THE
NON-WESTERN
WORLD
Environment, Development,
and Human Rights

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Preface

The focus of this book is on critical issues of development, environment, and cultural conflicts facing the non-Western world. The first chapter provides an introduction to the non-Western world and emphasizes important contemporary cultural, socioeconomic, environment, and development issues. Each of the major cultural areas of the non-Western world—China, Japan and Korea, Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent, the Middle East, and sub-Saharan Africa—is covered in subsequent chapters. In each regional chapter significant geographic, socioeconomic, political, cultural, environmental and sustainable development, human rights, and gender-related issues as they pertain to the specific area are discussed. Discussion topics are adapted to each country’s specific political, economic, social, and environmental circumstances. Wherever desirable, national and regional comparisons have been included on topics such as population, environment, and development in India and China, and Asia and Africa.

The last chapter on challenges facing the non-Western world pulls together some of the ideas described in the regional chapters and discusses three challenges: adoption of an ecodvelopment model to achieve sustainable development and environmental management; integration of poverty alleviation programs, development, and environmental protection strategies with population policy; and resolution of ethnic and religious conflicts. To help readers interested in further exploration of some of the themes discussed in the book, a reading list of recent publications is given at the end of each chapter. Unless indicated otherwise, all data in this book are from the United Nations and the World Bank.

The origins of this book lie in my experiences and early education in the colonial setting. As a student in British India, I learned from textbooks printed in England about the most powerful Western world powers—their symbols of prosperity, economy, and culture. During the same period I witnessed how a scantily clothed man—Mokandas Gandhi—brought the downfall of the mighty British Empire through a nonviolent movement, which eventually began the process of decolonization of the non-Western world. As I graduated
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Chapter 1

Introduction to the Non-Western World

THE NON-WESTERN WORLD

What is the non-Western world, and why is it important to learn about its peoples and cultures? When we speak of the non-Western world we are referring to the areas in which cultures developed essentially apart from the Greco-Judaic-Christian tradition of the Western culture. Thus, it includes East Asia (China, Japan, and Korea), Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent, the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. Latin America, Russian Asia, and Oceania are excluded. The indigenous cultures of Latin America and Oceania are not Western, but they are also not non-Western in the same sense as the ancient civilizations of China and India. Moreover, the culture of the pre-Columbian settled communities in Yucatan and Andes (600 B.C.), the empire of the Mayas in Central America, the Inca civilization (1200-1535 A.D.), and the Aztec empire (1325-1521 A.D.) in the valley of Mexcio were conquered.

Colonization by the West played a role in the decay of indigenous peoples and their culture. The migration of swarms of Europeans and the transplanting into the new lands of languages, religion, arts, and institutions of Europe represented a great outward growth of Western culture on the other side of the Atlantic. Where the natives were not numerous in North America, the English drove them back into wilderness beyond the pale of the European settlements. In other regions, however, where the Spaniards and Portuguese penetrated, the new Western culture was merely overlaid like a veneer upon the older, indigenous culture of the natives. Throughout the hemisphere and also later on in Australia, New Zealand, and Oceania, power—economic, social, and political—was in the hands of the settlers of European stock, and this power assured the dominance of the Western culture. Therefore, the contemporary cultural pattern in Latin America and Oceania, unlike the
non-Western cultures of Asia and Africa, is based dominantly on Western traditions and values.

*Culture* in this book refers to the distinctive ways of life such as language and writings, value and belief systems; and forms of social, political, and economic organization that characterize human groups. It is the sum total of ways of living built by a group of human beings and transmitted from one generation to another. Often, regional cultures fused into one, creating larger cultural zones. Civilization resulted from this process of fusion into larger units such as India or China. Civilizations systematized ideas into organized stories, philosophies, and formal religions. Civilizations spread common belief patterns over wide areas as a means of linking diverse peoples. Civilization persists when these common belief patterns are maintained by a large population over a considerable period of time. Generally speaking, tribal societies or cultures are without them. In addition, tribal cultures are usually smaller and local. There are some exceptions such as the Yoruba of West Africa, whose tribe numbered hundreds of thousands, who maintained large cities and specialists, but lacked writing and large public works, which usually accompany civilizations.

The use of writing is a major clue for identifying cultures because the introduction of writing into a society improves transmission of social and cultural traits and enhances the availability of knowledge to affect and change all else in society. Likewise, the maintenance of cities and the specialization of occupation (such as blacksmiths, priests, traders, and rulers, and the technology and economic organization to support them) cannot exist without a rural hinterland to feed the city dwellers and without transport for food supplies. Once this economic basis is available, there is more effective energy and wealth for the development of culture.

There is a core of solidarity among non-Western societies of Asia and Africa that derives from non-European cultural roots, shared memories of the past, domination by Western powers, a resolve to remove the remaining traces of Western colonialism, and a feeling that they are a distinct part of humanity, long victimized and now sharing a common aspiration to protect their independence and development. Except for Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan, the non-Western lands range from the least developed nations to some that are close to crossing the threshold that Japan and Western nations crossed during the twentieth century.

Our focus in this book is on six major non-Western culture areas: China, India, Japan, Southeast Asia, the Islamic Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 1.1). Civilizations in China, India, and the Nile and Tigris-Euphrates valleys of the Middle East were already old when the Europeans rose out of barbarism. Sumeria, Tigris-Euphrates valleys around 4,600 B.C.E., Egypt (Nile Valley) five hundred years later, China (Yellow River Valley) around 3,500 B.C.E., and India (Indus Valley) about 2,500 B.C.E. all reached cultural maturity centuries before the Greeks appeared as the first civilized culture in the West (about 800 B.C.E.). Except for China and India, all of these ancient civilizations had lost their power by the time of Christ, and with few exceptions had been assimilated into later peoples. Distinctive cultural areas discussed in this book are delimited from one another partly by geography; partly by history; partly by cultural traits such as language, religion, political and economic organization; and most of all by value systems, behavior, and attitude.

The non-Western cultures of China (based on Confucianism) and India (based on Hinduism) survived to our day with national cultural ideals that were substantially unchanged for twenty-five centuries. Both are now engaged in a struggle for development in a modern age. China and India are patriarchs among the world’s civilizations, but they are also relatively new in the contemporary political family of nations. The experiences of the Chinese and Indians have marked similarities. China and India have each known an almost changeless civilization during two thousand years, securely based on a national belief system and an ethical code that reflects a national soul at peace with itself. Even the challenge of foreign religions—Buddhism in China and Islam in India—has not upset the basic pattern. Both nations have lived self-contained lives with relatively little curiosity about the lands beyond their borders, except in commerce. But both have been exploited for four centuries by more aggressive peoples from the West. Both countries hold immense lands and resources which still may be inadequate to support sustainable development of their large populations. As a result, both face bewildering problems of development, resource use, and environmental management.
Chinese cultural influence has been dominant in Japan and Korea since early times. Political and institutional forms were taken from China; the Chinese system of writing was adopted in Japan, which permitted the Japanese to gain ready access to the Confucian classics and to Chinese editions of the Buddhist scriptures. Buddhism was introduced in Japan about 552 A.D. from China and Korea, and has thrived alongside the indigenous Shinto religion. For several centuries Japan lived in splendid isolation under the rule of the Shoguns (1336–1688). Perry’s visit in 1854 led to the opening of Japan, and initiated a period of rapid growth. Japanese borrowed first from the Chinese and later from the West these elements that fitted their needs and environment. The resulting combination has been unique, and Japan today represents a distinctive culture of great interest and of much importance. Post-World War II Japan has advanced as one of the major economic superpowers in the world.

Culturally, Southeast Asia has been a zone of convergence for Indian and Chinese cultures. People from southern areas of China migrated into Southeast Asia. About 100 A.D. Hindu states were established in the East Indies by the Dravidian Kings of South India. By the second century A.D. several Indian colonies had developed in Cambodia. Buddhism expanded with the Hindu colonization of Java and there was expansion of Buddhism between 700 and 800 A.D. Islam was introduced about 1000 A.D. The Hindu states of Southeast Asia fell shortly before the discovery of the Philippines by the Portuguese navigator Ferdinand Magellan in 1521. As a crossroad between Europe and East Asia (China and Japan), Southeast Asia attracted Europeans. Batavia (formerly named Jakarta) was founded by the Dutch in 1619; two centuries later Raffles (1781–1826), an English governor in Sumatra founded Singapore in 1819. Most of Southeast Asia became colonies of Britain, France, and the Netherlands. Today, Southeast Asia is a dynamic region ruled mostly by authoritarian governments. Some nations such as Cambodia and Thailand are making slow progress toward democracy. The region’s most populous country, Indonesia, is engaged in a struggle between democratization and Islamic fundamentalism.

Torn between ancient traditions and the modern world, the Islamic countries of the Middle East search for a balance. It has become, as in ancient times, a nexus of bitter conflict. Some disputes are battles within nations, as a surging younger generation challenges autocratic regimes for opportunity and political reform. Others pit nation against nation, over issues ranging from weapons proliferation to the proper interpretation of Islam. The clash of Israelis and Palestinians over tiny parcels of land continues to make headlines around the world. In this land of crisis, oil-rich nations, and the birthplace of three great faiths—Judaism, Christianity and Islam—the United States is currently involved in establishing a foothold for democracy in Iraq. If this attempt is successful, it may change the political landscape of the region.

The political and economic development of Sub-Saharan Africa presents a major challenge in the twenty-first century. Most of its nations are among the non-Western world’s youngest and poorest. Colonial irresolutions beginning in the sixteenth century led to the exploitation of the region’s human and natural resources. By the mid-nineteenth century, European, American, and Arab slave traders had robbed the continent of perhaps as many as 25 million human beings. At the 1864 Berlin Conference, the competing European powers garnered Africa with their own political boundaries. In the aftermath of the wind of decolonization which began to sweep across Africa in the mid-1950s, Sub-Saharan nations became independent. Arbitrary political boundaries, which often divide language and tribal groups, have resulted in ethnic fragmentation. It has helped touch off civil wars and numerous coups led by military dictators during the post-independence period. Warring factions and regimes sell off diamonds, oil, timber, and ore to build armies and buy weapons, deepening conflicts and poverty. Meanwhile, about two thirds of Africans depend on agriculture for their livelihoods. The fate of agricultural production, therefore, directly affects economic growth, social improvement, and political stability. As the region’s population continues to grow, rapidly outpacing the growth rate in other regions of the non-Western world, its agricultural land is becoming increasingly degraded. Unless African governments, supported by the international community, take the lead in confronting the problems of land degradation, deteriorating agricultural productivity will undermine the foundations of sustainable development in Sub-Saharan Africa.

**SOURCES OF IDEAS SHAPING THE ROOTS OF NON-WESTERN CULTURE**

All of the six non-Western cultural areas are distinct from the West. Western culture is the product of Greco-Judaic-Christian tradition, Roman law, Greek philosophy (ideas of democracy and civil liberty), and the ideas and value systems derived from the Renaissance (1400–1650) in Europe. Writing as a part of technology has been an intellectual tool used by various cultures, and the great literary works have been a source of ideas that have shaped cultures. Writing led to achievements in astronomy, arithmetic, and geometry, and also in the accumulation of social surplus and the distinctive quality of the cultures that were established in Western and non-Western worlds. The great literature of the Western culture such as the Bible, the writings of Plato (427–347 B.C.), the Greek philosopher, Homer (the eighth-century Greek epic poet), Thomas More (1478–1536, English humanist and statesman), Machiavelli (1469–1527, Italian philosopher and author), Martin Luther (1438–1546, German theologian and author, leader of the Protestant Reformation), Galileo (1564–1642, Italian physicist and astronomer), Voltaire (1694–1778, French
philosopher and historian), Karl Marx (1818–1883, German economist, philosopher, and socialist), Charles Darwin (1809–1882, English naturalist), and Sigmund Freud (1856–1939, Austrian neurologist and founder of psychoanalysis) provide sources of ideas that helped to shape the Western culture. Literature in both Western and non-Western worlds represents reflection and refinement of thought that relates the community to the wider society and culture and often exemplifies the behavior of the people in that culture.

The ideas and values enunciated in these great books and by the authors noted in the preceding paragraph are clearly distinct from the literature of the non-Western world. Among the great literature of the non-Western world are the works by Confucius (551–470 B.C.), Li Po (701–762 B.C.), and Tu Fu (713–770 B.C.), the Vedic Hymns (2000–800 B.C.), the Mahabharata (about 1000 B.C.), works of Kalidasa (fifth or sixth century A.D.), the Koran (between 610 and 632 A.D.), The Arabian Nights (786–809 A.D.), and the poems of Omar Khayyam (eleventh century A.D.) and Hafiz (1300–1383 A.D.). These classical works tell us about sources of ideas that shaped the cultures of the non-Western world. Through the poems and essays one can capture the distinctive cultural values of the people.

Chinese literature had ethical content and its specialists influenced the people by precept and example. Li Po and Tu Fu in their poetry open a new world—a delicate, fragile world of bamboo and jade, yet inhabited by intensely human characters—revealing the distinctive aspects of the Chinese culture and life. Confucius pointed out a sensible way of life. No others could possibly represent the great Chinese culture to the world so well as these three master spirits. Despite periodic civil wars and invasions, the cultural unity of China has reasserted itself time and again and absorbed many would-be conquerors in its long history. The Chinese have assimilated foreign ideas and political systems without losing their essential point of view.

The persistent cultural stability of China has been due to four elements: rapport with earth and nature, the family, veneration of ancestors, and the Confucian code. The identification of the Chinese peasant with the land (to a greater extent than elsewhere) strengthened stability. The Chinese learned in the family from the beginning that individual preferences must be subordinated to the welfare of the group; Chinese family members deferred to the head of the family, who was the oldest male member. The old not only retained their authority during life but also after death through the veneration of ancestors. Veneration of the past did restrain hasty changes and the disruptions that invasions brought to most other peoples. Confucius concentrated on human relationships, and his teachings codified how to get along in this life.

In India there has been more reciprocal influence between literati and common people, between sacred literature and popular tradition. The ancient hymns of the Vedas, composed anonymously between 2000 and 800 B.C., are the foundations of the Indian culture and are the oldest writings in any Indo-European language. They are the ultimate source of Hindu religion and culture. Of the four great collections, the Rig-Veda (verse-knowledge) is the oldest and is the source of the other three. Compiled in stages over a long period, it contains hymns to the folk gods of nature such as sky (Varuna) and fire (Agni), and late hymns to abstract concepts such as the “Origin of All Things,” which led into the philosophical discussion of the Upanishads. These lyrics project an exalted sympathy with nature through noble imagery, vivid descriptions, simple, concrete diction, and a fine reverent tone. India’s greatest folk epic, the Mahabharata, dating back to perhaps 1000 B.C. and the longest poem in the world with 100,000 couplets, abounds in loosely connected stories and essays. The central plot of the epic concerns a great struggle between two families of royal cousins for succession to the throne. Like the Trojan War of the Greeks, the struggle has foundation in a protracted war between rival kingdoms. The most famous section of the Mahabharata is the Gita, a philosophical dialogue between the god Krishna and Arjuna, hero of the epic. The subject of the Gita is the Hindu reconciliation of work and necessary activity in this world with the idea that the world is a mere illusion to be ignored. Krishna explains that disinterested performance of duty in this world involves no desire and hence no sin. This subtle interpretation of actions in terms of attitude and intention is a central feature of Indian culture.

Kalidasa, as a great playwright of India, has often been called “the Shakespeare of India,” and the parallel goes far. Like Shakespeare, he was equally at home in narrative, lyric, and dramatic poetry. In the plan of his dramas, too, Kalidasa reminds us of Shakespeare, in his combination of serious and comic elements within the same play, especially in the use of clowns, and in his frequent interpolation of lyric verse in the midst of dramatic scenes. Kalidasa did not write tragedies. To the Hindu, defeat and death in this world have no tragic meaning.

The fantastic love theme of Kalidasa’s Shakuntala attracted the German poet Goethe (1749–1832), who borrowed from the play for his Faust, and Goldmark’s overture to Shakuntala has long been a standard concert selection. Kalidasa’s work shows that all the pessimism and asceticism in the Hindu view of life do not stifle the longing for worldly beauty and love for nature, seasons, and landscape.

In contemporary times Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi’s life and work provided a source of ideas that influenced Indian society and has had effects beyond the non-Western world in Martin Luther King, Jr.’s struggles for racial and political equality in America. Born in 1869, M. K. Gandhi spent twenty-one tumultuous years in South Africa resisting racism using his weapon of nonviolent satyagraha (pursuit of truth). He was 45 years old when he returned to India and transformed both the tactics and the purpose of India’s struggle against the British. This “half naked fakir,” as the British called him, converted an elite struggle into a mass movement, a violent uprising into a nonviolent but nonetheless insistent struggle, and political
demands into a testament of faith (Figure 1.2). Gandhi's ideas and life carry a remarkable message for many oppressed people who daily wrestle with the challenges of social and political reform. Gandhi's nonviolent resistance served well both Aung San Suu Kyi of Myanmar (Burma) and Nelson Mandela of South Africa during their years of arrest for demanding political and social justice.

The Koran, the first important body of Arabic prose, is the great book of authority for the morals, laws, theological doctrines, and social ethics for the Muslims everywhere from North Africa to Southeast Asia. Its 114 chapters, or suras, of varying length are accepted as the word of Allah, revealed to his only prophet, Mohammed. From the first to the last it preaches the unity and seriousness of the Most High, the Most Merciful, and Most Compassionate God, Allah, to serve him and to die for him are the greatest of privileges, to neglect him and to disregard his commandments are the unforgivable sins. The imagery of the Koran is the imagery of the desert, of the lonely places of body and soul, of the unsophisticated pastoral and rural scene rather than the crowded bazaar and teeming city streets. It entertains the promise of idyllic sensual existence for the faithful after the Day of Judgment. Millions of people today live by its words in the non-Western world.

African cultures have powerful persistence through deeply rooted religious beliefs connecting Africans with their environment through worship of ancestors and gods of nature, including a creator god, combined with strong community and family ties. Transmission by story and memory, in a largely oral tradition, add to the mix and maintain the vitality of the traditional cultures.

Some of the great works of the non-Western world noted above are in part a record of the ideas and customs, the special visions and feelings of the non-Western peoples. Through these works students of the non-Western world can understand the nations and cultures that created the great books. They tell us about their past and they help us understand the context of their present society. Knowing and understanding the great books of the non-Western cultures leads us into contact with ideas that may be new to many readers in the West, but such contact frees us from provincialism in the realm of ideas and gives us respect for other points of view.

We can summarize some of the major differences between non-Western and Western cultures (Table 1.1). These differences center around three related issues: the relation between society and nature, the role of religion in society, and the structure and nature of cultural values and the role of individuals and groups in the society. The common elements underlie all non-Western cultural areas, but there are other elements that distinguish each culture within a major cultural cluster and each major cluster from other clusters. The non-Western world should be viewed as a mosaic of cultures rather than as a big homogenous, undifferentiated area.

Many non-Western values involve blending some of the world's intellectual traditions such as Confucianism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Islam. As in the West, some of the non-Western values have gone wrong in parts of Asia. The attachment to the family has fostered nepotism in countries such as Indonesia and China. The importance of personal relationships rather than formal legality has become cronymy. Consensus has become wheel-greasing and corrupt politics. Conservatism and respect for authority has become rigidity.

**TABLE 1.1**

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<th>MAJOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN WESTERN AND NON-WESTERN CULTURES</th>
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<td>Western</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>1. Superiority over nature</td>
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<td>2. Christianity concerned with absolute moral values, differences between good and evil, and redemption of the soul</td>
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<td>3. Society is built on legalistic contractual relationships</td>
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<td>5. Behavior controlled by rules, punishments and rewards</td>
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<td>6. Attribution groups are important (family, class, occupation)</td>
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<td>7. Weak hierarchical structure</td>
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<td>8. Important values are freedom and personal conscience</td>
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<td>10. Contractual relationships based on rights and duties</td>
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*Figure 1.2. Mahatma Gandhi addressing a public meeting in 1946. A nonviolent movement led by Gandhi led to the independence of India, marking the beginning of decolonization of the non-Western world. The teachings of Gandhi inspired Martin Luther King, Jr. to nonviolent resistance in the civil rights movement. (Photo: G. R. Jain)
and inability to innovate. Much-vaulted educational achievements have become rote learning and a refusal to question those in authority.

INTERACTION BETWEEN WESTERN AND NON-WESTERN PEOPLES

More than 2,000 years ago, commercial interaction between the non-Western world and Europe was via the Silk Road, perhaps history's most famous highway (Figure 1.3). The route wound for 5,000 miles from China across vast steppes, through the mountains of Central Asia and Northern India to the open ports of the Mediterranean. Precious bales of silk from China, exotic spices, muslin, gems, and ivory from India were ferried on the backs of camels on the Silk Road to markets in Europe. Large-scale Western interaction with Asia and Africa began chiefly as a capitalist search for markets and commodities, but it soon grew into a movement of much greater scope. It intensified after 1500 A.D., following the discovery of the sea route to India by Vasco da Gama in 1498, six years after the discovery of the New World by Columbus.

Five hundred years ago, on the eve of Europe's intrusion into Asia and Africa, non-Western societies were stagnant. Many African societies were subsistence oriented and weak. Asian societies were more feudal and science and technology were "frozen." Between the feudal class and an oppressed peasantry, only a rudimentary class of merchants had arisen, except in China, among the Arabs, and perhaps in India and Japan.

Western Europe, on the other hand, rose on the strength of a dynamic economic system. An agricultural revolution in the twelfth century was followed by the growth of trade and industry, and the "rebirth of Europe" in the fifteenth century. A merchant-led middle class gradually rose to power, committed to the application of science and industry. Denied access to Eastern silk and spices, Europeans embarked on the Age of Exploration (see box on spices). Science and technology led to naval superiority and Western dominance of the non-Western world. A period of some five hundred years followed in which the Western trade and economy overwhelmed Asia and Africa.

In the Age of Colonialism (1500-1800), Europeans founded colonies all over the non-Western world and, with arrogance and inhumanity, imposed slavery on Africa, although most of Africa was colonized after 1800. Only Japan and Thailand escaped colonial rule. It was followed by the Age of Imperialism (1860-1947), which marked a period of intensified colonialism. With the evolution of West European capitalism, there was an intensified need for colonies to provide investment opportunities abroad, secure sources of raw materials, and guaranteed markets. The colonies brought profit and wealth to substantial section of the European population. The desire for profitable trade, plunder, and enrichment were forces that led to the establishment of the
imperial structure. For example, India was the main provider of employment for substantial numbers of the upper and middle classes in Britain. The Indian Empire also helped Britain to maintain its military power because the Indian Army could be shipped all over the world to fight wars on Britain's behalf, as in 1914 and 1939. Indian troops raised in the subcontinent and paid for by the people of India helped maintain Britain's global military status. The importance of economic factors varied; sometimes political factors were more important in colonial activities.

The cultural interactions between Africa and the West began following the European discovery of the New World during the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Labor needs on plantations prompted Europeans to turn to Africa as a source of slave labor. Slave collection centers were established along the west coast of Africa, and during three centuries of slave trade, ships carried millions of Africans to the Americas. After the scramble for Africa was over by the end of the nineteenth century, European powers had partitioned most of the Sub-Saharan Africa.

There was widespread contact between Arabs and the West from ancient times. Translations of Greek and other texts led to an Islamic intellectual awakening in the ninth century. All of Spain except Granada—including the great libraries of Cordoba and Toledo—was lost to Islamic rule by 1250. The rise of Islam created fear in Christian Europe. European Crusaders sought to win back the Holy Land from the Muslims. Muslims often scorned European backwardness and crudeness, and when Europe became powerful, they often evaded opportunities for imitation and interaction.

The Western impact on non-Western societies varied according to the intensity of European interest and the internal strength of the Asian society concerned. Where European interest was marginal, even weakly organized societies were left more or less undisturbed. Where European interest was intense, the impact varied according to the internal strength of the victimized society. Even in the post-independence period (since 1947), the interaction between the Western and the non-Western worlds is taking place within the constraints of a strongly entrenched global capitalist system.

**Geography of Spices**

In 1992 America, Spain, and Italy celebrated the 500th anniversary of Columbus's voyage; they also should have paid tribute to spices. After all, when Columbus bumped into America, he was on a mission for the King and Queen of Spain to locate a new and speedier route to a place called the Spice Islands, now part of Indonesia.

In the fifteenth century, any country that dominated the market in spices from Asia—the equivalent of controlling massive oil reserves today—was rich. Today, the effect of spices on the balance of trade is inconsequential, at least in the United States, and competition in the spice market lies between companies, not countries. But the fortunes in spices are still substantial. Their use has more than doubled in the last 20 years, to over 762 billion pounds in 2000, when Americans spent an estimated $2 billion on dried herbs and spices for cooking, according to the American Spice Trade Association in New York.

Elites Europeans 500 years ago needed spices to mask the taste and aroma of food that was often putrid; Americans are now using spices to add zest to dishes that are underseasoned, having little or no salt. The increased interest in highly seasoned ethnic cuisines such as Cajun, Mexican, Indian, and Chinese has also boosted demand. To further pump up usage, manufacturers are coming out with new varieties of blended spices such as special concoctions for microwave cooking. Some manufacturers also are trying to tap the fastest-growing segment of the market, the food processing industry.

In the trade, spices include all the plant material used as seasonings in dried or shelf-stable form. That includes the spices derived from tropical trees and plants such as black pepper, cinnamon, cloves, turmeric, ginger, nutmeg, cardamom, and allspice, in addition to dehydrated onion and garlic, and capiscum such as dried chilies and paprika.

Historically, the quest for rare tropical spices led to the quest for the most efficient trade routes. Cutting a few months from a two-year voyage or reducing the likelihood of shipwreck could give the spice merchant an advantage, and at various times, Venice, Portugal, and the Netherlands all respected fortunes from trading in spices.

In early times, black pepper was the most valued spice; at one point, it accounted for 25 percent of the world's trade. When Alaric, the king of the Visigoths, first arrived at the walls of Rome in 408 A.D., he demanded not only gold and silver as a tribute, but also 3,000 pounds of precious pepper. In Antwerp, Belgium, by the mid-1500s, the price of pepper had become the Dow Jones of the day.

With few exceptions such as the Mediterranean species, virtually all aromatic spices used in the United States are still imported from the tropics in the non-Western lands, some directly by companies, others through brokers. America's biggest spice companies are also the oldest. McCormick, Schilling, and the Durkee brand date back to the late nineteenth century. McCormick & Company, the nation's biggest spice maker, bought Schilling in 1947 and has since marketed the McCormick brand east of the Mississippi and Schilling to the west. The R.T. French Company bought Durkee Famous Foods of Cleveland in 1985; today, its Durkee-French division is the number two producer. Besides McCormick and Durkee-French, the other major spice marketers include Spice Islands, Lawry's, and such supermarket chains as Kroger, Safeway, and Winn-Dixie, which are believed to control 17 percent of the market.

The memory of colonial rule by Western countries—Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and, briefly, the United States—is still vivid in the non-Western world, so are the consequences of colonial rule's end. It is hard to imagine so comprehensive a change as decolonization in so little time. Suddenly, in Asia and Africa the colonial rule was a thing of the past by the end of 1950s. The very word imperialism acquired a strong overtone of condemnation, as did colonialism. This was true not only in the former colonies, but also in the former imperial or colonial powers in the West.

Why did imperialism and colonialism come so suddenly, so dramatically, to an end? Of course, the people of the former colonial territories actively sought independence. Some non-Western countries ceased to be governed because they had become ungovernable by outside authority. Self-assertion
and self-determination was too strong. This was undoubtedly true in India, where dissent had sophistication and a resulting force far in excess of what could be mobilized in opposition by the Western colonial power. Here, Satyagraha (which literally means "the force for truth") was shaped into a powerful political philosophy by M. K. Gandhi to assert and advance civil and political rights. Drawing on the ancient Indian tradition that evil could best be countered by nonresistance, Satyagraha became associated with noncooperation and nonviolent civil disobedience. The protesters used techniques such as nonpayment of taxes and refusal to cooperate with authority. It became a potent weapon in Gandhi's hands, a nonviolent means of confronting the big battalions of imperial supremacy. This step may be viewed as an important watershed in the history of resistance to imperialism and in the development of peaceful techniques to assert nationalism. There was organized military resistance to the colonial power in Indo-China against the French, in Indonesia against the Dutch, and in Malaya against the British. The rise of nationalism emerged as the most effective Asian and African response to Western colonialism.

Nationalism arrived late in Africa, in part because European conquest came late, and in part because most of the colonial units were arbitrary, with no relationship to political tradition. John Sarbah (1865-1910) from the British Gold Coast colony (now Ghana) argued for customary laws and virtues. In the 1920s and 1930s a larger number of Africans trained in the West led a more sweeping nationalist agitation. The first meeting of the Pan-African Congress was held in 1919.

The British encouraged Arab and Jewish nationalism in the Middle East in the early twentieth century, hoping to undermine the Ottoman Empire. A steady increase of nationalist agitation and identification has persisted in Asia and Africa.

Often nationalism was fueled by mounting repression and aided by a common language (the colonial ruler's), the mass media, and the new network of roads and railroads. In much of the colonial world, the Western powers were allowed to go in peace. In the United States there was no thought of keeping the Philippines by force.

There was also another important reason for sudden decolonization. After World War II colonialism no longer served any important economic interest. Economic factors joined hands with idealism and became a vital force for rapid decolonization. Once, the acquisition of colonial territory brought revenues and exploitable resources that benefited the merchant and industrial interests within the governments of colonial powers. With colonial possessions went a national monopoly of trade centered on import of raw materials from colonial lands and export of industrial factory products. After World War II economic development became centered externally rather than externally; it was from domestic economic growth that nations prospered. Trade between the industrial countries became dominant; economic relations with the colonial world became marginalized. The colonies could depart without major economic cost to the Western colonial powers. Few in the United States suffered financial loss from the liberation of the Philippines.

In the years following decolonization, the extension of superpower influence of the United States and the Soviet Union over the newly independent and poorer nations of the non-Western world was seen as the new form of imperialism during the decades of the Cold War. The superpower rivalry had disastrous military aspects in Afghanistan, Vietnam, and other places in the non-Western world. The end of the Cold War, the downfall of communism, and the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991 brought this to an end.

As we enter the twenty-first century there are great economic powers (the United States, Japan, and Germany) and lesser ones (such as China and India) with varying military strengths, but imperialism and colonialism belong to the past. The non-Western nations must now deal with the imperial legacy of grave, indeed intolerable, human suffering left in its wake. When the former colonial possessions achieved independence, they were forced to take on the most demanding of human tasks—the provision of honest, reliable, and responsible government. Many non-Western countries have failed in this regard. From this, in turn has come economic failure, for economic success depends on the support and supervision of a stable, efficient, and effective governmental structure. Instability, incompetence, corruption, and the dictatorship of the favored few have been all too frequent in non-Western world during the last fifty years. In extreme, but not exceptional instances, there is civil disorder and conflict. Cambodia, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Congo, and Burma are recent examples. Even where things are better, the routine tasks of the state—the collection of taxes, the rendering of essential services, and the provision of a firm legal basis for economic progress—are poorly performed or not performed at all (Figure 1.4).

Without stable and efficient government, the essential requirement for social and economic development is unrealistic. In most of the non-Western nations, stark poverty is still endemic. The West cannot set itself apart from this poverty and feel comfortable and content in its affluence while its former colonies are poor; it must be on the conscience of the former colonial powers. Since decolonization, the poor non-Western countries have received attention from the West. During the Cold War period (1950-1989) most of this attention was the result of the hope or fear of Communism. An influential constituency in the Western countries, and recently in Japan, has consistently expressed sympathy and supported aid for the poor lands, as have the World Bank and other international agencies. In recent years, the United States has spent $12 to $15 billion for bilateral and multilateral international development and security assistance. As the leader in an increasingly integrated global order, the United States has a vital stake in promoting sustainable development, political stability, and democracy in the non-Western world.
In the early days of development, assistance agriculture was frequently neglected. Emphasis was on the cities and their inhabitants, and that was where development occurred. Food prices were often fixed to favor the urban population, and this had a depressive effect on agricultural production. There are exceptions, the leading example, is as so often the case, being in India. Since independence, the Indian population has more than doubled, but, supported by grain hybrids, fertilizer, irrigation, other soil and water management, and assured prices for farmers, so has food production. In more recent times, the role of agricultural and rural development has become evident and accepted, and the importance of good education—particularly the education of women—environment, and infrastructure for effective development has been appreciated.

Most of the non-Western nations have followed the West’s frontier economics model of development, in which the environment has been treated as an infinite supply of physical resources (raw materials, energy, water, soil, and air) for use. At the same time, the environment has been viewed as an infinite sink for the by-products of development in the form of various types of pollution (waste) and ecological degradation. Some countries such as Japan have moved to the environmental protection model of development, in which the focus is on clean-up and repair of ecological damage resulting from development activities. A sustainable development program will involve three dimensions: economic, environmental, and sociocultural. These three dimensions must be addressed by the non-Western countries with equal emphasis to ensure sustainability. The economic dimension involves achieving the maximum flow of income while maintaining the stock of assets (or capital)—environmental, human, and industrial—that yields these benefits. The focus of the environmental dimension is on the maintenance of the stability of biological and physical ecosystems. The sociocultural dimension involves maintenance of the stability of social and cultural systems, particularly reduction of destructive social conflicts and preservation of cultural diversity. These three dimensions of sustainable development form a closely integrated triangle with interactions among them (Figure 1.5).

**RESPONSE OF THE TWO MAJOR NON-WESTERN CIVILIZATIONS TO THE WEST**

The non-Western world is dominated by two great systems of civilization, the Indian and the Chinese (from which the Japanese society is in some measure derivative). The two systems have represented two opposite methods of organizing the energies and purposes of humans in society. India—decentralized, fragmented in thousands of village councils, yet held together by great pilgrimages and the common celebration of great feasts—has remained in many ways a singularly uncoveted society. Princes fought, dynasties rose and fell, but at the base of the social order authority remained with the village. China, on the other hand, early demonstrated some of the characteristics of an organized, centralized, bureaucratic, and authoritarian society. The number of issues that the emperor could directly decide may have remained limited, but he had instruments of coercion. His bureaucracy—the mandarinate—was empirewide, and succeeding dynasties were able to experiment with large-scale planning and control. Drastic land reforms and forced procurement of
To their own traditions of tolerance within a plural society, educated Indians added a profound grasp of what was best in the Western constitutional tradition. They showed a unique capacity to fuse the new ideals with a living legacy from their own past. From Ram Mohan Roy in the early nineteenth century to M. K. Gandhi in the twentieth, India produced a line of leaders in whom new and old could coexist, producing not a superficial copying of Western ideas but a true Asian form of the liberal ideal.

The Chinese had no such opportunity. As the nineteenth century advanced, the Manchus, unlike the Moguls in India a century earlier, did not collapse. They ossified. The state structure remained nominally in being. Outside forces could not, as in India, usurp central authority and hence inherit responsibility. They could only nibble away at the edges, exacting treaty ports and concessions. China's official reaction was a deepening rigidity. Modern ideas were fended off in the name of tradition. As modernizing pressures grew on the edge of the system, a deepening anti-modern reaction paralyzed the core. No fruitful fusion took place, only collision. Moreover, after the collapse of the Manchus in 1911, China could not settle down to a period of peaceful adjustment to modernity since, save for brief intervals, the country was continuously exposed to external Japanese attack and internal civil war. By 1949 the divisions and incoherences in China called for drastic solutions and Communism, with its strict orthodoxy, its centralized planning, its all-powerful mandarinate of commissars, appealed to deep authoritarian trends in Chinese life and at the same time offered a shortcut to modernization.

The Communist seizure of power carried the old historical trend into the new age. Modern China, like ancient China, would be practical, forceful, centralized, and authoritarian. India would remain, or attempt to remain, plural, decentralized, tolerant, and permissive. During the last half-century, India has demonstrated that the Western ideal of constitutional government, personal freedom, and the open society has validity outside the Atlantic culture that gave it birth. In only one non-Western culture so far has the liberal order put down real roots, drawing on the temperament and philosophy of the people and on decades of practical experience. That place is India.

Emergence of the Non-Western World

The emergence of the non-Western World from largely dependent status under the tutelage of colonial powers of the West was one of the major events of the post–World War II period. The Second World War was in this context a watershed, separating the two great periods of human history: the European or Atlantic period and the Asian period.

In the Asian section of the non-Western world the rapid growth of Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, and, more recently, Thailand,
Malaysia, Indonesia, China, and India has poised the region to become potentially a vibrant leader in the global economy of the twenty-first century (Figure 1.6). The success of the region has been attributed to export-oriented economic policy of East Asian countries; a well-educated, disciplined, hard-working labor force; a favorable global economy; an innovative, dynamic business sector; industrial policies that supported development of key sectors; and high rates of saving and investment. The average growth rates in the last two decades have been 6 to 8 percent for China, 7 percent for Southeast Asia, and 9 to 12 percent for Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore.

The financial trauma and recession of late 1990s in South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore was a setback. But pressure from international agencies and overseas investors is whittling away at the financial and banking problems and encouraging more open and efficient markets. China and India did not share the financial turmoil that faced South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia.

The non-Western countries are in the grip of a complex series of agricultural, industrial, and post-industrial revolutions which are occurring in three waves, the nature and intensity of which vary according to the time, the country, and the country's historical and political traditions. The revolutions have broad similarities to the European Renaissance, Reformation, and the Industrial Revolution. Because of the compression in time, these three distinct revolutions intertwine in Asia.

The first wave crested across Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore (with a combined population of 210 million). These countries have served the role of internal dynamo in the evolving Asia-Pacific economies. Japanese, Korean, and Taiwanese investment strategies have fueled progress in other Asia-Pacific countries. Singapore and Taiwan are following in the footsteps of Japan and have emerged as leading investors in Southeast Asia and Hong Kong. The first wave is far from ebbing.

The second wave reached the Southeast Asian countries (population 320 million) in the 1970s. Since independence, Southeast Asian economies have been relying on the world trading system for the export of their oil and commodities. Active trading in farm exports, plantation products, and mineral resources has left many Southeast Asian countries with a basic infrastructure of ports, airports, roads, railways, and telecommunications. Forty years of experience in self-government has established the public administration and private sector organizations and mechanics. By tapping the international market for tourism (Thailand) and investments (Singapore and Malaysia), the countries have achieved high growth rates.

The planned or regimented economies of China, India, Myanmar (Burma), and Vietnam (population over 2 billion) make up the vanguard of the third wave in the Asian region. These countries suffer from more bureaucratic government control. But the Chinese economy has been growing very rapidly since the 1980s, and India's economic growth has moved rapidly under the impetus of market reforms since 1991. Vietnam is also beginning to attract foreign investment.

Despite their different political systems, China and India, the world's two most populous countries, followed similar development strategies from the early 1950s through the early 1980s, both focusing on an industrial-oriented strategy under heavy state control. Both are now engaged in attempts to liberalize and revitalize their economies. China began its reforms in 1978. India began in a piecemeal fashion in the 1980s and comprehensively in 1991. In agriculture, in 1978 China replaced the communal farm system that had led to the starvation deaths of 30 million people with the household responsibility system. India, soon after independence, passed reforms to reduce over-concentrations of land ownership. Although agrarian institutions evolved differently in the two countries, their overall agricultural performance has remained roughly identical. In the area of trade, China moved away from monopolies by national corporations to the development of export-oriented trade zones in coastal areas. Although the large industrial state enterprise system has yet to be reformed significantly, exports of all goods and services, particularly manufactures, rose rapidly and significantly. In India, attempts to reform trade were unsuccessful until 1991, and a diversified and dynamic

Figure 1.6. Hong Kong, with a per capita income of about $23,000, ranks among the most-developed areas of East Asia. Hong Kong became a British colony in 1842. By an agreement reached in 1984, China recovered sovereignty over Hong Kong in July 1997. It is now a Special Administrative Region of China. In 2003 Hong Kong's economy was on the verge of recession with unemployment at a record 8.3 percent. A bill to limit civil rights in 2003 drew half a million protesters into the streets and threw Hong Kong government into its biggest crisis since the territory returned to China. (Photo: P. F. Katzen.)
export sector has not emerged. Both nations are discovering that international trade holds great promise for economic growth.

Because of China's continental size (two to three times larger than Europe in its geographical area and population), the revolutions are uneven and are focused on the coastal or capital cities in China. Both in India and Vietnam, signs of rapid change have emerged, but the main tidal waves will probably not start until the turn of the century. The primary force for the revolutions in the Asian Pacific has been the rapid advance of powerful technologies. Whereas iron, steel, coal and steam powered the spread of European influence, microchips, telecommunications, and jet transport are powering the spread of a vast array of technological and commercial empires.

A significant problem facing development in non-Western countries is corruption. Indeed, according to a report on Asian corruption by a Hong Kong firm, Political and Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC), the biggest risk that business firms face in the non-Western world is corruption. China is among the three most corrupt countries in Asia, according to a survey of expatriate managers carried out by PERC. The managers were asked to grade corruption in each country on a scale from zero to ten. Rather than corruption itself, what bothers foreign companies most in Asia are the shortcomings within a country that allow corruption to flourish, such as the lack of a reliable legal system (a big problem in China) or poor pay for civil servants in most countries. In China, a purge against corruption has seen some officials executed and resignations in the highest places.

Despite Asia's teeming millions, shortage of both labor and skills are among additional constraints on the region's economic growth. From dusty construction sites in Malaysia to gleaming microchip plants in Taiwan and boardrooms in Shanghai and Mumbai (Bombay), companies are struggling to find skilled workers and managers. Finding, training, and hanging on to qualified local employees is a problem. In Penang, Malaysia, and Bangalore, India, high-tech firms try to retain staff by offering perks such as overseas travel and share options. In many places, economic development has simply outpaced the skills of the workforce. Across the region, a boom in infrastructure projects has created a massive demand for construction workers. In 1994 Thailand sent some 400,000 workers to building sites in Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Taiwan. Laborers from Myanmar work illegally on many Thai building sites. Immigrants from Bangladesh work on many building sites in major Indian cities. Both Hong Kong and Singapore have migrant workers, mostly Filipino maids, for cheap labor they can no longer provide for themselves.

Skilled managers and technicians are even more in demand. There is a shortage not just of engineers or specialists such as tax accountants, but also of staff who know how to deal face-to-face with customers in service businesses such as hotels. Many companies are investing in training facilities. Even so, the armies of migrant workers are likely to be a feature of

the Asian labor market. The Philippines alone has some 4.5 million workers overseas who send home an estimated $6 billion a year. The skills overseas workers acquire can be useful when they return home. Many of Taiwan's new high-tech firms are led by Taiwanese engineers and scientists who have returned from working overseas, especially in the United States. Something similar is now happening in Bangalore, India. Bangalore used to be a recruiting ground for Western companies seeking to hire cheap computer programmers. Now many of those who went abroad are returning to start up their own software firms.

The Twenty-First Century in the Non-Western World

Despite the problems of corruption, financial turmoil, and the resulting economic slowdown in Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asia; conflict in the Middle East; and ethnic/tribal hostilities in Africa, the non-Western world is standing on the verge of the most enormous changes that have ever occurred in world society. With its vast population and ancient traditions, it is joining the modern industrialized world. During the first decade of the twenty-first century, one billion Asians and Africans, roughly the population of the United States and Europe today, will have reached the threshold of middle-class income. Their entry into the world marketplace will transform nearly every business on earth, creating unprecedented demand for goods and services of all kinds.

Visit any Asian city from Beijing to Cape Town and you will witness an economic miracle: fast-growing industries, rising incomes, bustling trade, and twenty-first century skylines built on ground that, twenty to forty years ago, could barely support subsistence farming. Some of the most dynamic economies on earth—China, India, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines—were third-world countries ravaged by war and famine four decades ago. Notwithstanding the current financial crisis, since the 1970s Asia has produced more economic growth for more people than any other region in the history of humankind.

And the long-term future looks to be more astonishing and exciting than the past forty years were. By 2020, experts anticipate that some 2 billion will have climbed from poverty, creating the world's largest industrial consumer society. And the rise of a modern non-Western world won't just change life in the Asia and Africa; the development will affect every aspect of Western culture also, including business, investment, language, education, and entertainment.

The forces that will carry these age-old non-Western cultures into the future are already under way. Consider the impact of the Industrial Revolution, first in England, then in Europe, then in America in the twentieth century. Now imagine the effect of an even more sudden economic revolution currently sweeping through the non-Western world. Economies are moving
into the machine age and beyond into the information and technology age, all within a few decades. Over half the world’s population, including China and India, is on the brink of the modern era.

Historically, the fuel for Asia’s success can be summed up in one word: exports. Over the past four decades rising exports have pushed one Asian country after another to increasing levels of affluence. First Japan, then the four tiger territories of Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, and now China and the less-developed Asian nations have staked their futures on manufacturing. And that effort has succeeded. Today, Asia makes 40 percent of the world’s goods, up from 25 percent in the early 1970s. Europe and North America, by comparison, each contribute about 25 percent of the total.

Non-Western countries have followed a pattern in economic development:

- Countries start with relatively simple, labor-intensive industries that pay low wages.
- As modernization takes hold, wages and education levels rise. Countries then graduate to more complex, capital-intensive industries, often moving their labor-intensive businesses to less-developed neighbors.
- In the final stage, countries enter technology and service-based industries such as computer and telecommunications equipment, software, banking, consulting, and finance.

Some Southeast Asian countries and South Korea kept a tight political control on financial institutions and the economy. In 1997 they faced financial turmoil resulting from this strategy which often ignored sound financial practices and lent money to good friends instead of lending money to good borrowers.

Right now countries such as China, India, Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia are at various points in the first stage. South Korea and Malaysia are in the second stage, and Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore are at the final stage. The future clearly lies with value-added, technological industries. Taiwan has already made this shift, drawing an increasing flow of Taiwan-born managers and engineers educated abroad back home to establish a high-tech industry. South Korea now has a thriving semiconductor industry, trailing only the United States and Japan in world production. Singapore, too, has begun to emphasize high-tech manufacturing, particularly biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, microelectronics, computer software, and imaging. And Bangalore, India, is now one of the world’s largest exporters of computer software.

As rising incomes push millions into a thriving middle class, non-Western lands have become an important consumer market (Figure 1.7). Already the newfound wealth is shifting the patterns of trade within the region. In 1985, the countries of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong split their trade almost evenly between the United States and the rest of Asia and Africa. By 2000, these countries’ trade with Asia and Africa was double their trade with the United States. Regional trade should intensify further as consumers see their buying power increase. If current growth trends continue, by 2010 nearly 1 billion people in Asia will command as much as $10 trillion in spending power. That’s half again as big as the U.S. economy. And that’s why, in industry after industry, Asian consumers provide the greatest potential for future growth. For example, Boeing predicts that Asians will account for two thirds of the growth in air travel between 1995 and 2005. As phone usage increases, China and India represent stunning opportunities for the world’s telecommunication industries.

Although the changes will reach the countryside someday, their most immediate impact is on fast-growing cities. And as life in the metropolis grows more modern, the process of urbanization will accelerate. In 2000, fewer than a third of the non-Western world’s people lived in cities. The United Nations estimates that by the year 2020, some 60 percent will live in cities—an influx of about 1.5 billion people.

Three Large Nations of the Non-Western World: China, India, and Japan

Of the non-Western World’s three giant nations, two (China and India) are the world’s most populous, and the other (Japan) is the second largest economically. These three countries rank among the top five in the primary global structures—economic, military, and knowledge power. They are strong states with the ability to mobilize the country’s human and natural resources in the service of its worldview and policy objectives. By conventional measurements
of great powers (in terms of international military and economic power balances), China and India are rising powers. Japan, a great power before World War II, possesses all the requisites of a great power, but the Japanese appear to have little desire to pursue that status. For the time being, Japan is content to remain under the American nuclear and military protection. Yet in a rapidly changing world where transnational nonmilitary challenges to sources of power are becoming increasingly important, the future of China, India, and Japan as complete great powers remains indeterminate. At best, both China and India are emerging and assertive regional military powers, and Japan’s role is constrained by its military record in East Asia during the Second World War.

The growth of China’s economic power during the last twenty years has been impressive (Figure 1.8). The downside is that this remarkable economic growth has been made possible by China’s growing involvement and dependence on the capitalist world economic system. The greater involvement in the global political economy—external trade dependency and external debt—more easily translates into greater economic vulnerability and sensitivity than into a great power. A growing mismatch between China’s population and resources, and a possible eruption of ethno-national conflict accompanied by domestic, social, political, demographic, and environmental problems, could make the nation’s continuing success far from assured. The Chinese communist legitimacy is threatened by growing middle-class expectations created by the free market economy but frustrated by government repression. Despite its growing economic vulnerability and dependence, authoritarian China seems poised to mobilize significant resources for the exercise of power outside its borders. China is a member of the exclusive nuclear club, possessing the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal. It also maintains the world’s largest army with 3 million soldiers. China at 2000 is what Germany was in 1900: a large nondemocratic, have-not power of rising ambition and growing military might. Indeed, while every other Great Power has drastically reduced military expenditures, China’s have significantly increased.

India, the world’s largest democracy with its near-billion population, growing but largely self-reliant economy, efficient army and nuclear arsenal, and strong sense of cultural and national identity, is a growing and assertive power that is striding confidently on to the world stage as a contender for great power. In 1998, after a remarkably smooth electoral process, a new Indian government was sworn in, a government free from the ideological baggage that, coming from the left, had slowed economic performance. In contrast to authoritarian China, India is constrained by a democratic framework in the transformation of its socioeconomic structure. India’s concern with both democracy and development poses a good counterexample within the non-Western world to the Chinese model of development in which the state presides over the introduction of a capitalist sector. An authoritarian Chinese government is better capable of running a vigorous economic and military policy than democratic governments, because it does not need its people’s consent. When Deng Xiaoping ordered troops to crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators in Tianamen Square in 1989, he was not worrying about what it would mean and how he would do in the next election. But a totalitarian government can make a serious mistake if dictatorial over-confidence leads it to ignore hard facts. On the other hand, a democracy can be vigorous because decisions are arrived at discussion, debate, and consent of the masses.

India has now begun remediing its weaknesses. The economy has reached a size at which it can support a burden of military spending that is significant by global standards. Located between East Asia and West Asia, at the head of the Indian Ocean, India has clear interest in a favorable geopolitical balance in both areas of Asia as well as in eastern and southern Africa.

Japan has much of what it takes to be a great power. Its military technology and defense spending are well ahead of all other non-Western countries. Japan knows what role it wants to play in the world. Japan faces China, across the
East China Sea, where feelings about Japan’s wartime occupation are still raw. Japan faces problems arising from its location. East Asian countries do not want a strong Japan. China would like to keep Japan militarily weak. With dependence on the U.S. nuclear arsenal and defense, Japan has a problem making itself an independent great power.

How will power redistribute itself in the non-Western World in the opening decades of the twenty-first century? It appears that China, India, and Japan will emerge along with the United States, Russia, and the European Union as centers of political, economic, and military power. However, what happens in the next generation will depend largely on the behavior of three Asian powers—China, India, and Japan—and the United States’ strategic interests in the region. Despite the presence of American military forces in Japan and South Korea, the United States does not enjoy much political leverage to influence the policies of India and China, as recent events have indicated. The ability of America and Europe to exercise control over balance of power in Asia will continue to decline.

DEMOCRACY, DEVELOPMENT, AND ENVIRONMENT

Population and Food Supply

Rapid population growth presents a problem in the non-Western world’s development. The faster the population grows, the harder it is to achieve rapid rates of economic growth per head (Figure 1.9). Within the non-Western world, population growth has been fastest in the Islamic Middle East. Since 1975 the number of people in this region has increased by an average of 3.1 percent a year. Next is Sub-Saharan Africa, with an average annual population growth rate of 2.9 percent. In the Indian subcontinent the growth rate is 2.2 percent per year. In East Asia, where the economies have been more successful, the figure is a modest 1.6 percent per year.

As a result of broad social and economic development and effective national family planning programs, Asian fertility rates declined by 39 percent, or 62 percent of the way toward the population-replacement level of 2.1 children per woman, between the late 1960s and the late 1980s. Although every region of Asia participated in the decline, the amount varied greatly, ranging from 20 percent in the Islamic West Asia (Figure 1.10) to 57 percent in East Asia. Qualified observers did not expect that in Asia’s populous countries fertility would fall substantially or contraceptive prevalence rise rapidly in just two decades. Six Asian countries with strong national family planning programs—Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam—collectively have a contraceptive use rate of 64 percent and total fertility rates ranging from 4.5 to 2.1 children per woman. Together, they account for 76 percent of Asia’s population.

China, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam, the four countries with the largest fertility declines, have, in addition to strong national family planning programs, two important development indicators: low mortality and high adult female literacy. China has mobilized its peasant population. India’s moderately strong program is not always well implemented in the field, and national mortality and illiteracy rates remain high. In Bangladesh, which, despite high mortality and low female literacy, has had a substantial fertility decline, with 40 percent of the population of childbearing age now using contraceptives. Two countries, Pakistan and Nepal, still have high mortality and low female literacy. Their family planning programs are ineffective, and fertility remains high.

Six countries in East and Southeast Asia already have below-replacement fertility. For Hong Kong (a special territory of China) and Japan, the explanation is social and economic development combined with private family planning services. For South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand, it is broadly based development combined with strong family planning programs. Ideas about family planning and new lifestyles, carried by modern communication networks, play a role; but in some of these countries traditional familial values persist despite low fertility rates. The movement from replacement to below-replacement fertility
intuition, there is empirical evidence. The state of Kerala in populous India, though poor, has reduced its fertility rate to replacement levels, thanks in large part to high levels of female literacy and education and growing economic opportunities for women.

For centuries, many writers have been predicting food shortages and famine in non-Western countries such as China and India. Thomas R. Malthus (1766–1834) argued two centuries ago that the growth of population must outstrip that of food supplies. In 1968 Gunnar Myrdal, a Swedish Nobel laureate, declared that India would have trouble feeding more than 500 million people. Some have argued that China’s growing demand for food imports could trigger food price shocks, in turn causing starvation for hundreds of millions.

Although population doubled in many countries between 1950 and 1990, food supply kept pace with demand. Pessimists had failed to anticipate the “green revolution,” in which use of fertilizers, irrigation, and new crop varieties spread and allowed food production to keep pace with population growth. In Asia, wheat yields rose fivefold between 1961 and 1991. Output was boosted further by better farming methods, more irrigation, and more chemical fertilizers. Apart from some blips in the 1970s, food prices continued their long-term decline. Asia, which grows almost half of the world’s
cereals, produced 20 million tons more in 1995 than the 900 million tons of 1994. The green revolution has transformed Asian farming since the 1970s, making India and several other countries self-sufficient in food.

Certainly, the challenge of food supply is daunting, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 1.12). Every year the population of the non-Western countries expands by almost 90 million. The United Nations estimates suggest that by 2020 world population will exceed 8 billion, up 45 percent from 1995. Food demand will rise faster still as people are lifted out of poverty. There are some worrying signs, too, on the supply side. Yields of rice and wheat in Asia are still rising, but much more slowly than they did in the 1960s and 1970s. Growth in the use of fertilizers has slowed worldwide.

The green revolution has brought problems too. In Asia many irrigated areas have become saline or waterlogged. Pests have developed resistance to chemicals. In many countries, fertile areas still uncultivated are often precious habitats for wildlife. In some areas, such as northern China, irrigation has led to water shortages. The environmental problems brought by modern farming methods are real enough, but it is unlikely that the world will let them seriously restrain food production.

Along with fertility decline, growing agricultural productivity, and robust economic growth rates, advances in Asia will continue in the twenty-first century, and the forces of change will have an effect on more than 3 billion people. In Asia, the Western world’s Calvinist work ethic has met, fused with, and been reinforced by Chinese and Indian business principles. The result is an area where the wave of future development will rise and crest. It’s a concept that’s often hard to grasp in the United States—a nation that has spent 200 years looking across the Atlantic Ocean toward Europe, drawn by ethnic and cultural heritages, political goals, and economic needs. But that doesn’t change what’s happening in the Asian region of the non-Western world.

Modernization and Development

Modernization may be defined as the application of science and technology to the problems of life and society. The resulting patterns of change offer prospects for the betterment of human conditions, but also may threaten mankind in some cases with environmental destruction. Colonial rule in the non-Western world stressed westernization—the adoption of Western customs—without modernization. In general, colonialism and modernization were contradictory. Independence is a necessary condition for modernization involving upgrading of the application of science and technology to society.

Development is a process of directed social and economic change. Drawing on the experience of several decades of development efforts, the concept of sustainable development emerged in the 1980s. Historically, the development of the Western world and Japan focused on production. Not surprisingly, therefore, the model followed by the developing nations of the non-Western world in the 1950s and 1960s was output and growth dominated, based mainly on the concept of economic efficiency. By the early 1970s the large and growing numbers of poor in the developing countries, and lack of "trickle down" benefits to them, led to greater efforts to directly improve income distribution. The development paradigm shifted toward equitable growth, in which social (distributional) objectives, especially poverty alleviation, were recognized as distinct from, and as important as, economic efficiency.

Protection of the environment has now become the third major objective of development with the economic and social objectives noted in the preceding paragraph (Figure 1.13). By the early 1980s, a large body of evidence had accumulated that environmental degradation was a major barrier to development. The concept of sustainable development has therefore evolved to encompass three major points of view: economic, social, and environmental. The economic approach to sustainability places emphasis on growth,
The non-Western world is characterized by efficiency, stability, and sustainability. The social-cultural concept of sustainability is people-oriented, seeking to maintain the stability of social and cultural systems. Elimination of poverty, equity, and the rights of future generations are important aspects of this approach. The preservation of cultural diversity and the better use of knowledge concerning sustainable practices embedded in indigenous cultures are emphasized. For socially sustainable development, a society must encourage and harness pluralism and grassroots participation to form a more effective decision-making framework. The environmental view of sustainable development focuses on the stability of biological and physical systems. The emphasis is on preserving the resilience and dynamic ability of natural systems and habitats, including human-made environments such as cities. Natural resource degradation, pollution, and loss of biodiversity reduce the resilience of the system.

To achieve sustainable development, the economic, social-cultural, and environmental concepts must be integrated. Integrating and operationalizing them to achieve sustainable development is a formidable task. Most development decisions in the non-Western world continue to be based on economic efficiency criteria; often attempts are made to incorporate social-cultural approaches, but these have not been very successful. There is a need to develop a broader conceptual framework that integrates the economic, social-cultural, and environmental approaches. The major goals of development in the non-Western world must be growth with equity, and cultural and environmental preservation.

The United Nations includes Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Myanmar (Burma), and Laos among the least-developed countries in the Asian Pacific region. The obstacles to development are measurably greater in Africa than in Asia, where growth-oriented nations have quickened the pace of innovation, investment, and social and economic change. Among the criteria used for measuring development are income per capita, structure of the economy (employment in primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors), and social indices such as literacy, health, and infant mortality. A recent report by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) suggests that some non-Western countries are less poor than official figures indicate. Rather than convert local-currency GDPs (gross domestic product) into dollars at market exchange rates, the IMF now has decided to use purchasing power parities (PPP), which take into account international differences in prices. The result is a sharp jump in the developing countries' share of the world's output, to 34 percent with the new method from 18 percent with the old method. By contrast, the share of industrially advanced countries has dropped from 73 percent to 54 percent.

The central issues in development in non-Western lands involve continued emphasis on improving agricultural production through higher yields, the reform of land tenure, development of modern industry, and protection of the environment through better management of growth. The speed of development has been determined by the amount of funds available through investment by multinational corporations. Significant development will continue in the future, if the governments of less-developed countries in the non-Western world put people, rather than ideology, at the center of their national development goals. This would involve emphasizing education, primary health care, family planning, safe water, and feasible growth and resource development strategy. In addition, long-term development in any country will not be possible without the establishment of human freedom indicated by multiparty elections, freedom of the press, rule of law, right to travel and assembly, and opportunities for gender and ethnic equality.

In 1990 the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), an independent agency which in 1990 channeled $1.4 billion in aid, introduced a human development index (HDI) ranking 139 countries on a composite index. The 1991 Human Development Report refined that index and expanded it to cover 160 countries, while introducing a new "human freedom index" to show the relationship between freedom and development. It shows that the world's poorest nations are generally also the least free, and concludes that "overall there seems to be a high correlation between human development and human freedom." Among the non-Western countries, Japan ranks at the top with 32 of a possible 40 points and Iraq as the least free, with a score of zero. Most of
the non-Western world's poor countries including China, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Bangladesh score 10 points or less.

Five Sins of Development in the Non-Western World

Development efforts in the non-Western countries have been bedevilled by a lack of appropriate emphasis in five major areas. An emphasis on these items is necessary to make the development efforts a success.

1. Development without infrastructure. Development efforts of recent years have yielded a range of techniques and strategies that could accelerate real development even in the difficult decades that lie ahead. Most of the cost-effective techniques now available, from immunization to oral rehydration therapy, and from new seed varieties to new hand-pumps, are of little value without a reliable delivery mechanism for informing and supporting people in their use. The backbone of infrastructure is made up of a properly trained staff and informed people.

2. Development without participation. Sustained development ultimately depends on enhancing people's own capacities to improve their lives and to take more control over their own destinies. External assistance, whether from a capital city or a foreign country, cannot long be the star of the show, and must learn the skills of the supporting role. Whether in agriculture or industry, water supply or housing schemes, development experience to date has shown that there is an absolutely crucial distinction between the kind of assistance that enables and involves and the kind that alienates and disenfranchises. The success or failure of any development effort will usually depend on which side of that sometimes subtle line such assistance falls.

3. Development without environment. Twenty-five years ago it was widely thought that environmental degradation was a problem of the industrialized world, a function of affluence, and of little relevance to the less-developed nations. Today the deforestation of lands, erosion of soils, siting of lakes and rivers, the new propensity to drought and flood, and industrial disasters such as the Bhopal tragedy have shown that the environment is also a problem in Asia and Africa. At the same time, rising concern over the depletion of the ozone layer, global warming, and the unknown consequences of the destruction of the world's forests should have made it clear to all that the environment is everyone's problem. In every development initiative the environment ought to be a part of the forethought and not an afterthought.

4. Development without the poor. Development has for too long been confined to showcase examples and pilot projects. Such projects have shown what can be done: the emphasis must now shift toward doing it for the poorest third of the families in non-Western lands. The problems of malnutrition, poor growth, frequent ill-health, child deaths, maternal mortality, illiteracy, and low productivity are concentrated among the poorest third of the population.

The challenge of reaching the very poorest is the greatest challenge of social development. Over the last fifteen years, almost every initiative, large or small, has come up against the same problem of reaching the unreached. Even the most serious and politically difficult attempts at shifting priorities in favor of the poor—via primary schools or adult literacy campaigns, rural clinics, or supplementary feeding programs—have often failed to reach substantial numbers among the very poorest groups.

There is no one answer to this problem. Just as the impact on the environment must now be borne in mind at every stage of every development initiative, so pressure must be maintained at every stage to keep the focus on the poorest communities. In particular, the pressure must be kept up for the increasing representation of the poor in decision making and for the inversion of spending pyramids so that the majority of resources available for development are devoted to actions that benefit the poorest.

5. Development without women. The women of the non-Western World are responsible for producing and marketing most of its crops; they also carry the main responsibility for food preparation and homemaking, for water and fuel, for nutrition and health care, for hygiene, and for the education of the young (Figure 1.14). Not least, they are almost entirely responsible for the physical and mental development of the next generation. Yet the bulk of the development assistance efforts to date, most of the education and training, the technology and the inputs, the investments and the loans, have gone to men.

The gender-based imbalance in development is difficult to correct because it is part of a landscape of fundamental social inequities in all countries. But the inefficiency involved in this bias, not to mention its injustice, costs the development effort dearly. The effects of female education on family size, child health, and the use of available government services are already known. But the possibilities for increased productivity and incomes through credit, training, and technology for women have hardly begun to be explored. Similarly, investments in safe motherhood and in labor-saving devices of particular relevance to women are among the most productive but the most ignored of all investments in social and economic development.

It is no exaggeration to say that the avoidance of these "five sins" could more than double the cost-effectiveness of the development effort.
of its income, and own less than 1 percent of its property. The work women do in the home and on the farm is never calculated into the gross national product of any country. Women's unpaid contributions to their national economies are largely overlooked.

The gap between women's work and their rewards is largest in Asia and Africa. As populations have exploded (mainly because of a decline in infant mortality) women's burdens have increased and their health has deteriorated. Most women spend all their childbearing years either pregnant or nursing children. Largely because of the male urban migration, women end up heading at least 17 percent of the households—30 percent or more in some rural areas of the non-Western lands.

Depletion of the land has meant that millions of women are fleeing to the cities and crowding into often primitive slums. Conditions there are even harder than in the countryside. Back on the land, deforestation, poor land management, and emphasis on cash crops have shrunk the arable acreage available to food producers, most of whom are women. At the same time, environmental decay has forced women to spend more time each day walking greater and greater distances to find water and firewood for their families.

By keeping food prices low, government policies in many countries have sacrificed the welfare of rural peasants—most of whom are women—to appease the growing, more politically focused demands of the city dwellers. These policies have encouraged cash crops in a desperate attempt to generate hard currency and pay off national debts. In many areas, local wars or drought and floods, have relegated large numbers of women and children to the crowded and dehumanizing conditions of refugee camps.

As if all of this were not enough, a breakdown in the pattern of traditional marriage has left many women with children to fend for themselves. Alcoholism, mainly among men, and the domestic violence that results from it have become major problems in several countries. And while the world economic crunch has meant that few families are able to survive on only one income, women often have neither the training nor the freedom from family responsibilities to enable them to find gainful employment.

A major effort is underway throughout the non-Western world to widen women's horizons beyond childbearing and the collecting and preparing of food. Jobs and education are essential if more and more women are to be given a chance. Literacy and education are also vital in freeing women from the drudgery of village and slum life.

To increase equality of opportunity for women, it will be important to remove the long-standing laws and social practices that have either explicitly or effectively discriminated against women in the non-Western world. In many countries, laws and practices restrict women's right to own property, secure credit, enter certain occupations, and access education. It is often difficult to change traditional social practices without strong and widespread involvement of women in national and local social movements. National laws
to ban dowries in India and prohibitions on prostitution in Thailand are significant steps, but they had limited effects in removing long-standing practices. Public policy such as subsidies for girls’ education, employment preference for qualified women, and assistance such as flexible working hours, on-site child care, maternity leave, and child care tax credits to women who are combining the role of worker and household manager can play an important role in alleviating gender inequality.

**Inequity and Rural Poverty**

Rural poverty, a dominant feature of life in all regions of the world, affects the lives of close to 900 million people in the non-Western world. The proportion of rural population whose incomes and consumption fall below nationally defined poverty lines is estimated at 31 percent (633 million) in Asia (46 percent or 262 millions if China and India are excluded), 60 percent (204 million) in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 26 percent (27 million) in the Middle East.

These rural poor are largely untouched by the recent progress in the non-Western world. The goal of lifting this impoverished majority out of its hopelessness and misery through development has largely failed. The development quest continues, but problems such as poverty, ignorance, unemployment, hunger, and disease (which the developers set out to solve) still afflict vast millions. Development is not reaching the rural poor in any decisive degree. Countries such as China and India are growing in gross economic terms, but the individual lives of the bulk of their people living in rural areas are stagnating (Figure 1.15). Even though many nations in Asia and Africa are dotted with showcase factories, modern urban areas, new universities, high-yielding fields of rice and wheat, and shops filled with consumer goods, there is widespread evidence in the rural landscape that the development efforts have failed.

Not only has development failed to give significant help to the poor, it has also contributed to widening the gap between rich and poor in many non-Western countries. The failure is rooted in two major factors: the inability to curb the relentless growth of population in most countries and the inability and, in many cases, unwillingness of officials in governments plagued by inefficiency and corruption and preoccupied with other concerns to push social development with enough vigor to transfer some of the fruits of economic growth to the rural poor.

Throughout the non-Western world the advantaged minority in the rural areas—those with power, influence, money, or education—has pushed quickly ahead since the 1970s, but the rest of the rural poor have remained behind. Although the average per capita income has increased, the per capita income of the majority of the people remained below the poverty line. The social tensions caused in large part by the population burden and economic inequities have often produced political turmoil. For example, in Pakistan, the East Pakistanis revolted, charging neglect, deprivation, and exploitation, and

Figure I.15. Yangze valley, near Wuhu, China. Rural poverty in China has declined substantially during the last two decades. Yet, even as China’s economy continues to grow and it enters into the World Trade Organization, it is becoming harder to reduce poverty and inequality further. China’s smallholder farmers are among those most threatened by the changes resulting from the country’s membership in the World Trade Organization, which calls for relaxation in duties and quotas on imported agricultural products. This will license the competition farmers face from imports. Already, Chinese farm incomes are falling, and poverty is spreading in some areas where rural households depend on money and hence by relatives working on construction sites in cities. Labor is plentiful and cheap in the countryside, but total production costs on China’s small farm plots are actually higher than in the West, where large mechanized farms provide economies of scale. For example, American wheat can be bought in China for about $36 less a ton than domestic wheat, putting downward pressure on local prices. That pressure will intensify after China raises its ceiling on wheat imports from the current 2 million tons annually to 9.3 million tons by 2004. Consolidation from efficient foreign agriculture is expected to hasten the already huge migration of people from the countryside into China’s cities. The influx will strain urban social services and women urban employment. (Photo: P. P. Kamin.)

with the help of India won a two-week war for independence in December 1971, as the new nation of Bangladesh. Nonetheless, the Pakistanis, though relieved of what was seen as a burdensome Bengali majority, continue to have an impoverished and anxious rural population of 23 million living below the poverty line. With large populations of poor people estimated in 1997 at 251 million in India, 119 million in China, 82 million in Bangladesh, 34 million in Indonesia, 22 million in the Philippines, and 14 million in Thailand, the major battle in some non-Western countries is just to keep the numbers of poor from increasing further.

There is no doubt that, individually and collectively, the obstacles facing the rural poor are formidable. They are not, however, insuperable. Most of the forces creating poverty are essentially social. They reflect systems of resource allocation that are made by societies, and as such they can be reversed. Basic
elements in the effort to render the rural poor in non-Western countries more productive are the provisions of economic services and assets that the rural poor have tended not to receive in the past. The prosperity of the rural poor depends on the improvement in the means of production directly available to them. Health and education are very important, but they offer more if they are combined with the material means of making a living. To pull people out of poverty, it is also important to first empower them with self-esteem and with the hope that change is always possible (Figure 1.16). When confronting major challenges such as traditional poverty, small steps are more effective than monumental antipoverty programs.

**Massive Urbanization**

The cities of the non-Western world are growing at an extremely rapid pace and many are becoming unmanageable. Millions of people in Africa and Asia pour each year from the impoverished countryside, swelling the ranks of the unemployed and straining the already limited supply of urban services. Of the world's urban population of 2.6 billion, nearly 1.2 billion are in the non-Western world. By 2025, the urban population is projected to increase to 2.7 billion in Asia and 804 million in Africa. An estimated 600 million people in urban areas of the non-Western world today cannot meet their basic needs for shelter, water, and health. The population living in urban slums in megacities of the non-Western world varies between 12 percent in Seoul to 84 percent in Cairo. The slum population of other cities, according to estimates made by the International Labor Organization, is 20 percent in Shanghai, 57 percent in Mumbai, and 58 percent in Lagos. National studies in Asia show large percentages of the urban population in slum and squatter settlements: Bangladesh at 47 percent, Sri Lanka at 21 percent, Malaysia at 15 percent, Thailand at 15 percent, and Indonesia at 54 percent.

The rapid growth of cities and the development of slums and squatter settlements in much of the non-Western world is an outgrowth of a failed strategy of development that emphasized industrial and urban growth at the expense of agriculture and rural development. The urban-based development strategy fueled substantial rural-to-urban migration and the concentration of economic activity in urban areas. Housing, urban infrastructure, and water supplies failed to keep pace with urban growth. In many non-Western cities, modern districts are set apart from the traditional city centers and expanding slums settlements are frequently on the periphery. One can see these slums on the outskirts of Delhi, India, and on the periphery of many other cities. Less than a half-hour drive from New Delhi's dazzling architectural wonders, comfortable neighborhoods, and splendid gardens, there are abject slum settlements along the Jamuna river on government-owned land. From the levee above the river one can look down on a staggering clutter of rusted and crumbling corrugated iron roofs secured only by stones. Here, over 20,000 marginalized people are crammed into makeshift homes. Dirt, disease, and squallor cast a spell of hopelessness in such slums in the major cities.

Most cities do not have the resources to provide adequate sanitation and public health. Poor living conditions lead to increased risks from pollution to environmental health, the quicker spread of infectious diseases, and the interactions of viral and bacterial infections. Crowding and poor-quality water are major elements in disease transmission.

Historic areas are threatened by expanding urban development, and preservation efforts often conflict with economic restructuring priorities. The feminization of poverty in the cities is a cause for increasing concern. Women in the larger cities are either unemployed or work in the lower ranks of clerical, sales, and menial occupations rather than in production and manufacturing. In some Asian cities such as Karachi, civil disturbances, violent social movements, and periodic unrest have displaced growing numbers of women and their children. Such women become heads of their households with few resources to provide for their families' basic needs and limited opportunities to improve their situation.
Most non-Western countries have lately become concerned about the degree of urbanization and the resulting social, economic, and environmental problems. The 1996 U.N. Conference on Urbanization held in Istanbul highlighted the problems of the rapid growth of cities. Overurbanization did not occur in the development of the Western countries because, broadly speaking, migrants were absorbed by industry in the cities, or they moved to new territories overseas. But non-Western countries today are in a different situation from that of the Western countries on the eve of their industrialization. The major difference is that there are many more people today attempting to enter industries that require much less labor.

Two policy approaches, undertaken simultaneously, are necessary to retard the current urban growth rate in major cities by redirecting the flow of migrants to smaller cities in rural areas and by increasing the attractiveness of rural areas. The first, rural development is now widely accepted—in theory at least, if not always in practice. Its aim is to increase employment and incomes in the countryside so that fewer people feel compelled to migrate to cities in search of a livelihood. The second, urban bias in development policy such as special tax breaks, subsidized interest rates, excessive tariff protection and other privileges enjoyed exclusively by urban large-scale industry, must be eliminated. The governments must expand urban public services in rural towns and small city service centers. This is not an argument that non-Western countries should remain rural and disregard industrialization. Rather, it asserts that in the absence of participatory rural development, few countries will be able to achieve their industrialization goals without severe and chronic urban problems. If the countryside does not prosper, the cities will continue to deteriorate. National leaders in the non-Western world will need courage, political skill, administrative ability, and self-confidence—not the most common combination of leadership attributes in the non-Western countries—to enact development policies to reverse current urbanization trends. These policies are generally opposed by the urban wealthy classes.

Environmental Degradation

Environmental degradation is a rapidly growing problem for most of the non-Western World, but the least-developed countries, especially their poorest citizens, are facing the most immediate and extreme consequences. Perhaps the most dramatic are the chronic droughts and desertification that are swallowing up large parts of the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, turning millions of farmers and shepherds into permanent refugees. Erosion and deforestation on the slopes of the Himalayas (Figure 1.17) may partially contribute to the flooding of millions of acres of arable land in the Indo-Ganges plain.

The steady deterioration of their environment and dwindling resources have made it clear that the environment must become a top priority for the least-developed nations of the non-Western world. Otherwise, in some cases, their populations will simply no longer have any life support system left. It is no exaggeration to say that halting environmental degradation is one of the most formidable, difficult, yet inescapable challenges facing the non-Western lands in the 1990s.

In the past, most of the inhabitants of the non-Western world devised ways of adapting their lifestyles to the environment, establishing a harmonious relationship with the natural habitat surrounding them. Simple techniques were developed to cope with drought, to exploit water resources, to contain erosion, and to protect forests and rivers. When the colonial powers introduced modern methods of cultivation and fishing, and large commercial companies began to exploit the natural resources, the fragile ecological balance in the non-Western world was disturbed. The unabated expansion of commercial operations has meant the shrinking of the physical resource base of the poor. In many cases this has led to the destruction of the environment and its productive capacity. Tree loss and deforestation are also partly the
result of a heavy dependence on fuelwood, but as the area of woodland diminishes, it can no longer sustain the cutting rate. The seas along the coasts formerly fished only by small unmechanized boats, have been pillaged by modern fleets, resulting in depleted stocks and less food for the coastal state.

Well-meaning development projects have wreaked unintentional havoc in many areas. In particular, ecologically sound traditional practices have been spurned in favor of ill-adapted Western technologies. For example, the introduction of modern irrigation systems has caused widespread losses of once-productive land through salinity and water logging.

Many of the poor non-Western countries have become cheap garbage depositories for the industrialized nations. Millions of tons of toxic waste, some of it radioactive, are deposited in the poor countries of the non-Western world in exchange for much-needed dollars. The state of Washington sends about two-thirds of the plastic it collects from individual recyclers to Asia. In Hong Kong, China, Indonesia, the Philippines and elsewhere, these U.S.-made plastic soda bottles and milk jugs are sorted by low-wage laborers, melted down, reused, burned or buried, often without strict environmental or labor law enforcement. Greenpeace, an environmental watchdog, has reported the unloading of wastes from Europe in non-Western countries. The waste business has flourished not only because of the poor countries’ desperate need for foreign exchange but also because of the corruption of government officials, weak national legislation, and unclear international law. But will improved international laws stop the illegal trade in toxic wastes?

Hazardous smelting dust, sludge, rubble, bloody hospital syringes, amputated limbs, expired chemicals and paints, shredded clothing, broken furniture, rusted refrigerators, scrap tires consigned to burning—what the West cannot use, Asia and Africa receive, despite laws on both sides that sharply restrict such trade. The pressure is mainly financial. Under U.S. and European environmental laws, the cost of disposing of hazardous industrial and mining waste can reach as high as several thousand dollars per ton, depending on content. Shipping such material abroad often is much cheaper.

In the rapidly growing economies of the Asian Pacific, the environment has become the victim of their success. Rapid economic development in countries such as South Korea, Thailand, Taiwan, China, Malaysia, India, and Indonesia has created spectacular development and a consumer boom. Much of Asia has adopted a growth-first strategy that puts investment above environment. Governments have given priority to infrastructure projects to promote economic activity such as power plants and ports, rather than sewage and water treatment plants. Now, across the Asian Pacific region, rapidly industrializing economies are attracting millions of migrants from the poorer rural areas to the urban centers. With few exceptions, the governments in Asia are failing to provide even the most basic services such as sanitation and piped water for much of their burgeoning populations.

China, Indonesia, Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan face urban environmental problems on such a vast scale that the viability of their major cities is at stake, as is the sustainability of the capitals of medium-size nations such as Thailand and the Philippines. The reality in many of the large cities in the non-Western world is foul air and waterways and a severe shortage of basic facilities such as water, sewage systems, garbage disposal services, and transportation.

The Indonesian government has long considered the growth of the capital, Jakarta, a major problem, and in 1971 the city was closed to new rural migrants. Despite efforts to stem the arrival of these migrants, the population of the greater Jakarta region grew from 5.8 million to 17 million between 1960 and 1990. Reams of statistics reveal the consequences: shrimp in Jakarta Bay are contaminated by mercury from some 30,000 small factories that dump untreated effluent upstream. On the international air pollution index, particle pollution has exceeded the standard on a maximum of 268 days a year and an average 173 days a year since 1975.

World Health Organization data point to the special risks for residents of the most densely populated cities (except those in Japan, which have benefited from two decades of investment in pollution-control technology). The large cities of China and India, both of which have recently liberalized their economies to promote foreign investment and rapid development, top the list. Mukden, China, has exceeded international safety standards for particle-pollution levels on 347 days of the year and for sulfur-dioxide levels on 326 days. In all Chinese cities, lung cancer mortality rates are four to seven times the national average. In Delhi, India, 30 percent of the population suffers from respiratory diseases, 12 times the national average, and particle-pollution levels exceed the safety limit on an average of 294 days of the year. In Manila, the failure of infrastructure is particularly obvious. No new power stations have been built since the mid-1980s, and blackouts are now scheduled daily. The result is that businesses and households that can afford to generate their own electricity use diesel generators, which create noise and air pollution.

In 1992 the United Nations Environmental Program and the World Health Organization concluded that all of the non-Western megacities—places with more than 10 million inhabitants in 2000—already exceeded the level the WHO deems healthy in at least one major pollutant. Several exceeded the guidelines for two pollutants. In Beijing, Seoul, Delhi, Calcutta, Cairo, Mumbai, and Shanghai the major pollutants are gases comprising small particles of unburnt carbon, forming various oxides of sulphur, which dissolve in water to produce acid. Their presence in the air turns rain into acid. Along with gases is gunge, small particulate matter less than ten-millions of a meter across. The smaller the particles, the deeper into the lungs they seem to penetrate.

The cities in the non-Western world will continue to grow, despite their deteriorating environments. One factor is simply the weight of numbers.
Rural populations have continued to grow at such a rate that migration to the cities has not reduced total numbers, and the opportunity to find a job in the city is forcing more and more people off the land (Figure 1.18). At the same time, new middle classes are emerging in the cities with the same energy consumption expectations as their Western counterparts: cars, air travel, labor-saving household goods, power, running water, air conditioning, heating, and high-quality housing.

Japan offers a contrast to the rest of the non-Western world in environmental preservation. In forty years, Japan has left behind its reputation as one of the dirtiest industrial powers and gone on to set world standards with its technology to control pollution and use energy efficiently. Japanese politicians and civil servants are now asking whether their achievements have provided them with a long-awaited opportunity to exercise global political leadership. Could Japan really set the pace in the battle to clean up the planet?

Compared with other industrial nations, Japan uses less energy per head of population, produces less carbon dioxide, has stricter standards for airborne pollutants, and provides its citizens with cleaner water. Japanese industries are already working on dozens of projects to develop new technologies that use energy and materials even more sparingly. Business is, of course, looking for profits from its activities.

In the 1950s and 1960s, Japan's fledgling industries belched millions of tons of noxious pollutants into the country's waterways, atmosphere, and homes. The results were horrific. In Minamata, on the southern island of Kyushu, mercury from a factory left thousands crippled. Cadmium pollution in the industrial city of Yokkaichi, some 185 miles south of Tokyo, caused another horrific disease, simply named tat ("it hurts, it hurts") for the endless cries of its victims. The eventual outcome was uniquely Japanese—industry and government cooperated to set new standards for clean emissions and devised new technologies to meet them.

One priority in the 1960s was to develop the technology for filtering heavy metals out of industrial effluent. Alongside the purge of waterborne effluent came the speedy introduction of scrubbers to filter out sulfur dioxide and oxides of nitrogen from smokestacks. By 1989, Japan's 2,189 desulfurization and denitrification units represented three-quarters of all those installed around the world. With the oil crises of the 1970s, Japan redoubled its efforts to use materials efficiently and developed the world's most sophisticated industrial technology for saving energy. While the country's gross domestic product grew by more than 65 percent between 1973 and 1986, energy consumption rose by a mere 10 percent.

It is this history that helps make Japan believe that it has something to offer to other nations. The Japanese experience should be invaluable to the nations of Asia and Africa (Figure 1.19). But there is a worm in Japan's rosy plans to lead the world in solving global environmental problems. Plenty of people outside Japan see the damage its timber industry has wrought in the tropical forests of Southeast Asia, and its heartless pursuit of whales, as making it unfit to speak about the environment.

Differences in the way Japan perceives its successes, and in the way the outside world sees its failures, may be partly cultural. Japan has earned the most international condemnation for its continued insistence on the right to kill whales. Yet many Japanese cannot see why. To them, a whale is just another fish, like a tuna or a sardine.

The non-Western world must focus on improving quality of life through environmental preservation. To this end, support from Japan and other industrialized countries, and international agencies, can be valuable in implementing policies to protect and preserve the environment.

DEMONCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

For most of the past four decades South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, and Hong Kong, and recently China, have been known
largely as countries with rapid economic growth but stilted political development, with most countries led by military regimes, autocratic strong men, or all-powerful ruling parties that kept power through money, patronage, and a measured amount of repression. Yet recent events are converging to challenge some of the old certainties, upending some long-held political orthodoxy, despite the fact that leaders in countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, and China still advocate the idea of "Asian values," a system that prizes stability and consensus while eschewing Western-style democracy with its emphasis on individual freedoms.

In the early twenty-first century there are stirrings of democracy in East Asia that are testing the much-repeated axiom that Asians, by and large, care little about democracy and human rights and favor authoritarian governments. South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia—where general elections were derisively called "election of generals"—have embraced democracy. Some Asian countries have a tradition of democracy, including Japan, which became a Western-style liberal democracy after World War II; the Philippines, where democracy was aborted by the Marcos dictatorship; and India, the world's most populous democratic nation. But Asia's autocrats have brushed aside these countries as unsuitable models for the rest of the region because of their unique circumstances: Japan's war-time defeat and occupation, for instance, and the Philippines' history as a U.S. colony. And India, with its endemic poverty, often still is viewed as a negative example showing that democracy does not generate economic development and stability. Asian countries compare the limits India encounters in speedy or radical economic reforms to the relatively free hand of governments in authoritarian societies such as China.

Nonetheless, democracy is becoming more entrenched, most remarkably in South Korea, Thailand, Taiwan, and the Philippines—countries where armed forces once exercised control. There are few exceptions and holdouts to the democratizing trend. Burma (Myanmar) is still run by a military junta that refuses to recognize the National League of Democracy as the party that won national elections in 1990. Communist-run Vietnam is also lagging behind in the democratization trend. Cambodia had ushered in a new democratic government after the UN-brokered elections, but in July 1997 a bloody coup destroyed the fragile democracy.

The region from North Africa to the Persian Gulf is full of authoritarian regimes whose claims to power come from God (Iran), genealogy (Saudi Arabia), or the barrel of a gun (Libya). Yet some Middle Eastern nations have started to embrace democratic reforms. Turkey is the only Muslim democracy in the Middle East. In recent years it has made great strides in addressing human rights. One of the United States' more ambitious goals for Iraq is a democratic government that would be an example for the region.

The Sub-Saharan Africa region is also dominated by authoritarian regimes. In new South Africa widespread unemployment, crippled schools, and rampant corruption have produced a violent, hopeless young population that threatens the stability of the elected government. Ethnic disputes resulting from lack of representation of local people in the government have disrupted oil production in Nigeria. Values such as individual freedom and democracy have been a disappointment in Sub-Saharan Africa, often producing sham elections, continued misrule, and poverty.

In the long term, development operating within a democratic framework is more enduring because growth and development take place through the participation of the electorate rather than by the command or dictates of a single person or a small group of people. In Asia, China and India offer contrasting examples in this regard. Many Asian countries overlook the fact that democratic politics in India, over time, have provided an enduring foundation for economic and social development. The consensus-building process required by democracy has helped to ensure that developments are broadly based and will survive changes of government leadership. The results
of development and economic reforms in turn have helped strengthen democracy in India.

The development challenges facing many countries of the non-Western world are monumental. Unlike Western countries, they do not have the luxury of executing the process of nation building, economic growth, and democracy in a sequential fashion, spread over centuries. Instead, these three processes must be carried out simultaneously, even though they are not always mutually reinforcing.

Compounding their problems, these developing countries must deal with these challenges in an open, and increasingly networked, global economy. To be successful in such an environment, they must become further integrated into the world economy. Yet, by being more open, these countries run the risk that international players, with agendas of their own, could undermine their efforts at nation building by competing for economic resources as well as political and cultural loyalties. The resources of the non-Western world countries to meet these challenges are severely limited, especially in the least-developed states.

Civil Strife and Human Rights

What makes one group of people ready to kill another group? The answer is usually a conflict of interests, or a clash of life-shaping ideas, or one group’s belief that it is in blood and bone superior to the rest. Have those causes of conflict disappeared from the face of the earth? Of course they have not. In the non-Western world the major civil strife are the result of all these factors: ideology, conflict of interest, and blood-and-bone animosity. In Asia, several areas of conflict are located in the overlapping sections of Islamic and non-Islamic cultures: Kashmir, Sinsiang, Chakmas in Bangladesh, Malay Muslims in Thailand, Christians in East Timor, and Muslims in Mindanao.

In China, the Tibetans seek independence, while the Kurds want to carve a state out of Turkey (Figure 1.20). Muslim Indonesia fights a separatist movement in mostly Christian North Sumatra, as deaths in Kashmir’s Muslim insurgency against India pass the 8,000 mark. Indigenous Uighurs in Xinjiang, China, want independence for the land they call East Turkestan. The 6 million Han Chinese immigrants have reduced the Muslim Uighurs to 54 percent of the population. The Uighurs fear that, if the influx continues, they will become the minority. As it is, the Chinese get the best paid jobs, while about 25 percent of adult Uighurs are unemployed. Hundreds of mosques have been closed. Uighur schools are neglected. Thousands of angry Uighurs have taken to the streets to protest Chinese rule. Likewise, Buddhist Chakmas in Bangladesh, Pathans in Pakistan, and Tamils in Sri Lanka all seek varying degrees of self-rule or statehood.

Figure 1.28. A Tibetan refugee in Sikkim, India. The era of Chinese influence in Tibet ended with the uprising against China in Lhasa in 1911. Between 1952 and 1959 Tibet enjoyed full independence. In 1959 the new communist government in China decided to "liberate" what China called oppressed and exploited Tibetans and reunite them with the "great motherland." The People Liberation Army invaded Tibet and took control of the country. China's attempt to dismantle Tibet's traditional society, Buddhist spiritual values, and customs led to the uprising in 1959 and the flight of the Dalai Lama to India in 1963. Several thousand Tibetans have fled the country as refugees. The Dalai Lama, who is revered as a "separatist" by the Chinese government, opposes violence in the quest for Tibetan autonomy. His meetings to discuss autonomy in 1992 Tibetans, who have a distinct language and culture, demand autonomy. (Photo: P. P. Kass.)

The non-Western world's dizzying array of ethnic hot spots starkly illustrate how, of all the features of the twenty-first-century world, the most consistently troubling are turning out to be the hatreds that divide humankind by race, faith, and nationality. The explosion of ethnic and religious violence is the paramount issue facing the human rights movement today. Indeed,
xenophobia, religious rivalry, and the general intolerance of anything different are often now more anguishful and cruel than the ideological differences that until recently divided the world.

Why are ethnic, religious, and tribal conflicts so widespread? The end of totalitarian regimes (colonial or communist) that repressed old political and cultural rivalries has been linked to the proliferation of clashes. In Indonesia, one of Asia's large states, the war pitting Christians and Muslims in Timor has long roots. To a large extent, history provides only the context. Most ethnic conflicts have a background of domination, injustice, or the oppression of one group by another. These historic elements have been shaped and given form by a growing number of regimes that have recently tried to build followings by exploiting ethnic, religious, and other differences. Contemporary leaders in many non-Western countries use accumulated historical animosity for their own political and economic gains. In Bangladesh, the Muslim-dominated government uses that animosity to promote the Islamic agenda, which the Buddhist Chakmas of southern Chittagong consider a threat to their way of life and a violation of their human rights. The hatred is built around traditional differences that, but for appeals of opportunistic leaders, might not have been transformed into hostility or warfare.

Transitions to democracy can also create an uncertainty that fuels ethnic and religious passions, and eventually rivalries. The problem is not democracy per se, but the turbulent transition to democracy. Along the way, secular democratic governments such as in India have faced increasing unemployment, inflation, public disillusionment, and even resistance. The tremendous psychological pressure on human populations from political change creates a sense of anxiety that frequently makes people seek refuge in belief systems that involve defined membership and the value of belonging to a specific ethnic or religious group. So people fall back on their primordial identities such as religion and ethnicity. The most visible case is the explosion of political Islam in places such as Afghanistan, Indonesia, and Pakistan. But as Islamists redefine identities and agendas ethnic minorities have sensed new threats.

Limited resources and the struggle to survive can also spawn or deepen ethnic or religious conflicts. The more limited the resources, the greater the danger of ethnic strife. In Sudan, the multilayered hostility between northerners and southerners, Arabs and Africans, Muslims and Christians has been exacerbated by a hostile desert environment and the chronic recent cycle of drought and famine. In India, the Sikhs' separatist movement is in part related to the water resources, which are of vital importance to the 80 percent of Punjabi Sikhs who are farmers. The green revolution was successful in Punjab because of the excellent system of irrigation and the steady flow of water from the Sutlej, Ravi, and Beas rivers. In 1976, however, a substantial amount of water from these rivers was diverted to the neighboring Indian states of Rajasthan and Haryana. The water problem enlarged the potential base of support of the militant Sikhs seeking an independent Khalistan in the 1970s.

In Sri Lanka an estimated 20,000 persons have been killed and more than 1.5 million displaced since 1990 in a contemporary conflict sparked by the age-old discrimination by the predominantly Buddhist Sinhalese against the minority Hindu Tamils. In dealing with the ethnic separatist or independence movements, many governments have responded with actions such as torture, abductions, and murder that violate human rights. National security, or the need to combat insurgency, is not a justification for political killings, arbitrary arrests, or the stifling of free expression.

**What Are Human Rights?**

Definitions can be controversial. The U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 1948, includes both civil rights and economic rights. Some examples follow.

- Life, liberty, and the security of person
- Entitlement to equal protection under the law
- Freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state and freedom to leave and return to any country
- Freedom of thought, religion, and expression, including the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media
- Freedom to own property
- Free choice of employment, just and favorable conditions of work and protection against unemployment, and equal pay for equal work
- A standard of living adequate for health and well-being, including food, clothing, housing, medical care, and the necessary social services
- Protection of the moral and material interests that result from an individual's scientific, literary, or artistic productions
- Participation in government, directly or through freely chosen representatives
- Freedom from subjection to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment
- Freedom from being held in slavery or servitude
- Freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile

At the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights there was a debate between countries such as Japan, India, and Western democracies that defended the universal human rights enshrined in the 1948 Declaration, and countries such as China, Syria, Iran, Malaysia, and Indonesia (countries not exactly renowned for their love of democracy); that wanted to water down the concept of universal rights with economic, cultural, and religious arguments. They have been promoting an "Asian" concept of human rights in which political and civil liberties are subordinated to economic development.
The nongovernmental organizations attending the 1993 conference, such as the human rights lawyers from Pakistan and Sri Lanka; representatives of indigenous peoples from Bangladesh; women's rights activists from India and the Philippines; Japanese, Thai, Indian, and Korean civil liberties groups; environmentalists from Malaysia; Buddhists and Baha'is; a group working on behalf of refugees from Bhutan; and another for human rights in China, refuted or contested every major premise of the "Asian" concept of human rights. They effectively exposed the governments' line for what it is: a pretext of largely authoritarian governments to justify their unchecked power in the name of meeting economic and social needs. The nongovernmental organizations stressed the universality of human rights and stated that neither a lack of resources nor cultural differences could justify abuse by the governments. It is not surprising that the countries most adamant about the primacy of economic development are those in which alternative voices are silenced or harassed. Citizens of non-Western countries such as China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore do not want their political and civil rights traded in the name of development.

The French embrace of 1789. Americans pledge allegiance to 1776: Britons, when not romanticizing the Magna Carta, snap a salute to the Glorious Revolution of 1688. All were landmarks in the emergence of a political system that is now widely hailed as the best guarantor of human rights, life, and liberty. The increasingly self-confident and prospering Confucian societies of the Asian Pacific region are challenging democratic liberalism with their own Asian model of democracy—a system sometimes called "soft authoritarianism"—that exists in Singapore and other of the region's economically vibrant states. These countries have no scruples about using their reserve powers of arbitrary arrest and detention or about using the tame news media to blacken the credentials of opponents. Along with harsher restraints on civil liberties, Malaysia bans satellite-television dishes, and Singapore censors music and the movies and belabors its citizens with all manner of preachments. China carries out tortures and summary executions.

The major problem with the Asian model of democracy in Southeast Asia and China is that it has not developed the art of the adversarial relationship. How does one disagree with the government without being disagreeable? In China anyone who criticizes the government is "unpatriotic." Unconventional figures are considered misfits and egotists—nails that stick out and must be hammered down. The leadership protects itself and prevents any opposition from emerging. The only systemic change that the Confucian tradition sanctions is revolutionary: toppling a hierarchy that is bad at its job.

Western models of democracy in non-Western nations such as India and Japan strive to protect the freedom of expression of their citizens and guard them against abuses by the state. Here the concept is that people, who created the government, granted it the minimal rights of interference, not the other way around. Democracy's ultimate strength in these countries is the capacity for political change, which most of the other Asian and African countries have yet to demonstrate. China and Southeast Asian countries have grown rich in large part due to Confucian ethics, not Confucian government, and due to the more tangible benefits of U.S.-supplied strategic defense, Western investments, and Western markets. The Asia Pacific is more self-reliant now, but without the freest nation in its midst—Japan—those startling economic statistics would make a much poorer show. With the exception of Japan and India, human rights remain severely circumscribed in most non-Western countries.

**GEOPOLITICAL LANDSCAPE**

World political geography has entered a new phase in the twenty-first century in which the fundamental source of conflict is not ideological or economic but cultural. The principal conflicts are occurring between groups of different cultures. The clash of cultures will dominate global political geography. During the Cold War (1946–1989), the world was often divided into the first (the United States, Canada, Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand), second (the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe), and third worlds (Asia, Africa, and Latin America). Those divisions are no longer relevant. It is far more meaningful to group countries in terms of their cultures than in terms of their political or economic systems or their level of economic development. A culture is the important grouping of people. Western culture has two major variants, European and North American; non-Western cultures have four major variants: Chinese, Indian, Islamic, and African. Islam has its Arab, Turkish, and Malay subdivisions.

Cultural identity has become increasingly important, and the world is being shaped in large measure by interactions among half a dozen major cultures, including the Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, and African. Conflicts often occur along the borders separating these cultures because of the differences among them: their history, language, tradition, and, most important, religion. Different cultures have different views on the relations between nature and society, citizens and the state, parents and children, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy. These differences are centuries old.

As the world becomes smaller, interactions between people of different cultures are increasing, intensifying the awareness of differences and sameness within cultures. For example, Americans react far more negatively to investments from Japan and China, non-Western countries, than to larger investments from Western nations such as Canada and Britain or the Netherlands. In much of the world, religion has become a dominant fact of life, often in the form of movements such as that of the fundamentalists. Such movements are found in Western Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Islam.
Conflict along the border line between the Western and Islamic cultures has been ongoing for 1,300 years. The centuries-old conflict is unlikely to decline. On the northern border of the Islamic world, conflict has increasingly erupted between the Orthodox and Muslim peoples, including the 1990s conflict in Bosnia and the tense relations between the Russians and Muslims in Central Asia. On the southern border area of the Islamic world the antagonistic interaction of the Arab Islamic culture has been with the pagan, animist, and increasingly with the black Christian people of Africa. On the eastern margin of the Islamic world, the historic clash between Muslims and Hindus in the Indian subcontinent and Muslims and other groups in Southeast Asia are manifest in religious strife.

Non-Western cultures have attempted to become modern without becoming Western. Only Japan has fully succeeded in this quest. Non-Western cultures will continue to acquire the wealth, technology, skills, machines, and weapons that are part of being modern. They will continue to reconcile this modernity with their traditional culture and values. Their economic and military strength relative to the West is increasing. Hence, the West must accommodate these non-Western cultures such as Japan, China, and India, whose power will, in the twenty-first century, approach that of the West but whose values and interests differ significantly. This will require the West to develop a much more profound understanding of the basic religious and philosophical assumptions underlying other cultures and the ways in which people in those cultures perceive their interests.

Non-Western nations are of great importance to the industrialized nations of Europe, the United States, and Japan. These countries occupy nearly half of the world’s surface and contain two-thirds of its population. They contain vast material and human resources and are of great consequence to the North American, European, and Japanese economies as suppliers of both raw materials and manufactured goods, and markets for farm products and high-technology products. The 1997–1998 bank failures, plunging currencies, and stock market tumult in South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia, after two decades of rapid growth, had negative effects on the economies of the United States, Japan, and Europe. Until the economic rebound began in 2000, Asian fallout reduced or slowed the economic growth in the Western industrialized nations and Japan, which are dependent on Asian export markets.

A large share of American manufactured goods are exported to the non-Western world, which also receives over 50 percent of American agricultural products. A substantial percentage of the Western world’s and Japan’s crude oil imports come from the non-Western world, as does the bulk of industrial raw materials. Increasingly, non-Western countries, including many without impressive natural resource endowments, exert a powerful force on investment flows and world trade in manufactured products through their entrepreneurial prowess, their capacity for innovation, and their marketing skills.

The strategic location of many non-Western countries also gives them a special military and geopolitical importance to the United States. Some, such as South Korea, Japan, and Israel are close allies; others such as Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain provide America access to important facilities.

Spending on Weapons

Although the world became a safer place with the end of the Cold War, the spending on weapons in the non-Western countries is awesome. While the global arms spending is on the wane, two regions—the Middle East and East Asia—are running counter to the trend. The Middle East is perpetually among the world’s most unstable areas, but China and Southeast Asian countries are enjoying even as the area enjoys a period of relative peace and prosperity.

Countries such as Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, and Algeria in the Middle East, India, Pakistan, China, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia have substantially increased military spending. Nearly 50 percent of the world’s conventional weapons are sold to the Middle East by the United States and other industrialized nations, and at a time of shrinking defense markets in Europe and America, the arms bazaar in the non-Western countries will be all the more important in the future.

According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's Yearbook 2003, military spending in Southeast Asia, Taiwan, and South Korea increased between 1993 and 2002. China boosted its military spending by 18 percent in 2002. Viewed on a global basis, arms spending in Asia in 1981 accounted for only 15 percent of the world’s total. By 2002, the figure had reached 23 percent of the global total. Japan ($46.7 billion), China ($31.1 billion), Saudi Arabia ($21.6 billion), Iran ($17.5 billion), South Korea ($13.5 billion), India ($12.9 billion), Turkey ($10.1 billion), and Israel ($9.8 billion) were major spenders in terms of market exchange rate. However, on the basis of purchasing power parity (PPP) rates, in which dollar figures are converted to purchasing power of the local currency (calculated by the World Bank PPP project), the leading spender countries were China, India, Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. China’s increased spending reflects in part pursuit of military reform and in part the effort to strengthen its position as a regional and global power. India’s increased spending is due to heightened tension on Pakistan and regional power ambition, where it is in competition with China. In Sub-Saharan Africa military spending increased by a modest 4 percent during 1993–2002.

China, India, and Pakistan have nuclear weapons; Israel has nuclear weapons, although it has not declared itself a nuclear state. North Korea and Iran have or could be within range of obtaining nuclear weapons. Most of these countries already have a significant number of ballistic missiles and many are looking to acquire more. In the Asian Pacific, China’s soaring
military spending could destabilize the entire region as wary neighbors watch the arms build-up. Ominously, China also has reasserted its claim to the entire South China Sea. Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei have also made conflicting claims in the South China Sea, particularly to the Spratly Islands. Rich undersea oil fields are believed to be in the area, and the major shipping lanes for oil from the Middle East to Japan and South Korea pass through the Spratlys.

The military intentions of China worry Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, and South Korea. Which is the real China? The one that professes peaceful intentions or a China with a historical view of itself as "the center of the Earth" surrounded by dutiful tributaries? The evidence is mixed. Vietnam accuses China of speaking peace and practicing hegemony by bullying its smaller neighbors. Indeed, Vietnam's effort to establish diplomatic relations with the United States is linked to fears of China's growing military punch. India also views China as a bigger threat in terms of firepower, including the nuclear kind, which prompted India to carry out nuclear tests in 1998 to develop its own nuclear arsenal.

There are a number of areas that have the potential to produce international conflict in Asia. Three key points of tension in Asia—the Korean peninsula, relations between China and Taiwan, and the dispute over the Northern Territories involving Japan and Russia—although difficult to resolve, have stabilized. Regional conflicts in Kashmir, in the Persian Gulf, or over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea remain a distinct possibility, and there are a number of other domestic and international trouble spots. But their potential to involve competing major powers and affect regionwide security is limited.

The international political system that is still taking shape as a result of the end of the Cold War, the implosion of the Soviet Union, and Asia's growing economic dynamism has the potential to produce conflicts in the non-Western world. But despite the fact that many countries are using their economic wealth to purchase arms and strengthen their military capabilities, the stabilizing forces in the region outweigh the destabilizing ones. Many Asian countries have pursued economic modernization through outward, export-oriented policies that place a high premium on a stable and healthy international environment. They have a vested interest in preventing the outbreak of violent conflict. Deepening economic integration in the region will also increase the cost of and raise the threshold for using force. By and large, the non-Western world will be a zone of peace, especially at the level of the major powers of Japan, China, Russia, India, and the United States. Of course, there will still be periods of tension among these powers, but these will be periods of tension leading to accommodation, not conflicts.

There is greater potential for continuing conflict in the non-Western world at the domestic level in Tibet, Burma, Sri Lanka, Rwanda, Sudan, Turkey, Egypt, Kashmir, Palestinians in Israel, and many more. But again, although these disputes incite armed violence, their potential to involve competing major powers (except in Israel) and affect regionwide peace and stability is limited.

Rise of Terrorism

The last two decades have seen a rapid increase in terrorist activity in the non-Western world with major negative effects on economic development and political stability. Individual countries in the non-Western world have suffered terrorist attacks and endured continued terrorist group activities in 2003. Terrorism is generally defined as premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to terrorize and influence a wide audience. The aim is to use the psychological impact of violence or of the threat of violence to effect political change.

Among the terrorist organizations, al-Qaeda has emerged as an international terrorist network that seeks to rid Muslim countries of the profane influence of the West and replace their governments with fundamentalist Islamic regimes. Al-Qaeda has also targeted American and other Western interests, Jewish targets, and the Indian territory in Kashmir. From 1991 to 1996, al-Qaeda worked out of Sudan. From 1996 until the collapse of the Taliban in 2001, al-Qaeda operated out of Afghanistan and maintained training camps there. After al-Qaeda's September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, the United States launched a war in Afghanistan to destroy al-Qaeda bases there and overthrow the Taliban, the country's Muslim fundamentalist rulers. Now, al-Qaeda's senior leadership has regrouped in lawless tribal regions just inside Pakistan, near the Afghan border. Al-Qaeda has underground cells in some 100 countries, including the United States. Al-Qaeda-linked attacks include the May 2003 car bomb attacks in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; a November 2002 car bomb attack in Mombasa, Kenya; an October 2002 attack on a French tanker off the coast of Yemen; and the September 11, 2001, hijacking attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. It is reported that senior officials of Saudi Arabia may have funneled hundreds of millions of dollars to charitable groups and other organizations that may have helped finance al-Qaeda activities.

In Japan, the Aum Shintirikyo religious cult attacked the Tokyo subway system with sarin gas in 1995. The Philippines continues to experience violent attacks in the southern province of Mindanao from rebels in the Moro Islamic Liberation Army and the Abu Sayyaf Group. In Thailand, a strong military offensive against Muslim separatists of the New Pattani United Liberation Organization helped restore calm in the south, which has experienced a wave of bombings. In addition to the sectarian ethnic and religious violence that affects lives and property in Karachi and elsewhere in Sind and
Punjab, there were credible reports of official Pakistani support for Kashmiri militant groups that engage in terrorism. In 1998 the militant terrorist group Harakat-ul- Ansar kidnapped four Western visitors, including a U.S. citizen in India's Kashmir.

Ongoing civil wars and ethnic violence in some regions of Africa overshadow individual incidents of terrorism. Major areas of violence were in Angola, Congo, Ethiopia, Liberia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Somalia, and Uganda.

Many scholars argue that a well-focused, sustained development program that encourages employment, institution building, public security, and education could help some of the poor countries in the non-Western world and thereby reduce their risk of becoming havens for terrorism. It may also reduce the anti-Americanism in the Arab and Muslim world that al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups often exploit. Indonesia, the Philippines, and Yemen have received funding to combat terrorism.

ORGANIZATION OF THE NON-WESTERN WORLD

The following discussion of the non-Western world is organized under six major cultural regions: the Chinese cultural area, Japan and Korea, Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent, the Islamic Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa.

Each major cultural area is characterized by well-marked distinguishing features and occupies a distinctive geographic environment. Countries in each cultural area have grown out of a shared body of religious or philosophical beliefs and a shared experience of history. The various regional chapters of the book are devoted to the discussion of distinctive features of each area. In regional chapters themes of physical and cultural diversity, population and food supply, environment and sustainable development, human rights, and economic restructuring are discussed to present a contemporary picture of the region blending history, geography, politics, economy, and culture of the area.

The Chinese Culture Area

The cradle of the Chinese or Sinic culture lies in the irrigable middle reaches of the Huang He (Yellow River). Like the cultures of the Indus, Nile, and Tigris-Euphrates, civilized life began through the gifts of a river that permitted food to be raised in such quantity that some inhabitants were released for other pursuits. Chinese civilization subsequently spread southward through the tropics, displacing or absorbing the indigenous Thai and related groups. The need to defend China against the incursions of nomadic tribes led to a progressive assertion of political control over the grasslands of Mongolia and the desert basins of Turkestan. Western economic development in

Southeast Asia acted as a magnet, drawing millions of Chinese south into Malaya and the adjoining areas in the nineteenth century. In recent years these overseas Chinese (estimated at 60 million), particularly those in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, have been important sources for almost half the foreign direct investment in China.

Since reforms began in 1979, China has become one of Asia's fastest-growing economies. The country's population of 1.2 billion offers incredible purchasing potential as incomes rise. Foreign investments have poured into China at an accelerating rate, from $3 to $4 billion in the late 1980s and early 1990s to some $34 billion in 1994. Though China's inefficient state-owned companies still monopolize much of the country's technology and assets, a burgeoning private sector should drive continued growth.

Hong Kong, which became part of China in July 1997, employs three quarters of its population in services. Banking and finance are particularly important, and this tiny area provides much of the capital for developing mainland China. Hong Kong's port is the main outlet for Chinese goods on their way to the United States, with $168 billion in exports passing through it each year. China's commitment to Hong Kong's development appears firm, but Hong Kong's economy contracted in 1998, the first negative growth in thirteen years.

Despite tensions with China, Taiwan continues its global economic expansion as the sixteenth-largest economy in the world. Taiwan has a per capita income of $11,640, rivaling some developed countries in the West. Recent free elections highlight the country's drive and determination. Taiwan has led the charge in investing in Asia's less-developed countries, pouring capital, equipment, and manufacturing know-how into China, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia.

Japan and Korea

Japan and Korea, whose early civilizations and subsequent development were strongly influenced by China, are related to the Chinese culture area. In Japan and Korea, the Chinese written language, or a derivative of it, has been or is still used. The Chinese classics played the same molding role that the Greek and Latin classics played in Europe, and Confucianism, a secular philosophy of the state and of man's role in society, deeply influenced political thinking in these countries. A major contribution of the Confucian ethos for Japan's modernization was its openness to Western learning.

Japan's unusual combination of localization and globalization makes it not only one of the most enigmatic modern postindustrial states but also a most intriguing case in comparative cross-cultural studies. Japan arose as a new power in a part of the Western Pacific Rim that was ravaged after World War II. By the late 1960s Japan had become the world's third-largest economic power. In the
postwar period the annual growth of Japan’s gross national product approached 10 percent, nearly three times that of the United States, and it climbed to 11.1 percent between 1960 and 1969. The Japanese worked hard at jobs six days a week. They lived simply. Their frugality enabled the Japanese to save for the future and promoted Japanese success. In the 1980s Japan became a major financial power, and its economic might is second only to that of the United States. Close cooperation between government and industry enabled Japan’s rapid growth. Despite its major economic strength, its economy is vulnerable. It experienced a severe recession that started in 1992 and lingered into 1998. Commercial land prices plunged to less than half of what they were earlier, and office vacancies soared.

Japan is the most densely populated nation in the non-Western world; its land area is about the size of California, but its population is 124 million, compared to 30 million in California. Most of its land is mountainous and nonarable. Lacking mineral resources, it imports about 80 percent of its coal, 90 percent of its minerals, and 98 percent of its oil and gas. It had to import rice in 1994. It desperately needs a continued flow of surplus trade and dollars to import raw materials and food.

The Japanese economy in the late 1990s became more like that of an older industrial economy. It is importing more, paying more for labor, suffering from financial downturns and recessions, and carrying a postwar baby-boom population that is becoming an aging and unproductive population. The tight Japanese political fabric is becoming frayed. The Liberal Democratic Party lost its majority in parliament in 1993, after twenty-eight years of governance without challenge. Japan faces major economic, political, and environmental challenges in the twenty-first century.

Led by the country’s chaebols (or conglomerates), South Korea’s economy has tripled every decade since the 1960s. Its economy now is the eleventh-largest in the world. South Korea made a comprehensive use of public instruments to achieve rapid development. Government began a coordinated campaign in 1971 to build up firms in six designated industries: steel, shipbuilding, machinery, electronics, petrochemicals, and metals. The most important measure was heavily subsidized credit and tight controls on the financial system. The policy was successful in the development of South Korea, but there were long-term costs borne by the banks resulting from the shackles of directed credits. In 1997 South Korea’s fifty largest firms, and the banks that lent to them, found themselves overburdened with debt. Banks raised billions in foreign currency to finance over-expansion and passed them on in Korean currency (the won) to the firms. As the won fell in value, South Korea required ever more won to repay loans denominated in foreign currency. The financial crisis has put South Korea’s erstwhile development miracle in serious trouble.

Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia is a composite region, lying in the contact zone of Indian and Chinese civilizations. It is from these major civilizations that the “high cultures” of the region are derived. These high cultures are essentially lowland cultures based on the cultivation of rice. They include the Indochinese cultures of the Burmese; the Thai and Khmers, which developed in the river valleys of the Irrawaddy, the Menam, and lower Mekong; and the Siamese culture of the Vietnamese, which developed in the Red River lowland. The upland areas were little touched by these high cultures; they remain to this day occupied by more backward tribal groups only partially integrated into the states within whose frontiers they live.

To the south, the peninsulas and islands of Southeast Asia have, from early times, been the center of the Malay peoples. In the west the maritime fringes of the region were Indianized, then strongly influenced by Islam, which became the dominant religion of Malaysia and Indonesia, and which spread as far east as the southern Philippines. Subsequently, the Catholic Spanish influence thrusting westwards from the Spanish parts of Latin America came to dominate the northern Philippines, introducing a new element of cultural diversity which has only partly been effaced by half a century of American control.

Within the island world of Southeast Asia there is, as in the mainland, the same ethnic contrast between the lowlands and the forested uplands of the interior and, in the east, the tribal peoples of New Guinea link the Southeast Asian world with the Melanesian section of the Pacific.

This region of spectacular beauty has done a remarkable job of encouraging economic growth and reducing poverty. The number of abjectly poor in Indonesia has fallen from 68 million to 18 million over a twenty-year period. Malaysia, once an economy entirely based on commodity production, has turned itself into a manufacturing powerhouse. The Philippines, long among Asia’s least-developed countries, has launched an ambitious program of infrastructure development. As the United States reduced its military presence there, this island nation converted the former Subic Bay naval base into a hotspot of entrepreneurship. In 1993, Subic Bay attracted foreign direct investment. Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia were fast making the transition from economic backwater to modern industrial states until the financial crisis of 1997.

One of Asia’s newest emerging economies, Vietnam has proved adept at putting capitalist ways into practice. Today Ho Chi Minh City has become a capital of commerce, and private entrepreneurs in Vietnam have created some 4.7 million new jobs in just four years. Vietnam’s future is bright, too, because of its educated population and the government’s commitment to economic reforms. The problem in Vietnam is that a rigid communist regime
talks about economic reforms on the one hand, but obstructs liberalization on the other.

Mixing authoritarian government with free-market capitalism has made Singapore a center for high-tech manufacturing, finance, and services. It is among the world’s most competitive economies, ranked second behind the United States in 1995 for manufacturing efficiency. Along with Hong Kong, Singapore has successfully made the transition to a modern consumer-oriented society, with average per capita incomes topping $19,000.

But not all of Southeast Asia has developed rapidly. Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar lag behind in development.

Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia pursued a development policy model employed by South Korea and Japan. They coined the term “Look East Policy” in 1981. Malaysia brought in Korean advisors to help pick and produce industrial winners. Indonesia encouraged foreign investment and liberalized trade. In Thailand Japanese investment was heavy. Like in South Korea, banks in all these countries face unbearable levels of bad debt—the result of cozy relationships between businesses, banks, and governments. The poor investments will slow down the economies of these leading Southeast Asian countries as they enter the twenty-first century.

The Indian Cultural Area

The cradle of the Indian culture lies in the alluvial river valleys of the north, those of the Indus and the Ganges. The Indian civilization subsequently became subcontinental in extent, integrating the peoples of the Deccan and the coasts of peninsular India. The extension of Islam brought the Indus valley and much of Bengal into the Muslim world, and the partition in 1947 followed religious lines, leading to the emergence of the Islamic state of Pakistan and the dominantly Hindu, but secular, Indian Union. At an early stage of history Indian influences penetrated deep into Southeast Asia, shaping the civilization of Burma, Thailand, and Cambodia, and leaving a strong Indian imprint on the cultural and political life of Indonesia. This imprint survives, in a slightly modified form, on the island of Bali. The extension of British control over Burma and the Malay Peninsula made possible a new diffusion of Indian settlers, which has left a major legacy in the plural societies of Southeast Asia.

In the Indian subcontinent past political philosophies do not appear to have created the same barriers to the growth of Western-style democracy as has the Confucian legacy of China. The Indian subcontinent—or its elite group—has been much more effectively Westernized; the leaders of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka have tended to think in at least the forms of Western-style institutions and to work through a Western-style bureaucracy, the latter inherited in part from the colonial period.

Recently, India pledged to put forty years of experimentation with socialism and central planning behind it and convert its bureaucracy-ridden economy into a market economy. As a result, foreign direct investment is rising. Like China, India commands an enormous population whose sheer numbers promise a tempting market. A long entrepreneurial tradition, a commitment to growth, and an expatriate business class much like the ethnic Chinese all point toward accelerating growth in India.

The Islamic World of the Middle East

The term Middle East applies to the region that stretches from Morocco in the west to Iran in the east, and from the Caspian Sea in the north to Sudan in the south. The region contains one of the major culture hearths in the world, a source area or innovation center from which cultural traditions were transmitted. The culture hearths lie in the Tigris-Euphrates Plain (in ancient Mesopotamia) and in the Nile Valley of Egypt. Two other culture hearths are located in the Huang He Valley of North China and in the Indus Valley of the Indian Subcontinent. In the Middle Eastern culture hearth people first learned to domesticate plants such as wheat and barley and to gather harvests. They employed the wheel, a revolutionary invention, and built some of the world’s oldest cities 6,000 years ago.

The Middle East has a crossroads location at the junction of Europe, Asia, and Africa. The central location favored dissemination of culture and the receipt of culture brought by invaders. Its location has given the area strategic importance in global air and sea routes. It is a dry land, a vast belt of deserts and dry grasslands with an average annual precipitation of less than 10 inches. Two of the world’s large deserts, the Empty Quarter in Arabia and the Sahara in North Africa, lie within this region. In the valley of the Nile in Egypt and the Tigris and Euphrates in Iraq, the soil is rich and fertile. Here several crops can be grown during the year with irrigation, and the population concentration is heavy.

The Middle East is the birthplace of three great monotheistic religions—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—but it is a world of Islam, with Muslims (practitioners of Islam) dominant in all countries except Israel (Judaism), Lebanon, and Ethiopia (ancient form of Christianity). The region lacks most of the natural resources, but it contains over 50 percent of the world’s petroleum resources.
Sub-Saharan Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa covers over 9 million square miles—more than three times the size of the continental United States. Most of its nations are among the world's youngest and poorest. In the Great Rift system, where manlike beings were walking upright 3.6 million years ago, Ethiopians today subsist on an annual income of $100. In Upper Volta, only 6 percent of the population can read, and a newborn child is not expected to live to celebrate a fortieth birthday. Many of Africa's 450 million people, who speak more than a thousand languages, till drought-prone farmland. Their governments struggle with numerous economic, social, and environmental challenges.

Missionaries, traders, and adventurers penetrated the continent in the nineteenth century. They were followed by government officials engaged in extending colonial domains. Most of the area was controlled by France, Britain, Portugal, and Belgium. Europeans settled in various areas of the continent, traded, extracted minerals, and established governments reflecting the different policies and institutions of the colonial powers.

The wave of African independence began in 1957, and now all countries are free. But the political evolution of these African countries during the last four decades has been tumultuous, with most of the countries undergoing nonconstitutional changes in their governments. More than half of the nations are led by military leaders, and conflicts between tribal or ethnic groups are rampant. The vast majority of Africans suffer from a variety of diseases and from malnutrition. In recent years the AIDS epidemic has continued through Africa, outraging the preventive campaigns.

As these six culture areas of the non-Western world continue their transformation from poverty to prosperity—from dominions to dynasties—the reader should look at a combination of change and continuity to understand the evolving social and economic patterns. One of the consequences of prosperity has been the emergence of a rising middle class in all countries from Korea to South Africa, which exemplifies change and continuity. In Singapore, Shanghai, Bangalore, and Bangkok, educated, highly skilled young men and women are much like their American counterparts, while retaining elements of the traditional Asian ethic that includes discipline, sacrifice, and frugality.

FURTHER READINGS