections, usually with rather sophisticated models. Current assumptions about future total fertility rates vary from as low as 1.4 to as high as 2.4. While some countries such as Bel-

gium assume the current low fertility will be temporary, others see little prospect of a rise. Population projections, it should be recognized, are always strongly influenced by existing trends and current theories do not suggest than any one course can be taken as most likely. The only sensible attitude is not to be dogmatic and not to exclude the unexpected. However, those who argue that a rise in Europe's fertility cannot be excluded can nowadays expect to be greeted with derision. And, indeed, there is little to point to in support of that position. Of course, one might recall that in 1936, the eminent British demographer A.M. Carr-Saunders wrote of Europe:

"With the possible exception of Russia, the net reproduction rate is falling everywhere and there is no sign that it is approaching stabilisation in any country. In North and West Europe and in Austria and Hungary where the rate is below unity, the population will presently begin to decline unless there is an immediate and considerable rise in fertility."⁵¹

The rise *did* occur, thanks largely to the war, the recovery, and economic expansion thereafter. And although, as British demographer Maurice Kirk has said so well, it would "take a very bold student to build comparable or analogous events into a medium-term perspective at any time,"⁵² this is another illustration of the wisdom of not being too precise about what will happen.

Two scenarios

In light of the background to the second demographic transition described at the beginning of this *Bulletin*, one might suggest two scenarios that would ward off long-term population decline in Europe.

The first assumes that all countries pass through the "standard" sequence of changes in family formation. All countries experience the four shifts and the shift from the golden age of marriage to the dawn of cohabitation, in particular, is completed. Extramarital fertility becomes as normal as marital fertility. The trend toward individualism and independence continues, but after a generation of adjust-

ment and adaptation, women and men decide (again) that having several children would enrich their lives, lead to greater self-fulfillment, and be in the best interests of society. Such a scenario takes into account the period effects in current trends, assumes that policies to support such changes will be accepted because of increasing concern about low fertility, and that the sequence sketched has not come to an end. In the "progressive" phase of the growth of demographic choice, many further options will be seen and chosen.⁵³

There is not much concrete evidence to support such a scenario, but at least four points should be stressed.

The first is that it can easily be demonstrated how important extramarital fertility becomes as marriage wanes. Suppose the aim is a net reproduction rate of 1.00. That requires each 100 women to give birth to at least 100 girls. Under normal conditions, this will imply the birth of 106 boys, that is, 206 children in all. Allowing for the deaths of 3 percent of these children before they reach the mean age of childbearing, the number should be increased to $206 + 6 = 212$. If one assumes that 6 percent of births are contributed by never-married women, then 100 women who marry must give birth to $212 - 12 = 200$ children. With varying proportions of women marrying, one obtains the following requirements per ever-married woman:

- 90% = 2.22 children per woman
- 80% = 2.50 children per woman
- 75% = 2.67 children per woman
- 60% = 3.33 children per woman

However, the 3.33 children per ever-married woman required when 60 percent of women marry drops to 2.65 per ever-married woman if 25 percent, rather than 6 percent, of the 212 children are contributed by never-married women and to 2.12 when 40 percent of all children are born out of wedlock, as now in Denmark and Sweden.

This is still considerably higher than current total fertility rates in Europe, but not inconceivable if one notes—and this is the second point—that there are many

survey results which suggest that desired family size has not declined so dramatically as actual fertility rates.⁵⁴

The third point relates to the character of the second transition. Shifts in norms made possible by the development of the welfare state have allowed individuals and couples to make a choice of fertility behavior "based on their own assessment of available options of 'satisfaction' or 'happiness'."⁵⁵ That assessment of options may change now that economic recession and the burden of increasing proportions of elderly are forcing many Northern and Western European governments to step back from all-encompassing social security programs. It is possible, for example, that societies concerned about the "feminization of poverty" which frequently follows divorce or separation will put more emphasis on marital stability. There appears to be increasing reluctance to pay taxes that go toward supporting individuals who have chosen to divorce, separate, or remain unmarried.

The fourth point stems from the growing concern about current population trends. If these trends continue, democratically elected governments could find a majority of their populations in favor of direct and indirect policies to stimulate and enable couples to have more children.

The second scenario would be much simpler. It assumes that immigration becomes a major component of population growth, more so than before 1973. Conflict and political instability elsewhere in the world swell the numbers of people seeking political asylum and/or a better life in Europe, more particularly in north-western Europe. Admittedly, the recent tightening of restrictions suggests that a resumption of large-scale immigration is unlikely to be acceptable. Also, if arriving "refugees" claiming eligibility for political asylum are motivated mainly by economic considerations, they are not warmly welcomed. But in the past, at least, many European countries have allowed refugees and others to enter on

broadly defined humanitarian grounds; such politics were usually widely supported, and could be again.

When all is said and done, however, the only reasonable expectation is that Europe—at least most of it—will inevitably see birth and death rates converge at low levels, followed by population decline. Austria, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Hungary, where births already fell short of deaths in 1985, will very soon be joined by Belgium, Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic, Italy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, where natural increase was less than 0.15 percent in 1985, and then by others (see Table 2, page 13). At the same time, the population will age further. According to the 1984 UN medium variant projections, the proportion of Europe's population aged 65 and over will increase from 13.1 percent in 1985 to 18.4 percent in 2025, while the proportion under age 15 declines from 22.4 to 18.3 percent. This shift will be most marked in Western Europe: nearly 21 percent of the region's population will be 65 and over in 2025 and only 16.8 percent under age 15, and the changes will be still more striking in some countries (see Figure 11).

The Population Debate


Two quotes from among countless articles appearing in the press since the mid-1970s illustrate the extremes in the public debate over population trends that grips Northern, Western, and Southern Europeans.

Writing for the opinion page of *Le Monde*, December 14, 1978, former French prime minister and rightwing politician Michel Debré warned:

"But the policy setters, ministers, elected officials, journalists, teachers, priests have a responsibility: to make it understood that in France everything is at stake with this catastrophe of the decline in births—pension plans, social legislation, economic prosperity, free-

Figure 11. Population Under Age 15 and 65 and Over in Three Western European Countries: 1985 and 2025

(Percent of total population)



Source: UN, *World Population Prospects: Estimates and Projections as Assessed in 1984* (New York: 1986), medium variant.

dom . . . Continuation of the 1978 birth rate could cause the population of France to fall to 20 million inhabitants in five generations. And you, gentlemen, are doing nothing! . . . All the mistakes that can be made in internal affairs or external affairs would be attenuated by a strong birth rate. They become fatal when the birth rate slumps. Fatal for the nation. Fatal for men and women. Fatal for their liberties."

At the opposite end of the pole, Vera Slupik attacked what she labeled "Brainwashing with population policy" in the Federal Republic of Germany in a 1981 issue of the feminist journal *Emma*:

"... as the notion of women which these childbirth-technocrats have has . . . not changed very fundamentally, we should keep a watchful eye on these characters. All attempts to influence the decision of women for motherhood must again and again be confronted with the demand for self-determination; in concrete terms: my belly is mine!"

It is not women who express concern over fertility, Slupik continues, and why should they? "Why should we be concerned about the decline in the birth rate of the Federal Republic and Europe, given the fact that our planet" is already overfull, women in Third World countries are being forced to undergo sterilization, and the FGR even refuses to let in a few hundred thousand refugees from Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and Turkey. In her view, the population debate is a male ploy to send women back to the kitchen, and if she then has children, so much the better for the man, "it gives him the certainty that you will stay with him."

The debate reflects opposing views on collective versus individual interests, the concept of the nation, conservative versus progressive approaches to demographic change, and the likely so-

cioeconomic consequences of aging populations.

Proponents of pronatalist measures

Proponents of government action to raise fertility seem propelled by three broad areas of concern.

The first is concern for the continued vitality of national populations that do not replace themselves: no children, no future, is the key phrase. They cannot believe that people can be so self-centered and uncommitted to the future of the nation that nurtured them. The shift to independence, particularly of women, is viewed as detrimental to family life and the socialization of children, a kind of collective suicide.

The second concern is that a nation's position as a world or regional power will wane and Europe's cultural identity disappear as the populations of nearby non-European countries grow much faster. Mindful of the nationalist-socialist past, the power issue is cautiously expressed as no longer being able to accept national and international responsibilities. Also, European countries must still guard against military aggression and with too few young men, young women will soon have to be recruited to make up the necessary numbers of soldiers. And as newcomers with different religions and customs take over the places left empty in dwindling populations, Europe's cultural heritage could be lost in the resulting pluralistic societies.

The third concern is for the future of the welfare state. The increase in numbers of dependent elderly relative to numbers in the productive working ages that comes with low fertility could overwhelm the elaborate systems of pensions, health and unemployment insurance, benefits for the poor, etc. built up in the 1960s and 1970s to redistribute resources. Some population growth is also necessary to ensure a young, growing labor force to absorb, use, and develop technological innovations and generate

economic growth.

Opponents of pronatalist measures

Opponents aim their barbs at all these concerns.

They dismiss as exaggerated the specter of Europe as a decrepit society of ruminating octogenarians. Leaders and innovators always form a fraction of the total population and Europe has nothing to fear so long as it invests sufficiently in its young. The aim should be to increase the fraction of each birth cohort that receives university or technical education. The anxiety to maintain a society or nation is reminiscent of the fascist period and detrimental to the necessity of achieving greater European integration. The shift to independence is a blessing. Relieved of superstitions and the hold of the churches, people can live a humanistic life. Governments must observe fundamental human freedoms and not interfere unnecessarily in the lives of their citizens.

Opponents also attach no special value to their own cultures, welcome an open pluralistic society, and fiercely oppose racial discrimination. More generally, they consider it Europe's duty to let others share in its resources and not to stimulate population growth when this clearly is a serious problem at the global level. Moreover, economic resources rather than military resources or population size determine a country's international standing. Economic integration is a much more effective way to maintain Europe's international position than stimulating the birth rate.

They also question whether labor forces beset with the high unemployment that plagues Europe's market economies should be encouraged to grow. With modern technology eliminating jobs, workers are encouraged to work shorter hours, part-time, or retire early and immigration is halted, so why should we have more people? As long as labor productivity increases, there is no problem of funding social security systems. And

are not economists themselves divided about the likely consequences of population decline? The opponents admit that population decline requires adaptation but insist that it is not catastrophic. It is better to accept decline and the supremacy of individual over collective interests than to try to reverse the valuable process of emancipation—more equal rights for women, for example—which may have generated the decline.

As a rule, opponents of pronatalist measures identify more with the socio-craic than the technocratic view of society, favor postmaterialism over materialism, progressiveness over conservatism, and politically place themselves to the left rather than right of center.

Political response

Population concerns are more recognized and acknowledged in some European countries than in others. In France, with a century-long history of concern about population stagnation, the government probably has a majority of the population behind its strong pronatalist stand. In the Netherlands, a large majority shares the official view that an end to natural population growth should be welcomed and the ultimate goal should be a stationary population smaller than at present.⁵⁶ But in all Western European countries there are sizable minorities which oppose the majority views. This makes the population issue very unattractive to politicians. They risk losing votes if they propose measures bound to displease some groups in populations of different ages, sexes, marital status, and family life stages and usually there is no strong lobby to please in order to gain votes.⁵⁷ As a result, governments of Europe's free market economies move cautiously. In official UN population inquiries, they are likely to declare themselves satisfied with current fertility levels and, at any rate, to consider intervention inappropriate.⁵⁸ They are caught "between freedom, equality and solidarity"⁵⁹ and find it difficult to choose.

This was evident in the fate of a French initiative at an April 1984 meeting of Ministers of Social Affairs and Employment of the European Economic Community. The French Minister sought support for the proposition that community-level action was required to deal with Europe's demographic situation. He raised the specter of lost influence as the share of the then ten EEC countries' population in world population shrank from 8.8 percent in 1950 to 2.3 percent in 2025. But only Luxembourg dared support the proposal. That a few days later the European Parliament *did* pass a resolution along the proposed lines was of little significance. However, an interesting report on demographic trends in the EEC was published two years later.⁶⁰

Public debate about population issues appears to play less of a role in determining policies in the centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe. At least this topic is not mentioned in studies of population policies in the region by U.S. researchers Henry David and Robert McIntyre and by Macura.⁶¹ Macura stresses that it would very wrong "to suggest that the development of policies affecting population in European socialist countries was a uniform process," but it is evident that governments acted more immediately and decisively in response to demographic trends than elsewhere in Europe. Macura observes that ideologically, "socialist optimism tends to generate policies" which favor population growth. The assertion is that a socialist society can overcome relative overpopulation and provide for a rapidly growing population. However, Macura points out factors that are also part of the ideological setting but which would tend to reduce fertility: elimination of wage differentials, sexual equality, important status of women in society and the labor force, shift to urban areas, and legalized abortion. The emphasis on the right to decide freely on the number and spacing of children also tends to reduce family size. Arguments now used to justify pronatalist policies are akin to those put for-

ward in the rest of Europe. They refer to the deteriorating age structure and the likely detrimental effects of a further aging of the population. Thus, they are basically planning-oriented.

Pronatalist Policies and Their Effects

Eastern Europe

When the fertility of all Eastern European countries except the German Democratic Republic fell precipitously during the 1950s and early 1960s, the official reactions were prompt. Since the mid-1960s, all countries of the region have taken measures intended to stimulate fertility. These can be divided into two groups.

The first measures are simply to make it more difficult to contracept or to resort to induced abortion. In centrally planned economies, the import, production, and distribution of contraceptives can be controlled rigidly, and re-restriction of legal abortion will have an immediate effect. Romania's abrupt cutoff of legal abortion (and imported contraceptives) in October 1966 was the most striking example of this approach (as described in the box on page 30). Thousands of women intending to resort to abortion were clearly caught unexpectedly and forced to carry their pregnancies to term. The birth rate soared, but declined again in subsequent years. The Romanian State Council claimed that the step was taken for both health and demographic reasons, but demographic aims were no doubt paramount.

The second group of measures aims, as Frejka puts it, to make children "a more attractive proposition."⁶² They are designed to make it financially possible for couples to begin childbearing early and to ease the financial burdens of childbirth and early childrearing. In many countries of Eastern Europe, the focus has been on second and third births, the births that are crucial to bringing national fertility up to replacement level. In 1980-81 the child allowances for two and

three children as proportions of the average monthly industrial wages were: 12 and 34 percent in Bulgaria; 18 and 53 percent in Czechoslovakia; 4 and 9 percent in the German Democratic Republic; 21 and 35 percent in Hungary; 9 and 16 percent in Poland; and 19 and 30 percent in Romania.⁶³

Since 1964 in Czechoslovakia, women with five or more children are entitled to their old-age pensions at 53, those with three or four children at 54, those with two at 55, those with one at 56, and the childless at 57. Also in Czechoslovakia, newlywed couples receive low-interest loans up to 30,000 crowns (U.S.\$5,200 as of early 1987); 2,000 crowns are written off the debt at the first birthday of the first child and 4,000 crowns at the first birthday of each subsequent child.⁶⁴

Besides child allowances and marriage loans, pronatalist economic incentives in Eastern Europe include birth grants, full-paid maternity leave up to 26 weeks in some countries and subsidized leave thereafter (up to the child's third birthday in Hungary), subsidized nurseries and kindergartens, educational and transportation subsidies, tax rebates, rights to housing dependent on family size, free medical care during pregnancy and delivery, etc.

Northern and Western Europe

Some countries of Northern and Western Europe have also attempted to generate favorable conditions for fertility decisions, or to make society more *kinderfreundlich* (child-friendly), most notably France. A year-long government campaign to "Ouvrons la France aux enfants" (Let us open France to children) was launched in May 1985. Industrial leaders, labor organizations, politicians, etc. were exhorted to build for families: construct playgrounds, do everything to make parents feel children were welcome. There have been similar private campaigns: "La France a besoin d'enfants" (see photo). It is also in France that successive presidents and

**Il paraît que je suis
un phénomène socio-culturel.**



**LA FRANCE
A BESOIN
D'ENFANTS.**

France has been the most aggressive of countries outside Eastern Europe in campaigns to raise fertility.

prime ministers (Giscard d'Estaing, Mitterand, Chirac) have been most outspoken about population concerns.

Many countries in the region have established national bodies to explore and report on the possibilities for and likely effects of economic measures to ward off imminent population decline. But although most countries already provide comparatively generous maternity benefits and child support, in only a few cases can these be considered explicitly pronatalist measures. France is the most clearcut example, but Austria, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Sweden can—with some imagination—be put in that category. The hesitation stems not only from the political hazards described, but also the large expenditures involved and uncertainty about the effects.

Effects of pronatalist measures

The effects of population policy measures are difficult to ascertain. They sel-

dom occur in isolation, usually several measures are introduced at the same time, general social welfare policies may interfere (to bolster family resources in low-income families, for example), and benchmark data are difficult to establish.⁶⁵ In a recent comparison of the effects of child allowances in 28 countries as of 1979, Olivia Ekert concluded that government child support at the level of France, covering 16 percent of child costs, increases average completed family size by 0.2 of a child; full coverage of child costs would raise the average number of children per woman by about 0.5.⁶⁶

Hungarian demographer Andras Klingner feels that the strenuous pronatalist efforts of Hungary to the mid-1970s—strengthened economic incentives and denial of abortion on request to married women with fewer than two children in 1974 (coupled with a campaign to promote more effective contraception)—meant that at best "a reduction of fertility could be avoided in the case of

these cohorts [women born 1953-58], although it could not raise fertility to replacement level."⁶⁷

Charlotte Höhn and Herman Schubnell looked at the effects of population policy measures in three countries of Western Europe (Austria, France, Sweden) and four in Eastern Europe (Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Romania).⁶⁸ Except for France, they found no long-term effects on fertility in Western Europe. The findings were similar in Eastern Europe. In the latter region, they point out, population policy measures are influenced by government measures in other areas—the economy, tax policies, labor market, social policy—so their effects, certainly of any one measure, cannot be singled out. They conclude:

"Even extensive and costly pronatalist measures hardly ever lead to spectacular long-term effects on the average number of children of female generations, if we except short-term positive effects. . . . They may, however, contribute toward slowing down the fertility decline and, in particular, improving the social situation of parents and their children."

The only spontaneous, at least unintended, rise in births registered in Europe in recent years has occurred in Poland, beginning in the late 1970s and peaking in 1983, at a time of social and economic crisis. Kondrat reports that per capita income declined 30 percent between 1979 and 1982.⁶⁹ This put luxury goods far beyond the reach of many families and some demographers predicted that this would weaken their attraction in comparison to children and birth numbers would rise. The rise did in fact happen. But Kondrat concludes that it was an "unexpected and unintended effect" of the state's social policy aimed at the "protection of families, especially those in a particularly difficult situation." Other factors are likely to have been at work as well (see box).

It is also worth noting that the USSR is so large and heterogeneous that both antinatalist and pronatalist measures

appear to be called for. In fact, Tass reported on January 22, 1987, that in the predominantly Muslim Soviet Republic of Tadzhikistan a campaign has been launched to reduce the fertility rate (5.8 births per woman, compared to 1.9 in the Russian Republic about 1980). Benefits available to large families elsewhere are to be withdrawn in this Central Asian republic to alleviate the problems caused by rapid population growth.

Making the Gift of a Baby to the Pension Funds?

In 1986 the influential Germany weekly *Der Spiegel* ran a series of articles under the heading *Den Alterskassen ein Baby schenken?*, which translates roughly as above. It sums up Europe's demographic dilemma well. Collective and individual interests do not seem to coincide. The transition to individualism appears to have led to an extended period of below-replacement-level fertility, population decline, and an age structure that will in the long run make full funding of old-age pensions virtually impossible. Yet it is difficult to imagine people having babies to please the pension funds and economic incentives, even at the level offered in France and some Eastern European countries, appear incapable of overcoming individualistic desires and raising fertility to replacement level. Relying on immigration to adjust age structures is practically out of the question. All countries of immigration have taken effective measures to end the influx and increasingly aim at rapid integration of the current minorities. In the Heidelberg Manifesto, published in *Die Zeit* (February 5, 1982), 15 prominent German scholars went further, arguing for a return of the foreigners to their home countries on social and ecological grounds. Current French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac similarly asserted in 1984: "Their num-

Box 5. Poland: Rising Birth Rates In a Time of Crisis

Political, social, and economic events often have unexpected consequences for demographic trends, as in Poland during the early 1980s. Numbers of births rose sharply, particularly in urban areas, from an annual average of 600,000 in 1971-1975 to 676,000 in 1976-1980 and almost 701,000 in 1981-1983. Some 720,000 children were born in 1983, the highest total in 22 years. The numbers then declined to 699,000 in 1984 and 678,000 in 1985.

The upturn in births is partly an "echo" of Poland's postwar baby boom of the 1950s, which has increased the number of women now in the childbearing ages. However, Poland's total fertility rate, which is unaffected by numbers of women in the fertile ages, is also one of the highest in Europe. In 1983 it reached 2.40 births per woman, just behind the rate of 2.74 in Ireland in that year (see Table 5, page 19).

The fertility rise took place during a time of social, political, and economic crisis, highlighted by the formation in 1980 of the independent Solidarity trade union to push for reform, the suppression of Solidarity and declaration of martial law at the end of 1981, and subsequent imposition of economic

sanctions by NATO member countries in an effort to force the Polish government to lift martial law and start a dialogue with Solidarity and the Roman Catholic Church of Poland. Since living standards were deplorable in these years, the fertility rise must have reflected changing attitudes toward life. The major causes of these changes appear to be:

- In times of social disintegration, people fall back on the family.
- There was a lack of confidence in the stability of government policy on matters such as maternity leave and child support.
- Official Roman Catholic Church views on the sanctity of the family and prohibition of artificial contraception and abortion gained influence, due to the important role the church has played in Polish society during and since the crisis.
- Due to acute shortages of consumer goods, any spare income could be devoted to new babies.
- The crisis fostered a renewed pride in the nation.

Source: Janice Jozwiak and Teresa Slaby, "Poland: Unexpected Birth Rise in a Time of Crisis," *Demos*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (January 1986).

bers will have to decline."⁷⁰

What then is the answer to the predicament? Most countries will probably follow the old maxim: If in doubt, do nothing; wait and see. After all, the art of governing is not to do anything until action can no longer be avoided.

Another approach is to try out new, more imaginative measures to raise fertility and have them ready when needed. Thinking in this direction is developing rapidly. So far no serious proposal seems to be compatible with the shift to individualistic values. But a recent proposition by Population Council demographer Paul Demeny is certainly imag-

inative.⁷¹ He proposes to relink fertility behavior and economic security in old age. The pronatalist institution he sees would " earmark a socially agreed-upon fraction of the compulsory contribution from earnings that flow into the common pool from which pay-as-you-go national social security schemes are now financed and transfer that fraction to individual contributors' live parents as an additional entitlement."

It is easy to make a long list of reasons why this proposal has no chance in the world of being implemented. But then, in demographic matters the unexpected sometimes happens. □

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