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UNIVERSITY OF UTAH:
It must be remembered that this figure is only a conservative estimate based on incomplete evidence.

It is my estimate that 8 percent of Iowa's Gross State Product is based on Pentagon dollars. It is interesting to note that the percentage of GSP remains approximately the same as in fiscal 1973, despite a reduction of $32,764,000 in military active-duty pay. This situation is not healthy when one considers all of the ramifications (including inflation) of such an economic abnormality. The picture becomes much more disturbing when one realizes Iowa is thirty-fourth as a recipient of defense expenditures. One can only ponder the extent of the reliance of the entire nation on the MITLAMP.

In order to arrive at a more valid understanding of this problem, scholars must cease looking to the percentage of GSP as the source of all truth. Instead they should seek to discover the dependence of the nation on Pentagon dollars as I have sought to do in Iowa. Only in this quantitative manner will we arrive at a closer truth and better understanding of the complexity of the unique phenomenon of the twentieth century that is the MITLAMP.

HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL CRITICISM

The public outcry which rose against the military-industrial complex and most specifically against the aerospace/defense industry in the 1960s was in some respects a distinctive phenomenon of the period. It grew out of the public concern for dramatic increase in the size of the peacetime defense budget in the late 1950s, was catalyzed by Eisenhower’s warning against “the acquisition of unwarranted influence... by the military industrial complex” in his 1961 farewell address, and came to full bloom as a part of public reaction to American involvement in the Vietnam War and the movement to make American business more “socially responsible.” To a lesser extent, it derived from frustration growing out of the realization we had created a weapons arsenal that could potentially annihilate civilization; the awareness, and then seeming insolvency, of problems in the American social fabric; and the end of the American Dream — affluence had not brought the expected happiness to many Americans, and they sought a convenient scapegoat. This environment proved receptive to the same liberal and radical critiques of the American industrial and defense establishment which had existed in this country for the previous half century, but which with the exception of a brief period in the 1930s, had been largely ignored by the bulk of the American public.

The separate distrust of the military establishment and of American business is a long-standing and well-documented fact in American social and intellectual history. What is in many respects unique in military-industrial criticism is the simultaneous attack on the military and industry as a unified body, an attack which integrates the criticism previously directed at the two as separate institutions. This essay will endeavor to show that this unified attack on the military and industry also has some strong antecedents.
in modern American and European history. Particularly, it will show that those aspects of military-industrial complex criticism which focus on the aerospace/defense industry are part of a number of historical movements which have concerned themselves specifically with military-industrial integration in the arms business. Because of its deep roots in American culture and Western culture generally, this historical criticism of the arms business was in many respects as important in bringing the military-industrial complex to popular consciousness as the unique conditions which prevailed in America in the 1960s.

**HISTORICAL CRITICISM OF THE ARMS BUSINESS**

One need not go back very far in American history to find a precedent for military-industrial criticism. In the 1930s there was a visceral attack both in Europe and America on armaments manufacturers. In this country, the merchants-of-death scandal, culminating in a congressional investigation headed by Senator Nye of North Dakota, had a dramatic impact on American attitudes towards the arms industry. Even more recently, at the end of World War II, it was a popularly held view that there had been a Japanese military-industrial complex—a "Gumbatsu-Zaibatsu complex," as one contemporary Russian writer has called it—behind Japanese military expansion, and an equally sinister German military-industrial complex behind the Nazi movement. Like the contemporary attack on the military-industrial complex, these movements perpetuated a historical distrust of military-industrial relationships which had long existed in American society.

**Economic Motives in Warfare**

To fully understand the origins of the military-industrial-complex criticism, one must begin with the long-standing distrust of businessmen and their unbridled pursuit of profits, dating at least to classical times, and the equally long-standing concern over economic motives in warfare. Throughout history, politicians, merchants, and generals have found successful warfare to be their liking, whether fought for colonies, for markets, or for plunder, a fact which has rarely gone unnoticed by their contemporaries. However, Richard Lewinsohn, in his book, *The Profits of War Through the Ages*, has emphasized that, while bankers, shipbuilders, and other classes of businessmen have long been associated with war making, the arms merchant, and especially the arms manufacturer, is actually a relative latecomer to the profits of war, and, as we shall presently discuss, to the roster of professions attacked by promoters of peace.

**HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL CRITICISM**

In history, the first to make profit from war were those who carried arms. Next were those who financed armaments, and only much later those who made them. This sequence does not seem altogether natural. The arms dealer is one of the most ancient of trades and one might suppose that weight and power were from an early date derived from it. But this was far from being the case. From occasional allusions in literature, we know that in the ancient world some armurers were well-to-do. We are told, for instance, that Sophocles was the son of Sophilus, a rich Athenian armurer. But neither in Greece nor Rome were great fortunes made in armaments. And in the Middle Ages the armurers were respectable artisans without any great ambitions. In some towns highly skilled specialists arose, Seville, Toledo, Milan, Nuremberg and Liège achieving a reputation for exceptional workmanship. But even here, the master forgers attained a comfortable haute-couture status, but no more.

The distrust of businessmen and the broad concern with economic motives in warfare are established historical facts and might in themselves be enough to have laid the foundations for military-industrial criticism. But there are three other historical movements which also are important. They are: (1) the movement to establish a permanent peace through disarmament; (2) the legal debate over the rights and obligations of neutrals regarding the sale of arms to belligerents in wartime; and (3) the public concern with the price, quality, and delivery of military supplies sold to the government. The first two of these concerns date to the seventeenth century, the third to the American Revolution. In the following pages we will give a brief review of these movements up to the beginning of the twentieth century when, in the shadow of the ominous cloud of World War I, they coalesced and came to focus on the armaments industries of Europe and America.

**Disarmament**

As J. F. C. Fuller so amply demonstrated in *Armament and History*, munitions have played a pivotal role in warfare from its very origins when the man armed with the better physiological weaponry—hands, feet, and teeth—could claw, kick, and bite his way to victory. This awareness of the value of weapons in warfare has created through history a slow but inexorable arms race in which nations have devoted considerable time and resources to the development and production of new and better armaments. Although the resultant flow of weapons has usually been matched by efforts to avoid or at least limit warfare, it was not until the seventeenth century that these efforts focused on the armaments themselves and a genuine disarmament movement began.

From its earliest beginnings, the movement for disarmament has been
three-pronged in its attack. First and foremost, disarmament has had an economic dimension, focusing on the costs of standing armies, their equipment, and warfare itself. Second, disarmament has had a political dimension; armaments are seen as a threat to liberty, whether as standing armies or as "military-industrial complexes." Finally, disarmament has focused on preventing war; critics observed that nations with a large store of armaments are inclined to use them, but more importantly, these armaments engender enmity with neighboring nations, leading to arms races and the increased likelihood of a preventive first strike being undertaken by one nation among another.

**Early European Efforts at Disarmament**

The first major disarmament writers were Europeans. The duc de Sully in *The Great Design of Henry IV* (1625), and Abbe C. I. Coste de Saint-Pierre in *Memoires pour rendre La Paix Perpetuelle en Europe* (1632) stressed what was to become for the next two hundred years the principle argument in favor of disarmament—the economic costs of war and the preparation for war. Unfortunately, the ceilings on armies and armaments which both suggested were widely noted, but never implemented. A century later, Emmerich de Vattel in *The Law of Nations* (1758) again raised the economic argument against armies and armaments, and also noted the threat to liberty they represented. In 1795, Immanuel Kant in his famous essay on *Perpetual Peace* warned of the danger of war created by the availability of armaments. But again, these admonitions fell on deaf ears among European heads of state.

**The Disarmament Movement in America**

Resistance to armaments had an early beginning on the American continent, and not surprisingly, it is to the Quakers that Americans owe their disarmament heritage. As early as the seventeenth century, American Quakers were preaching nonviolence and, in the eighteenth century, voting against military expenditures for the French and Indian War. While governor of Pennsylvania, William Penn not only preached Quaker pacifism but also put his theories of disarmament into practice by placing totally disarmed colonies in western Pennsylvania among hostile Indian tribes. But those in opposition to armaments and force in early America were clearly a minority. As Merle Curti has noted:

> The American colonies were planted and grew to full stature in an age when few questioned the glory of physical prowess, the effectiveness of force, and the inevitability of war. With some notable exceptions, the

**HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL CRITICISM**

English-speaking colonists who settled on the Atlantic seaboard brought with them the dominant attitude toward war and force. Occasionally, as in the wars against France, colonists hesitated to vote military supplies and to engage in the hostilities vigorously, but their hesitation was based on self-interest. They did not question the wisdom or the justice of the conflict. Although many Americans hated the idea of war in theory, all but a minority nourished the belief that in the last analysis, when peaceful efforts to redress wrongs had clearly failed, a resort to the sword was justifiable in the eyes of man and God.

There is no clearer view of the stance of most eighteenth-century Americans toward disarmament than their position on the Revolution. "The natural right of man to resist tyrannical authority" dominated any pacifist sentiment: "The Revolution was a military struggle for independence and the open appeal to the sword was questioned on pacific grounds by few indeed.... The plain fact [is] that our national independence was won on the field of battle, not in the council chamber."

Benjamin Franklin's views on armaments were probably typical of those of most of the leaders of the Revolution. Although an ardent supporter of the revolt, Franklin lamented the cost of armament and war, noting the lost labor, the lost habits of industry, and the diminished quality of the citizenry because soldiers rarely marry. It remained, however, for Washington, in his farewell address, to make the most enduring statement against armaments from eighteenth-century American leaders. Washington's admonition against standing armies was based on political, not economic grounds: "Overgrown military establishments are, under any form of government, inauspicious to liberty, and are to be regarded as particularly hostile to republican liberty."

The nascent United States did, in fact, try to practice a measure of disarmament in 1794 when Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton encouraged Washington to seek a mutual limitation of armaments on the Great Lakes. The proposal was eventually accepted by Great Britain, but not until the Rush-Bagot Convention of 1817, the first successful disarmament agreement in modern history.

Following the Rush-Bagot Convention, the American government, the American people, and the American peace movement turned its attention away from disarmament. It was not to be an American issue again until the twentieth century, and not until then would it be widely recognized that the arms merchant stood across the path to disarmament.

**The Traffic in Arms**

It was arms trade, not arms manufacturing, which first raised public awareness of the arms business. In the early seventeenth century in Europe and in the late eighteenth century in America, the concern which brought
it into focus was the dispute over the rights of neutrals to sell military goods to belligerents in wartime. Hugo Grotius, the Dutch publicist, statesman, and jurist, in his great work, *The Rights of War and Peace* (1625), made the first contribution in this long-standing debate. Grotius first divided all goods into three groups: "Objects which are of use in war alone, as arms; others which are useless in war, and which serve only for purposes of luxury; and others which can be employed both in war and peace, as money, provisions, ships, and articles of naval equipment." He then expressed the view that neutrals were free to sell any articles of the first class to belligerents, but they were entitled to no recourse should such goods be captured by the enemy of the purchaser. Grotius thus made the control of traffic in arms a belligerent right and not a neutral duty, a position which was to prevail for the next three centuries.\(^5\)

Over a century later, in *The Law of Nations*, Vattel reaffirmed this view with some refinement, arguing that neutrals could furnish arms and other war supplies to one belligerent as long as they were willing to furnish like supplies to the other. Whereas at one time states could maintain "neutrality" while shipping arms to one belligerent as long as the two had entered a treaty prior to the outbreak of hostilities, beginning in Vattel's time, neutrality required the adherence to the principles of "impartiality"—the neutral state was obliged to treat both belligerents alike—and "abstention"—neutral states were obliged not to give active aid to either belligerent. The distinction being drawn between the rights and obligations of neutral states and individuals in those states during this period deserves special mention. Vattel again emphasized that neutral governments bore no responsibility for the safety of "contraband goods" (as such arms came to be called) sold and/or carried by their own merchants.

**The American Experience**

The first formal American statement on the arms trade came in the United States Neutrality Act of 1793. Within a month of this neutrality proclamation, the British Ambassador called to the attention of then Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson the sale of arms by American merchants to France, with whom England was then at war. This brought forth Jefferson's oft-quoted interpretation of American neutrality (and defense of the American defense industry):

> Our citizens have been always free to make, vend, and export arms. It is the constant occupation and livelihood of some of them. To suppress their calling, the only means perhaps of their subsistence, because a war exists in foreign and distant countries, in which we have no concern, would scarcely be expected. It would be hard in principle and impossible in practice.

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The law of nations, therefore, respecting the rights of those at peace, does not require from them such an internal disarmament in their occupations. It is satisfied with the external penalty pronounced in the President's proclamation, that of confiscation of such portion of these arms as shall fall into the hands of any of the belligerent powers on their way to the ports of their enemies. To this penalty our citizens are warned that they will be abandoned, and that even private contraband may work no inequality between the parties at war, the benefit of them will be left equally free and open to all.\(^6\)

Atwater argues that such a policy was rooted more in economic than philosophical ground:

The United States, in 1793 and 1794, not only accepted the principles of impartiality and non-participation as applied by the European neutrals in the preceding years, but also enlarged upon them, clarified them and gave considerable impetus to their general recognition as obligations under the international law of neutrality. The American Government did not go as far, however, as had the European neutrals in prohibiting its nationals from supplying or carrying arms or contraband to the belligerents. This, it was felt, would impose too heavy a financial and economic sacrifice upon American industry. Therefore the United States made a careful distinction between government assistance or participation, which it promised not to engage in, and the acts of private citizens in aiding one or the other belligerent through the supplying or carrying of contraband, which it announced could take place freely subject to the risk of penalties at the hands of the belligerents. Thus, instead of following the complete standards of the Armed Neutrality, the United States, while accepting and enlarging upon the principles of governmental impartiality and non-participation, chose to retain for its private citizens the right to engage at their own risk in the profitable arms and contraband trade.\(^6\)

For the next hundred years, the continuing challenge by foreign governments to the American policy of freedom of trade in arms was resisted. The policy was actually set aside on four occasions, but only to conserve arms for national use. This occurred twice in the late nineteenth century when war first with Great Britain and then with France appeared possible, in the Civil War, and again in the Spanish-American War. The American arms industry has operated in the international arms market with the full support of the American government throughout our history, just as it does today.

**Government Contracting**

Public concern with the price, quality, and delivery of military supplies sold to the government dates at least to the American Revolution. There were numerous efforts to control profiteering during the war, including legislation in Maryland and Virginia prohibiting merchants from representing the states in Congress, wage and price controls in New England, and a series
of investigations into profiteering by government officials (including Robert Morris, chairman of the congressional finance committee) at the war's end, but they were largely unsuccessful. The period between the Revolution and the Civil War saw little public attention given to government contracting. However, the Civil War again brought forth unscrupulous contractors in all areas of government procurement, including weapons, prompting a congressional investigation whose final report was highly critical of the weapons industry:

The government has been the victim of more than one conspiracy, and remarkable combinations have been formed to rob the treasury. The profits from the sale of arms to the government have been enormous, and realized, too, in many instances, even by our own citizens through a system of brokerage as unprincipled and dishonest, as unfriendly to the success and welfare of the nation, as the plottings of actual treason. 9

The government had in part brought these abuses on itself by authorizing the several states and the generals commanding the several divisions of the army to procure their own arms at the expense of the federal government, thereby creating severe competition and a sellers' market for those limited numbers of arms available for sale. The result was arms of poor quality, some even unusable, being bought at prices up to ten times their parwar levels.

For thirty years after the Civil War, there was relative quiet for the arms merchants, again because there were only limited sales of weapons to the government during that time. Burdened with considerable excess capacity from the war period, the arms industry urged the Congress in 1878 to expand their weapons procurement from private sources, arguing they were far more innovative and efficient than government arsenals. However, arguments of the industry were successfully rebutted by the Army Chief of Ordnance, and the industry remained in a depressed state. 10

In the early 1890s European nations and the United States began a race to build heavy naval armor which saw such exorbitant prices being paid by the US Navy for the heavy armor plate that it caused a congressional investigation. The Senate Committee on Naval Affairs was charged:

...to inquire whether the prices paid or agreed to be paid for armor for vessels of the Navy have been fair and reasonable; also, whether any prices paid have been increased on account of patent processes used for the introduction of nickel, or for cementation by the Harvey process; and if so, whether the increases in price are fair and reasonable; whether the issuance of any of the patents was expedited at the request of the Navy Department; whether such patents were properly issued and were for inventions not previously known or used, and who were and are the owners of such patents; whether any officers of the Government were interested therein, or at the

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time when any contracts were made were, or have since been interested in the patents or employed by the owners thereof, and whether any legislation is necessary to further promote the manufacture and cheapen the price of armor for vessels of the Navy. 11

The committee found considerable evidence to substantiate claims against price-fixing by Bethlehem and Carnegie Steel companies, participation of naval officers in royalties on patents used by naval contractors, and the practice of naval officers taking temporary leaves from their duties to work for these same contractors. The government responded with legislation to fix prices and prohibit the employment of retired or furloughed military officers by government contractors, but because of contractor resistance it was never effectively enforced.

THE ARMAMENTS MAKER IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

The early twentieth century brought together these three concurrent streams of thought: the peace and disarmament movement, the desire to control the arms traffic, and the scrutiny of government contracting practices. The interrelationship between these concerns was dramatized first in Europe and then in this country by what had come to be, in the forefather-owning of World War I, an international peace movement.

The international peace movement enjoyed spectacular growth in the period between the Spanish-American War and 1914. The movement was instrumental in giving broad publicity to the Second Hague Conference of 1907, which again considered the international traffic in arms, although its only action was to reaffirm the rights of neutrals to export arms to belligerents. The movement also focused its attention for virtually the first time on the manufacturers of armaments, especially the large European firms—Schneider-Creusot in France, Krupp in Germany, Vickers and Armstrong in England, and Skoda in Czechoslovakia.

One of the best-known and enduring attacks on armaments manufacturers came in 1905 in George Bernard Shaw's satirical play, Major Barbara. Shaw put these words in the mouth of Undershaft, the armaments maker:

The government of your country? I am the government of your country: I, and Lazarus. Do you suppose that you and half a dozen amateurs like you, sitting in a row in that foolish gable shop, can govern Undershaft and Lazarus? No, my friend: you will do what pays us. You will make war when it suits us, and keep peace when it doesn't. You will find out that trade requires certain measures when we have decided on those measures.

When I want anything to keep my dividends up, you will discover that my want is a national need. When other people want something to keep my...
dividends down, you will call out the police and the military. And in return you shall have the support and applause of your newspaper, and the delight of imagining that you are a great statesman. Government of your country! Be off with you, my boy, and play with your casuaries and leading articles and historic parties and great leaders and burning questions and the rest of your toys. I am going back to my counting-house to pay the piper and call the tune."  

In the United States, the peace movement found itself in conflict with the newly formed (1902) Navy League whose dedication to expansion of the Navy appeared to peace advocates to be less an outgrowth of patriotism than of the vested interests of some of its officers and supporters in the manufacture of war materials. This conflict reached its peak in 1914 when Representative Clyde H. Tavenner denounced the League on the House floor, accused its membership of profiteering, fraud, and false patriotism, and called for the nationalization of the arms industry.  

The attention given to armaments in the early 1900s was an outgrowth not only of the activities of the peace movement, but also of a series of armament scandals which rocked the major European powers. In England, there had been a number of minor scares and "scrap"s (drives to scrap existing armaments and build new and better ones) which received some publicity, but none so much as the "Naval Scare of 1909," in which it was revealed that H. H. Mulliner, managing director of the Coventry Ordnance Company, had for three years been anonymously circulating a false rumor that the Krupp Steel Works was greatly expanding its capacity to enable it to outfit an enormously increasing German navy. The famous "Putiloff Affair" drew equally wide publicity in France. The Putiloff factory was a Russian munitions factory in St. Petersburg, jointly financed by Schneider-Creusot of France and Skoda of Czechoslovakia, then a Krupp subsidiary, and using Schneider patents. The firm was competing for Russian armament contracts against an alliance of British armaments firms and a French bank, Société Générale. When a rumor began circulating in France that Schneider intended to sell its interest in the Putiloff factory to Krupp, Frenchmen became enraged at the possibility of French armament secrets being funneled to Germany through Krupp's access to Schneider patents. The attack on the armaments industry during this prewar period had all the elements of the merchants-of-death scandal twenty years later, including charges of industry participation in war scares, international armaments cartels, and manipulation of the news media, as well as charges of conflict of interest on the part of government officials who awarded armament contracts. Some good examples of this genre include the National Labor Press' "The War Trust Exposed," the Union of Democratic Control's "The International Industry of War," the National Peace Council's "The War Traders," the World Peace Foundation's "Syndicates for War," and "Dreadnoughts and Dividends."  

The argument that the exportation of munitions to the Allies should be stopped may be reduced to the following propositions:  
1. It makes our country a workshop of death.  
2. It is for profits, not patriotism.  
3. It compromises us in the eyes of humanity.  
4. It makes us an ally of the Allies.  
5. It fosters an industry whose interest will be to extend militarism in the United States.  
6. It theoretically enables a small state to buy arms when attacked, but practically this right is of little value, as the small state is likely to be completely invaded by its greater and more warlike antagonist.  

The official justification by the Secretary of State of the exportation of arms can be epitomized as follows:  
1. It is the accepted rule of international law, which no nation should break.  
2. It is and has been the universal practice of nations—Germany and Austria included.  
3. It is unneutral in that it would deprive England of her superiority on sea and nor Germany of her superiority on land.  
4. It enables the United States to keep a small military establishment in time of peace.  
5. It enables all nations to go without storing up vast reservoirs of military supplies.  
6. It thus tends to the peaceful method of settling international disputes.  

Almost unnoticed in this period was an article by Shailer Matthews in the Journal of Political Economy which went far deeper than any other writings in exploring the possibility that expanded American arms manufacturing capability could lead to a militarized economy and society. In warning of the dangers inherent in the private manufacture of armaments, Matthews noted that "...the propaganda for preparedness becomes a means of perpetuating the...private business in war materials..." and warned of "...the tendency of business like that of Krupp and Armstrong to fasten war upon civilization in the interests of industrialism."  

American entry into the war in 1917 aborted arms criticism in this country, just as it had in Europe three years before. There were some, like
Senator George W. Norris of Nebraska, who believed that munitions makers and Wall Street financiers were pushing us into the war to guarantee their profits, but they were a minority. Most Americans were supportive of the munitions makers' contribution to the war effort, even when it became apparent near the end of the war that many were profiting immensely from it.

Following the war, the League of Nations made numerous attempts to secure international agreement on limiting the manufacture and trade in armaments. The Covenant of the League of Nations even included provisions which stated:

The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections [emphasis added]... The League is entrusted with general supervision of the trade in arms and ammunition with the countries in which control of this traffic is necessary to the common interest.17

Within two months of the Treaty of Versailles, the Convention for the Control of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition was signed by twenty-eight powers at St. Germain-en-Laye, prohibiting the export to certain territories of arms and munitions used in war—except for the use of the signatory governments. But the Convention was never ratified by the major arms producers, including the United States, and never went into effect. There followed a series of meetings in Geneva throughout the early 1920s to achieve international support for the principle of arms-trade control, spurred on by wars in China, Mexico, and Morocco fought with arms manufactured in Europe, Japan, and the United States. These efforts also met with failure in the large arms-exporting nations. The United States eventually sent to Geneva a delegation which signed the Arms Traffic Convention of 1925, but the Convention languished in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations until 1934.

Criticism of the arms business among the general public was present but not widespread in the United States in the 1920s. Revelation of the extensive profits made by many American firms brought some criticism immediately after the war but were then largely forgotten. A number of writers picked up the theme of the League of Nation's Temporary Mixed Commission on Armaments whose 1921 report argued that armament firms had:

1. Been active in fomenting war scares and in persuading their own countries to adopt warlike policies and to increase their armaments;
2. Attempted to bribe government officials both at home and abroad;
3. Disseminated false reports concerning the military and naval expenditures of various countries in order to stimulate armament expenditures;
4. Sought to influence public opinion through the control of newspapers in their own and foreign countries.

The rapid turnaround in American sentiment which saw virtually the entire country join the hysterical attack on armaments manufacturers, culminating in the Nye Committee Investigation in 1934, began in the late 1920s. As Americans again began to look abroad, they saw that in the decade since the end of the World War the League had been largely unsuccessful in its efforts to institute international organization and outlaw war and armaments traffic. In Congress, the Burton Resolution in 1928 and the Capper and Porter resolutions in 1929 were introduced to "prohibit the exportation of arms, munitions, or implements of war to any nation which is engaged in war with another."20 Although each failed to secure congressional approval, their debate renewed public interest in arms control. Then, in August of 1929, it was revealed that three large American shipbuilding firms had employed one William Shearer to sabotage the Geneva Naval Conference of 1927. A halfhearted Senate investigation resulted after considerable press coverage and, although it did nothing, the public's interest in the arms business was further aroused. The signing of the Kellogg Briand Pact that same month, renouncing war as an instrument of national policy, was the first official indication of the end to American isolationist thinking.

In the early 1930s war clouds again appeared on the horizon. Japan invaded Manchuria, Italy conquered Ethiopia, and the Chaco War broke out in South America. More importantly, Hitler came to power and, in defiance of the Versailles Treaty, Germany began to rearm. The fear of war again took hold of the minds of many Americans and they began to search for ways to avoid another world conflict. In 1931 Congress established the War Policies Commission to study proposals for removing profit from war and the commission's star witness, Bernard Baruch, published his own treatise, Taking the Profits Out of War. In 1932, the United States sent to the General Disarmament Conference at Geneva a delegation which
for the first time had broad public support for American participation in international control of private (and state) arms manufacture. At home, the popular press again turned its attention to the role of the armaments industry in warfare. In the fall of 1931, The Living Age and The World Tomorrow carried articles attacking the European armaments firms for their false patriotism and indiscriminate trafficking in arms. In 1932, taking their lead from the British and French press, The Literary Digest, The Nation, and The New Republic joined the fray, accusing the international armaments industry of subverting the latest Geneva Disarmament Conference. A series of three articles in The New Republic by historian Charles A. Beard attacking the Navy League was perhaps the most important work in this early period, not only because of Beard's notoriety, but because the articles focused exclusively on the abuses of American, not European, armaments firms. These journals continued their attack on the munitions industry through 1933, and then, in the spring of 1934, two books, Engelbrecht and Hanigher's Merchants of Death and Seldes' Iron, Blood and Profit, and an article in the much-respected business magazine Fortune (reprinted with wide distribution in The Reader's Digest) brought the American munitions makers into the view of most American citizens. These works so aroused the American public and Congress to the supposed evils of private arms manufacture that when Senator Nye's proposal for an investigation of the munitions industry was finally brought to a vote on April 12, 1934, two months after it had first been introduced, there was not a single dissenting voice.

The day-to-day proceedings of Senator Nye's Munitions Committee hearings were given generous coverage in newspapers and magazines for the next two years. Yet when the committee had finished its hearings and prepared its report, the members were almost unanimous in their view that the evidence did not support the merchants-of-death charge. When the committee finally closed its doors in 1936, the possibility of a new war in Europe was becoming clearer, and by 1939 the merchants-of-death had once again become the "Arsenal of Democracy."

Critics of the Nye Committee have been legion, including President Truman, who called it "...pure demagoguery in the guise of a Congressional Investigating Committee." The committee was accused of having mistreated witnesses, excessively pursued newspaper publicity, and in their attack having given aid and comfort to enemies of the American system. The aspect of the committee most criticized was its alleged contribution to the passage of the neutrality laws of 1935-37. The laws were felt by many to have delayed the buildup of American military strength for World War II by as much as two years, a charge hotly denied by former committee members.

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Although the armaments industry shared the criticism of excessive business influence on the Office of Production Management during World War II, which arose out of the Truman Committee hearings, the industry was largely free of criticism from 1936 until the military-industrial complex debate in the 1960s. It is ironic that it was in this period that critics asserted the armaments firms made their most significant inroads into American economic and political life.

SUMMARY

The combined attack on the military and industry derives, as we have endeavored to show, from historical movements to control armaments, the arms trade, and arms profiteering. Although varying in origin and content, by the start of the twentieth century they were all focused on the arms industry and its relation to the military establishment. The concept of a unified "military-industrial complex" dates to the start of the century as well, particularly in the attack on the joint military-industrial promotion of war scares in Europe and the conflict of interest and profiteering charges against military officers and their sometime industrial employers in this country. These early attacks did not change the military-industrial domination of society as did the attacks of the 1960s. However, it is clear they had laid a solid ideological groundwork on which such a change eventually would be constructed.

NOTES

3. Ibid., pp. 22, 23.
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17. See Article 8, section 5, and Article 23.

